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Abstract 
The  industrial  organisations  introduced  into  the  law  of  the  USSR  from  1987,  and  thereafter 
into  the  law  of  the  former  republics,  developed  upon  a  foundation  that  was  rooted  in  Soviet 
law  and  was  constructed  during  the  period  from  1985  to  mid-1990. 
While  this  study  focuses  on  the  industrial  economy,  certain  aspects  of  the  agrarian  economy, 
and  in  particular  the  early  history  and  structure  of  the  collective  farm,  are  considered  where 
appropriate. 
The  thesis  presents  an  entirely  new  understanding  both  of  the  nature  of  these  developments 
and  of  the  significance  of  the  law  on  ownership.  The  foundations  of  the  law  on  industrial 
organisations  are  conceptualised  within  specific  heuristic  models  which  are  elaborated  in  an 
attempt  to  consolidate  and  highlight  the  key  steps  in  this  history.  It  is  argued  that  Soviet  law 
did  not  contain  a  concept  of  the  "generic  owner"  or  a  developed  understanding  of  the 
ownership  of  a  juridical  person,  in  particular  by  multiple  owners  holding  "ownership 
interests"  of  that  juridical  person;  and  that  their  absence  critically  impaired  a  rational  and 
coherent  structure  for  the  foundations  of  the  law  on  industrial  organisations  both  within  the 
Stalin  economic  settlement  and  the  new  economic  constitution  of  1990. 
-2- CONTENTS 
CHApTERISECTIONAND  PAGE  NUMBERS  IN  BRACKETS 
1. 
2. 
Introduction  and  Short  Thesis  (8) 
1985:  Origins,  State  Ownership  and  CoRective  Farms  (17) 
2.1  Origins  -  The  Structure  of  Soviet  Civil  Law  (18) 
2.2  The  Stalin  Economic  Settlement,  Principles  of  the  Soviet  Economy  and  Feudal 
Law  (26) 
2.3  The  Soviet  Law  on  Ownership  (35) 
2.3.1  State  Ownership  and  Ownership  of  State  Enterprises  (38) 
2.3.2  Other  Forms  of  Ownership  -  Exceptions  and  Origins  (39) 
2.4  Collective  Farms,  Ownership  of  Collective  Farms  and  Personal  Ownership 
(41) 
2.4.1  The  Collective  Farm  and  Collective  Farm  Ownership  -A 
Combination  of  Social  and  Personal  Interests  (42) 
2.4.2  Ownership  of  Collective  Farms  (50) 
2.4.3  Personal  Ownership  (53) 
3. 
2.5  Ownership  Interests  and  the  Classification  of  Soviet  Juridical  Persons  (53) 
2.6  Common  Ownership  and  Joint  Activity  (57) 
Model  1-  The  Confirmation  Enterprise:  Soviet  State  Enterprises  and  Associations 
(60) 
3.1  The  Role  of  the  Soviet  State  and  the  Confirmation  Model  -  General  Principles 
(70) 
3.2  Formation,  Reorganisation  and  Liquidation  by  Confirmation  (79) 
3.3  Juridical  Personality  -  The  Veil  of  Legal  Autonomy  (82) 
3.4  Governance  -  Economic  Dependence  (87) 
3.4.1  The  Charter  and  Special  Legal  Capacity  (88) 
3.4.2  Operative  Management  -  Property  without  Ownership  (92) 
3.4.3  Unitary  Ownership,  One-Man  Management  and  Coercive  Law  (95) 
3.5  Conclusion  (99) 
-3- 4 
5 
The  Bridge  -  Contract-Based  Associations  without  Juridical  Personality  (100) 
4.1  Background  -  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code,  Chapter  X:  The  Simple  Partnership 
(100) 
4.2  Background  -  1961  FPCivL  and  the  Civil  Codes:  The  Contract  for  Joint 
Activity  (104) 
4.3  The  Legacy  -A  Contract-based  Association  without  Juridical  Personality  (106) 
4.4  Formation  and  Participants  (108) 
4.5  Charter  and  Termination  (110) 
4.6  Juridical  Personality  -  Ownership  Interests,  Vires  and  Responsibility  (I  11) 
4.7  Management  (115) 
4.8  Conclusion  (116) 
Model  2-  The  Contract-Based  Concession  Enterprise:  1987  Joint  Enterprises  (118) 
5.1  The  Model  of  the  Contract-Based  Concession  Enterprise  -  General  Principles 
(124) 
5.2  Protection  of  the  Interests  of  the  State  (131) 
5.2.1  Control  over  Purposes  -  The  Authorisation  Procedure  (13  1) 
5.2.2  Control  over  Activities  -  Constitutive  Documents,  Ultra  Vires  and 
Other  Techniques  (134) 
5.2.3  Mandatory  Requirements  and  Economic  Sovereignty  (136) 
5.2.4  Indirect  Control  -  The  Exclusive  Rights  of  the  Soviet  Participant  (139) 
5.3  Inducement  -  The  Nature  of  the  Concession  (140) 
5.3.1  Juridical  Personality  (140) 
5.3.2  Full  Khozraschet,  Non-Subsidy  and  Self-financing  -  Responsibility  and 
Insolvency  (142) 
5.3.3  Charter  Privileges  (145) 
5.3.4  Dispute  Resolution  (147) 
5.4  Governance  -  The  Regulation  and  Protection  of  the  Interests  of  the  Participants 
(147) 
5.4.1  Negotiating  the  Constitutive  Contracts  (148) 
5.4.2  Ownership  Interests  and  the  Joint  Enterprise  (149) 
5.4.2.1  Ownership  of  the  Joint  Enterprise  (149) 
5.4.2.2  Ownership  by  the  Joint  Enterprise  (15  1) 
5.4.3  The  Operation  of  the  Board  and  the  Directorate  -  Governance  Regime 
and  Management  (154) 
-4- 5.5  Joint  Enterprise  -  Enterprise  or  Corporation?  (156) 
6  Model  3-  The  Participation  Enterprises  (1987-1990):  1987  State  Enterprises,  1988 
Cooperative  Enterprises  and  1989  Leased  Enterprises  (159) 
6.1  Foundations  and  Basic  Principles  of  the  Participation  Enterprises  (163) 
6.1.1  General  Theoretical  Foundations  -  Constitutional  and  Collective  Farm 
Law  (163) 
6.1.2  1987  State  Enterprises  (166) 
6.1.3  1988  Cooperative  Enterprises  (171) 
6.1.4  1989  Leased  Enterprises  (181) 
6.2  The  Three  Expressions  of  the  Participation  Model  (186) 
6.3  1987  State  Enterprises  -  Separating  the  Private  from  the  Public  (187) 
6.3.1  The  State  Enterprise  and  the  Labour  Collective  (187) 
6.3.2  Incentivisation  -  the  First  Pillar  (Full  Khozraschet,  Self-financing  and 
Wages  linked  to  Performance)  (191) 
6.3.3  Democracy  -  the  Second  Pillar  (The  Combination  of  Centralised 
Management  and  Socialist  Self-Management)  (198) 
6.3.4  Coercive  Law  and  Governance  in  a  Regime  of  Separate  Interests  (202) 
6.3.4.1  Coercive  Law  (203) 
6.3.4.2  Creation  and  Termination  (205) 
6.3.4.3  State  Ownership  of  the  Enterprise,  Juridical  Personality  and 
Responsibility  (206) 
6.3.4.4  Economic  Sovereign  (209) 
6.3.5  The  State  as  Defendant  and  the  Significance  of  the  First  Expression  of 
the  Participation  Model  (210) 
6.4  1988  Cooperative  Enterprises  -  Towards  a  Non-State  Owned  Industrial 
Organisation  (212) 
6.4.1  Membership,  the  Nature  of  the  Ownership  Interest  of  a  Cooperative, 
Juridical  Personality  and  Responsibility  (215) 
6.4.2  Participation  and  Incentivisation  -  the  First  Pillar  (225) 
6.4.3  Participation  and  Democracy  -  the  Second  Pillar  (227) 
6.4.4  Protection  of  the  Interests  of  the  State  (229) 
6.4.4.1  Loss  of  Role  as  Creator-owner  (230) 
6.4.4.2  Loss  of  Role  as  Property-owner  (Cooperative  Ownership)  (233) 
6.4.4.3  Loss  of  Role  as  Economic  Sovereign  (The  Cooperatives  Sector, 
Coercive  Law,  and  State  Aid)  (235) 
-5- 6.4.5  The  Significance  of  the  Second  Expression  of  the  Participation  Model 
(241) 
6.5  1989  Leased  Enterprises  -  From  Administrative  Subordination  to  Contractual 
Parity  (243) 
6.5.1  Group  Structures  in  the  Soviet  Command  Economy  -a  Summary  (245) 
6.5.2  Group  Structures  based  on  Contract  -  the  Leased  Enterprise  (249) 
6.5.2.1  Parties  to  the  Lease  Contract  -  the  State  as  Lessor  and  a  new 
Juridical  Person  as  Lessee  (250) 
6.5.2.2  The  Object  of  the  Lease  Contract  and  the  Creation  of  the 
Leased  Enterprise  (252) 
6.5.3  The  Ownership  Regime  of  the  Leased  Enterprise  (255) 
6.5.3.1  Ownership  of  the  Leased  Enterprise  (255) 
6.5.3.2  Ownership  by  the  Leased  Enterprise  (257) 
7 
7.4.2  The  Underlying  Doctrinal  Socialist  Structure  of  the  1990  Ownership 
Law  (28  1) 
7.4.2.1  The  Forms  of  Ownership  Regime  -  Rationale  (283) 
7.4.2.2  The  Forms  of  Ownership  Regime  and  Basic  Doctrinal 
Shortcomings  -  1985  to  1990  (284) 
7.4.2.3  Legacy  of  the  Forms  of  Ownership  Regime  in  the  1990 
Ownership  Law  (288) 
7.4.2.4  The  Problem  of  Mixed  Ownership  (292) 
6.5.4  Participation,  Incentivisation  and  Democracy  (258) 
6.5.5  Coercive  Law  and  Responsibility  of  the  Lessee  (261) 
6.5.6  Contract  and  the  Post-Command  Economy  (264) 
Perestroika  or  Novostroika?  -  The  Triumph  of  the  Enterprise  (1990  Ownership  Law 
and  1990  Law  on  Enterprises)  (268) 
7.1  The  Confirmation  Enterprises  and  the  Economic  Constitution  of  the  Stalin  State 
(268) 
7.2  The  Challenge  to  the  Stalin  Economic  Constitution  -  1987-1990  (272) 
7.3  March  1990  Constitutional  Amendments  -  Towards  a  New  Economic 
Constitution  (276) 
7.4  1990  Ownership  Law  -  the  Principles  and  Doctrinal  Structure  of  the  New 
Economy  (278) 
7.4.1  New  Principles  -  Equivalence,  the  Permissive  Regime  and  the  Rule  of 
Law  State  (279) 
7.4.3  Summary  and  Outstanding  Issues  (296) 
-6- 7.5  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  (297) 
7.5.1  The  Concept  of  the  Generic  Enterprise  and  Classification  of  Enterprises 
(298) 
7.5.2  The  Role  of  the  Enterprise  (301) 
7.5.3  Management  and  Governance  (302) 
7.5.4  The  Ownership  Regime  and  Responsibility  (305) 
7.5.4.1  The  Property  of  the  Owners  and  the  Property  of  the  Enterprise 
(305) 
7.5.4.2  Associations  and  Subsidiaries  (309) 
7.5.4.3  Property  Responsibility  (311) 
7.5.5  The  New  Economy  and  the  Role  of  the  State  (312) 
7.5.6  Creation  and  Liquidation  of  Enterprises  (314) 
7.6  Whither  the  General  Corporation  (315) 
8.  Conclusions  (318) 
Appendix  I  Abbreviations  (324) 
Appendix  11  Citations  and  Bibliography  (326) 
-7- 1.  INTRODUCTION  AND  SHORT  THESIS 
1.  Methodology  This  study  conceptualises  the  "industrial  organisation"  within  the  Soviet  law 
on  ownership  and  posits  various  models,  each  a  point  of  reference  to  be  used  when  charting 
and  analysing  the  foundations  of  the  law  on  industrial  organisations  developed  during  the 
perestroika  years.  These  models  are,  by  definition,  abstractions  based  principally  on 
distinctive  structures  and  governance  regimes.  They  are  not  an  attempt  to  reproduce,  or 
simply  paraphrase,  the  detail  of  the  relevant  legislation.  Summaries  and  discussions  of  the 
minutiae  of  that  legislation  have  already  been  adequately  treated  in  textbooks,  commentaries 
and  translations  published  both  within  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  independent  former  republics, 
as  well  as  abroad.  While  reference  is  made  to  various  aspects  of  Soviet  law,  including  civil 
law  and  the  law  of  juridical  persons,  economic  law  and  the  system  of  planning  and  price 
fixing,  collective  farm  law,  foreign  relations  law,  administrative  law  and  labour  law,  this 
study  neither  provides  a  comprehensive  guide  to  that  legislation,  nor  a  handbook  for  what  was 
the  day-to-day  operation  of  the  relevant  organisations. 
By  contrast,  the  analysis  and  models  are  stylised  and  are  aimed  to  be  used  as  heuristic  tools 
for  understanding  and  categorising  the  different  industrial  organisations  and  the  links  to  the 
organisations  (both  agricultural  and  industrial)  that  preceded,  and  were  to  succeed,  them. 
There  are  therefore  principles  that  thread  the  models  together,  evolutionary  and  gradual, 
providing  them  with  their  own  "history";  principles  that  at  the  outset  were  based  on  Soviet 
civil  law,  developing  to  those  based  more  on  market  economy  principles.  During  the  course  of 
this  study,  it  is  hoped  to  derive  a  theory  of  the  "enterprise"  in  the  context  of  Soviet  and  post- 
Soviet  law  and  thereby  distinguish  "Soviet"  forms  of  organisation  from  "corporate  forms". 
Certain  key  features  of  each  of  the  models  are  summarised  in  the  table  at  the  end  of  this 
Section.  Relevant  Sections  of  the  thesis  are  referred  to  as  applicable. 
2.1985:  Origins,  State  Ownership  and  Collective  Farms  This  Chapter  analyses  what  is 
called  "the  Stalin  economic  settlement".  It  summarises  the  principal  aspects  of  collective  farm 
law  and  the  law  on  ownership  (based  on  the  forms  of  ownership  regime)  which  influenced  the 
shape  of  the  perestroika  era  industrial  organisations.  Finally  it  develops  one  of  the  key 
analytical  tools  of  this  study,  the  "ownership  interest"  of  a  juridical  person,  and  explains  why 
a  developed  understanding  of  the  ownership  interest  was  superfluous  in  the  context  of  the 
traditional  Soviet  juridical  person  classified  by  reference  to  the  Stalin  forms  of  ownership. 
-8- 3.  Model  I-  The  Confirmation  Enterprise:  Soviet  State  Enterprises  and  Associations  This 
Chapter  attempts  to  abstract  the  legislative  enactments  on  socialist  industrial  organisations  to 
the  level  of  general  theory  and  conceives  of  their  purpose  and  function  in  terms  of  a  single 
overarching  model.  It  argues  that  the  Soviet  state  traditionally  protected  its  interests  by  acting 
in  four  distinct  capacities:  (i)  as  creator-owner,  (ii)  as  property-owner,  (iii)  as  legal  sovereign, 
and  (iv)  as  economic  sovereign.  The  leitmotif  of  "confirmation"  for  this  model  of  the  Soviet 
industrial  organisation  encompasses  all  four  capacities  of  the  state.  The  state:  as  legal 
sovereign  confirmed  the  civil  law  legislation  setting  out  the  nature  of  these  industrial 
organisations;  as  economic  sovereign  confirmed  the  state  plan  which  set  out  the  necessity  for 
their  creation  and  the  nature  of  their  operations;  as  economic  sovereign  and  creator-owner 
confirmed  the  decision  to  create  them,  by  order  of  the  relevant  state  agency;  as  creator-owner 
drafted  the  contents  of  their  charters;  as  property-owner  confirmed  the  designation  and 
allocation  of  property  to  them;  upon  confirmation  of  the  charter  by  registration,  as  legal 
sovereign  conferred  juridical  personality  upon  the  organisations;  and  finally  as  economic 
sovereign  and  creator-owner  would  confirm,  when  expedient,  the  decision  for  any  of  them  to 
be  terminated. 
4.  The  Bridge  -  Contract-Based  Associations  without  Juridical  Personality  The  contract  for 
joint  activity  is  argued  to  be  the  underlying  thread  that  linked  the  industrial  organisations  of 
the  perestroika  and  post-perestroika  periods  back  to  NEP  era  organisations,  and  back  further 
still,  to  the  artels  of  pre-revolutionary  Russian  law.  This  contract  incubated  the  notion  of  a 
contract-based  association  operating  within  the  industrial  economy  during  the  Soviet  period  to 
1985.  Moreover,  it  provided  for  the  possibility  of  founding  an  association  by  more  than  one 
person. 
5.  Model  2-  The  Contract-Based  Concession  Enterprise:  1987  Joint  Enterprises  The 
significance  of  the  joint  enterprise  in  the  history  of  the  foundations  of  the  law  on  industrial 
organisations  is  generally  overlooked  because  it  was  introduced  as  part  of  the  reform  of 
foreign  relations  law  and  not  explicitly  as  a  "new"  industrial  organisation  operating  within  the 
domestic  economy.  It  was  however  the  first  time  since  the  early  1920s  that  the  Soviet  state 
permitted  the  establishment  of  an  organisation  operating  within  the  industrial  economy  that 
was  not  entirely  owned  by  the  state.  The  state  therefore  lost  its  role  as  creator-owner  and  was 
forced  to  rely  principally  upon  a  concessionary  authorisation  procedure  and  legislative  diktat 
to  ensure  that  its  interests  were  protected.  The  interests  of  the  participants  were  governed  by 
the  constitutive  contract  and  were  expressed  through  a  voting  management  regime. 
-9- The  joint  enterprise  was  very  different  from  the  existing  socialist  industrial  organisations  and 
the  contract  for  joint  activity  as  used  by  those  organisations.  It  was  a  distinct  juridical  person, 
operating  outside  the  planned  economy  as  an  exception  to  the  principle  of  state  ownership  of 
all  of  the  means  of  production,  and  was  created  by  parties,  both  foreign  and  Soviet,  each  with 
possibly  different  agendas.  As  such,  the  form  of  this  organisation  required  for  the  first  time  a 
legal  regime  that  tackled  separately  the  question  of  "ownership  of"  the  juridical  person  (by 
more  than  one  person)  from  the  question  of  the  nature  of  the  right  of  "ownership  by"  that 
juridical  person.  These  questions  were  difficult  to  conceptualise  and  regulate  in  a  coherent 
manner  from  within  the  logic  of  the  Soviet  "forms  of  ownership  regime". 
6.  Model  3-  The  Participation  Enterprises  (1987-1990):  1987  State  Enterprises,  1988 
Cooperative  Enterprises  and  1989  Leased  Enterprises  The  framework  of  the  confirmation 
model  was  explicitly  undermined  in  the  domestic  Soviet  economy  with  the  introduction  of  the 
1987  state  enterprises,  1988  cooperative  enterprises  and  the  1989  leased  enterprises.  It  is 
argued  that  rather  than  being  classified  as  three  separate  forms  of  juridical  person,  all  of  these 
organisations  can  be  understood  as  expressions  of  a  single  model.  The  participation  model 
highlights  their  common  structural  principles. 
The  participation  model  is  based  on  the  identification  of  "participants"  within  the 
organisational  forum.  The  business  of  these  enterprise  was  based  on  the  personal  participation 
of  such  participants.  Three  pillars  of  the  participation  model  are  developed:  incentivisation 
(linking  economic  rewards  to  profitability);  democracy  and  the  right  of  management  (hence 
giving  control  over  profit  to  the  participants);  and  coercive  law  as  the  method  by  which  the 
state  protects  its  interests  (ie  through  legislative  diktat). 
The  application  of  the  participation  model  in  each  of  the  three  expressions  undermined  the 
coherence  of  the  Stalin  forms  of  ownership  regime  almost  to  breaking  point.  By  Spring  1990 
the  contract  based  concession  and  participation  enterprises,  together  with  the  other  perestroika 
reforms,  necessitated  a  revaluation  of  the  fundamentals  of  the  existing  system. 
7.  Perestroika  or  Novostroika?  -  The  Diumph  of  the  Enterprise  (1990  Ownership  Law  and 
1990  Law  on  Enterprises)  It  is  argued  that  1990  saw  the  introduction  of  a  new  economic 
constitution  for  the  post-command  economy  (through  the  adoption  of  the  1990  Ownership 
Law),  and  a  new  constitution  for  the  industrial  organisation  operating  within  that  economy 
(through  the  adoption  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises).  Soviet  law  was  at  a  crossroads:  either 
it  could  have  embraced  novostroika  (a  rebuilding  afresh)  by  creating  the  foundations  of  a  legal 
system  based  on  the  market  economy  and  its  attendant  corporate  structures.  Alternatively,  it 
could  have  adopted  perestroika  (a  restructuring)  by  preserving  the  framework  of  the  Stalin 
-10- settlement  and  merely  adjusting  certain  of  the  "problematic"  aspects  without  implementing  any 
fundamental  reconstruction  at  the  level  of  principle.  This  Chapter  examines  the  choice  that 
was  made  and  concludes  by  describing  and  analying  the  foundations  of  the  law  on  industrial 
organisations  that  was  built  upon  its  legacy. 
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"0 1985:  ORIGINS,  STATE  OWNERSHIP  AND  COLLECTIVE  FARMS 
"In  this  feudal  world,  then,  we  should  think 
always  of  seisin  and  never  of  ownership.  77ze 
tenant  was  seised  of  the  land  and  the  lord 
was  seised  of  the  tenant's  services,  but 
neither  of  them  "owned"  in  any  sense  which 
can  be  intelligibly  divorced  from  that  of 
seisin.  " 
J.  H.  Baker 
The  models  presented  in  this  study  have  been  developed  from  specific  legislation  of  the 
perestroika  years  taking  into  account  the  wider  backdrop  of  Soviet  law  and  history.  The  state 
enterprises  and  associations  of  the  1980s,  explained  in  terms  of  the  confirmation  model,  '  were 
creatures  of  the  Stalin  industrial  economy  and  the  assumptions  and  ideology  upon  which  it  was 
based.  The  introduction  of  the  contract-based  concession  and  participation  enterprises  in  the 
period  to  1990  saw  the  Soviet  regime  look  beyond  the  traditional  and  narrow  legal  principles 
of  that  economy  in  the  search  for  alternative  foundations.  These  were  found  in  the  previously 
2 
distinct  branches  of  foreign  relations  law,  collective  farm  law  and  the  law  of  contract.  By 
1990  the  logic  of  these  "new"  enterprises,  coupled  with  the  radicalisation  of  the  perestroika 
economic  reforms,  necessitated  a  reconsideration  of  the  fundamentals  of  that  legislative 
framework  almost  in  its  entirety.  ' 
This  Chapter  outlines  the  structure  and  development  of  Soviet  civil  law  in  order  to  illuminate 
the  general  background  from  which  these  models  emerged.  It  then  presents  a  specific 
understanding  of  the  "spine"  of  the  Soviet  economy,  '  and  outlines  the  principles  of  that 
economy  and  the  law  on  ownership.  While  the  models  developed  in  this  study  provide  broad 
I  See  infra  Chapter  3. 
2  See  infra  Chapters  5  and  6. 
3  See  infra  Chapter  7. 
4  To  borrow  the  term  famously  used  by  Krzhizhanovsky  in  his  report  of  December  1929  where  he 
described  1929/30  as  the  "spinal  year"  of  the  five  year  plan,  and  indeed  the  concept  of  the  Soviet  spine  in 
this  study  dates  to  that  time. 
-  17- deconstructed  analytical  stepping  stones  for  the  writing  of  a  "history"  of  the  foundations  of  the 
Soviet  law  on  industrial  organisations,  it  shall  be  argued  that  the  development  and 
classification  of  those  organisations  most  abstractly  are  best  understood  in  terms  of  the 
bending,  breaking,  and  reconstitution  of  this  Soviet  spine,  and  in  particular  the  failure  of 
Soviet  law  on  ownership  to  develop  a  comprehensive  and  coherent  understanding  of  the 
"nature  of  the  ownership  interest"  of  a  juridical  person.  '  While  this  thesis  presents  an  analysis 
of  industrial  organisations,  no  understanding  would  be  complete  without  taking  into  account 
the  framework  and  influences  of  those  organisations  also  present  within  the  Soviet  economy, 
but  in  the  agricultural  sphere. 
2.1  Origins  -  The  Structure  of  Soviet  Civil  Law 
The  categorisation  of  Soviet  civil  law  into  various  "periods"  was  the  subject  of  much  debate 
among  Soviet  legal  scholars.  The  question  of  categorisation  was  especially  important  for  a 
regime  that  was  premised  upon  the  assumption  of  societal  development  along  a  linear  path 
from  one  mode  of  production  to  another.  As  such,  this  issue  was  ideologically  charged. 
Traditionally  Soviet  textbooks  on  "The  History  of  State  and  Law  in  the  USSR"  categorised  the 
development  of  Soviet  law  into  nine  periods.  '  With  regard  specifically  to  Soviet  civil  law, 
there  were  a  number  of  attempts  at  periodisation  based  on  political  events,  economic  policy 
and  civil  law  initiatives.  '  The  following  is  by  no  means  comprehensive  and  is  intended  only  to 
provide  a  brief  sketch  of  the  development  of  substantive  law  and  thinking  in  order  to  provide  a 
context  for  the  subsequent  analysis  of  the  perestroika  era  industrial  organisations. 
On  the  concept  of  an  "ownership  interest",  see  in  particular  infra  Sections  2.3.1,2.4.2,2.5,  and  7.5. 
6  The  period  of  the  October  Revolution  (1917-1918);  the  period  of  military  intervention  and  the  civil  war 
(1918-1920);  the  period  of  the  transition  to  peaceful  work  regarding  the  establishment  of  a  national  economy 
(1921-1925);  the  period  of  the  struggle  for  socialist  industrialisation  of  the  country  and  the  collectivisation  of 
agriculture  (1926-1934);  the  period  of  the  completion  of  the  construction  of  socialism  and  the  adoption  of  a 
new  Constitution  (1935-1941);  the  period  of  the  Great  Patriotic  War  (1941-1945);  the  period  of  the  struggle 
for  the  establishment  and  development  of  the  national  economy  in  the  post-war  period  (1945-1953);  the 
period  of  the  completion  of  the  construction  of  socialism  (1953-1960s);  and  thereafter,  the  period  of 
developed  socialism.  See,  for  example,  the  following  textbooks  all  titled  Istoriya  Gosudarstva  i  Prava  SSSR 
Chast'  II  (Yuridicheskoe  Izdatel'stvo  Ministerstva  Yustitsii  SSSR:  1947);  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo 
Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1962);  (Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1966);  (Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskaya 
Literatura:  198  1).  Unsurprisingly,  histories  of  the  state  and  law  written  after  the  demise  of  the  Soviet  Union 
have  departed  from  this  periodisation  of  the  Soviet  times.  See,  for  example,  I.  A.  Isaev,  Istoriya  Gosudarstva 
i  Prava  Rossii  (Yurist:  1994),  pp.  259-435.  Western  sovietologists  have  tended  to  classify  the  Soviet  period 
by  reference  to  leaders  of  the  Communist  Party  noting  the  periods  of  war  communism,  NEP  and  central 
planning  for  the  years  until  the  mid-1930s.  See,  for  example,  Geoffrey  Hosking,  A  History  of  the  Soviet 
Union  (Fontana  Press:  1985).  However,  the  debate  as  to  periodisation  was  never  so  contentious  among 
western  sovietologists  as  it  was  among  Soviet  scholars. 
The  best  overview  in  English  of  the  different  schools  of  thought  regarding  the  periodisation  of  civil  and 
economic  law  is:  Olimpiad  S.  loffe,  Development  of  Civil  Law  Thinking  in  the  USSR  (Dott.  A.  Giuffre 
Editore:  1989),  pp.  3-129. 
-  18- During  the  first  few  years  after  the  1917  revolution,  law  as  a  formal  institution  was  regarded 
as  a  feature  of  capitalist  society  that  would  rapidly  disappear  and  would  be  replaced  by  the 
conscience  of  the  proletarian.  A  most  extreme  example  of  the  nihilism  that  symbolised  the 
years  of  1917-1921,  known  as  "war  communism",  was  the  introduction  of  the  People's  Courts 
where,  in  cases  of  uncertainty,  judges  were  directed  to  decide  the  issue  before  them,  not  on 
the  basis  of  positive  law,  but  by  reference  to  their  own  "revolutionary  legal  consciousness".  ' 
Despite  this,  two  codes  were  adopted  during  this  time:  the  Labour  Code  and  the  Family 
Code.  '  Both  were  aimed  at  entrenching  the  "victory  of  the  proletariat"  and  general  socialist 
principles  in  these  highly  political  areas.  During  these  years  a  Soviet  socialist  constitution  for 
Russia  was  adopted  on  10  July  1918.  " 
The  formal  decision  by  the  state  to  retreat  to  the  "commanding  heights"  of  the  economy  was 
taken  at  the  famous  10th  Congress  of  the  Communist  Party  held  on  8-16th  March  192  1.  "  This 
was  to  herald  the  period  known  as  the  New  Economic  Policy  (or  NEP)  notable  from  a  legal 
point  of  view  for  the  law  reform  initiatives. 
NEP  lasted  until  1928/9  when  state  planning  and  collectivisation  were  introduced  on  the  basis 
of,  and  legitimated  by,  a  new  theory  of  law,  "economic  law",  expounded  by  Evgeny 
Pashukanis,  the  leading  theorist  of  the  time.  12  Capitalism,  he  argued,  necessitated  the  presence 
of  law  which  structured  the  regulation  of  commodity  exchange.  However,  under  socialism  and 
the  guidance  of  the  Communist  Party,  the  commodification  of  labour  and  time  would  give  way 
to  economic  relations  based  upon  centralised  administrative  orders  (ie  the  plan)  leading 
eventually  to  the  "withering  away  of  private-law  aspects  of  the  legal  superstructure  and, 
finally,  the  progressive  dissolution  of  the  legal  superstructure  itself".  13  In  the  interim,  these 
administrative  relationships  would  be  governed  by  a  totally  separate  branch  of  law  which  he 
labelled  "  economic  law  ",  in  contrast  to  "  civil  law  ". 
8  Lewis  H.  Siegelbaum,  Soviet  State  and  Society  between  Revolutions  1918-1929  (Cambridge  University 
Press:  1992),  p.  15. 
9  Istonya  Gosudarstva  i  Prava  SSSR,  Chast'  II  (Yuridicheskoe  lzdatel'stvo  Ministerstva  Yustitsii  SSSR:  194  1), 
pp.  29-32,61-63. 
10  "Russia"  during  Soviet  times  was  referred  to  as  the  "Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic"  (or  the 
RSFSR).  Until  1922,  Russia  constituted  an  independent  state.  On  the  creation  of  the  USSR,  see  infra  n.  26. 
See  Istoriya  SSSR,  Epocha  Sotsialiszma  (1917-1957)  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Politicheskoi 
Literatury:  1957),  pp.  140-14  1. 
KPSS  v  Rezolyutsiyakh  i  Resheniyakh  S"ezdov,  Konferentsii  i  Plenumov  TsK,  Chast'  I  (Izdatel'stvo 
Politicheskoi  Literatury:  1954),  p.  515. 
12  On  the  question  of  dating  the  end  of  NEP  see,  R.  W.  Davies,  The  Soviet  Economy  in  Turmoil,  1929-1930 
(Harvard  University  Press:  1989),  p.  170,  n.  41  therein. 
-  19- By  the  mid  1930s,  Pashukanis  was  ousted  and  executed  in  Stalin's  purges  in  January  1937. 
Planning  had  become  an  accepted  feature  of  the  Soviet  economic  system  and  in  this  new 
environment,  law  was  seen  as  a  necessary  tool,  existing  in  addition  to  the  planning  network 
and  administrative  instruction.  The  theory  that  law  would  eventually  "wither  away"  was 
therefore  discredited  and  official  ideology  came  to  focus  on  the  concept  of  "legal  stability" 
and  the  endurance  of  a  distinct  "new"  form  of  legal  system  based  on  "socialist  legality".  This 
theory  of  socialist  legality  was  developed  by  the  Andrei  Vyshinsky  in  his  book  "The  Law  of 
the  Soviet  State"  published  in  1936,  the  same  year  that  the  Stalin  Constitution  was  adopted. 
As  Vyshinsky  explained  in  his  classic  work:  "Marxism  teaches  the  necessities  of  using  law  as 
one  of  the  means  of  the  struggle  for  socialism  ... 
In  the  Soviet  state,  law  is  entirely  and 
completely  directed  against  exploitation  and  exploiters  ... 
Stalin  teaches  the  strengthening  of 
socialist  legislation...  ".  "  The  tension  between  Pashukanis  and  Vyshinsky,  between  economic 
law  and  civil  law,  between  planning  instruction  and  contract  was  ever  present  throughout  the 
Soviet  period.  "  This  ultimately  was  a  reflection  of  the  tension  at  the  heart  of  Soviet  economic 
policy  between  central  control,  through  administrative  instruction,  and  the  desire  for  some 
level  of  decentralised  discretions,  through  the  civil  law  of  contract.  16 
The  codes  of  the  RSFSR  promulgated  during  NEP  included  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code,  a 
new  redaction  of  the  Labour  Code  (1922),  a  Land  Code  (1922),  a  Forest  Code  (1923),  a  Civil 
13  Evgeny  B.  Pashukanis,  Allgemeine  Rechtslehre  und  Marxismus:  Versuch  einer  Kfitik  der  Juristischen 
Grwidbegriffie  (1929,  reprinted  Pluto  Press:  1989),  p.  13  3. 
14  Andrei  Y.  Vyshinsky,  The  Law  of  the  Soviet  State  (1936,  reprinted  The  Macmillan  Company:  1948),  pp.  50- 
55. 
15  Despite  often  heated  debate  as  to  the  place  of  economic  law,  the  legal  initiatives  and  civil  law  framework, 
first  developed  during  NEP,  still  endured  right  up  until  1991.  Academic  disagreements  as  to  the  role  of 
economic  law  were  particularly  rife  during  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  1961  FPCivL.  For  an  outline  of 
the  disputes,  see  O.  S.  1offe,  Razvitie  Tsivilisticheskoi  Mysli  v  SSSR,  Chast'  I  (Izdatel'stvo  Leningradskogo 
Universiteta:  1975),  pp.  39-108.  The  two  paragraphs  of  article  1  of  the  1961  FPCivL  illustrated  the 
compromise:  the  first  referred  to  the  regulation  of  "property  relations  and  personal  non-property  relations 
connected  therewith"  and  the  second  to  "socialist  property"  and  "the  state  plan  of  economic  and  social 
development".  During  the  late  1980s  when  the  adoption  of  a  new  set  of  Fundamental  Principles  of  Civil 
Ixgislation  was  being  considered,  there  were  a  number  of  initiatives  arguing  for  the  adoption  of  an 
economic  code  in  its  stead  (see  V.  K.  Andreev,  Obsuzhdenie  Proekta  Khozyaistvennogo  Kodeksa  SSSR, 
SGiP  (1985),  p.  949).  Nevertheless  the  1991  FPCivL  was  passed  in  1991  with  few  concessions  to  the 
economic  law  movement.  However,  still  today  in  the  post-Soviet  legal  systems,  the  notion  of  economic  law 
persists  as  a  credible  academic  movement.  In  1994  a  two-volume  treatise  under  the  title  "Economic  Law" 
was  published  by  Professor  Martem'yanov  (V.  S.  Martem'yanov,  laozyaistvennoe  Pravo,  Tom  Ii2 
(Izdatel'stvo  BEK:  1994)). 
16  This  basic  dichotomy  is  central  to  a  number  of  aspects  in  this  study  including  the  principle  of  democratic 
centralism  (infra  Section  2.2),  the  vacillation  of  policy  between  the  enterprise  and  association  (both 
conceived  in  conceptual  terms  by  reference  to  the  confirmation  model  (infra  Chapter  3)),  and  the  balance 
between  personal  and  social  interests  (in  particular  in  the  governance  regimes  of  the  collective 
farm/cooperatives  and  1987  state  enterprises  (infra  Sections  2.4.1,6.3.3  and  6.4.3)). 
-20- Procedure  Code  (1923),  a  Code  on  Marriage,  the  Family  and  Adoption  (1926)  and  a  new 
redaction  of  the  Criminal  Code  (1926).  "  The  NEP  codes  were  written  by  jurists  educated 
during  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century;  a  time  during  which,  as  Wortman  has  argued,  Russia 
first  developed  an  advanced  "legal  consciousness".  "  These  lawyers  were  influenced  by  the 
Romanist  civil  law  tradition  of  their  European  neighbours,  and  with  the  granting  of  the 
October  Manifesto,  they  saw  the  creation  for  the  first  time  in  Russia  of  a  limited  constitutional 
monarchy  and  the  establishment  of  a  state  Duma.  "  The  Russian  legal  literature  of  the  first 
decade  of  the  twentieth  century  represented  a  kind  of  "golden  age"  of  legal  development, 
shining  in  the  new  democratic  liberal  culture.  20 
Such  were  the  jurists  who  were  co-opted  by  the  new  Soviet  state  to  lead  the  legal  revolution. 
However,  Lenin  took  care  to  remind  them  that  their  work  had  to  be  guided  "not  [by]  the 
corpus  iuris  romani,  but  our  revolutionary  concept  of  law.  ""  The  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code 
22  was  drafted  in  the  space  of  a  few  months  predominantly  by  Goikhbarg.  It  was  based  on  the 
draft  that  had  been  submitted  to  the  State  Duma  in  1913,  but  never  passed.  There  were  four 
sections:  the  General  Part,  the  Law  of  Things  (the  law  on  ownership  and  collateral),  the  Law 
of  Obligations,  and  Inheritance  Law.  Chapter  X,  in  the  Section  on  the  Law  of  Obligations, 
was  devoted  to  "Partnerships"  and  was  divided  into  five  parts  on:  the  Simple  Partnership,  the 
Full  Partnership,  the  Partnership  on  Belief,  the  Partnership  with  Limited  Responsibility,  and 
the  Joint  Stock  Society  (Share  Partnership).  Despite  the  fact  that  with  the  advent  of  state 
planning  many  of  its  provisions,  especially  in  relation  to  the  joint-stock  society  and 
partnerships,  were  repealed,  23  the  structure  and  approach  of  the  subsequent  1960s  civil  codes 
were  clearly  indebted  to  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code. 
17  See,  Sobranie  Kodeksov  RSFSR  (Yuridicheskoe  Izdatel'stvo  NKYu  RSFSR:  1928). 
18  See,  Richard  S.  Wortman,  7he  Developtnent  of  a  Russian  Legal  Consciousness  (The  University  of  Chicago 
Press:  1976). 
19  Lionel  Kochan,  Russia  in  Revolution  1890-1918  (Granada:  1983),  p.  104,115. 
20  In  fact,  the  works  of  Shershenevich,  Pakhman  and  Maksimov  are  still  read  and  cited  today  by  post-Soviet 
legal  scholars  searching  for  their  Slavic  roots  and  identity  within  the  pre-Soviet  Romanist  tradition.  The 
principal  works  of  Shershenevich  have  recently  been  reprinted  (see,  for  example,  G.  F.  Shershenevich, 
Uchebnik  Torgovogo  Prava  (1914,  reprinted  SPARK:  1994)). 
21  Quoted  in  W.  E.  Butler,  Soviet  Law  (2'  ed.,  Butterworths:  1988),  p.  176. 
22  See  definition  of  "Civil  Code  RSFSR"  and  "Civil  Code"  written  by  S.  Raevich  and  P.  Stuchka  respectively  in 
Entsiklopediya  Gosudarstva  i  Prava,  Tom  Pervyi  (Izdatel'stvo  Kommunisticheskoi  Akademii:  1929),  pp.  507- 
521  for  a  contemporary  account  of  its  adoption.  See  also,  Vladimir  Gsovski,  Soviet  Civil  Law:  Private 
Rights  and  Yheir  Background  under  the  Soviet  Regime,  Volume  One  (University  of  Michigan  Law 
School:  1948),  pp.  24-25. 
23  Infra  n.  320. 
-21- Although  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  contained  provisions  governing  the  operation  of  joint- 
stock  societies,  partnerships  and  commercial  contracts,  and  even  a  section  on  private 
ownership,  it  was  certainly  a  socialist  text.  Chapter  1,  article  I  of  the  code  set  the  tone 
providing  that  "civil  rights  shall  be  protected  by  law,  except  in  those  instances  when  they  are 
exercised  contrary  to  their  socio-economic  purpose".  As  such  all  the  rights  contained  in  the 
code  were  conditional.  Where  entrenched  rights  were  exercised  in  a  manner  contrary  to  "their 
social-economic  purposes",  no  legal  protection  would  be  afforded.  The  1922  RSFSR  Civil 
Code  thereby  evidenced  the  merger  of  the  legal  with  the  political  within  the  prevailing 
ideology  of  the  Soviet  regime.  In  order  to  decide  whether  the  code  provided  protection  for  a 
certain  sub  ect,  the  judiciary  had  to  not  only  interpret  the  letter  of  the  law,  but  also  had  to 
promulgate  policy  based  on  the  general  purpose  of  the  law.  This  was  confirmed  by  article  5  of 
the  decree  implementing  the  code  which  provided  that  "a  broad  interpretation  of  the  Civil 
Code  shall  be  permitted  only  in  the  instances  when  it  is  required  for  the  protection  of  the 
interests  of  workers-peasants  of  the  state  and  the  working  mass.  , 21 
The  adoption  of  civil  codes  by  the  other  union  republics  of  the  USSR  was  a  product  of  the 
development  of  the  political  history  of  the  USSR  and  its  constitutional  law.  In  December  1922 
the  Declaration  and  the  Treaty  on  the  Formation  of  the  USSR  was  made  by  the  First  Congress 
of  Soviets  of  the  USSR  ;  2'  and  on  the  basis  of  that  declaration,  the  creation  of  the  USSR  was 
formalised  through  the  adoption  by  the  Second  Congress  of  Soviets  of  the  USSR  in  1924  of 
the  first  Basic  Law  (Constitution)  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics.  2'  Therefore  after 
1924,  the  RSFSR  (ie  Russia)  became  merely  one  of  the  constituent  "union  republics"  of  the 
USSR.  Throughout  the  late  1920s  the  other  union  republics  adopted  their  own  constitutions  on 
the  basis  of  the  1924  USSR  Constitution.  In  the  area  of  civil  law,  some  union  republics 
adopted  their  own  civil  codes  that  were  broadly  "analogous"  to  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code, 
whereas  in  others,  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  was  adopted  as  being  directly  applicable  on 
their  territory.  27 
24  0  Vedenii  v  Deistvie  Grazhdanskogo  Kodeksa  RSFSR  Prinyatogo  na  4  Sessii  VTsIK  IX  Sozyva  31 
Ok-tyabrya  1922,  SU  (1922),  no.  7  1,  item  904. 
25  S  "ez&  Sovetov  v  Dokumentakh  1917-1936  Tom  III  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1960),  pp.  15-22. 
26  Osnovnoi  Zakon  (Konstitutsiya)  Soyuza  Sovetskikh  Sotsialisticheskikh  Respublik  reprinted  in  Istoriya 
Sovetskoi  Konstitutsii  v  Dokumentakh  1917-1956  (Gosudarstevennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi 
Literatury:  1957),  pp.  458-473.  On  the  formation  of  the  Soviet  Union,  see  Richard  Pipes,  7he  Formation  of 
the  Soviet  Union:  Communism  and  Nationalism  1917-1923  (Harvard  University  Press:  1964),  pp.  242-297. 
27  The  author  has  consulted  a  number  of  sources  with  a  view  to  ascertaining  the  status  of  the  1922  RSFSR 
Civil  Code  on  the  territories  of  the  other  republics  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  1964  FPCivL  including: 
O.  S.  Ioffe,  Sovetskoe  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo  (Izdatel'stvo  Leningradskogo,  Universiteta:  1958),  p.  37;  Sovetskoe 
Grazhdanskoe  Pravo,  Tom  I  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1950),  pp.  81-82;  supra 
-22- The  creation  of  the  USSR  led  to  a  bifurcation  of  sources  of  law:  those  at  the  federal,  or  "all- 
union"  level;  and  those  at  the  republic,  or  "union  republic"  level.  All-union  legislation  was  to 
prevail  over,  and  determine  the  scope  of,  the  more  detailed  union  republic  legislation.  As  part 
of  Stalin's  pursuit  of  the  centralisation  of  power,  article  14(f)  of  the  Stalin  Constitution 
removed  from  the  competence  of  the  union  republics  the  right  to  adopt  their  own  civil  codes. 
This  was  relocated  to  the  competence  of  all-union  bodies.  Article  14  was  only  amended  after 
Stalin's  death  on  11  February  1957  to  provide  for  the  right  of  all-union  bodies  to  adopt 
"Fundamental  Principles"  of  legislation.  The  union  republic  constitutions  were  amended 
accordingly  to  provide  for  their  right  to  adopt  "codes".  "  The  introduction  of  the  concept  of 
all-union  Fundamental  Principles  meant  that,  in  the  area  of  civil  law,  the  RSFSR  civil  code 
was  no  longer  to  prevail  or  form  the  basis  for  the  legislation  in  the  other  union  republics.  For 
each  branch  of  law  (including  civil  law),  the  USSR  Supreme  Soviet  would  promulgate  all- 
union,  federal,  "Fundamental  Principles"  and  on  the  basis  of  which,  each  union  republic 
would  adopt  its  own  more  detailed  "Code" 
. 
29Thus  in  1961  the  "Fundamental  Principles  of 
n.  6  (1947),  p.  99;  D.  M.  Genkin,  I.  B.  Novitskii,  N.  V.  Rabinovich,  Istoriya  Sovetskogo  Grazhdanskogo 
Prava  1917-1947  (Yuridicheskoe  Izdatel'stvo  Ministerstva  Yustitsii  SSSR:  1949),  pp.  38-42;  I.  B.  Novitskii, 
Istoriya  Sovetskogo  Grazhdanskogo  Prava  (Gosudarstvemoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1957), 
pp.  103-104;  and  Vladimir  Gsovski,  Soviet  Civil  Law:  Private  Rights  and  Their  Background  under  the  Soviet 
Regime,  Volume  Two  (University  of  Michigan  Law  School:  1949),  pp.  3-7  (which,  together  with  Novitskii, 
draw  heavily  upon  Bakhchisaraitsev  (see  below  for  reference)).  However  it  was  difficult  to  derive  a  clear 
picture  of  the  legal  position  for  each  republic,  in  particular  as  to  whether  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  was 
simply  of  direct  effect  in  the  territory  of  the  other  republics;  or  was  brought  into  effect  in  the  relevant 
republic  by  the  adoption  of  a  specific  implementing  law  of  that  republic  (replacing  the  reference  to  the 
RSFSR  with  the  name  of  the  relevant  republic,  but  without  further  amendment);  or  was  brought  into  effect 
by  an  implementing  law  that  amended  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  in  a  more  substantive  way.  For  example, 
in  the  case  of  the  Tadjik  SSR,  Gsovski  noted  that  "when  it  became  a  constituent  republic  in  1929,  [it] 
retained  the  RSFSR  Civil  Code"  (P.  5);  however  a  Tadjik  SSR  Civil  Code  was  adopted  on  19  December 
1929  which  was  substantially  the  same  as  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  but  did  refer  to  the  Tadjik  SSR  (in 
the  place  of  the  RSFSR)  and  included  minor  amendments  (in  particular  in  the  "Explanatory  Notes"  to  certain 
articles).  (Grazhdanskii  Kodeks  Tadzhikskoi  Sovetskoi  Sotsialisticheskoi  Respubliki  (Yuridicheskoe 
Izdatel'stvo  NKYu  SSSR:  1939)).  The  author  has  not  been  able  to  locate  a  copy  of  the  principal  study  on  this 
question  (Kh.  E.  Bakhchisaraitsev,  K  Istorii  Grazhdanskikh  Kodeksov  Sovetskikh  Sotsialisticheskikh  Respublik 
(Gosyurizdat:  1948)),  however  a  collection  of  the  civil  codes  before  their  re-enactment  in  the  early  1960s 
included  civil  codes  for  the  RSFSR  (1922),  Ukraine  SSR  (1922),  Belorussian  SSR  (1923),  Uzbek  SSR 
(undated),  Georgian  SSR  (1923),  Azerbaidzhan  SSR  (1920),  Tadjik  SSR  (1929),  Armenian  (1923), 
Turkmen  (1925)  (see,  Grazhdanskoe  Zakonodatel'stvo  SSSR  i  Soyuznykh  Respublik  (Gosyurizdat:  1957)). 
28  Sovetskoe  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo,  Tom  I  (Gosyurizdat:  1959),  pp.  40-41.  See,  Konstitutsiya  (Osnovnoi  Zakon) 
SSSR,  Konstitutsd  (Osnovnye  Zakony)  Soyuznykh  Sovetskikh  Sotsialisticheskikh  Respublik  (Izdatel'stvo 
Izvestiya  Sovetov  Deputatov  Trudyashchikhsya  SSSR:  1972). 
29  The  concept  of  "fundamental  principles"  may  be  traced  to  the  1918  RSFSR  Constitution.  Article  49 
referred  to  the  right  of  TsIK  to  adopt  "general  state  legislation  ("obschgosudarstvennoe 
zakonodatel'stvo)"  on  judicial  structure  and  procedure  and  civil  and  criminal  legislation.  In  December 
1919  the  "Leading  Principles  ("Rukovodyashchie  Nachala")  of  Criminal  Law  of  the  RSFSR"  were 
enacted,  and  on  the  basis  of  those  Leading  Principles,  the  1922  RSFSR  CrimC  was  adopted 
(A.  A.  Gertsenzon,  Sh.  S.  Sringauz,  N.  D.  Durmanov,  M.  M.  Isaev  and  B.  S.  Utevskii,  Istoriya  Sovestskogo 
Ugolovnogo  Prava  (Yuridicheskoe  Izdatel'stvo  Ministerstva  Yustitsii  SSSR:  1948),  p.  158).  The  1924 
-23- Civil  Legislation  of  the  USSR  and  Union  Republics"  was  adopted  and  new  civil  codes  were 
adopted  in  each  union  republic  during  the  period  1963-64.30 
The  main  change  in  the  structure  of  the  new  1961  FPCivL  and  civil  codes  as  compared  to  the 
old  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  was  that  the  section  on  the  "Law  of  Things"  was  renamed  the 
"Law  on  Ownership"  and  the  provisions  relating  to  the  law  of  collateral  were  moved  from  the 
section  on  the  "Law  of  Things"  to  the  section  on  the  "Law  of  Obligations".  This  underlined 
the  growing  importance  of  the  institute  of  "ownership"  in  the  Soviet  economic  and  legal 
system.  "  For  the  purposes  of  this  study,  there  was  one  other  notable  change:  the  chapter  on 
partnerships  (Chapter  X),  contained  in  the  section  of  the  code  on  the  Law  of  Obligations,  was 
deleted.  A  new  article  was  included  in  the  chapter  on  juridical  persons,  contained  in  the 
section  of  the  code  setting  out  the  General  Provisions.  This  new  article  seemed  to  provide  an 
exhaustive  list  of  forms  of  juridical  person  (which  did  not  include  any  of  the  former  Chapter 
X  partnerships  in  that  liSt).  32  This  legalised  the  de  facto  position  that  the  NEP  era  industrial 
organisations,  rooted  in  the  law  of  obligations,  no  longer  formed  part  of  mainstream  Soviet 
civil  law  and  had  been  replaced  by  socialist  juridical  persons  characterised  by  their  form  of 
33  ownership  rather  than  contract. 
The  new  codes  of  the  various  union  republics  were  essentially  the  same  in  all  but  the 
numbering  of  articles,  just  as  the  pre-1960s  codes  had  been.  As  Feldbrugge  noted,  "the  texts 
of  [the  legislation  ofl  the  union  republics  were  overwhelmingly  identical.  The  only  conclusion 
allowed  is  that  model  code  texts  were  actually  prepared  in  Moscow  and  that  only  a  small 
degree  of  divergence  was  allowed".  "  Despite  this,  and  the  fact  that  they  included  almost 
verbatim  the  provisions  of  the  1961  FPCivL,  the  mere  existence  of  the  separate  union  republic 
USSR  Constitution  in  Section  2,  chapter  1,  article  l(o)  continued  this  practice  by  providing  for  the 
"establishment  of  fundamental  principles  ("osnov")"  of  judicial  structure  and  procedure,  civil  and 
criminal  legislation.  Therefore  in  1924,  the  1924  FPCrimL  were  adopted  (Ibid,  p.  318).  The  concept  of 
"fundamental  principles  of  legislation"  found  their  way  into  the  1936  Stalin  Constitution  with  regard  to 
labour  law,  but  civil  and  criminal  law  returned  to  being  regulated  by  "codes"  (article  14).  Following 
constitutional  amendments  in  1957,  the  concept  of  "fundamental  principles  of  legislation"  as  all-union 
framework  legislation  coupled  with  more  detailed  union  republic  codes  was  established  for  most  branches 
of  Soviet  law. 
30  On  the  relationship  between  the  1961  FPCivL  and  the  civil  codes  generally,  see  S.  V.  Polenina,  0snovy 
Grazhdanskogo  Zakonodatel'stva  i  Grazdanskie  Kodeksy  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1968). 
31  The  Soviet  law  on  ownership  infonns  many  aspects  of  this  study,  but  is  specifically  considered  infta 
Sections  2.3,3.4.2  and  7.4. 
32  Supra  p.  17,  and  infra  Sections  2.5  and  4.1-4.3. 
33  Infra  Sections  4.2-4.3. 
34  F.  J.  M.  Feldbrugge,  Russian  Law:  lhe  End  of  the  Soviet  Sýstem  and  the  Role  of  Law  (Martinus  Nijhoff 
Publishers:  1993),  p.  97. 
-24- codes  was  to  prove  remarkably  important  during  the  late  1980s.  The  union  republic  codes  and 
law  meant  that  there  was  a  pre-existing  legal  framework  through  which  individual  republics 
could  challenge  central  all-union  diktats,  and  upon  which  they  could  develop  their  own 
"national"  legislation  independently  from  federal  determinants.  And  when  the  Soviet  Union 
did  eventually  vanish,  its  constituent  union  republics  had  a  legal  framework  of  their  own  in 
place,  apart  from  all-union  legislation,  that  could  form  the  basis  of  a  new  independent  legal 
order. 
This  structure  of  civil  law  (the  all-union  1961  FPCivL  and  the  union  republic  codes)  remained 
in  place  until  the  eventual  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  1991;  and  until  1985,  the  1961 
FPCivL  and  union  republic  codes  continued  in  force  broadly  unamended.  There  were  two 
attempts  to  codify  Soviet  law  as  a  whole  after  the  1960s;  "  and  within  these  compilations,  or 
digests,  of  Soviet  Law  generally,  there  were  specific  parts  related  to  civil  law. 
Work  was  started  in  the  early  1970s  on  the  publication  of  the  "Systematic  Collection  of 
Prevailing  Legislation"  of  the  USSR  (all-union  legislation)  and  separate  collections  for  each  of 
the  union  republics.  The  "SDZ",  as  each  collection  was  known,  was  for  "internal  use  only"; 
each  volume  was  numbered  and  circulated  among  a  selected  list  of  state  agencies  and 
institutions.  "  They  were  completed  in  the  early  1980s  and  most  sets  included  supplementary 
updating  volumes  containing  new  legislation.  There  was  a  SDZ  for  the  USSR  and  separate 
SDZs  for  each  union  republic  with  the  exceptions  of  Armenia,  Estonia  and  Latvia.  "  Section  4 
of  the  SDZs  was  devoted  to  civil  legislation. 
In  the  early  1980s  a  fresh  attempt  to  codify  the  legislation  of  the  USSR  and  its  union  republics 
commenced.  This  resulted  in  the  "Digest  of  Laws".  Once  again,  there  was  a  "Digest  of  Laws" 
for  the  USSR,  and  separate  digests  for  each  of  the  union  republics.  Publication  was  in  binder 
form  (the  SDZ  by  contrast  was  in  book  form)  enabling  pages  to  be  replaced  as  legislation  was 
35  "Codify"  is  used  here  in  the  sense  of  producing  "compilations"  or  "collections"  of  existing  legislation. 
36  During  Soviet  times,  only  a  microfiche  version  of  the  SDZ  USSR  was  available  outside  the  USSR.  A 
resulting  conference  of  western  sovietologists,  mainly  lawyers,  was  held  on  the  significance  of  the  SDZ 
USSR.  The  papers  were  published  in  Richard  A  Bauxbaum  &  Cathryn  Hendley  (eds.  ),  Yhe  Soviet 
Sobranie  of  Laws:  Problems  of  Codification  and  Non-Publication  (University  of  California,  Berkeley:  199  1). 
37  While  it  is  unlikely  that  a  SDZ  was  not  complied  for  Armenia,  Estonia  or  Latvia,  from  research  conducted 
at  the  Ministries  of  Justice  in  Belarus,  Turkmenistan,  Kazakhstan,  Tadjikistan  and  Uzbekistan  and  other 
libraries  within  the  CIS,  the  author  has  not  seen  any  evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  SDZ  of  any  of  these 
republics.  Complied  before  the  existence  of  the  SDZ  USSR  on  microfiche  (ibid),  Walker's  book  was  one  of 
the  few  bibliographies  to  acknowledge  even  the  existence  of  the  SDZ,  and  then  it  only  referenced  the  SDZ 
for  the  USSR  (and  not  any  of  the  union  republics)  noting:  "Full  publication  details  not  available.  Die 
collection  was  intended  for  official  use  only  and  no  copies  are  known  in  the  West.  "  (W.  E.  Butler  in 
G.  Walker  (ed.  ),  Official  Publications  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe  1945-1980  (Mansell 
Publishing  Ltd:  1982),  pp.  296-7). 
-25- amended.  These  digests  were  made  available  to  the  general  public,  practitioners  and  students. 
Chapter  I  of  section  2  of  the  digests  was  devoted  to  civil  law.  Over  time  the  digests  came  to 
replace  the  SDZs.  First,  they  contained  more  recent  enactments  and  secondly,  being  a  loose- 
leaf  publication,  updating  proved  cheaper  and  quicker.  The  only  way  to  update  the  SDZs  was 
the  publication  of  supplementary  volumes,  the  practice  of  which  ceased  in  the  early  1980s. 
2.2  The  Stalin  Economic  Settlement,  Principles  of  the  Soviet  Economy  and  Feudal 
Law 
The  question  of  the  "distinctiveness"  of  Soviet  law  has  spawned  many  pages  of  debate  in 
academe.  Although  Zweigert  and  Kotz  asserted  that  "it  was  a  truth  universally  acknowledged 
that  there  was  such  a  thing  as  a  socialist  legal  family",  "  others  stressed  its  place  within  the 
Romanist  civil  law  tradition,  and  others  debated  the  nature  of  this  "distinctiveness"  noting 
"Socialist",  "Russian"  and  "Parental"  influences,  39  as  well  as  its  "totalitarian"  nature.  40  While 
it  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study  to  revisit  and  evaluate  the  detail  of  these  various  different 
views,  the  present  Section  outlines  the  "central  principles  of  the  administration  of  the  Soviet 
economy"  as  generally  stated  in  Soviet  legal  texts  and  suggests  yet  one  more  strand  in  the 
context  of  the  debate  on  the  nature  of  socialist  law. 
Perhaps  because  the  Soviet  experiment  was  an  ideological  one,  the  Soviet  state  was  obsessed 
with  guiding  principles.  As  such,  politics  and  law  were  rooted  in  principles  and  theory. 
Furthermore,  principles  are  easy  to  formulate,  easy  to  learn  and  easy  to  repeat  and  therefore 
are  an  important  tool  of  a  centrally  governed  state.  General  principles  were  found  in  the 
introductory  chapters  of  many  Soviet  law  textbooks,  and  more  specific  principles,  in  the  form 
of  a  numbered  fist,  were  ubiquitous  in  laws,  decrees,  campaigns  and,  of  course,  speeches,  of 
the  Soviet  period.  Over  time  these  principles  became  concretised,  almost  cliches,  evidencing 
the  creed  and  credentials  of  the  speaker  or  author.  Such  principles  were  however  more  than 
just  empty  rhetoric.  They  informed  the  style  of  the  legislation  as  well  as  its  content  and,  it 
shall  be  argued,  that  they  formed  the  basis  for  understanding  the  central  spine  of  the  Stalin 
38  Konrad  Zweigert  and  Hein  Kotz,  Introduction  to  Comparative  Law,  Volume  1  (2'  ed.,  Clarendon 
Press:  1992),  p.  296.  The  classic  treatise  making  the  argument  for  the  distinctiveness  of  Soviet  Law  is  John 
N.  Hazard,  Communists  and  7heir  Law  -A  Search  for  the  Common  Core  of  the  Legal  Systems  of  the 
Marxian  Socialist  States  (The  University  of  Chicago  Press:  1969).  Standard  texts  on  comparative  law  like 
Zweigert  and  Kotz  generally  treated  "socialist  law"  or  the  "socialist  legal  family"  separately  from  other 
systems  (see,  for  example,  Rene  David  and  John  E.  C.  Brierly,  Major  Legal  Systems  in  the  World  Today 
(Stevens  &  Sons:  1985),  p.  15). 
39  See  Harold  J.  Berman,  Justice  in  the  USSR  -  An  Interpretation  of  Soviet  Law  (Harvard University  Press: 
1966). 
40  Supra  n.  34,  pp.  13-30. 
-26- economic  system  which  gave  rise  to  the  confirmation  model  as  well  as  the  alternative 
structures  posed  by  the  contract-based  concession  and  participation  models. 
The  central  principles  of  the  administration  of  the  Soviet  economy  included:  the  unity  of 
political  and  economic  administration;  the  unity  of  state  socialist  ownership;  planning;  one- 
man  management;  economic  accountability;  democratic  centralism;  socialist  legality  and  state 
discipline.  "  Most  were,  in  one  form  or  another,  expressed  in  the  Brezhnev  Constitution. 
The  Unity  of  Political  and  Economic  Administration  The  Soviet  state  both  determined  and 
executed  policy.  It  was  both  the  planner  and  the  operator,  the  supervisor  and  the  supervised, 
the  controller  and  the  controlled.  Only  in  this  way  could  the  success  of  the  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat  be  ensured.  As  Lenin  famously  noted  "In  bourgeois  society  business  is  carried  out 
by  the  landlords  and  not  state  organs,  whereas  here  economic  activity  is  our  common  affair.  It 
itself  is  an  interest  for  us  of  politics.  ""  The  entire  economy  was  thus  considered  as  a  single 
indivisible  complex,  run  for  political  ends.  However,  total  central  control  over  the  economy 
through  law  could  only  be  carried  out  if  the  state  both  owned  all  the  means  of  production  and 
had  a  mechanism  in  place  for  directing  the  micro-econornic  activity  of  those  organisations  that 
made  up  the  Soviet  economy.  This  was  achieved  through  the  twin  principles  of  state 
ownership  and  the  plan. 
The  Unity  of  State  Socialist  Ownership  The  basic  tenets  were  set  out  in  the  Brezhnev 
Constitution  which  provided  in  article  10  that  the  "fundamental  principles  of  the  economic 
system  of  the  USSR  shall  comprise  socialist  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  in  the  form 
of  state  (all-people's)  ownership...  ".  This  principle  grew  out  of  the  de  facto  expropriation  and 
nationalisation  of  the  former  Imperial  Russian  economy  in  the  early  years  of  Soviet  power. 
The  abolition  of  private  property  in  land  and  an  extension  of  state  ownership  over  the  means 
41  See,  for  example,  V.  V.  Laptev,  Pravovoe  Polozhenie  Gosudarstvennykh  Pronzyshlennykh  Predpfiyatii  v 
SSSR  (Izdatel'stvo  Akademii  Nauk  SSSR:  1964)  pp.  4-10.  These  principles,  however,  appeared  in  most 
standard  Soviet  "Textbooks"  "Courses"  or  "Monographs"  of  the  period  to  perestoika.  They  were  sometimes 
even  referred  to  as  "the  Leninist  Principles  of  Administration"  despite  the  fact  that  most  of  them  were 
identified  as  key  principles  after  his  death  (see,  M.  S.  Smirtyukov,  Sovetskii  Gosudarstvennyi  Apparat 
Upravleniya  (Izdatel'stvo  Politicheskoi  Literatury:  1982),  p.  50).  Soviet  civil  law  textbooks  also  included 
various  sets  of  principles  upon  which  civil  law  specifically  was  based.  Most  were  the  same  as  the  general 
principles  of  the  administration  of  the  economy  or  expressed  with  a  slightly  different  emphasis.  For 
example,  the  principle  of  "the  unity  of  state  socialist  ownership"  was  expressed  as  the  civil  law  principle  of 
"strengthening  the  protection  of  socialist  ownership  and  the  socialist  economic  system".  See,  for  example, 
Sovetskoe  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo,  Chast'  I  (Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1986),  p.  22,  and  Sovetskoe 
Grazhdmkoe  Pravo,  Chast'I  (Izdatel'stvo  Leningradskogo  Universiteta:  1982),  p.  14. 
42  43  Lenin  330.  This  quote  was  the  "clich6"  that  appeared  in  most  legal  textbooks  of  the  later  Soviet  period 
when  addressing  this  principle  (for  example  Khozyaistvennoe  Pravo  (Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskaya 
Literatura:  1983),  p.  24). 
-27- of  production  were  in  fact  directly  contemplated  in  the  10  steps  "pretty  generally  applicable" 
set  out  by  Marx  and  Engels  in  their  Communist  Manifesto.  "  During  the  1930s,  the  law  on 
ownership  developed  into  a  key  aspect  of  the  Soviet  legal  and  economic  system:  it  gave  the 
Soviet  state  a  direct  link  to  all  aspects  of  the  economy;  it  facilitated  state  control  of  the  entire 
productive  system;  and  it  allowed  for  state  allocation  of  the  fruits  of  industry  and  agriculture. 
Planning  If  the  law  on  ownership  provided  the  legal  building  bricks  for  the  creation  of  the 
Soviet  economy,  the  plan  provided  the  cement.  As  one  1950s  civil  law  textbook  put  it: 
"socialist  planning  lies  at  the  heart  of  Soviet  civil  law.  Planning  instructions  are  the  pre- 
condition  for  transactions  governing  property  relations  between  socialist  organisations  as  well 
as  for  transactions  concluded  between  socialist  organisations  and  citizens.  "'  References  to 
state  planning  in  the  works  of  Lenin  can  be  seen  as  early  as  1918  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk,  "  however  it  was  only  pursued  vigorously  as  official  state  policy  after 
1927.  "  The  ideology  of  socialist  planning  was  based  both  on  ethical  and  economic 
considerations:  planning  was  considered  to  result  in  the  fairest  distribution  of  goods  between 
members  of  society  and  further  encouraged  the  most  efficient  production  of  goods,  through 
scientific  and  optimal  combining  of  synergies.  The  importance  of  the  plan  was  emphasised  in 
article  11  of  the  Stalin  Constitution  and  then  in  article  16  of  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  which 
provided  that  "the  economy  of  the  USSR  shall  comprise  a  single  national-economic  complex 
encompassing  all  links  of  social  production,  distribution  and  exchange  ...  administration  of  the 
economy  shall  be  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  state  plans  for  economic  and  social 
development 
...... 
One-Man  Management  The  principle  of  one-man  management  broadly  required  that  the 
management  of  state  industrial  organisations  was  carried  out  by  a  single  person.  This  ensured 
that  the  requirements  of  the  plan  could  be  carried  out  without  procrastination  or  debate  by  a 
committee.  In  addition,  it  allocated  responsibility  for  the  condition  of  the  organisation  to  a 
single  person. 
The  origins  of  one-man  management  lay  in  the  early  years  of  Soviet  power.  During  the  chaos 
in  Russia  that  was  associated  with  the  February  Revolution  and  the  setting  up  of  the 
43  Karl  Marx  and  Friedrich  Engels,  77ze  Communist  Manifesto  (Penguin  Books:  1985),  p.  104. 
44  Supra  n.  50  (1950),  p-7- 
45  See,  for  example,  36  Lenin  228;  where  he  directs  the  Academy  of  Sciences  to  form  a  commission  to 
examine  the  possibility  of  creating  "a  plan  for  the  reorganisation  of  the  industry  and  the  economic  revival  of 
Russia"  including  the  rationalisation  of  the  location  of  industry  and  its  concentration  into  large  trusts. 
46  See,  Boris  Brutzkus,  Economic  Planning  in  Soviet  Russia  (George  Routledge  &  Sons,  Ltd.:  1935),  part  H; 
and  see  generally,  E.  H.  Carr  and  R.  W.  Davies,  Foundations  of  a  Planned  Economy  1926-1929,  Volume  One 
(I)  and  (II)  (Macmillan:  1969). 
-28- provisional  government  of  Kerenskii,  workers'  collectives  and  workers'  councils  were  created 
spontaneously  and  often  sought  to  take  control  over  the  management  of  enterprises.  "  Lenin 
exploited  this  situation  by  encouraging  the  seizure  of  control  of  private  enterprises  by  the 
workers  under  the  banner  of  his  socialist  revolution.  "  The  economic  shortcomings  of  this 
form  of  industrial  organisation  soon  became  apparent,  and  nationalisation  provided  an 
opportunity  to  reassess  this  management  structure.  Lenin  argued  that  workers'  control  of 
nationalised  enterprises  was  no  longer  necessary  because  the  Soviet  state  itself  comprised  a 
dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  and  as  such  could  be  trusted  with  safeguarding  their  interests  as 
the  new  owner  of  these  organisations. 
Lenin  developed  the  idea  of  one-man  management  as  early  as  1918.  In  his  "Current  Tasks  of 
Soviet  Power"  he  wrote:  "as  to  the  significance  of  one-man  management  of  dictatorship 
power,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  specific  tasks  of  the  present  moment  it  is  necessary  to 
note  that  all  large-scale  machine  industry 
...  requires  an  unconditional  and  strict  singular  will, 
directing  the  joint  work  of  hundreds,  thousands,  tens  of  thousands  of  people...  But  how  can  a 
strict  singular  will  be  ensured?  By  the  subordination  of  the  wills  of  a  thousand  to  the  will  of 
one.  vt49  However  in  1918,  despite  the  support  of  Trotsky,  Lenin  was  unable  to  change  the 
management  structure  of  collegiality  to  one  of  subordination  to  a  "single  will".  In  1918  a 
number  of  different  systems  of  management  operated  side-by-side.  In  some  instances, 
workers'  control  gave  way  to  trade  union  control,  and  in  others,  previous  managers  were 
compulsorily  retained  in  their  positions  but  were  required  to  run  the  plants  in  the  interests  of 
the  new  goverm-nent.  'o  During  this  time  Lenin  continued  to  argue  the  merits  of  one-man 
management:  at  the  2nd  All-Russian  Congress  of  Councils  of  National  Economy  in  December 
1918;  at  the  Th  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  a  year  later;  and  at  the  3'  All-Russian 
Congress  of  Councils  of  National  Economy.  It  was  only  after  the  victory  of  the  Red  Army  in 
the  civil  war  and  the  subsequent  consolidation  of  Soviet  power  that  the  principle  of  one-man 
management  came  to  be  accepted.  It  was  formally  approved  at  the  9th  Congress  of  the 
Communist  Party  in  April  1920  when,  in  the  midst  of  industrial  crisis,  the  concept  of 
worker's  control  and  the  principle  of  collegiality  as  elements  of  the  management  of  industry 
were  finally  cast  aside.  From  the  9th  Congress  to  the  1980's,  one-man  management  was  a 
central  principle  of  state  industrial  organisation  and  was  most  notably  recognised  in  the 
47  See  John  L.  H.  Keep,  Ae  Russian  Revolution,  A  Study  in  Mass  Mobilization  (Wiedenfeld  and 
Nicholson:  1976),  chapter  21  (The  Factory  Committees  and  "Workers'  Control"). 
48  See,  0  Rabochern  Kontrole,  SU  (1917-1918),  no.  3,  item  35. 
49  36  Lenin  200. 
50  See,  Silvana  Malle,  7he  Economic  organization  of  War  Communism  1918-1921  (Cambridge  University 
Press:  1985),  chapter  3. 
-29- resolution  of  5  September  1929  "On  Measures  to  Regularise  the  Administration  of  Production 
51 
and  Establish  One-man  Management". 
IVL 
Khozraschee'  While  the  single  manager  was  obliged  to  run  the  state  industrial  organisation  in 
accordance  with  the  requirements  of  the  state  plan,  he  also  had  to  operate  its  activities  on  the 
basis  of  "economic  accountability"  (a  literal  translation  of  the  Russian  term  of  art, 
"khoyaistvennyi  raschet",  or  "khozraschet"  for  short).  Where  khozraschet  applied,  a  state- 
owned  juridical  person  at  the  time  of  its  creation  was  given  sufficient  resources  for  its 
continued  operation  and  was  removed  from  the  state  system  of  financing.  "  Thereafter,  with 
the  exception  of  small  payments  to  the  budget,  the  juridicial  person  was  expected  to  cover  its 
expenses  with  its  income  and  would  not  be  (or  would  be  less)  dependent  on  the  state  for 
continued  subsidy.  " 
The  principle  of  khozraschet  was  formulated  during  NEP,  much  later  than  those  of  centralised 
planning  and  one-man  management.  The  10'  All-Russian  Conference  of  the  Communist  Party 
held  in  Moscow  between  26-28  May  1921  approved  the  principle  of  "broadening  of  the 
autonomy  and  initiative  of  every  large-scale  enterprise  in  matters  of  disposition  of  financial 
assets  and material  resources"  and  directed  Sovnarkom  to  draw  up  the  appropriate  decrees  to 
further  this  policy.  "  Two  decrees  followed:  the  Basic  Provisions  Relating  to  Measures  For  the 
Revitalisation  of  Large-Scale  Industry  and  the  Raising  and  Development  of  Production;  and 
On  Khozraschet.  56  The  former  noted  in  article  1a  new  form  of  industrial  organisation: 
"enterprises  organised  on  the  principles  of  khozraschet".  These  two  pieces  of  legislation  set 
out  the  principles  for  the  future  operation  of  khozraschet.  " 
51  Resheniya  Partii  i  Pravitel'stva  po  Khozyaistvennym  Voprosam,  Tom  2  (Izdatel'stvo  Politicheskoi 
Literatury:  1967),  p.  125. 
52  The  rationale  and  role  of  khozraschet  is  examined  in  more  detail  in  the  first  part  of  Chapter  3. 
53  Some  textbooks  made  the  distinction  between  khozraschet  as  an  "economic  category"  and  as  a  "method  of 
management".  The  economic  category  was  used  to  distinguish  socialist  enterprises  and  hence  suitable  for 
khozraschet,  from  capitalist  enterprises  based  on  private  property  which  were  not  (see,  I0iozyaistvennoe 
Pravo  (Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskaya,  Literatura:  1977),  pp.  129-130). 
54  See,  Emile  Bums,  Russia's  Productive  4stem  (Victor  Gollancz  Ltd:  1930),  p.  48. 
55  Supra  n.  11,  p.  575.  On  the  origins  of  state  enterprise  operating  on  the  basis  of  khozraschet,  see  supra  n.  27 
(1957),  pp.  109-117. 
56  Osnovnye  Polozheniya  o  Merakh  k  Vosstanovleniyu  Krupnoi  Promyshlennosti  i  Podnyatiyu  i  Razvitiyu 
Proizvodstva,  SU  (192  1),  no.  63,  item  462,  and  0  Khozraschete,  SU  (1922),  no.  4,  item  43. 
57  On  the  origin  of  the  principle  of  khozraschet  generally,  see,  AN.  Venediktov,  Gosudarstvennaya 
Sotsialisticheskaya  Sobstvennost'  (Izdatel'stvo  Akademii  Nauk  SSSR:  1948),  pp.  443-472;  and  on  the  early 
decrees  on  trusts  relating  to  the  development  of  khozraschet  and  commentary  generally  see,  AEP  i 
AMozraschet  (Ekonomika:  1991). 
-30- Khozraschet  appeared  in  most  pieces  of  civil  legislation  relating  to  the  industrial  economy 
from  the  mid-1920s  onwards  and  was  enshrined  in  the  1961  Programme  of  the  Communist 
Party  which  provided  that  "it  is  necessary  to  really  strengthen  khozraschet,  to  strive  for  a 
stricter  economy  and  thrift,  the  reduction  of  waste,  the  lowering  of  cost  price  and  the 
increasing  of  profitability  of  production".  58  Furthermore  the  Brezhnev  Constitution,  in  article 
16,  mentioned  that  "khozraschet,  profit,  cost  of  production  and  other  economic  levers  and 
stimuli"  were  to  be  used  in  carrying  out  the  instructions  of  centralised  management. 
Khozraschet  was  subsequently  used  in  a  number  of  other  contexts  in  addition  to  its  original 
role.  "  In  particular  "internal  khozraschet"  was  applied  to  the  operation  of  subdivisions  of  an 
enterprise  or  association  which  were  not  necessarily  juridical  persons  in  their  own  right. 
Internal  khozraschet  was  aimed  at  ensuring  that  a  subdivision  would  have  sufficient  resources 
allocated  to  it  to  be  in  a  position  to  satisfy  the  requirements  imposed  upon  it  through  the  plan. 
Democratic  Centralism  The  balance,  tensions  and  ambiguities  between  the  centralising 
principles  (eg  one-man  management)  and  the  decentralising  or  "democratic"  principles  (eg 
khozraschet)  within  the  Soviet  polity  and  economy  were  perhaps  best  expressed  by  the  concept 
of  "democratic  centralism".  "  Democratic  centralism  had  been  used  to  describe  the  operations 
of  the  Communist  Party  since  its  early  days.  The  5'  party  conference  in  London  in  1907  noted 
that  the  organisation  of  the  party  "shall  be  built  on  the  principles  of  democratic  centralism".  61 
A  definition  was  developed  in  article  18  of  the  1934  Communist  Party  Statute  which  explained 
democratic  centralism  as  "(a)  the  electability  of  all  leading  organs  of  the  party  from  the 
highest  to  the  lowest;  (b)  periodic  accountability  of  party  organs  before  their  party 
organisations;  (c)  strict  party  discipline  and  subordination  of  the  minority  to  the  majority;  and 
(d)  the  absolute  binding  nature  of  decisions  of  the  highest  organs  over  the  lowest  and  upon  all 
members  of  the  party"  - 
62  This  principle  eventually  found  expression  in  the  Brezhnev 
Constitution.  Article  3  of  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  described  democratic  centralism  in  the 
58  KPSS  v  Rezolyutsiyakh  i  Resheniyakh  S"ezdov,  Konferentsii  i  Plenum"  TsK,  Tom  8  (Izdatel'stvo 
Politicheskoi  Literatury:  1972),  p.  264. 
59  These  included  internal  khozraschet,  administrative  khozraschet  as  well  as  khozraschet  of  the  production 
system  as  a  whole;  khozraschet  of  the  economic  system  as  a  whole;  khozraschet  in  organs  of  economic 
administration  (supra  n.  42,  pp.  124-136). 
60  See  Sovetskaya  Sotsialisticheskaya  Demokratiya  (Izdatel'stvo  Nauk:  1963),  pp.  145-156.  On  the  seven 
different  spheres  to  which  the  principle  of  democratic  centralism  was  applied,  see  Sovetskoe 
Administrativnoe  Pravo  (Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1973),  p.  33.  See  also,  D.  D.  Tsabriya, 
Demokratichesii  Tsentralizm:  Nekotorye  Voprosy  Teorii  i  Praktiki,  SGiP  (1986),  no.  1,  p.  30. 
61  Supra  n.  11,  p.  170. 
62  KPSS  v  Rezolyutsiyakh  i  Resheniyakh  S"ezdov,  Konferentsii  i  Plenumov  TsK,  Chast'  III  (Gosudarstvennoe 
Izdatel'stvo  Politicheskoi  Literatury:  1954),  pp.  235-6. 
-31  - political  arena  as  "the  electability  of  all  organs  of  state  power  from  the  bottom  to  the  top,  their 
accountability  to  the  people  and  the  binding  nature  of  decisions  of  the  superior  organs  on  the 
inferior";  and  in  the  economic  area  as  a  principle  which  "shall  combine  unified  direction  with 
initiative  and  creative  activity  at  the  grassroots  level  with  the  responsibility  of  each  state  organ 
and  official  for  the  matters  to  which  they  have  been  entrusted".  Article  15  of  the  Brezhnev 
Constitution  expanded  this  concept  providing  that  "the  direction  of  the  economy  shall  be 
carried  out  on  the  basis  of  state  plans  ...  combining  centralised  management  [on  the  one  hand] 
with  the  economic  independence  and  initiative  of  enterprises  ... 
khozraschet,  profit,  cost  of 
production  and  other  economic  levers  and  stimuli  [on  the  other].  " 
As  such,  the  principle  of  democratic  centralism  embodied  a  number  of  the  tensions  within  the 
Soviet  polity  and  economy:  between  centralisation  and  decentralisation  within  the  macro- 
economy;  63  and  also,  within  the  micro-economy,  between  administrative  orders  (based  on  the 
plan)  and  "market"  mechanisms  (such  as  profit  and  incentives  realised  through  the  law  of 
contract).  Democratic  centralism  was  simply  a  fulcrum  upon  which  such  a  balance  could  be 
struck  from  time  to  time.  It  was  therefore  an  adaptable  and  flexible  principle,  and,  as  will  be 
shown  in  this  study,  was  applied  by  the  Soviet  regime  to  the  very  different  governance 
regimes  of  the  confirmation  enterprises,  the  collective  farms  and  the  participation  enterprise. 
State  Discipline  and  Socialist  Legality  While  democratic  centralism  balanced  instruction  and 
autonomy,  the  principles  of  discipline  and  legality  ensured  that  the  balancing  act  would  not  at 
any  time  threaten  the  perpetuation  of  the  regime  itself.  Both  discipline  and  an  adherence  to 
socialist  legality  had  their  roots  in  the  Stalin  "red  terror"  years  of  the  thirties  and  Vyshinsky's 
legal  doctrine.  '  As  a  1953  legal  dictionary  defined  the  term:  "Socialist  legality  is  one  of  the 
fundamental  methods  for  the  securing  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  reflected  in  the 
unconditional  and  exact  compliance  by  all  state  agencies,  officials  and  citizens  with  the  laws 
and  other  normative  acts  of  the  socialist  state".  65  This  definition  extended  the  requirement  of 
"exact  compliance"  only  to  agencies,  officials  and  citizens  of  the  state  but  not  to  the  state 
itself,  which  in  accordance  with  the  concept  of  socialist  legality,  defined  the  boundaries  of 
"the  legal"  without  being  subject  to  them.  Legislative  enactments  therefore  became  a  tool  of 
the  state,  a  series  of  rules  expressing  state  policy  and  ideology  that  had  to  be,  and  should  be, 
63  See  infra  Chapter  3. 
64  In  general,  see  Pravovye  Garantii  Zakonnosti  v  SSSR  (Izdatel'stvo  Akademii  Nauk  SSSR:  1961).  For  an 
account  of  the  performance  of  Vyshinsky  at  the  "greatest  trial  of  all",  see  Robert  Conquest,  Yhe  Great 
Terror.  -  a  Reassessment  (Hutchinson:  1968),  chapter  12. 
65  Yuri&cheskii  Slovar'  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1953),  p.  632  [emphasis 
added].  As  to  the  suppression  of  democratic  process  and  fractionalism  in  early  Soviet  history,  see  infra 
Section  6.3.3. 
-32- obeyed  and  "socialist  legality"  expressed  a  crude  form  of  absolute  positivism  giving  rise  to  a 
legal  system  without  any  intrinsic  norms  or  values  in  and  of  itself.  " 
The  Communist  Party  While  the  administration  of  the  Soviet  economy  was  embedded  in  the 
aforementioned  principles,  the  co-ordination  of  that  economy  through  law  was  supervised  and 
policed  by  the  Communist  Party  in  all  its  manifestations:  from  the  Politburo  down  to  local 
factory  committees.  "  Study  of  the  history  and  role  of  the  Communist  Party  was  compulsory 
for  all  Soviet  students,  "  and  its  organisation  shadowed  that  of  the  state  political 
administration:  69The  apex  of  the  Party  and  the  polity  was  the  point  of  de  facto  merger  of 
these  two  administrations:  the  General  Secretary  of  the  Communist  Party  was  usually  also  the 
Chairman  of  the  Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  and  as  such,  the  Head  of  State.  In  addition 
to  its  structure,  in  terms  of  actual  legislation,  important  decrees  were  sometimes  adopted 
jointly,  by  the  USSR  Council  of  Ministers  (ie  the  Soviet  state  government)  and  the  Communist 
Party.  The  Communist  Party  was  the  only  party  permitted  to  operate  within  the  Soviet 
political  system  and  its  position  was  enshrined  in  the  famous  (or  infamous)  article  6  of  the 
Brezhnev  Constitution  as  the  "guiding  and  directing  force  of  Soviet  society,  the  nucleus  of  its 
political  system".  No  understanding  of  the  application  of  Soviet  law  in  practice  would  have 
been  complete  without  an  appreciation  of  the  breadth  of  influence  that  this  shadow  power  had 
in  the  political  system  as  a  whole,  and  hence  in  the  operation  and  interpretation  of  sometimes 
broadly  permissive  and  flexible  legislative  provisions. 
The  Feudal  Nature  of  the  Stalin  Economic  Settlement  These  general  principles  can  be 
sunimarised  by  viewing  the  Soviet  state  as  a  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  based  upon  state 
ownership  and  control  of  the  means  of  production  and  manifested  through:  on  the  one  hand, 
one-man  management,  state  discipline,  socialist  legality  and  the  informal  controls  of  the 
66  The  political  system  was  by  contrast  based  on  an  ideology;  and  in  accordance  with  traditional  Marxist 
theory,  this  ideology  informed  the  elaboration  of  the  legal  system  based  on  socialist  legality.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  that  the  word  "legality"  ("zakonnost"')  in  Russian  derives  from  the  word  zakon  (meaning  "positive 
law")  as  opposed  to  the  word  pravo  (meaning  "Law")  -  and  thus  socialist  legality  required  absolute 
obedience  to  positive  laws  enacted  by  the  state  without  further  evaluation  or  review  with  reference  to  any 
"higher"  notions  of  "Law"  or  "constitutionality".  This  is  derived  from  the  Roman  law  distinction  between 
"lex"  and  "ius". 
67  See  Leonard  Schapiro,  Yhe  Conununist  Pany  of  the  Soviet  Union  (Methuen  &  Co  Ltd:  1970). 
68  Stalin's  "Short  Course  on  the  History  of  the  All-Union  Communist  Party  (the  Bolsheviks)"  published  in 
1938  became  a  classic  of  Soviet  political  literature  and  was  compulsory  reading.  It  was  reprinted  a  number 
of  times  (for  example,  Istofiya  Vsesoyuznoi  Kommunisticheskoi  Partii  (Bol'shevikov)  -  Kratkii  Kurs 
(Gospolizdat:  1952)).  A  more  detailed  history  in  several  volumes  commenced  publication  in  1964  (Istoriya 
Konununisticheskoi  Partii  Sovetskogo  Soyuza  (Izdatel'stvo  Politicheskoi  Literatury:  1964)). 
69  As  Lenin  was  quick  to  acknowledge,  "we  all  know  that  as  the  governing  party,  we  could  not  help  ftising 
the  Soviet  structures  with  the  party  structures  -  with  us  they  are  ftised  and  will  so  be"  (43  Lenin  15). 
-33- Communist  Party;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  an  opportunity  for  incentivisation  and  devolved 
decision  making,  effected  by  way  of  the  principles  of  democratic  centralism  and  khozraschet. 
In  this  way  a  balance  between  centralising  and  decentralising  principles  was  constructed 
around  the  central  spine  of  the  Stalin  economic  settlement,  namely  state  ownership  and  state 
control  of  the  means  of  production. 
For  the  purposes  of  understanding  its  influences  on  the  foundations  of  the  law  on  industrial 
organisations,  it  is  helpful  to  conceive  of  this  settlement  not  just  in  terms  of  a  comparison  with 
existing  common  and  civil  law  systems,  but  with  the  legal  system  of  English  feudalism  and  its 
legacy.  Although  the  author  knows  of  no  examples  of  a  comparison  having  been  made 
between  English  feudal  law  and  the  Soviet  spine  of  state  ownership,  the  similarities  are  self- 
evident  once  suggested.  Indeed  Plekhanov  had  warned  Lenin  as  early  as  1904  that  his 
. 
70  ideology  confused  "a  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  with  a  dictatorship  over  the  proletariat". 
and  early  critics  of  the  Soviet  regime  actually  referred  to  it  specifically  as  "  military-  feudal 
exploitation",  "party  feudalism",  "a  formless  conglomerate  constituted  from  feudal 
princedoms,  amongst  which  we  would  name  the  "Pravda"  princedom,  the  VTsSPS 
princedom,  the  princedom  of  the  secretariat  of  IKKI,  the  princedom  of  NKPS,  the  princedom 
of  VSNKh  etc".  71 
As  in  the  English  feudal  regime,  72  Soviet  power  politics  and  ideology  attempted  to  vest 
ownership  of  all  the  means  of  production  of  the  Soviet  economic  system  in  a  single  source, 
fisc  or  weal.  In  the  feudal  system,  the  means  of  production  comprised  only  land,  and  the 
single  source  was  the  king.  Despite  possible  early  origins  in  comitatus,  -  the  patrocinium,  the 
precaria  and  grants  by  the  crown  in  the  Merovingian  dynasty  in  France,  the  English  feudal 
system  can  be  primarily  traced  to  the  conquest  of  England  by  William  the  Conqueror  in  1066 
and  hence  his  acquisition  by  conquest  of  all  land.  There  was  no  possibility  for  allodial 
73  holdings  thereafter.  Chief  lords  were  then  "allocated"  land  in  return  for  the  incidents  of  that 
tenure  '74  originally  the  knight  service  7'  and  they,  in  turn  "subinfeudated"  their  holdings  to 
70  In  his  article  "Centralism  or  Bonapartism"  (G.  V.  Plekhanov,  Sochineniya,  vol  xiii,  p.  90-91).  The  final 
chapter  of  Trotsky's  "Our  Political  Tasks"  was  also  titled  "The  Dictatorship  over  the  Proletariat"  (quoted 
in  E.  H.  Carr,  77ze  Bolshevik  Revolution  1917-1923,  Volume  One  (1950,  reprinted  Macmillan:  1978),  p.  32- 
33). 
71  KPSS  v  Rezolyutsiyakh  i  Resheniyakh  S"ezdov,  Konferentsii  i  Plenumov  TsK,  Chast'  H  (Gosudarstvennoe 
Izdatel'stvo  Politicheskoi  Literatury:  1954),  p.  558,562. 
72  See  J.  L.  Bolton,  Yhe  Medieval  English  Economy  1150-1500  (J.  M.  Dent  &  Sons  Ltd:  1980),  and 
M.  M.  Postan,  Yhe  Medieval  Economy  and  Society  (Penguin  Books:  1972). 
73  M-T.  Clanchy,  England  and  its  Rulers  1066-12  72  (Fontana  Press:  1983),  p-  82. 
74  "Tenure  belongs  to  a  smaller  world  in  which  there  is  no  need  and  no  room  for  abstract  ideas  like 
ownership.  Rights  are  dependent  upon  a  lord  seen  as  having  total  control  of  his  lordship.  A  tenant  is  in 
-34- it  mesne"  (or  middle)  tenants  in  return  for  services  to  them.  This  produced  chains  of  land- 
"holding"  while  preserving  a  single  "owner"  of  all  land  (ie  the  King).  76  In  legal  terms,  1917 
can  be  viewed  as  Russia's  1066.  Russia  was  still  an  agrarian  economy  and  it  was  perhaps 
therefore  no  coincidence  that  among  the  first  decrees  that  Lenin  famously  adopted  on 
8  November  1917  were  those  "On  Land"  and  "On  Peace".  In  the  same  way  that  the  Soviet 
state  had  seized  power  in  1917,  promising  peace  and  taking  eventual  control  over  the  means 
of  production,  so  too  had  the  feudal  English  crown  in  1066. 
While  the  feudal  analogy  should  not  be  stressed  in  all  aspects  and  a  detailed  comparison  of 
these  two  systems  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study,  the  similarities  between  them  are 
instructive  in  assisting  an  understanding  of  a  legal  system  predicated  upon  a  single  owner  of 
the  means  of  production  (the  king  or  the  state);  with  many  holders  of  tenures  (vassals  or 
enterprises);  and  where  the  means  of  production  (land  in  the  feudal  case,  the  industrial 
economy  and  land  in  the  Soviet  case)  are  allocated  without  ownership  to  others  (thereby 
giving  rise,  in  the  feudal  case,  to  the  lord-tenant  relationship  through  subinfeudation;  and  in 
the  Soviet  case,  the  state-state  enterprise  relationship  through  operative  management").  While 
the  feudal  relationship  was  defined  by  "incidents"  of  tenure,  the  socialist  relationship  was 
defined  by  different  "incidents"  imposed  by  the  state,  namely  obligatory  administrative 
instructions  prescribed  pursuant  to  a  state  plan.  And  in  this  way  the  Soviet  legal  system 
contemplated  both  "administrative  law"  or  "economic  law"  relationships  (a  product  of  the 
logic  of  the  quasi  feudal  ownership  system)  and  "civil  law"  relationships,  marking  the 
traditional  balance  between  economic  and  civil  law,  instruction  and  contract,  centralisation 
and  "democracy" 
2.3  The  Soviet  Law  on  Ownership 
The  feudal  framework  of  "tenures"  was  reflected  in  the  Soviet  law  on  ownership  through  the 
concepts  of  "forms  of  ownership"  and  "operative  management".  A  theoretical  evaluation  of 
this  system  has  been  left  for  subsequent  Chapters,  and  for  present  purposes,  this  Section 
by  the  lord's  allocation.  He  can  have  no  more  by  way  of  title,  unless  it  is  some  obligation  on  the  lord  to 
keep  him  in,  or  to  admit  his  successors.  He  cannot  by  his  own  transaction  confer  whatever  title  he  has 
upon  another.  And  he  cannot  by  himself  engage  in  dispute  about  the  land:  in  principle,  the  lord  must 
decide  who  is  to  be  his  tenant.  "  (S.  F.  C.  Milsom,  Historical  Foundations  of  the  Common  Law  (2'  ed., 
Butterworths:  1981),  p.  100). 
75  A.  L.  Poole,  Doomesday  Book  to  Magna  Carta  1087-1216  (2ded.,  Oxford  University  Press:  1955),  p.  15. 
76  Indeed  the  present  system  of  English  land  law  is  still  based  upon  the  concept  of  tenures.  The  freeholder 
while  "holding"  the  "fee  simple  absolute  in  possession"  is  still  seised  of  the  land  which  "escheats"  to  the 
crown  propter  defectum  sanguinis  and  propter  delictum  tenentis  (Charles  Harpum,  Megarry  &  Wade,  The 
Law  of  Real  Property  (61  ed.,  Sweet  &  Maxwell:  2000),  p.  17). 
77  See  infra  Section  2.3.1. 
-35- presents  a  summary  of  the  basic  positive  law  with  a  view  to  understanding  the  role,  or  more 
properly  the  absence  of  the  role,  of  the  "nature  of  the  ownership  interest"  in  traditional  Soviet 
law.  This  is  then  further  developed  in  Section  2.5. 
Market  orientated  legal  systems  traditionally  adopt  the  concept  of  the  "generic  owner  t,  78  upon 
which  is  developed  a  "law  of  property".  On  this  basis,  different  legal  regimes  may  apply  to 
different  types  of  property.  Rights  of  any  owner  are  then  defined  by  reference  to  the 
relationship  between  the  generic  owner  and  the  property,  and  most  importantly  whether  the 
rights  comprising  that  relationship  amount  to  "title".  " 
The  emphasis  in  the  Soviet  legal  system  lay  elsewhere.  In  contrast  to  a  "law  of  property  it 
based  on  the  generic  owner  and  title,  Soviet  law  developed  a  "law  on  ownership"  which 
prescribed  different  ownership  regimes  depending  upon  the  "identity"  of  the  particular  owner 
(irrespective  of  the  type  of  property  in  question). 
The  positive  Soviet  law  on  ownership  was  almost  exclusively  set  out  in  the  constitution  and 
the  1961  FPCivL  (then  elaborated  in  the  civil  codes).  While  the  theory  of  ownership  was  the 
subject  of  numerous  treatises  in  the  Soviet  period,  until  1990,  there  was  no  separate  "act"  or 
it  80  "law"  on  ownership,  and  there  were  no  subordinate  enactments  specifically  "on  ownership  . 
This  was  presumably  because  "ownership"  was  viewed  as  a  conceptual  structure  capable  of 
complete  elaboration  in  the  civil  codes  themselves  without  the  need  for  more  detailed 
legislation. 
Under  Soviet  law,  the  so-called  "forms  of  ownership"  sought  to  define  the  concept  of 
"ownership"  by  reference  to  the  fisc  ("dostoyanie")  and  the  "holding"  of  property  by 
allocation.  "  The  "form  of  ownership"  was  the  ideological  doctrine  that  lay  at  the  heart  of 
Soviet  civil  law  giving  legal  expression  to  the  notion  of  the  state  ownership  of  the  means  of 
production,  state  planning  and  the  classification  of  subjects  of  civil  law.  "  Most  broadly, 
according  to  Marxist  political  doctrine,  forms  of  ownership  were  the  product  of  the  applicable 
78  All  owners  irrespective  of  their  identity  are  considered  equally  capable  of  owning  rights  (with  limited 
exceptions:  eg  minors  whose  rights  are  curtailed  generally  by  civil  law). 
79  "Title  is  a  shorthand  term  used  to  denote  the  facts  which,  if  proved,  will  enable  a  plaintiff  to  recover 
possession  or  a  defendant  to  retain  possession  of  a  thing  ...  the  term  "absolute"  is  here  used  as  meaning 
that  the  title  cannot  be  defeated  and  also  that  it  is  not  relative"  (F.  H.  Lawson  and  Bernard  Rudden,  77ze 
Law  of  Propeny  (2'  ed.,  Clarendon  Press:  1982),  p.  44  and  45). 
80  On  the  1990  Ownership  Law,  see  infra  Chapter  7,  in  particular  Section  7.4. 
81  Supra  n.  4  (1982),  pp.  210-212. 
82  Supra  n.  27  (1958),  p.  269,  distinguishing  between  the  economic  and  legal  meanings  of  the  term 
of  ownership". 
-36- stage  of  societal  development:  the  socialist  mode  of  production  gave  rise  to  a  particular 
economic  system  based  on  the  socialist  form  of  ownership,  in  contrast  to  private  ownership 
that  existed  under  the  capitalist  mode  of  production.  " 
Civil  legislation  attempted  to  reduce  this  political  theory  to  the  legal  by  providing  for  two 
principal  forms  of  ownership:  socialist  ownership  and  personal  ownership.  '  As 
aforementioned,  whether  any  property  fell  within  socialist  ownership  or  personal  ownership 
depended  primarily  on  the  identity  of  the  owner  -  thus  the  concept  of  "forms  of  ownership" 
provided  the  doctrinal  basis  for  distinguishing  different  regimes  for  the  owning  of  identical 
ob  ects  by  different  owners.  The  law  thereby  protected  the  ownership  of  different  owners  in  j 
relation  to  the  same  types  of  property  in  different  ways.  85 
By  contrast  with  the  forms  of  ownership,  the  "right  of  ownership"  was  the  manifestation  of 
that  economic  base  or  mode  of  production  in  the  form  of  positive  rights.  "  The  scope  of  any 
"right  of  ownership"  was  defined  by  Soviet  law  in  terms  of  the  traditional  Romanist  triad:  the 
right  of  possession,  use  and  disposition.  "  This  characterisation  was  inherited  from  pre- 
revolutionary  Russian  law;  "  and  Soviet  civil  law  provided  that  these  rights  of  the  owner  arose 
"within  the  limits  established  by  law".  "  As  in  other  areas  of  Soviet  law,  the  existence  of  the 
right  of  ownership  did  not  necessarily  imply  the  factual  exercise  of  that  right  by  the  owner. 
For  example,  while  the  state  had  the  "right"  of  ownership  (including  the  right  of  possession) 
83  As  Marx  observed  "The  sum  total  of  these  relations  of  production  constitutes  the  economic  structure  of 
society,  the  real  foundation,  on  which  rises  a  legal  and  political  superstructure  and  to  which  correspond 
definite  forms  of  social  conscience"  (quoted  in  Maureen  Cain  and  Alan  Hunt,  Marx  and  Engels  on  Law 
(Academic  Press:  1979),  p.  52).  For  "in  [Marx]  saying  that  a  person  is  determined  by  his  class  status  one 
really  says  that  man  becomes  a  predicate  of  his  property"  (Shlomo  Avineri,  Re  Social  and  Political 
Aought  of  Karl  Marx  (Cambridge  University  Press:  1988),  p.  27). 
84  1961  FPCivL,  articles  20  and  25.  See  N.  D.  Egorov,  Tipy,  Vidy  i  Formy  Sobstvennosti  i  Prava 
Sobstvennosti  v  SSSR,  SGiP  (1985),  no.  5,  p.  60. 
85  Depending  on  the  applicable  form  of  ownership  involved  (and  hence  the  identity  of  the  owner),  different 
criminal  penalties  were  imposed  for  illegally  interfering  with  the  ownership  of  different  owners  (see  infra 
n.  939).  There  were  however  certain  types  of  property  that  could  only  be  owned  by  a  specific  identified 
owner.  For  example,  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  listed  certain  property  that  could  only  be  owned  by  the 
state  (see  infra  n.  96). 
86  See  supra  n.  27  (1958),  pp.  274-276  for  a  summary  of  the  principal  schools  of  thought  within  traditional 
Soviet  law  as  to  the  nature  of  the  right  of  ownership;  and  pp.  278-281  on  the  concept  of  private 
ownership. 
87  The  ius  utendi,  the  iusfruendi  and  the  ius  absutendi. 
88  The  triad  was  referred  to  by  Shershenevich  (G.  F.  Shershenevich,  Uchebnik  Russkogo  Grazhdanskogo  Prava 
(1907,  reprint  Spark:  1995),  p.  166)  and  was  in  the  pre-revolutionary  Digest  of  Laws  (volume  X(l),  article 
420). 
89  1961  FPCivL,  article  19;  and  RSFSR  CC,  article  92. 
-37- of  land  (all  of  which  was  in  state  ownership),  actual  possession  however  could  have  been 
granted  to  a  state  enterprise  for  a  temporary  period  of  time.  10 
2.3.1  State  Ownership  and  Ownership  of  State  Enterprises 
Socialist  ownership  was  divided  into  (i)  state  (all-people's)  ownership;  (ii)  collective  farm- 
cooperative;  and  (iii)  trade  union  ownership.  While  these  various  forms  and  kinds  of 
"ownership"  were  all  considered  to  be  "socialist  ownership",  article  11  of  the  Brezhnev 
Constitution  specifically  prescribed  state  ownership  to  be  "the  basic  form  of  socialist 
ownership". 
This  is  entirely  consistent  with  the  argument  that  the  feudal  spine  of  Stalin  economic 
settlement  comprised  principally  state  ownership  and  control  over  the  means  of  production 
and  the  allocation  of  state  resources  to  enterprises  and  others  without  the  right  of  ownership. 
Developing  this  reasoning,  it  shall  be  argued  that  the  "forms  of  ownership  regime"  was  an 
attempt  to  consolidate  the  principal  place  of  state  ownership  within  the  Soviet  economy;  and, 
more  importantly,  was  designed  to  identify  the  "permissible"  exceptions  to  the  principle  of 
state  ownership  and  to  restrict  the  scope  or  availability  of  such  exceptions.  " 
Although  state  ownership  is  perhaps  best  understood  by  reference  to  the  feudal  system,  it  was 
born  of  the  theory,  not  of  state  control,  but  of  "all-people's  control"  -  the  means  of  production 
were  expressed  to  be  held  as  "the  commonfisc  of  all  soviet  people  , 92  and  as  a  consequence  it 
was  regarded  that  the  exploitation  of  man  would  be  avoided,  9'  and  the  proper  development  of 
the  socialist  state  and  the  increasing  wealth  of  Soviet  citizens  would  be  assured.  9'  However 
because  the  Soviet  state  was  treated  by  definition  in  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  as  "an  all- 
people's  state"  where  class  conflict  had  been  eliminated,  there  was  in  theoretical  terms  no 
difference  between  state  ownership  and all-people's  ownership  and  hence  the  use  of  the  term 
"state  (all-people's)  ownership"  in  the  Brezhnev  Constitution.  9' 
90  Zenzel'noe  Pravo  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1949),  pp.  161-175.  This 
distinction  became  important  in  the  context  of  the  third  expression  of  the  participation  model  (see  infra 
Section  6.5.4). 
91  This  is  examined  in  more  detail  infra  Section  7.4.2.1. 
92  Brezhnev  Constitution,  article  11. 
93  Konsfitutsiya  SSSR  Polifiko-Pravovoi  Kommentarii  (Izdatel'stvo  Politicheskoi  Literatury:  1982),  p.  6  1. 
94  Kommentaiii  k  GK  RSFSR  (Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1969),  p.  132. 
95  On  the  fragmentation  of  the  concept  of  the  "all-people's  state"  see  infra  Chapter  6  generally  and  Section 
7.3  et  seq. 
-38- The  Brezhnev  Constitution  and  the  civil  codes  listed  property  that  comprised  exclusively  state 
ownership.  This  included  ownership  of  land  and  other  natural  resourcesl  the  basic  means  of 
production  in  industry,  construction  and  agriculture,  means  of  transport  and  communications, 
banks,  property  of  trade,  municipal  and  other  enterprises  organised  by  the  state.  " 
While  the  form  of  "state  ownership"  established  the  state  as  fisc,  it  was  the  concept  of 
it  operative  management"  that  provided  the  legal  mechanism  by  which  tenure  was  allocated  to 
state  enterprises  without  passing  ownership.  "  As  with  ownership,  "operative  management" 
also  conferred  on  the  operative  manager  the  triad  of  rights,  namely  possession,  use  and 
disposition.  However,  while  the  rights  of  the  owner  were  limited  only  by  law,  the  rights  of 
the  holder  of  property  by  way  of  operative  management  could  be  restricted  further,  by 
limitations  placed  by  the  owner  itself.  " 
Under  Soviet  law,  the  concept  of  the  ownership  by  the  state  "of  a  state  enterprise"  was 
relatively  simple  because,  although  the  state  enterprise  was  a  juridical  person  and  hence  a 
subject  of  civil  law,  it  was  at  the  same  time  treated  as  an  object  of  state  ownership.  99  An 
enterprise  therefore  was  simply  an  indivisible  object  of  the  law  on  ownership  and  this 
treatment  can  be  traced  back  to  the  Soviet  decrees  of  war  communism  years  on  the  lease  of 
"an  enterprise".  "  Therefore,  in  accordance  with  the  Brezhnev  Constitution,  "enterprises 
organised  by  the  state"  were  expressed  to  be  "located  in  ("nakhodyatsya")  the  exclusive 
ownership  of  the  state".  101  This  was  confirmed  by  their  treatment  in  the  RSFSR  CC,  which 
included  "enterprises"  within  article  95  which  set  out  the  "Objects  of  the  Right  of  State 
Ownership". 
2.3.2  Other  Forms  of  Ownership  -  Exceptions  and  Origins 
In  addition  to  state  ownership,  Soviet  law  recognised  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership, 
trade  union  ownership  and  personal  ownership  -  the  former  two  kinds  were  also  designated 
96  Brezhnev  Constitution,  article  11;  See  also,  1961  FPCivL,  article  21  and  RSFSR  CC,  article  95. 
97  Operative  management  is  considered  in  more  detail  infra  Section  3.4.2.  See  generally,  Yu.  K.  Tolstoi, 
Sotsialisticheskaya  Sobstevennost'  i  Operativnoe  Upravlenie  in  Problenzy  Grazhdanskogo  Prava  (Izdatel'stvo 
Leningradskogo  Ul-fiversiteta),  p.  39.  Apart  from  state  property  in  the  industrial  economy  allocated  by  means 
of  operative  management,  the  other  principal  element  of  the  means  of  production  was  land.  Again,  in 
common  with  the  feudal  principle,  Soviet  law  also  provided  for  the  allocation  of  land  without  ownership 
through  the  concept  of  "grants  of  use"  (see,  Sovetskoe  Zemel'noe  Pravo  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1986)). 
98  Khozyaistvennoe  Pravo  (Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1967),  pp.  63-66. 
99  The  mechanism  by  which  state  enterprises  held  property  is  considered  at  length  within  the  confirmation 
model  infra  Section  3.4.2  and  7.4. 
100  Infra  Section  6.1.4. 
101  Brezhnev  Constitution,  article  11  [emphasis  added]. 
-39- it  socialist  ownership"  - 
It  has  been  argued  that  all  of  these  "other"  forms  should  be  regarded  as 
"exceptions"  to  the  spinal  principle  of  ownership  residing  in  the  fisc  (ie  state  ownership),  and 
allocation  to  subjects  of  civil  law  by  way  of  operative  management  or  for  use,  in  each  case 
without  ownership. 
The  origins  of  these  "exceptions",  and  indeed  the  treatment  in  Soviet  law  of  the  industrial 
organisation  as  separate  from  the  agricultural  organisation,  can  be  regarded  as  a  product  of  the 
early  history  of  the  Soviet  regime.  The  forms  of  ownership  reflected  the  key  battlegrounds  of 
the  emerging  Stalin  economy  of  the  late  1920s  and  early  1930s.  Each  form  (other  than  that  of 
state  ownership)  had  a  corresponding  interest  group  that  needed  to  be  defined  and  confined  to 
ensure  the  victory  of  the  Stalin  socialist  state  and  economic  settlement.  Through  identifying 
and  regulating  each  of  these  exceptions  as  a  separate  "form  of  ownership",  the  Stalin  state 
could  effectively  limit  the  scope  of  ownership  (and  hence  economic  power)  of  each  exception. 
The  agriculture/industry  and  peasant/worker  distinctions  can  be  traced  as  far  back  as  the 
Petrine  reforms  and  the  early  debates  in  Russian  history  between  the  Slavophiles  and  the 
Westernisers.  By  the  late  nineteenth  century,  the  organisation  of  agriculture  and  the  related 
peasant  question,  and  the  industrialisation  of  Russia  generally,  became  two  principal  policy 
issues  for  the  Tsarist  regime.  The  distinction  between  agriculture  and  industry  found  its  way 
into  Russian  Marxist  revolutionary  thinking  of  the  time  which  was  split  between  those  who 
regarded  the  peasant  as  the  revolutionary  class  (such  as  the  narodniks)  and  those  who  rather 
turned  towards  the  proletariat  (such  as  the  Russian  Social-Democratic  Workers  Party,  later  to 
evolve  into  the  Bolshevik  Party). 
This  legacy  was  taken  up  by  Lenin  as  early  as  1904  in  his  "Two  Tactics  of  Social  Democracy 
in  the  Democratic  Revolution".  102  Lenin  saw  the  proletariat  as  the  universal  class,  but  realised 
that  only  a  "a  revolutionary-democratic  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  and  the  peasantry" 
would  be  able  to  overthrow  the  existing  bourgeois  government.  On  this  basis,  the  early 
decrees  of  the  Soviet  government  stressed  the  concept  of  an  "alliance"  between  the  proletariat 
and  the  peasantry.  103 
102  11  Lenin  1. 
103  A  "provisional  workers'  and  peasants'  government"  was  to  be  established  by  the  decree  "On  Peace" 
(supra  n.  26  (1957),  p.  46);  the  "Declaration  of  Rights  of  the  Toiling  and  Exploited  People"  opened  with 
the  words  "Russia  is  declared  a  republic  of  Soviets  of  workers',  soldiers'  and  peasants'  deputies"  (ibid, 
p.  102);  and  article  9  of  1918  RSFSR  Constitution  referred  to  the  "establishment  of  the  dictatorship  of  the 
urban  and  rural  proletariat  and  the  poorest  peasantry  ...... 
Indeed  the  split  and  alliance  between  the  peasant 
and  worker  as  different  elements  of  the  Soviet  state  survived  into  the  preamble  to  the  Brezhnev 
Constitution  which  referred  to  the  USSR  as  an  "alliance  of  the  working  class,  collective  farm  peasantry 
and  people's  intelligentsia". 
-40- Following  the  end  of  the  civil  war  and  the  consolidation  of  Soviet  power,  it  became  clear  that 
the  policy  requirements  of  agriculture  and  industry  were  seemingly  mutually  exclusive  and  yet 
the  development  of  both  was  key  to  the  success  of  the  Soviet  regime.  Like  the  opening  and 
closing  of  Trotsky's  scissors,  official  policy  throughout  the  1920s  vacillated,  first  in  terms  of 
NEP  (the  policy  of  "facing  the  countryside"  and  the  so-called  "wager  on  the  kulak")  and  then 
in  terms  of  industrialisation  and  the  planned  economy  (the  policy  of  "favouring"  the 
proletariat  coupled  with  the  socialist  industrial  offensive  and  collectivisation  of  agriculture). 
The  development  of  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership  and  personal  ownership  as 
exceptions  to  the  feudal  principle  of  state  ownership  reflected  two  principal  battlegrounds  in 
the  emerging  Stalin  economy  -  between  the  demands  of  industry  on  the  one  hand,  and  those  of 
agriculture  and  the  individual/the  collective  farm  household  (the  "kolkhoznyi  dvor")  on  the 
other.  104 
The  legacy  of  the  Tsarist  state  and  the  "peasant  question"  resolved  during  the  struggles  for  the 
establishment  of  a  "socialist"  economy  during  the  1920s  and  1930s  gave  rise  to  a  different 
economic  settlement  for  industry  and  agriculture.  Within  agriculture,  the  emergence  of  the 
central  place  of  the  "artel  form"  of  collective  farm  symbolised  that  fact  that  the  Soviet  polity 
was  prepared  to  recognise  the  personal  interests  of  the  collective  farmers  (or  former  Tsarist 
household  farm  (the  Vvor"))  as  separate  from  those  of  the  collective  farm  as  a  whole.  105And 
it  was  this  separation  of  interests  that  perhaps  ultimately  gave  rise  to  the  possibility  for  two 
distinct  exceptions  to  the  basic  principle  of  state  ownership. 
2.4  Collective  Farms,  Ownership  of  Collective  Farms  and  Personal  Ownership 
While  the  status  and  law  of  collective  farms  may  not  seem  to  be  of  direct  relevance  to  the  law 
on  industrial  organisations  (and  indeed  such  a  link  has  to  the  knowledge  of  the  author  never 
...........  -...  . .........  ...........  ---  ........  . ...  ............  ......  ----  .......  .....  . 
104  In  the  same  way  as  the  history  of  the  collectivisation  of  agriculture  and  the  rights  of  the  dvory  were 
instrumental  in  the  development  collective  farm-cooperative  and  personal  ownership,  the  history  of  the 
independent  trade  union  movement  led  by  Tomsky  and  its  overthrow  were  probably  instrumental  in 
explaining  the  "third  exception"  to  state  ownership,  trade  union  ownership. 
On  the  potential  threat  of  the  independent  trade  union  movement  to  the  consolidation  of  centralised  Soviet 
power  and  its  eventual  defeat  in  the  late  1920s  see,  E.  H.  Carr  &  R.  W.  Davies,  Foundations  of  a  Planned 
Economy  1926-1929,  Volume  One  (H)  (1969,  reprinted  Macmillan:  1978),  chapter  20.  It  was  perhaps  due 
to  this  threat  that  the  Stalin  Constitution  did  not  reserve  a  specific  category  for  the  ownership  of  trade 
unions  and  other  social  organisations.  By  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Brezhnev  Constitution,  the 
ubiquity  of  Soviet  power  had  been  established  and  trade  unions  had  effectively  been  absorbed  into  the 
Soviet  state  structure.  The  Brezhnev  Constitution  recognised  for  the  first  time  the  ownership  of  trade 
unions  and  other  social  organisations  as  a  specific  form  of  socialist  ownership  in  its  own  right,  perhaps  as 
a  legacy  of  another  key  battleground  of  the  1920s  and  its  effective  neutralisation  at  the  hands  of  the  Stalin 
and  Brezhnev  states. 
105  On  the  artel  and  the  history  of  cooperatives  and  the  collective  farm,  see  infra  Sections  2.4.1  and  6.1.3. 
-41- been  made  in  Soviet  or  western  legal  literature  or  doctrine),  it  shall  be  shown  in  later  Chapters 
of  this  study  that  the  law  of  collective  farms  and  its  attendant  ownership  regime  can  be 
regarded  as  of  decisive  significance  for  the  structure  and  models  of  the  perestroika  era 
industrial  organisations.  This  Section  sets  out  the  basic  background  necessary  for  the 
elaboration  and  exploration  of  this  link. 
It  may  be  most  appropriate  to  regard  the  right  of  the  Soviet  collective  farm  to  own  property  in 
its  own  separate  capacity  as  a  product  of  its  history  and  the  legal  compromises  made  by  the 
Soviet  state  during  the  process  of  the  collectivisation  of  agriculture.  The  massive  disruption  to 
peasant  life  as  a  consequence  of  the  collectivisation  drive  has  been  well  documented.  The 
strategy  of  the  Soviet  regime  was  neither  entirely  reasoned  in  advance  of  the  last  months  of 
1929,  nor  did  it  represent  a  continuing  uninterrupted  progression;  rather  the  collectivisation 
effort  resulted  from  brutal  coercion  punctuated  by  restraint,  remorse  and  the  re-assertion  of 
the  voluntary  principle  of  which  Stalin's  article  "Dizzy  with  Success"  of  19  March  1930  was 
perhaps  the  most  famous  example.  106  The  resulting  legal  framework  found  some  stability  with 
the  adoption  of  the  "Stalin  Agricultural  Artel  Charter"  in  February  1935,107  however  as 
Davies  rightly  commented:  "this  was  not  a  unified  or  even  a  coherent  system,  but  a  mixture  of 
different  systems  and  devices,  traditional  and  new,  introduced  piecemeal  in  the  course  of  the 
struggle  to  adapt  the  individual  peasant  to  the  new  collective  way  of  life".  108 
2.4.1  The  Collective  Farm  and  Collective  Farm  Ownership  -A  Combination  of  Social  and 
Personal  Interests 
The  essence  of  the  collectivisation  compromise  was  embodied  in  the  legislation  on  collective 
farms.  At  its  heartl  collective  farm  law  was  essentially  based  on  the  principle  of  "the 
combination  of  social  and  personal  interests".  109  While  the  nature  of  the  social  interests  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  personal  interests  on  the  other,  were  not  specifically  set  out  in  the 
legislation  or  textbooks,  the  "combination  of  ... 
interests"  can  be  summarised  as  set  out  below. 
The  compromise  was  best  illustrated  by  reference  to  the  provisions  of  the  1935  Artel  Charter 
which  was  drafted  while  the  impact  of  collectivisation  was  still  very  real  in  peoples'  minds. 
The  later  1969  Collective  Farm  Charter,  while  embodying  the  same  compromise,  reflected 
106  12  Stalin  191. 
107  Sbornik  Zakonodatellstva  po  Sel'skomu  KhozyaistvY,  Tom  I  (Rassylaetsya  po  spisku)  (Gosudarstvennoe 
Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1955),  p.  139. 
108  R.  W.  Davies,  7he  Soviet  Collective  Farm,  1929-1930  (Harvard  University  Press:  1980),  p.  167. 
109  Kolkhoznoe  Pravo  (Gosyurizdat:  1950),  p.  22. 
-42- more  of  the  underlying  reality,  namely  the  state's  ability  in  practice  "to  trump"  many  of  the 
formal  legal  "rights"  of  the  collective  farmers. 
"Social  Interests"  The  basic  interest  of  "the  social"  (ie  the  Soviet  state)  was  to  retain  de 
facto  control  over  the  agrarian  economy  while  at  the  same  time  legitimating  the 
collectivisation  drive  by  characterising  it,  in  ideological  terms,  as  "voluntary"  and 
stressing  that  the  "rights"  of  collective  farmers  were  "achieved"  through  their  rejection  of 
the  pre-revolutionary  agricultural  settlement  and  their  embrace  of  the  collective  farm 
compromise.  As  such,  collective  farms  were  characterised  as  "voluntary"  associations,  "0 
and  the  legislation  used  the  term  "social  interests"  as  a  euphemism  for  "state  interests", 
and  "  socialisation  "  as  a  euphemism  for  "  nationalisation  ".  1" 
"Personal  Interests  "  The  basic  interests  of  "the  personal"  (ie  the  personal  interests  of  the 
individual  collectivised  peasants  and  dvory)  were  characterised  initially  as  the  right  to 
retain  a  certain  level  of  autonomy  of  operations;  to  receive  compensation  for  work  done; 
and  to  retain  a  personal  landholding  separate  from  the  collective  farm,  which  could  be 
farmed  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  the  dvor. 
The  Artel  and  Personal  Ownership  While  the  1922  RSFSR  Land  Code  contemplated 
various  cooperative  forms  of  collective  agriculture,  following  the  first  mass 
collectivisation  drive  of  October  1929-March  1930,  Stalin  chose  the  artel  form  to  be  the 
110  See  A.  K.  R  Kiralfy,  Ae  History  of  Soviet  Collective  Farm  Legislation,  in  W.  E.  Butler  (ed.  ),  Russian 
Law:  Historical  and  Political  Perspectives  (Oceana:  1977),  p.  196:  "The  "voluntary"  character  of 
collectivization  was  always  officially  stressed,  even  in  the  days  of  forced  collectivization". 
On  the  origins  of  the  "socialisation  principle"  in  this  area,  see  supra  n.  22  (1948),  pp.  686-690  and  702- 
704.  "Socialisation"  as  a  concept  was  initially  devised  by  the  social  revolutionaries  as  a  term  for  placing 
all  land  in  the  "public  domain"  without  state  or  private  ownership.  It  was  used  by  Lenin  in  the  earliest 
days  of  Soviet  power  to  attract  a  broad  range  of  interest  groups  to  the  Bolshevik  cause  against  the  Tsarist 
supporters.  Fundamentally  however  Lenin  was  against  the  concept,  as  his  Bolshevik  state  was  to  be 
constructed  specifically  on  state  ownership  (and  not  its  absence).  On  the  use  of  "socialisation"  in  the 
initial  decrees  on  land  in  1917-1918  Lenin  pragmatically  commented  "it  does  not  matter  that  our  first 
decrees  were  written  by  social  revolutionaries  ...  when  carrying  out  this  decree  the  soul  of  which  was  in 
"socialisation"  of  land,  the  bolsheviks  have  stated  precisely:  it  is  not  our  idea,  we  do  not  agree  with  such 
a  slogan,  but  we  consider  it  to  be  our  duty  to  carry  it  out  because  it  is  demanded  of  the  prevailing 
majority  of  peasants"  (quoted  by  Gsovski,  ibid).  And  indeed  the  use  of  the  term  "socialisation"  in  relation 
to  land  was  dropped  as  early  as  February  1919  when  the  decree  "On  Socialist  Land  Construction  and  on 
Measures  to  Transferring  to  Socialist  Agriculture"  referred  in  article  1  to  land  as  "a  single  government 
reserve"  (Resheniya  Partii  i  Pravitel'stva  po  Khozyaistvennym  Voprosam,  Tom  1  (Izdatel'stvo 
Politicheskoi  Literatury:  1967),  p.  109). 
Although  socialisation  was  rejected  by  the  Bolsheviks  in  favour  of  centralisation  of  power  through 
nationalisation  and  state  ownership,  ideologically  it  again  provided  a  pragmatic  solution  to  the  legal 
characterisation  of  the  collectivisation  process.  The  term  "social  isation  "  survived  in  the  context  of 
collective  farms,  and  was  specifically  referred  to  in  the  1935  Artel  Charter  and  the  1969  Collective  Farm 
Charter.  See  infra  n.  116. 
-43- basis  for  the  development  of  collective  farming  and  this  was  embodied  in  the  1935  Artel 
Charter.  112  The  artel  form  represented  a  balance  between  the  social  and  personal 
interests:  assets  of  farmers  were  transferred  to  the  collective  farm  (and  split  between  an 
indivisible  fund  and  a  share  fund).  However,  farmers  did  retain  the  right  to  certain  assets 
for  their  personal  use.  "'  Both  the  1965  Artel  Charter  in  Section  III  and  the  1969 
Collective  Farm  Charter  in  Section  X  contained  detailed  provisions  on  the  right  of  the 
dvor  to  retain  the  use  of  a  personal  land  plot  and  the  right  of  the  dvor  to  own  property 
that  could  be  used  in  connection  with  the  farming  of  that  personal  plot  (including  a 
dwelling  and  agricultural  implements).  These  separate  rights  of  the  dvor  required  legal 
expression  and  hence  the  necessity  to  provide  for  a  "form  of  ownership"  separate  from 
"state  ownership".  This  may  therefore  have  been  in  part  the  origin  of  "personal 
ownership""'.  Thus  the  artel  form  at  its  core  illustrated  the  collective  farm  law 
compromise  where  the  former  peasants  and  members  of  pre-revolutionary  dvory  were 
collectivised  but  at  the  same  time  were  given  the  formal  legal  right  to  carry  out  certain 
limited  "personal"  agricultural  operations  and  to  own  assets  connected  with  the 
performance  of  such  operations. 
0  Collective  Fann  Ownership  The  collective  farm  created  in  the  form  of  the  artel  was  given 
the  status  of  a  juridical  person  and,  in  contrast  to  state  enterprises,  was  given  the  right  of 
ownership  of  property  "needed  for  them  to  carry  out  charter  tasks""'  -  ie  collective  farm- 
cooperative  ownership.  This  can  be  viewed  as  another  exception  to  the  principle  of  state 
ownership  of  the  means  of  production  and  was  probably  designed  to  evidence  the 
"voluntary"  principle.  While  the  means  of  production  in  the  industrial  economy  were 
simply  nationalised  into  state  ownership,  the  Soviet  state  "seizure"  or  collectivisation  of 
the  agrarian  economy  was  more  complex,  and  needed  to  be  "legitimated"  or  "veiled"  by 
means  of  a  different  legal  framework.  Thus  the  property  of  the  members  of  the  collective 
112  See  infra  Section  6.1.3  as  to  the  other  forms  of  cooperation  provided  in  the  1922  RSFSR  Land  Code:  the 
artel  was  in  fact  the  compromise  form  Ooint  tillage  resulted  in  shared  use  of  only  the  basic  equipment, 
but  otherwise  farmers  operated  autonomously;  and  the  agricultural  comm  resulted  in  pooling  of  all  14 
assets  and  income).  The  artel  had  its  origins  in  the  pre-revolutionary  "wolrýingmen's  cooperatives"  and 
also  formed  the  basis  for  the  simple  partnership  of  the  industrial  economy  as  set  out  in  the  1922  RSFSR 
Civil  Code  (infra  Section  4.1). 
113  Supra  n.  109,  p.  8. 
114  "Personal  ownership"  was  also  seen  as  the  "socialist"  successor  to  the  capitalist  form  of  "private 
ownership"  (see  infra  Section  2.4.3). 
115  Brezhnev  Constitution,  article  12.  Property  exclusively  in  state  ownership  could  not  be  in  collective  farm- 
cooperative  ownership,  but  could  be  allocated  to  the  collective  farm  for  use  (eg  land).  See 
Zakonodatel'stvo  ob  Immushchemennykh  Pravakh  i  Obyaznnostyakh  Kolkhozov  (Izdanie  Numerovannoe  - 
Rassylawya  po  Spisku)  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1953). 
-44- farm  was  characterised  as  having  been  "socialised"  into  the  "social  ownership"  of  the 
collective  farm,  regulated  by  the  form  of  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership: 
Doctrinally  the  former  assets  "of"  the  dvor  (in  which  the  peasants  in  a  household  were 
members)  were  transferred/socialised  into  the  "social"  ownership  of  the  collective  farm 
(in  which  those  peasants  then  became  members)  and  not  into  the  ownership  the  state 
itself.  116 
0  Membership,  Fees  and  Funds  On  joining  a  collective  farm,  peasants  became  "members". 
This  was  expressed  to  be  "voluntary".  The  1935  Artel  Charter  provided  for  the  following 
payments  that  were  associated  with  membership  ("  chlenstvo  "):  "' 
an  entry  fee  ("vstqpite1'nyi  vznos")  of  between  20-40  rubles  was  payable  to  the 
"indivisible  ftind"  ("nedefimyi  fond")  of  the  collective  farm;  and 
-  "socialisation"  of  a  half  to  a  quarter  of  the  property  of  a  member  by  way  of  transfer  of 
such  property  to  the  indivisible  fund;  and  "socialisation"  of  most  of  the  remainder  by 
way  of  transfer  of  such  property  to  the  "share  fund"  ("paevoi  fond").  The  wealthier 
peasants  had  a  greater  share  of  their  property  transferred  to  the  indivisible  fund.  All 
land  was  transferred  to  the  indivisible  fund. 
A  member  had  the  right  to  withdraw  from  a  collective  farm  whereupon  his  share  ("pai") 
of  the  share  fund  (but  not  of  the  indivisible  fund)  would  be  transferred  back  to  him.  The 
voluntary  nature  of  collectivisation  was  therefore  underlined  in  the  legislation  by  the  right 
to  withdraw,  and  the  fact  that  only  a  certain  portion  of  the  former  holdings  of  the  dvor 
was  irrevocably  socialised  (ie  the  property  transferred  to  the  indivisible  fund)  and  that  the 
rest  was  potentially  available  for  return. 
0  Collective  Farm  Democracy  The  origins  of  the  democratic  process  in  agriculture  can  be 
traced  to  the  pre-revolutionary  mir  (or  assembly)  constituted  by  dvory  where  the  heads  of 
the  households  attended  the  skhod.  The  administration  of  the  Soviet  collective  farm 
developed  from  these  institutions  and  indeed,  in  early  collective  farm  legislation,  the 
chairman  was  actually  called  the  "starosta"  (the  elder).  The  collective  farm  legal 
literature  explained  that  the  1935  Artel  Charter  was  based  on  "collective  farm 
116  Supra  n.  111.  The  1935  Artel  Charter  set  out  specifically  a  list  of  property  of  the  collective  farmers  that 
was  to  be  "socialised"  upon  joining  the  collective  farm  and  stated  that  the  remaining  property  was  to  be 
"in  the  personal  use  of  the  collective  farm  household  (dvor)"  (articles  4  and  5).  The  1969  Collective 
Farm  Charter  also  referred  to  the  "social  ownership  of  the  collective  farm"  (Section  IV).  On  the  early 
socialisation  of  the  property  of  the  dvory  into  the  ownership  of  the  collective  farm,  supra  n.  108,  pp.  68- 
115. 
117  1935  Artel  Charter,  articles  9  and  10. 
-45- democracy",  "the  principle  of  broad  autonomy  of  the  collective  farm  mass  and  the 
election  of  organs  of  administration  arising  from  the  essence  of  the  collective  farm  as  a 
voluntary  organisation  of  peasants  and  democratic  fundamentals  of  the  administration  of 
the  collective  farm.  ""'  The  principal  organs  were  the  general  meeting  of  the  collective 
farmers,  a  board  and  a  chairman  (elected  by  the  general  meeting),  and  an  audit 
committee.  Various  basic  powers  and  procedures  for  calling  meetings  were  also  set  out  in 
the  charters.  '  " 
0  Personal  Participation,  Payment  and  Incentives  In  contrast  to  the  payment  of  workers  in 
state  enterprises  who  received  fixed  wages,  the  collective  farm  wage  structure  was  based 
on  the  principle  of  developing  a  "material  interest  of  the  collective  farms  and  the 
collective  farmers  in  the  results  of  their  labour".  "O  Personal  participation  in  the  activity 
of  the  collective  farm  was  an  obligation,  "'  and  wages  were  initially  linked  to  the  number 
of  "labour  days  worked".  122 
0  Coercion  and  State  Control  State  control  over  the  activities  of  the  collective  farm  was  in 
practice  almost  absolute  despite  the  "compromise"  of  the  artel  form  which  seemingly 
provided  for  the  "autonomy"  of  the  collective  farmer  evidenced  by  voluntarily  accession 
to  the  collective  farm;  the  right  of  withdrawal  and  the  return  of  property  socialised  by 
way  of  transfer  to  the  share  fund;  the  right  to  participate  in  decision  making;  the  right  to 
receive  a  portion  of  the  profits;  and  the  right  to  a  personal  land  plot.  After  the 
consolidation  of  the  collectivisation  drive  in  the  1940s  and  1950s,  state  control  was 
gradually  extended,  and  the  1969  Collective  Farm  Charter  reflected  more  accurately  the 
situation  in  practice  and  reality. 
118  Supra  n.  109,  p.  21. 
119  See  1935  Artel  Charter,  Section  XI  (Organs  of  Management  and  Audit  Commission  of  a  Collective 
Farm)  and  1969  Collective  Farm  Charter,  Section  VIII  (Administration  of  Activities  of  the  Artel).  See 
generally,  I.  V.  Pavlov,  Ponyatie  i  Sushchestnost'  Kolkhoznykh  Pravootnoshenii  i  Rol'  Organov 
Upravleniya  i  Formirovanii  i  Razvitii  Etikh  Otnoshenii,  in  Voprosi  Kolkhoznogo  i  Zemel'nogo  Prava 
(Izdatel'stvo  Akademii  Nauk  SSSR:  195  1),  p.  73. 
120  Kolkhoznoe  Pravo  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1970),  p.  17. 
121  1935  Artel  Charter,  article  13,  and  1969  Collective  Farm  Charter,  articles  5  and  24. 
122  1935  Artel  Charter,  article  15.  On  early  law  of  payment  for  labour  in  collective  farms  see,  supra  n.  119, 
p.  257.  On  the  origins  of  the  labour  day  principle,  see  supra  n.  108,  chapter  7.  The  labour  day  payment 
procedure  eventually  gave  way  to  a  more  general  test  of  "quantity  and  quality  of  labour"  as  set  out  in 
1969  Collective  Farm  Charter,  article  27. 
-46- The  legal  and  ideological  doctrines  which  suggested  that  collectivisation  was  voluntary 
were  not  of  course  supported  by  the  history  of  the  1920s.  123  In  any  event,  by  the  1970s, 
the  creation  of  collective  farms  by  voluntary  means  (ie  at  the  initiative  of  collective 
farmers)  was  described  in  textbooks  as  part  of  their  initial  historical  origin,  and  that  in 
"current  times"  new  collective  farms  were  only  permitted  to  be  established  by  way  of 
merger  or  division  of  existing  farms.  12'  Termination  of  collective  farms  was  only  really 
considered  in  the  context  of  a  possible  transformation  into  a  state  farm;  125  and  while  the 
principle  of  withdrawal  was  still  implicitly  referred  to  in  article  7  of  the  1969  Collective 
Farm  Charter,  there  was  no  mention  of  the  share  ftind  or  the  right  to  receive  a  portion  of 
it  upon  withdrawal.  As  one  textbook  explained:  "the  relationship  between  the  indivisible 
ftinds  and  the  share  fees  became  entirely  changed.  The  specific  weight  of  the  former 
increased  uninterruptedly,  while  the  latter  fell;  and  in  the  final  account,  the  former 
became  maximised,  nearly  all-encompassing  and  the  latter  insignificant".  "' 
The  1969  Collective  Farm  Charter  embodied  a  doctrine  that  more  appropriately  reflected 
reality.  The  indivisible  fund/share  fund  distinction  was  simply  ignored  and  was  replaced 
by  the  more  usual  distinction  used  in  industrial  organisations,  between  basic  and 
circulating  funds, 
127 
which  was  described  to  be  "the  real  state  of  affairs". 
128  The 
123  On  the  creation  of  collective  farms  loffe  rather  cynically  commented:  "now  it  is known  all  over  the  world 
that  collective  farms  were  created  not  on  the  initiative  of  the  peasants,  in  conformity  with  the  law,  but  by 
illegal  coercion  directed  by  Stalin  and  his  henchman...  "  (Olimpiad  S.  Ioffe,  Soviet  Civil  Law  (Martinus 
Nijhoff  Publishers:  1988),  p.  35).  Ioffe  clearly  presented  a  relatively  simplistic  view  of  the  extremely 
complex  history  of  the  collectivisation  of  agriculture.  The  early  collective  farms  in  the  period  to  1928  were 
small  scale  and  generally  voluntary  in  nature.  There  was  little  sometimes  to  distinguish  them  from 
agricultural  cooperatives.  It  was  only  later  with  the  collectivistion  drive  that  coercive  elements  became 
more  widespread,  particularly  for  the  period  from  November  1929  to  March  1930.  Following  Stalin's 
"Dizzy  with  Success"  article  in  March  1930,  the  voluntary  principle  was  seemingly  restored  (See, 
R.  W.  Davies,  Yhe  Socialist  Offensive,  Ae  Collectivisation  of  Soviet  Agriculture,  1929-1930 
(Macmillan:  1980),  pp.  110,135,153,205-212,269  and  286). 
124  Kolkhoznoe  Pravo  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1973),  p.  3  9. 
125  A  treatise  devoted  to  "Collective  Farm  Legal  Relations"  only  had  one  page  of  text  on  the  "Foundations  of 
Termination  of  Collective  Farm  Legal  Relations"  and  merely  noted  "sometimes  individual  collective 
farms  are  transformed  into  state  farms"  (A.  A.  Puskol,  Kolkhoznye  Pravootnoshcheniya  v  SSSR 
(Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1960),  p.  14  1). 
126  Kolkhoznoe  Pravo  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1972),  p.  233. 
127  1969  Collective  Farm  Charter,  article  12  and  1961  FPCivL,  article  11.  One  textbook  on  collective  farm 
law  noted  that,  in  addition  to  state  aid,  general  production  and  rights  under  contracts,  the  other  remaining 
"source"  of  collective  farm  property  and  funds  was  "socialised  implements  and  means  of  production  and 
the  making  of  entry  fees  upon  entering  a  collective  farm".  It  then  commented  that  "these  sources  of 
collective  farm  ownership  had  deciding  importance  in  the  organisation  and  creation  of  collective  farms. 
In  the  present  time,  socialised  means  of  production  and  entry  fees  as  sources  of  formation  of  collective 
farm  ownership  have  lost  their  significance  ... 
The  model  collective  farm  statute  of  1969  in  general  does 
not  contemplate  them...  The  process  of  collectivisation  in  our  country  has  long  been  completed"  (supra 
-47- ideological  veils  of  voluntary  collectivisation,  the  right  to  withdraw  and  the  right  to 
repayment  of  a  portion  of  contributions  made  to  a  share  fund  were  all  consigned  to  history 
as  the  law  shifted  to  reveal  yet  again  that  the  Soviet  concept  of  "socialisation"  was  little 
different  from  outright  "nationalisation".  129 
However,  the  use  of  the  term  "socialisation"  did  seemingly  mean  that,  as  a  matter  of  strict 
legal  doctrine,  the  collective  farm  did  not  fall  within  state  ownership  and  thus  the  state  did 
not  have  the  ability  to  control  the  activities  of  the  collective  farm  through  its  role  as  owner 
of  the  farm  or  of  its  property.  130  State  control  was  achieved  through  means  other  than 
direct  ownership  of  the  collective  farm,  through  its  direction  of  the  national  economy 
more  generally. 
As  regards  the  activities  of  the  collective  farms,  although  the  collective  farmers  notionally 
had  the  right  to  vote  in  the  decision  making  organs  and  had  wages  linked  to  productivity, 
Soviet  law  conceived  of  the  collective  farm  as  a  part  of  the  single  national  economic  state 
planned  network,  "'  and  this  was  stressed  not  only  in  the  1969  Collective  Farm  Charter, 
but  also  in  article  10  of  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  which  provided  that  collective  farm- 
cooperative  ownership  constituted  (together  with  state  ownership)  "the  basis  of  the 
economic  system  of  the  USSR".  "'  As  collective  farms  did  not  operate  outside  the  national 
economy,  they  were  subject  to  planning  discipline,  and  in  practice  therefore,  their  legal 
autonomy  was  significantly  curtailed.  "'  Intervention  by  the  state  in  their  operation  was 
explained  as  follows:  "the  leadership  of  the  collective  farms  on  the  part  of  the  party  and 
state  agencies  is  the  most  sure  guarantee  of  their  development  along  the  correct  path".  "' 
n.  120,  p.  147  and  n.  I  therein).  This  position  was  also  reflected  in  the  lists  of  objects  of  collective  farm- 
cooperative  ownership  in  1961  FPCivL,  article  23  and  RSFSR  CC,  article  100  which  did  not  mention 
entry  fees,  socialised  property  or  property  in  the  share  fund. 
128  Supra  n.  126,  p.  233. 
129  Supra  n.  111. 
130  On  the  ownership  of  collective  farms,  see  infra  Sections  2.4.2,6.4.1  and  6.4.4.2;  and  on  the  roles  of  the 
state  as  creator-owner  and  property-owner  in  the  context  of  state  enterprises,  see  infra  Section  3.4. 
131  See  generally,  Zakonodatel'stvo  o  Proizvodstve  i  Gosudarstvennykh  Zakupkakh  Sel'skokhozyaistvennoi 
Produktii  (DIya  Sluzhebnogo  Pol'zovaniya)  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1975). 
132  "Cooperative-collective  farm  organisations"  were  "an  integral  part  of  the  socialist  economic  system  of  the 
USSR  and  their  activities  shall  be  determined  and  directed  by  the  state  national  economic  plan  ...  in 
accordance  with  article  6  of  the  Model  Charter  on  the  agricultural  artel...  "  (supra  n.  27  (1950),  p.  3  14). 
133  On  the  importance  of  the  national  economic  plan  and  state  control  over  the  agrarian  economy  see 
A.  I.  Volkov,  0  Pravakh  i  Odyazannostyakh  Kolkhozakh  po  Razvitiyu  Obshchestvennogo  Proizvodstva 
(Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1961)  and  I.  F.  Kaz'min,  Proizvodstvenno- 
Khozyaistvennaya  Deyatel'nost'  Kolkhozov  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1972),  pp.  64-88. 
134  Supra  n.  126,  p.  30. 
-48- Textbooks  on  "collective  farm  law"  invariably  included  an  entire  chapter  on  "The  Legal 
Organisation  of  the  State  Management  of  Collective  Farms"  which  stressed  state  control, 
the  leading  role  of  the  party  and  its  local  organisations,  and  the  fact  that  "collective  farm 
democracy"  meant  a  combination  of  state  management  with  broad  autonomy  of  the 
collective  farm  mass.  "'  Article  14  of  the  1969  Collective  Farm  Charter  simply  required 
the  collective  farm  when  working  out  its  own  plan  to  "proceed  from 
...  the  fulfilment  of  the 
state  procurements  plan".  In  short,  although  as  a  legal  matter,  the  collective  farms  were 
not  owned  by  the  state,  despite  the  fact  that  they  had  the  right  to  own  property  in  their 
own  right  (unlike  state  enterprises)  and  despite  the  fact  that  collective  farmers  had  the 
right  to  vote  in  management  decisions,  in  reality,  the  state  ultimately  retained  broad 
control  over  their  activities. 
Collective  farm  law  was  basically  the  most  visible  expression  of  the  balances  in  the  Soviet 
macro  economy  between  economic  law  and  civil  law,  plan  and  contract,  central  control  and 
autonomy.  Ultimately  their  legal  framework  was  a  product  of  their  history.  As  Gsovski 
commented  "the  blend  and  equilibrium  of  the  collectivist  and  private  elements  in  the  collective 
farms  is  not  static  but  dynamic.  It  is  a  product  of  compromise,  of  trial  and  error,  and  bears 
the  traces  of  the  struggle  from  which  it  evolved".  "'  However,  as  the  Soviet  state  consolidated 
its  control  over  the  agricultural  sector  during  the  1940s  and  50s,  the  balance  shifted  in  favour 
of  the  state  or  "socialising  processes"  and  as  has  been  shown,  the  essence  of  the  collective 
farm  became  an  association  with  certain  formal  legal  rights  for  its  members  but  incorporating 
systemic  and  specific  over-riding  mechanisms  by  which  the  Soviet  state  retained  effective 
control.  By  abolishing  the  share  fund  and  referring  to  the  plan,  the  1969  Collective  Farm 
Charter  moved  the  legal  position  closer  to  the  underlying  reality  but  still  incorporated  the 
formal  legal  fundamentals  of  the  traditional  framework.  It  is  perhaps  for  this  reason  that  loffe 
135  See  for  example,  supra  n.  109,  chapter  IV;  n.  124,  chapter  3;  supra  n.  126,  chapter  V; 
Prof.  V.  N.  Demyanenko,  Kolkhoznoe  Pravo  (Saratov:  1972),  chapter  4.  On  the  role  of  the  party  and  state 
generally  in  leading  and  directing  the  collective  farms  on  the  basis  of  a  unified  state  and  economic 
administration,  see  Pravovye  Problenzy  Rukovodstva  i  Upravleniya  Sel'skim  Khozyaistvom  v  SSSR 
(Izdatel'stvo  Nauka:  1970),  pp.  57-91.  On  the  nature  of  the  normative  legal  enactments  promulgated  by  the 
party  and  state  in  "directing"  the  collective  farm  movement,  see  Z.  S.  Belyaeva,  Istochniki  Kolkhoznogo 
Pravo  (Izdatel'stvo  Nauka:  1972),  pp.  178-218. 
136  Supra  n.  22  (1948),  p.  724. 
-49- and  Maggs  noted  that  "the  degree  of  fiction  and  fantasy  is  substantially  higher  in  collective 
farm  law  than  in  other  areas  of  law  related  to  the  economy".  137 
2.4.2  Ownership  of  Collective  Farms 
The  law  of  collective  farms  was  indeed  very  much  a  fantasy  world,  with  origins  in  the  pre- 
revolutionary  agrarian  economy,  the  brutal  collectivisation  drive  and  the  socialist  industrial 
offensive.  Section  2.4.1  presented  the  skeleton  of  a  basic  model  for  the  collective  farm,  akin 
to  those  to  be  developed  in  the  principal  body  of  this  study  for  industrial  organisations.  Its 
importance  will  become  clearer  in  later  Chapters.  However,  the  question  of  the  "ownershipt' 
of  a  collective  farm  was  not  directly  considered. 
This  question  was  relatively  quickly  addressed  with  respect  to  state  enterprises  as  they  were 
conceived  as  indivisible  objects  of  the  law  on  ownership,  "located  in"  state  ownership.  "'  As 
regards  the  other  principal  juridical  person  in  the  Soviet  economy,  the  collective  farm,  the 
answer  to  the  question  "who  owned  the  collective  farm?  "  was  rather  unclear  and,  to  the 
author's  knowledge,  was  and  never  has  been  posed  in  these  express  termS.  13'  The  situation 
was  not  helped  by  the  use  of  the  phrase  "collective  farm  ownership"  ("kolkhoznaya 
sobstvennost"')  in  the  literature  as  it  finessed  the  distinction  between  the  ownership  of 
property  by  a  collective  farm;  and  the  ownership  of  that  collective  farm  by  others. 
In  the  absence  of  an  explicit  doctrinal  exposition  in  the  legislation,  it  is  tempting  simply  to 
view  collective  farms,  like  state  enterprises,  as  a  type  of  "enterprise"  also  "located  in"  state 
ownership.  Unfortunately  article  11  of  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  rather  explicitly  provided 
that  only  enterprises  "organised  by  the  state"  fell  within  state  ownership,  and  it  was  relatively 
clear  that  collective  farms  were  not  organised  by  the  state.  Article  6  of  the  Stalin  Constitution 
was  even  more  instructive  as  it  included  specifically  "state  farms"  within  state  ownership  and 
did  not  include  collective  farms.  Furthermore,  it  was  doubtful  whether  a  collective  farm  even 
constituted  an  "enterprise"  at  all.  The  word  "enterprise"  was  not  a  term  of  art  under  Soviet 
law  prior  to  1990,  however  the  1969  Collective  Farm  Charter  defined  the  collective  farm  as  a 
137  Olimpiad  S.  loffe  and  Peter  B.  Maggs,  Yhe  Soviet  Economic  System  -A  Legal  Analysis  (Westview 
Press:  1987),  p.  55. 
138  Supra  Section  2.3.1. 
139  For  example,  the  chapter  in  a  collective  farm  treatise  relating  to  the  "Constitutional  Foundations  of 
Collective  Construction  in  the  USSR"  considered  in  great  detail  the  right  of  the  collective  farm  to  own 
property  (and  how  this  interacted  with  state  ownership)  as  well  as  the  right  of  the  dvor  to  use  a  personal 
land  plot  and  own  property  for  its  farming,  however  there  was  no  consideration  of  the  nature  of  the  right 
of  ownership  of  a  collective  farm  itself  and  who,  if  anyone,  did  own  the  collective  farm  (I.  V.  Ivanov, 
Ustav  -  Zakon  Kolkhoznoi  Zhizni  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1979),  pp.  10-  19). 
-50- "cooperative  organisationti,  140  and  not  as  an  "enterprise";  and  indeed  it  was  very  unusual  to 
find  the  term  "enterprise"  being  used  to  describe  a  collective  farM.  '41  In  short,  as  already 
discussed,  the  collective  farm  was  a  creation  of  the  collectivisation  of  agriculture  whereby  the 
former  property  of  the  Tsarist  peasant  households  was,  as  a  strictly  legal  matter,  "socialised" 
to  form  the  collective  farms  and  was  not  "nationalised"  into  state  ownership. 
If  the  state  did  not  own  the  collective  farms,  it  is  again  tempting  to  assume  that  as  a  result  of 
the  socialisation  process  the  collective  farms  were  owned  by  the  collective  farmers.  There  was 
however  no  direct  reference  in  the  legislation  on  collective  farms,  nor  in  the  law  on  personal 
ownership,  that  hinted  at  the  possibility  that  a  collective  farmer  could  have  owned  a  direct 
interest  in  a  collective  farm  itself.  An  answer  therefore  is  perhaps  best  derived  through  an 
analysis  of  the  concept  of  "membership". 
The  concept  of  "membership"  dated  back  to  the  pre-revolutionary  customary  law  of  the  dvor. 
Following  collectivisation,  membership  in  the  dvor  was  replaced  by  membership  in  the 
collective  farm,  and  Soviet  law  provided  for  various  incidents  of  membership  in  a  collective 
farm  which  could  have  been  interpreted  as  indicating  "ownership  of"  the  collective  farm  by  its 
members.  These  included  the  obligation  to  pay  an  entry  fee  on  accession;  a  right  to  vote  at  the 
general  meeting;  and  (prior  to  1969)  the  right  to  a  portion  of  the  share  fund  on  withdrawal. 
Indeed  the  Russian  word  for  share  ("pai")  seemed  to  indicate  a  term  of  art  for  the  interest  that 
a  collective  farmer  owned  in  a  collective  farm.  Furthermore,  article  23  of  the  1969  Collective 
Farm  Charter  explicitly  provided  that  the  obligations  of  the  collective  farmers  were  separate 
from  those  of  the  collective  farm  itself  and  vice  versa.  Such  a  rule  suggested  that  collective 
farmers  might  have  had  an  ownership  interest  of  the  collective  farm  itself,  and  therefore 
legislators  thought  it  necessary  to  provide  explicitly  that  their  respective  responsibilities  were 
separate. 
There  was  some  discussion  generally  in  Soviet  doctrine  about  the  concept  of  "membership  142 
and  these  early  debates  were  no  doubt  bound  up  with  the  history  of  collectivisation  and  its 
legitimation  through  law.  However,  contemporary  textbooks  conceived  of  membership  purely 
in  terms  of  a  series  of  mutual  rights  and  obligations  as  between  two  subjects  of  civil  law  (the 
140  "Organisation"  was  as  a  term  of  art  used  for  any  juridical  person  (supra  Sections  2.5  and  7.5  (initial 
paragraphs)) 
141  While  the  collective  farms  were  rarely  described  as  "enterprises',  the  term  was  applied  to  subdivisions 
created  by  collective  farms  ("auxillary  enterprises")  and  combinations  of  collective  farms 
("Intercollective  farm  enterprises")  (see  1969  Collective  Farm  Charter,  articles  16  and  17). 
142  For  an  overview  of  the  early  debates,  see  Yu.  A.  Bobk,  Kolkhome  Trudovoe  Pravootnoshenie 
(Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1972),  pp.  5-24. 
-51  - collective  farmers  and  the  collective  farm)  and  not  in  terms  of  ownership  interests.  These 
rights  therefore  included  the  right  to  work,  the  right  to  receive  a  portion  of  the  distributed 
property,  the  right  to  receive  wages  based  on  quality  and  quantity  of  work,  the  right  to 
leisure,  the  right  to  material  support  in  the  case  of  illness  or  loss  of  an  ability  to  work,  the 
right  to  participate  in  management  activities  and  others.  "' 
The  only  clearly  identifiable  ownership  interest  of  the  collective  farmer  was  in  the  "share 
fund"  upon  withdrawal  under  article  10  of  the  1935  Artel  Charter.  Some  textbooks  argued  that 
this  right  to  a  portion  of  the  share  fund  upon  a  withdrawal  was  in  any  event  only  a  contractual 
right,  "  while  others  acknowledged  that  it  was  a  property  right,  but  only  a  right  in  the  share 
fund  and  not  more  generally  in  the  collective  farm  itself.  In  any  event,  with  the  introduction 
of  the  1969  Collective  Farm  Charter,  the  existence  of  the  share  fund  was  de-emphasised  and 
this  right  was  no  longer  explicitly  recognised.  "'  However,  even  under  the  1935  Artel  Charter, 
the  fact  that  certain  funds  had  always  been  "indivisible"  and  not  subject  to  distribution  to 
members  upon  withdrawal  suggested  clearly  that  any  ownership  interest  of  a  collective  farmer 
in  the  share  fund  could  not  have  given  rise  per  se  to  an  interest  in  the  collective  farm  as  a 
whole. 
In  conclusion,  there  was  no  doctrinal  consideration  or  identification  of  ownership  interests  in 
collective  farms  (beyond  the  question  of  the  share  fund);  no  clear  direction  in  the  literature  on 
state  ownership  that  collective  farms  fell  within  state  ownership;  no  suggestion  that  personal 
ownership  encompassed  the  right  of  members  to  own  a  collective  farm;  no  right  of  members 
to  sell,  transfer  or  bequeath  the  right  of  membership  in  a  collective  farm;  and  no  explicit 
entitlement  of  members  to  a  distribution  of  residual  funds  upon  termination  of  a  collective 
farm  (which  was  not  even  generally  contemplated  in  textbooks).  It  is  therefore  difficult  to 
disagree  with  the  analysis  of  Bobk  that  "on  the  basis  of  the  norms  of  socialist  law,  between  the 
collective  farm  and  the  collective  farmer  arises  an  individual  social  connection,  characterised 
143  Supra  n.  126,  pp.  144-154. 
144  "As  already  noted  in  the  literature,  the  right  upon  withdrawal  from  a  collective  farm  to  demand  a  return 
of  the  share  fees  is  not  a  right  in  rem  but  a  right  in  personam  ("ne  veshchnym  a  obyazatel'stvennym 
pravom")"  (Pravo  Kolkhoznoi  Sobstvennosti  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi 
Literatury:  196  1),  p.  25  1). 
145  "Property  legal  relations  in  collective  farms  previously  comprised  relations  with  regard  to  socialised 
property  joined  to  the  collective  farm  [and]  entered  by  way  of  share  fees  as  well  as  participation  of  the 
collective  farmers  in  the  use  of  collective  farm  property...  at  the  present  time  it  has  no  significance,  in  the 
Model  Charter  of  the  Collective  Farm  1969,  socialised  property  on  entry  into  a  collective  farm  is  not 
provided  for"  (supra  n.  124,  p.  11,76). 
-52- by  definite  subjective  juridical  rights  and  obligations  and  guaranteed  by  the  compulsory  force 
of  the  state",  146  and  that  no  ownership  relationship  arose  between  them. 
2.4.3  Personal  Ownership 
The  orthodox  understanding  set  out  in  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  was  that  personal  ownership 
by  citizens  was  "intended  [to  be]  for  their  material  and  cultural  requirements"  acquired 
through  "labour  incomes".  "'  Moreover  property  in  personal  ownership  could  not  be  used  to 
derive  non-labour  income  which  could  be  seized  by  the  state  or  returned  to  the  exploited 
party.  In  addition,  any  property  used  in  the  production  of  the  non-labour  income  could  be 
seized  without  compensation.  "'  Prevailing  Soviet  theory  contrasted  personal  ownership  with 
private  ownership.  Private  ownership,  a  feature  of  capitalist  societies,  resulted  in  the 
exploitation  of  labour  which  was  avoided  in  socialist  societies  through  the  concept  of  personal 
ownership  of  property  (and  which  was  actually  prohibited  by  article  14  of  the  Brezhnev 
Constitution).  As  such,  personal  ownership  represented  a  higher  level  of  ownership  present 
only  in  societies  where  class  conflict  was  no  longer  existed-`9 
Personal  ownership  can  also  however  be  viewed  as  the  final  exception  to  the  principle  of  state 
ownership  of  all  the  means  of  production.  Its  rationale,  as  has  been  argued,  can  be  traced  to 
the  history  of  NEP  and  collectivisation:  the  legacy  of  the  former  meant  that  some  degree  of 
subsistence  ownership  by  citizens  was  necessary,  and  the  compromise  effected  by  virtue  of  the 
latter  meant  that  the  dvor  retained  some  rights  of  ownership  within  the  artel  form.  The 
doctrine  of  non-labour  income  simply  and  conveniently  confined  this  "exception"  so  as  not  to 
encroach  in  any  significant  way  upon  the  state  ownership  doctrine. 
2.5  Ownership  Interests  and  the  Classification  of  Soviet  Juridical  Persons 
The  relationship  between  a  juridical  person  and  its  "  owners  "  or  "  founders  "  is  as  a  legal  matter 
generally  complex,  and  it  is  common  to  interpose  between  the  "founders"  and  the  juridical 
person  a  separate  object  of  the  law  on  ownership.  This  object  of  the  law  on  ownership  is 
typically  "issued"  by  the  juridical  person,  and  the  ownership  of  that  object  by  the  founders 
146  Supra  n.  142,  p.  46  [emphasis  added]. 
147  Brezhnev  Constitution,  article  13;  1961  FPCivL,  article  25;  and  RSFSR  CC,  article  105.  Non-labour 
income  was  never  defined  in  Soviet  law  but  was  understood  to  depend  both  on  the  legitimacy  of  the  source 
of  the  income  and  the  purpose  for  which  the  proceeds  were  applied. 
148  Some  civil  codes  only  had  provisions  relating  to  the  seizure  of  property  used  for  the  derivation  of  non- 
labour  income  (eg  RSFSR  CC,  article  111);  whereas  others  contained  an  additional  article  for  the  seizure  of 
property  acquired  through  non-labour  income  (Kaz  CC,  articles  105  and  106). 
149  R.  O.  Khalfina,  Pravo  Lichnoi  Sobstvennosti  Grazhdan  SSSR  (Izdatel'stvo  Akademii  Nauk  SSSR:  1955), 
p.  27. 
-53- gives  rise  to  rights  and  obligations  as  between  the  founders  and  the  juridical  person  (as  well  as 
between  the  owners  inter  se).  "O  The  ownership  of  that  object  by  founders  (rather  than 
ownership  of  the  juridical  person  itself)  allows  the  law  to  finesse  the  "problem"  of  "corporate 
slavery"  (ownership  of  one  subject  of  civil  law  (ie  a  juridical  person)  by  another  (ie  the 
founders))  and  furthermore  avoids  the  need  for  an  explicit  dual  characterisation  of  the  juridical 
person  both  as  the  sub  ect  and  the  object  of  the  law  on  ownership.  j 
For  the  purposes  of  this  study,  this  object  of  the  law  on  ownership  issued  by  a  juridical  person 
shall  be  (and  has  been)  generically  called  an  "ownership  interest"  of  a  juridical  person.  An 
example  of  an  "ownership  interest"  would  be  a  "stock":  a  stock  is  an  object  of  the  law  on 
ownership;  and  its  ownership  by  stockholders  gives  rise  both  to  an  ownership  relationship  as 
between  a  stockholder  and  the  stock,  as  well  as  to  rights  and  obligations  as  between  a 
stockholder  and  the  juridical  person  that  issued  the  stock.  "' 
Ownership  interests  are  generally  distinct  for  different  juridical  persons,  and  different  rights 
and  obligations  are  associated  with  the  owning  of  ownership  interests  of  different  juridical 
persons.  On  this  basis,  for  example,  a  joint-stock  society  that  issues  "stocks"  is  distinguished 
from  a  partnership  in  which  each  partner  has,  for  example,  a  "participatory  share 
participation".  The  ownership  interest  directly  reflects  the  nature  and  classification  of  the 
juridical  person  and  also  determines  the  form  and  procedure  for  the  transfer  of  these  interests 
from  one  owner  to  another. 
The  existence  of  the  ownership  interests  is  important  for  two  principal  reasons:  First  it  is 
critical  in  focusing  the  legislators'  mind  on  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  the 
"owners"  and  the  juridical  person,  and  in  particular  on  the  rights  and  obligations  that 
characterise  this  relationship.  Secondly,  it  provides  an  object  of  the  law  on  ownership  that  can 
form  the  basis  for  equity  investment  in  a  form  that  is  liquid.  As  Clark  commented  "because  of 
all  these  characteristics  of  corporate  stock  (free  transferability  of  the  whole  bundle  of  rights, 
negotiability  and  fungability  within  classes),  organized,  efficient  trading  markets  in  corporate 
stock  were  able  to  arise  and  did  arise".  152 
...........  .  ...........  .........  ....  ............  ..............  .... 
150  The  exact  nature  of  this  property  is  not  central  to  this  study,  however  such  "property"  could  be  tangible, 
intangible,  or  even  a  hybrid,  understood  perhaps  as  "a  bundle"  of  rights. 
151  For  the  concept  of  shares  as  objects  of  the  law  on  ownership,  see  for  example,  in  French  law,  article  529 
of  the  Civil  Code  which  characterises  shares  ("les  actions")  as  moveables  ("meubles");  and,  in  English 
law,  section  211  of  the  Companies  Act  1985  which  refers  to  "interests  in  shares"  and  "rights  of  a  person 
in  relation  to  shares".  Section  211  is  not  mentioned  by  Gower,  but  see  generally  L.  C.  B.  Gower,  Gower's 
Principles  of  Modern  Company  Law  (Sweet  &  Maxwell:  1992),  pp.  357-36  1. 
152  Robert  Charles  Clark,  Corporate  Law  (Little,  Brown  and  Company:  1986),  p.  14. 
-54- As  such,  while  the  ownership  interest  is  not  a  prerequisite  for  juridical  personality,  "'  it  is 
probably  a  necessary  component  of  a  juridical  person  that  comprises  an  association  of  capital 
where  ownership  is  fragmented  between  various  different  persons  and  is  intended  to  be  liquid. 
Furthermore,  it  provides  a  basis  for  an  initial  classification  of  different  corporate  organisations 
and  a  focus  for  the  establishment  of  the  relationship  between  the  owner  and  the  juridical 
person. 
For  reasons  of  both  function  and  principle,  there  was  no  concept  of  "the  ownership  interest  of 
a  juridical  person"  in  mainstream  Soviet  law;  and  it  shall  be  argued  that  this  proved  to  be  a 
critical  structural  flaw  in  the  prevailing  Soviet  legal  theory  that  undermined  any  precise 
analysis  of  ownership  relations  in  the  context  of  the  new  non-state  owned  organisations  that 
emerged  after  1987. 
Within  the  command  economy,  there  was  only  one  model  of  the  industrial  organisation,  "' 
because  the  state  owned  all  industrial  organisations  exclusively.  There  was  therefore  no  need 
for  a  legal  mechanism  to  be  introduced  which  contemplated  fragmented  ownership,  and  the 
possibility  for  equity  capital  raised  in  the  market.  As  such,  while  Russian  legal  terminology 
contained  various  concepts  that  might  have  been  used  to  describe  and  analyse  the  nature  of  the 
state's  ownership  interest  "in"  state  enterprises  (including  "pai"  (share);  "dolya"  (participatory 
share);  "aktsiya"  (stocks);  "dolya  uchastiya"  (participatory  share  participation);  and  "vklad" 
(contribution)),  none  of  these  appeared  in  the  primary  legislation.  Soviet  law  simply  regarded 
the  enterprise  as  an  indivisible  object  "located  in"  state  ownership.  "'  This  did  not  however 
result  in  a  single  person  being  characterised  both  as  a  subject  and  as  an  object  of  the  law  on 
ownership  because,  due  to  the  concept  of  operative  management,  while  an  enterprise  was  a 
subject  of  civil  law  (ie  a  juridical  person),  it  was  an  object  (and  not  a  subject)  of  the  law  on 
ownership  (ie  it  did  not  have  the  right  of  ownership). 
The  absence  of  a  concept  of  the  ownership  interest  within  the  logic  of  Soviet  law  contributed 
to  the  uncertainty  relating  to  the  legal  analysis  of  who  (if  anyone)  owned  the  other  principal 
juridical  person  within  the  Soviet  economy,  the  collective  farm.  "'  Soviet  law  finessed  this 
question  perhaps  because  any  explicit  treatment  of  the  issue  may  have  resulted  in  a  call  for 
these  agricultural  cooperatives  to  have  been  placed  in  the  direct  ownership  of  the  members, 
thereby  creating  a  ftindamental  and  visible  challenge  to  the  state  ownership  doctrine. 
153  As  illustrated  by  the  English  law  corporation  sole. 
154  Infra  Chapter  3. 
155  Supra  Section  2.3.1. 
156  Supra  Section  2.4.2. 
-55- The  concept  of  ownership  interests  in  juridical  persons  may  have  been  absent  in  the  case  of 
state  enterprises  and  finessed  in  the  case  of  collective  farms  not  just  because  this  concept  was 
simply  unnecessary  as  a  functional  matter,  but  also,  and  perhaps  more  significantly,  because 
at  a  deeper  level  it  was  entirely  contradictory  to  the  very  foundations  of  Soviet  civil  law 
theory.  Again  it  is  helpful  to  look  to  the  feudal  analogy.  In  the  feudal  world,  the  concept  of 
"owning"  the  means  of  production  (ie  land)  was  a  nonsense;  rather  legal  theory  approached 
this  relationship  in  terms  of  "seisin".  Indeed  the  noun  "ownership"  was  never  used  in  the  legal 
framework  of  English  feudalism,  and  developed  almost  unnoticed  as  a  consequence  of  the 
forms  of  action  that  emerged  throughout  the  course  of  the  thirteenth  century.  "'  As  has  been 
argued,  the  Soviet  legal  system  can  be  viewed  as  having  adopted  a  similar  approach,  and  in 
common  with  medieval  English  terminology,  there  is  no  word  in  Russian  for  the  verb  "to 
own".  Thus  in  an  economy  of  state  ownership  of  all  the  means  of  production,  the  logic  of  the 
law  on  ownership  was  based  on  the  need  to  identify  and  regulate  the  scope  of  any  exceptions 
to  that  rule,  158  rather  than  to  elaborate  a  framework  for  a  law  of  property  where  all  subjects  of 
civil  law  have  the  generic  capacity  "to  own"  and  where  the  focus  therefore  is  on  the  nature  of 
the  different  rights  that  those  subjects  have  in  relation  to  property.  159 
The  general  definition  of  the  juridical  person  was  set  out  in  article  11  of  the  1961  FPCivL  and 
took  into  account  the  fact  that  industrial  organisations  (ie  state  enterprises)  did  not  have  the 
right  of  ownership  but  were  only  allocated  property  by  the  state  for  operative  management. 
Thus  juridical  persons  were  defined  as  "organisations"  that  had  "solitary"  ("obosoblennye") 
property  (ie  property  owned  by  or  allocated  to  it).  In  this  way  it  was  meaningful  to  talk  of  the 
property  "of'  a  juridical  person  (ie  entered  into  its  independent  budget  or  separate  balance 
sheet)  without  it  necessarily  being  in  the  ownership  of  that  juridical  person.  Furthermore, 
juridical  persons  were  expressed  to  have  the  capacity  "to  acquire"  rights  as  well  as  to  bear 
obligations.  By  using  the  word  "acquire"  in  relation  to  rights  (rather  than  "owing"),  the 
definition  enabled  all  juridical  persons  to  enter  into  contractual  relations  and  acquire  rights, 
even  if  they  did  not  have  the  right  of  ownership.  This  was  consistent  with  the  law  on 
ownership  which  did  not  include  "rights"  within  "objects  of  the  law  on  ownership"  -  hence 
157  See  S.  F.  C.  Milson,  The  Legal  Framework  of  English  Feudalism  (Cambridge  University  Press:  1976), 
pp.  36-65. 
158  le  the  identity  of  persons  other  than  the  state  that  had  the  capacity  to  own  (eg  collective  farms,  trade 
unions,  citizens).  See  supra  Sections  2.3.1  and  2.3.2. 
159  Supra  Section  2.3  and  infra  Sections  7.1  and  7.2. 
-56- rights  were  not  capable  of  being  owned,  and  therefore  were  capable  of  being  acquired  by 
juridical  persons  without  the  right  of  ownership.  " 
Article  11  of  the  1961  FPCivL  then  classified  juridical  persons  implicitly  on  the  basis  of  the 
forms  of  ownership  outlined  above.  Therefore  article  11  distinguished  four  categories  of 
juridical  person:  (i)  state  enterprises  and  other  state  organisations;  (ii)  collective  farms,  inter 
collective  farms  and  other  cooperative  organisations;  (iii)  state-collective  farm  and  state- 
cooperative  organisations;  and  (iv)  other  organisations  in  the  instances  provided  for  by 
legislation  of  the  USSR.  161 
Until  1985,  industrial  organisations  almost  exclusively  fell  in  the  Category  (i)  (state 
enterprises  to  which  were  allocated  property  in  state  ownership).  The  classification  and 
ownership  regime  of  the  "new"  industrial  organisations  introduced  from  1987  either  fell 
within  the  Category  (ii)  and  its  implicit  ownership  regime  (eg  cooperatives  on  the  basis  of 
collective  farm-cooperative  ownership),  or  made  use  of  Category  (iv),  the  catch-all  category 
(eg  leased  enterprises),  but  this  inevitably  resulted  in  an  ambiguous  ownership  regime 
because,  as  a  catch-all  category,  it  had  no  corresponding  ownership  form  upon  which  it  was 
based.  While  these  "new"  industrial  organisations  were  situated  on  the  edges  of  this  matrix  of 
ownership  law,  they  exploited  another  element  of  the  law  on  ownership,  namely  the  concept 
of  common  ownership. 
2.6  Common  Ownership  and  Joint  Activity 
Common  ownership  was  not  a  "form"  of  ownership  but  merely  a  mechanism  by  which 
property  was  jointly  held.  Thus  relations  between  an  owner  and  its  property  were 
characterised  by  a  "form  of  ownership"  whereas  relations  between  two  owners  of  the  same 
property  were  additionally  characterised  by  "common  ownership".  Not  surprisingly,  common 
ownership  law  was  intimately  connected  with  associations  based  on  personal  participation  and 
facilitated  their  creation  on  the  basis  of  pooled  resources  without  the  formation  of  a  juridical 
person.  112  Common  ownership  was  contemplated  between  juridical  persons  or  between 
citizens,  but  not  between  citizens  and  juridical  persons.  "' 
.............  .  .....  . .....  ....  ...  .........  ........  ............ 
160  On  the  Soviet  law  of  rights  in  this  respect,  see  infra  n.  519,859  and  912.  "Rights"  only  became  an  object 
of  the  law  on  ownership  with  the  enactment  of  the  1991  FPCivL.  Article  4  thereof  on  objects  of  civil 
rights  included  "other  property,  including  property  rights". 
161  Category  (iv)  was  inserted  by  virtue  of  an  amendment  in  1981  (0  Vnesenii  lzmenenii  i  Dopolnenii  v 
Osnovi  Grazhdanskogo  Zakonodatel'stva  Soyuza  SSR  i  Soyuznikh  Respublik,  Vedomosti  SSSR  (1981), 
no.  44,  item  1184). 
162  See  infra  Chapter  4. 
163  RSFSR  CC,  article  116. 
-57- The  law  of  common  ownership  was  governed  by  a  separate  chapter  of  the  civil  codes,  " 
which  distinguished  "joint  ownership"  from  "common  participatory  share  ownership" 
(flobshchaya  dolevaya  sobstvennost  "').  "' 
Joint  ownership  could  be  considered  as  equivalent  to  the  common  law  notion  of  "joint 
tenants",  "'  each  owner  held  an  undivided  interest  in  the  whole.  Under  Soviet  law,  it  was  only 
really  applicable  in  two  instances:  property  held  by  a  husband  and  wife  which  did  not  stem 
from  a  marriage  contract;  and  that  of  a  collective  farm  household  (or  dvor) 
Common  participatory  share  ownership  could  be  considered  as  equivalent  to  the  common  law 
concept  of  "tenants-in-common".  "'  The  common  property  was  divided  into  participatory 
shares  (Volya")  which  were  allocated  separately  to  the  individual  owners.  The  owners  did  not 
own  specifically  identified  items  of  the  property  which  were  held  in  common  participatory 
share  ownership,  but  simply  a  proportionate  participatory  share  of  the  entire  property.  "' 
Although  the  provisions  of  the  civil  codes  permitted  natural  persons  to  hold  property  by 
common  participatory  share  ownership,  it  was  traditionally  used  in  ownership  relations 
between  collective  farms,  cooperatives  and  other  social  organisations.  Common  participatory 
share  ownership  was  always  derivative  upon  the  particular  "form  of  ownership"  which 
regulated  the  underlying  relationship  between  the  owners  and  their  common  property.  As  has 
been  noted,  the  identity  of  the  owners,  and  hence  the  relevant  form  of  ownership,  would  limit 
the  possible  objects  that  could  be  held  in  common  participatory  share  ownership  in  any 
particular  case. 
The  possession,  use  and  disposition  of  property  in  common  participatory  share  ownership  was 
governed  by  the  contract  made  between  the  "participants".  Expenses  relating  to  the  property 
were  divided  between  the  participants  in  proportion  to  their  participatory  shares.  Each 
participant  had  the  right  to  alienate  their  participatory  share.  However,  existing  participants 
had  pre-emption  rights  with  respect  to  the  participatory  share  of  any  selling  participant  at  the 
sale  price  or,  as  applicable,  the  auction  bid.  The  selling  participant  had  to  notify  in  writing  the 
other  participants  of  its  intention  to  sell,  the  agreed  price  and  other  conditions  of  sale;  and  the 
other  participants  had  10  days  from  the  communication  of  the  offer  to  accept. 
164  RSFSR  CC,  chapter  12. 
165  1961  FPCivL,  article  26.  On  this  distinction,  see  M.  G.  Markova,  Ponyatie  i  Soderzhanie  Prava  Obshchei 
Sobstvemosti  in  Ocherki  po  Grazhdanskomu Pravu  (Izdatel'stvo  Leningradskogo  Universiteta:  1957),  p.  9  1. 
166  See,  supra  n.  79,  p.  82. 
167  Ibid. 
168  Supra  n.  41  (1982),  p.  295. 
-58- In  addition  to  the  right  to  alienate  their  participatory  shares,  participants  also  had  the  right  to 
require  the  separation  of  their  participatory  shares.  In  the  event  that  the  contract  between  the 
owners  did  not  provide  for  this  right  of  separation,  it  could  be  sought  by  judicial  process. 
Furthermore,  creditors  could  apply  to  the  court  for  the  separation  of  a  participatory  share.  On 
a  request  for  separation,  if  the  property  was  fungible  and  divisible,  the  participatory  share 
could  simply  be  removed.  If  it  was  not  divisible,  then  the  entire  property  could  be  sold  for 
cash  and  the  cash  could  be  distributed.  This  could  only  take  place  with  the  consent  of  all  the 
other  owners.  If  such  consent  was  not  obtained,  a  cash  evaluation  of  the  participatory  share 
had  to  be  made  and  paid  over  to  the  separating  participatory  shareholder.  In  the  event  of  a 
dispute,  there  was  the  right  to  take  judicial  proceedings.  "' 
169  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1949),  p.  44. 
-59- 3.  MODEL  1-  THE  CONFIRMATION  ENTERPRISE:  SOVIET  STATE 
ENTERPRISES  AND  ASSOCIATIONS 
irThe  legal  entities  of  the  soviet  government 
are  in  fact  sham  entities  and  their  mutual 
contracts  are  sham  contracts.  The  soviet 
quasi  corporations  lack  that  sufficient 
freedom  of  disposal  over  their  property 
which  is  the  economic  background  of  true 
corporate  status.  The  property  handled  by 
them  is  not  in  fact  their  property  but  the 
property  of  one  single  owner  -  the  soviet 
State.  Likewise  their  mutual  contracts, 
being  controlled  by  the  general  plan  and 
various  directivesfrom  top  agencies,  do  not 
express  the  free  will  and  individual 
initiatives  of  the  executives  of  the  quasi 
corporations.  " 
Vladimir  Gsovski 
Gsovski  correctly  pointed  out  that  the  Soviet  state  enterprises  were  very  different  from  their 
counterparts  operating  within  the  relative  freedom  of  a  market  economy.  But  this  did  not 
mean  that  they  were  "sham  entities"  but  merely  that  they  were  creatures  of  a  different  order, 
of  a  different  economy,  and  now,  of  a  different  time...  In  this  Chapter  it  will  be  argued  that 
the  former  socialist  state  industrial  organisations,  existing  within  the  Soviet  economy  in  1985 
on  the  eve  of  perestroika,  are  best  conceptualised  within  the  framework  of  what  has  been 
called  the  "model  of  confirmation",  as  well  as  by  reference  to  the  concept  of  the  unitary  state, 
and  in  particular  the  state  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  and  state  planning.  By 
reconceptualising  the  law  of  these  industrial  organisations  within  the  confirmation  model,  it  is 
hoped  to  highlight  and  explain  some  of  their  distinct  functional  and  structural  characteristics 
and  to  present  an  alternative  understanding  of  their  legal  regulation  which  is  today  still  largely 
derived  only  from  within  the  tradition  of  mainstream  Soviet  law.  Furthermore,  the 
confirmation  model  attempts  to  analyse  the  unique  role  of  the  state  in  the  creation,  ownership 
and  governance  of  its  enterprises;  a  role  that  changed  throughout  the  late  1980s,  and  through 
-60- such  changes,  gave  rise  to  "new"  forms  of  industrial  organisation  introduced  into  the  Soviet 
economy  after  1987. 
The  management  of  the  Soviet  economy  during  the  period  1918-1920  was  characterised  by 
various  policy  initiatives  which  Silvana  Malle  referred  to  as  "an  unstable  framework  for 
management,  which  went  through  three  stages:  workers'  control,  state  control,  party 
control.  ""'  Despite  early  attempts  at  wholesale  nationalisation  during  that  time,  "'  it  gradually 
became  accepted  that  some  form  of  goods-money  relations  would  have  to  play  a  part  within 
the  Soviet  economy  through  state-owned  juridical  persons.  As  Lenin  famously  stated  in  his 
report  on  the  New  Economic  Policy  in  October  1921,  "we  must  learn  to  trade".  172  The 
principle  of  industrial  organisations  separated  from  the  central  state  budget  was  set  out  in  a 
series  of  decrees  during  the  early  1920s,  "'  and  was  confirmed  in  article  19  of  the  1922 
RSFSR  Civil  Code  which  provided  that  "state  enterprises  and  their  associations  transferred  to 
khozraschet,  and  not  financed  on  the  basis  of  the  budget,  shall  enter  into  [civil  law]  turnover 
as  autonomous  juridical  persons  and  shall  not  be  connected  to  the  Treasury",  thereby  linking 
juridical  status  with  khozraschet. 
Due  to  their  legal  status  as  subjects  of  civil  law  separated  from  the  state  itself  with  a  separate 
balance  sheet,  these  state-owned  industrial  organisations  had  by  definition  some  degree  of 
legal  autonomy  over  their  activities.  However,  unlike  the  collective  farms  where  the 
"personal"  interests  of  the  members  were  required  (at  least  formally)  to  be  taken  into  account 
by  legislation,  the  only  factor  that  would  determine  the  level  of  autonomy  of  the  industrial 
organisations  was  the  state  itself  in  accordance  with  its  macro-economic  policy.  As  a  practical 
matter,  the  degree  of  control  ceded  by  the  state  to  the  management  of  its  juridical  persons 
varied  over  time.  Indeed,  as  official  state  policy  with  regard  to  control  and  the  organisation  of 
the  economy  changed,  so  did  the  structure  and  size  of  these  industrial  organisations.  During 
times  of  centralisation,  industrial  organisations  were  usually  consolidated  into  vertically  and 
horizontally  integrated  associations  or  trusts,  thereby  simplifying  the  spheres  and numbers  of 
economic  units  and  facilitating  central  management.  Conversely,  during  times  of 
decentralisation,  such  associations  or  trusts  were  generally  broken  down  into  constituent 
170  Supra  n.  50,  p.  89. 
171  Supra  n.  6  (1947),  pp.  20-27. 
172  Quoted  in  OlYmPiad  S.  Ioffe  and  Peter  B.  Maggs,  Soviet  Law  in  Theory  and  Practice  (Oceana 
Publications,  Inc.:  1983),  p.  137. 
173  Supra  n.  56  and  57. 
-  61 
- enterprises,  which  led  to  a  more  diversified  industrial  management  structure  leaving  more 
room  for  individual  initiative.  This  "cyclical  development  on  the  basis  of  an  alternation  of 
opposite  reforms  -  from  centralisation  to  decentralisation  and  then  back  to  centralisation", 
loffe  and  Maggs  described  as  "an  objective  law  of  economic  development  in  the  USSR" 
- 
174 
Therefore,  although  the  law  of  the  early  Soviet  industrial  organisations  was  complex  and 
characterised  by  a  number  of  different  policy  initiatives,  two  distinct  generic  organisational 
forms  emerged:  (i)  the  trust  or  association  (large-scale  integrated  industrial  organisations);  and 
(ii)  the  enterprise  (smaller-scale  industrial  organisations  operating  on  the  basis  of  more 
discrete  economic  functions). 
Trusts  State  trusts  had  their  origins  in  the  desire  to  centrally  manage  industry  during  the  years 
of  war  communism.  However,  it  was  during  the  NEP  years  of  the  1920s  that  their  role  and 
numbers  significantly  increased.  They  were  originally  formed  through  ad  hoc  legislation,  "' 
and  then  through  the  enactment  of  various  dekrets  on  state  trusts  in  1923.  "'  The  trust,  as 
conceived  in  the  early  1920s,  was  a  juridical  person  in  its  own  right  combining  a  number  of 
enterprises  within  its  umbrella  structure.  The  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  did  not  refer  to  "trusts" 
explicitly  but  only  to  "state  enterprises  and  their  associations";  177  however  the  status  of  the 
trust  was  soon  clarified  by  the  adoption  of  the  1923  Trusts  Dekret  which  in  article  1  provided 
that  the  trust  "shall  operate  on  the  principles  of  commercial  accountability  with  the  purpose  of 
deriving  profit".  In  addition,  although  the  state  was  the  owner  of  the  trust  and  indeed  of  all  of 
its  property,  the  state  was  expressed  not  to  be  responsible  for  the  debts  of  the  trust  and  vice 
versa. 
174  Supra  n.  137,  p.  7.  They  argued  that  a  properly  functioning  economy  must  allow  for  a  level  of 
decentralised  economy  activity.  However,  the  Soviet  political  system  was  predicated  upon  "unlimited 
political  power  of  the  ruling  summit"  and  therefore  "the  permanent  attempts  to  find  a  way  out  of  this 
vicious  circle  by  the  Soviet  leadership  have  always  necessitated  manouvering  between  centralization  and 
economic  decentralization"  (ibid,  p.  2,6).  Harold  Berman  in  reply  in  his  article  "The  Possibilities  and 
Limits  of  Soviet  Economic  Reform"  argued  that  the  underlying  factors  may  have  been  more  complex 
(Olimpiad  S.  loffe  and  Mark  W.  Janis  (eds.  ),  Soviet  Law  and  Economy  (Martinus  Nijhoff 
Publishers:  1987),  p.  29). 
175  Venediktov  noted  that  by  the  end  of  1921  there  were  430  trusts  formed  containing  4,144  enterprises  with 
977,000  workers  (A.  V.  Venediktov,  Organizatsiya  Gosudarstvennoi  Promyshlennosti  v  SSSR,  Tom  II 
(Izdatel'stvo  Leningradskogo  Universiteta:  196  1),  p-  56). 
176  Including,  the  General  Model  Statute  on  Associations  (Trusts)  and  Explanatory  Note  of  12  September 
1922;  the  1923  Trusts  Dekret;  and  the  Dekret  of  17  July  1923  regulating  those  located  in  local  agencies 
of  state  administration  (ibid,  pp.  57-58,63).  Venediktov  referred  to  these  trusts  as  "trusts  of  a  new  type" 
to  distinguish  them  from  the  various  forms  of  association,  also  called  trusts,  created  during  the  period 
1918-1920  but  which  operated  on  the  basis  of  Treasury  finance  (ibid,  p.  9,  footnote  10). 
177  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code,  article  19. 
-62- By  1927  industrialisation  had  become  the  central  plank  of  Soviet  policy  and  hence  increasing 
attention  was  paid  to  maximising  efficiencies  and  production.  178  As  such  the  organ'sation  of 
industry  as  a  whole  was  re-examined.  In  this  context,  the  relationship  between  planning  and 
centralisation  was  long  debated  and  it  was  considered  necessary  to  simplify  and  concentrate 
the  administrative  organs  of  the  economy  as  well  as  to  decentralise  operational  management. 
This  resulted  in  administrative  reform  of  Vesenkha,  the  delegation  of  management  to 
republican  and  local  authorities,  and  increasing  the  rights  of  the  trusts  with  the  adoption  in 
1927  of  a  new  Trusts  Dekret.  179The  1927  Trusts  Dekret  contained  no  references  to  "profit" 
and  although  it  devolved  certain  activities,  it  also  stressed  the  subordination  of  the  autonomous 
operation  of  the  trusts  to  the  requirements  of  the  state  plan;  and  indeed  over  the  next  two  and 
a  half  years  the  autonomy  of  the  trust  gradually  became  restricted  due  to  the  expansion  of  the 
authority  of  Vesenkha.  "O 
Trust  Enterprises  and  Autonomous  Enterprises  The  history  of  the  "enterprise"  was  closely 
linked  to  that  of  the  trust  and  under  early  Soviet  legislation  its  precise  legal  relationship  with 
the  trust  was  often  difficult  to  discern.  Braginsky  explained  the  development  of  the  enterprise 
as  follows:  While  the  1923  Trusts  Dekret  contemplated  the  existence  of  "trust  enterprises" 
existing  within  the  trust  framework  ("trestirovannye  predpriyatiya"),  they  were  neither  given 
separate  juridical  nor  economic  status.  However,  the  Dekret  also  contemplated  separate 
"autonomous  enterprises"  ("avtonomnye  predpriyatiya")  that  operated  alongside  trusts  with 
identical  rights,  and  in  contrast  to  the  trust  enterprises,  were  juridical  persons.  The  trust 
enterprise  eventually  was  given  the  status  of  a  juridical  person  in  its  own  right.  Under  section 
IV  of  the  1927  Trusts  Dekret  they  were  transferred  to  operating  on  the  basis  of  internal 
khozraschet  with  a  separate  balance  sheet  and  one-man  management  thereby  ensuring  a  degree 
of  economic  autonomy  from  the  operations  of  the  trust  as  a  whole.  This  expression  of 
decentralisation  continued  with  the  decree  of  5  December  1929  "On  the  Reorganisation  of  the 
Management  of  Industry"  providing  for  "the  enterprise  as  the  basic  link  in  the  management  of 
industry".  "'  It  was  shortly  afterwards,  by  a  decision  of  the  Council  of  Labour  and  Defence  on 
23  July  1931,  that  the  trust  enterprise  was  given  the  remaining  features  of  juridical 
178  See,  P.  I.  Lyashchenko,  Istoriya  Narodnogo  Khozyaistva  SSSR,  Tom  III  (Sotsialism)  (Gosudarstvennoe 
lzdatel'stvo  Politicheskoi  Literatury:  1956),  pp.  262-274. 
179  Supra  n.  175,  p.  373  and  378. 
180  As  Zaleski  explained:  "the  role  of  the  trust  [in  1923]  as  an  autonomous,  market-orientated,  and  profit- 
operated  economic  agency  became  increasingly  compromised"  (Eugene  Zaleski,  Stalinist  Planning  for 
Economic  Growth  1933-1952  (The  University  of  North  Carolina  Press:  1980),  p.  28). 
181  0  Reorganizatsii  Upravleniya  Promyshlennost'yu,  Resheniya  Partii  i  Pravitel'stva  po  Khozyaistvennym 
Voprosam,  Tom  2  (supra  n.  5  1,  p.  13  6. 
-63- personality,  in  particular  that  the  circulating  assets  allocated  to  it  could  only  be  withdrawn  in 
limited  circumstances. 
182 
Syndicates  and  Associations  The  significance  of  the  trust  in  the  Soviet  economy  was  gradually 
diminished  by  the  growth  of  "syndicates"  in  the  late  1920s.  In  response  to  the  crisis  in  the 
state  industrial  sector  following  the  commencement  of  NEP,  Lenin  sanctioned  the  formation 
of  syndicates  by  groups  of  trusts  in  a  particular  sector.  A  syndicate  would  monopolise  the 
marketing  of  all  products  by  those  trusts  in  that  sector  in  an  attempt  to  increase  bargaining 
strength  at  a  time  when  market  forces  tended  towards  depressing  prices.  From  March  1922, 
..........  --  ................  . .....  --11,  . ...  ....  ....  .--  ---  I........  ...............  I--  ---  -------  -1-1--l  . ........  .  ------ 
182  Mikhail  Braginsky,  Ae  Soviet  State  as  a  Subject  of  Civil  Law  (Progress  Publishers:  1988),  p.  11  et  seq. 
The  author  has  not  been  able  to  verify  this  account  from  the  legislation  that  was  available  to  him.  In 
particular,  the  author  could  not  identify  the  use  of  the  terms  "trust  enterprises"  and  "autonomous 
enterprises"  directly  in  the  trusts  dekrets  and  believes  Braginsky  borrowed  this  terminology  from 
concepts  used  by  Venediktov  and  from  terminology  in  other  subordinate  legislation  (supra  n.  175,  p.  72, 
75). 
The  1923  Trusts  Dekret  defined  state  trusts  as  "state  production  enterprises  to  which  the  state  grants 
autonomy  in  the  production  of  its  operations  ...  and  which  shall  operate  on  the  basis  of  commerical 
accountability  with  the  purpose  of  attracting  profit"  (article  1)  and  provided  that  "each  trust  shall  be  a 
single  enterprise  within  which  shall  be  several  production  subdivisions  ("edinits")  (establishments  such 
as:  factories,  plants,  businesses,  divisions,  shops  etc)  listed  in  its  charter.  Explanatory  note:  this  dekret 
may  also  be  applied  to  enterprises  who  have  within  their  composition  only  one  production  subdivision" 
(article  3).  Thus  the  1923  Trusts  Dekret  implied  that  state  production  enterprises  combined  to  form  a 
trust;  that  state  production  enterprises  existed  outside  the  framework  of  the  trust,  however  it  did  not  use 
the  term  "autonomous  enterprises"  to  describe  them.  Furthermore,  it  did  not  provide  that  other 
enterprises  were  located  within  the  trust  and  did  not  use  the  term  "trust  enterprises":  there  were  simply 
"subdivisions".  Perhaps  this  is  what  Braginsky  meant  by  the  term  "trust  enterprises".  Subordinate 
legislation  did  however  refer  to  the  concept  of  enterprises  within  the  trust  framework.  For  example,  the 
"Model  Statute  on  Production  Enterprises  within  the  composition  of  a  Trust"  adopted  by  an  instruction  of 
Vsenkha  on  4  October  1927  referred  to  subdivisions  as  capable  of  existing  as  enterprises  (article  1). 
The  1927  Trusts  Dekret  specifically  referred  to  "production  enterprises"  or  "enterprises"  within  the  trust 
(articles  25  and  32),  and  not  simply  as  subdivisions.  As  Braginsky  correctly  noted,  they  were  not 
explicitly  given  the  status  of  a  juridical  person;  however  the  1927  Trusts  Dekret  did  not  specifically  state 
that  they  were  to  operate  on  the  principles  of  khozraschet  (although  article  I  of  the  Model  Statute  did 
state  this  and  Venediktov  derived  this  attribute  as  a  consequence  of  their  other  characteristics  as  set  out  in 
the  dekret  (supra  n.  175,  p.  27  1)). 
The  author  has  not  been  able  to  locate  a  copy  of  the  decision  of  the  Council  of  Labour  and  Defence  on  23 
July  1931,  but  neither  the  Model  Statute  nor  the  decree  of  5  December  1929  referred  to  the  enterprises 
within  the  trust  as  juridical  persons.  However  a  commentary  to  the  civil  code  published  in  1928  noted  a 
judicial  interpretation  dating  to  1924  that  considered  a  factory  operating  on  the  basis  of  khozraschet 
within  a  trust  as  a  separate  juridical  person  (Grazhdanskii  Kodeks  s  Postateino-Sistematizirovannymi 
Materialami  (Yuridicheskoe  Izdatel'stvo  NKYu  RSFSR:  1928),  pp.  100-  10  1). 
The  increasing  role  of  the  enterprise  after  June  1931  does  however  accord  with  the  economic  history  of 
that  year  that  witnessed  Stalin's  call  for  the  breaking  up  of  associations  on  23  June  1931  in  his  famous 
speech,  "The  New  Situation  -  New  Tasks  for  Economic  Construction"  which  set  out  the  new  conditions 
for  industrialisation  (13  Stalin  51,  at  p.  79). 
A  textbook  on  civil  law  published  in  1950  summarised  the  position  by  stating  that  "the  trust  enterprise 
had  not  been  officially  named  anywhere  as  a  juridical  person  although  legislation  and  court  and  arbitrazh 
practice  consider  it  an  autonomous  subject  of  law"  (supra  n.  27  (1950),  p.  170). 
-64- leading  industries  united  to  create  these  syndicates.  By  1924  the  syndicates  had  become  so 
prevalent  that  a  tension  developed  between  the  trusts  and  the  syndicates,  the  latter  ever 
seeking  increased  control  over  the  marketing,  sale  and  pricing  of  production.  As  the 
syndicates  achieved  greater  importance  in  the  organisation  of  production  and  internal  trade, 
they  became  the  logical  institution  to  be  used  by  the  state  in  the  industrial  isation  drive  based 
on  state  planning  that  emerged  after  the  14'  Party  Congress  in  1925.  During  the  years  to  1929 
the  place  of  the  trust  in  the  planned  economy  became  squeezed  between  the  development  of 
the  power  of  the  glavki  within  Vesenkha  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  syndicates  on  the  other.  A 
new  statute  on  the  syndicates  was  adopted  in  February  1928  and  by  that  time  they  controlled 
entire  sectors  of  production,  issuing  compulsory  orders  to  the  trusts.  183  In  light  of  the 
promulgation  of  the  5  year  plan,  the  organisation  of  industry  was  formally  restructured 
pursuant  to  a  decree  of  5  December  1929,184  which  specified  the  "enterprise"  as  the  basic  link. 
In  addition  it  reorganised  the  syndicates  into  "associations"  of  enterprises  ("ob"edinenie 
predpriyatii"),  185  within  which  were  located  enterprises  alone,  or  a  combination  of  trusts  and 
enterprises.  186  While  the  rights  of  the  enterprise  were  increased,  the  associations  were  given 
power  over  their  management  and  sales. 
Therefore,  from  the  earliest  days  of  Soviet  management  of  the  economy,  tensions  existed 
between  the  association  and  the  enterprise;  between  centralised  management  of  the  economy 
through  large-scale  monolithic  industrial  organisations  and  decentralised  control  through 
increased  local  discretions;  and  perhaps  ultimately,  between  the  principles  of  planning  and 
khozraschet.  "'  Prevailing  legislation  invariably  provided  for  both  forms  of  organisation,  the 
association  and  the  enterprise;  however,  their  importance  and  the  detail  of  the  applicable 
legislation  was  dependent  upon  the  official  state  macro-economic  policy  of  the  time. 
Various  policy  initiatives  were  carried  out  in  the  period  to  1964  and  the  accession  of 
Brezhnev.  Most  notably,  in  "  1957  there  occurred  the  largest  restructuring  of  the  system  of 
183  E.  H.  Carr  &  R.  W.  Davies,  Foundations  of  a  Planned  Economy,  Volume  One  (1)  (1969,  reprinted 
Macmillan:  1978),  p.  376. 
184  Supra  n.  18  1. 
185  Associations  had  also  existed  in  their  own  right  since  the  early  1920s  and  hence  were  mentioned  in  article 
19  of  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code;  however  their  role  developed  most  significantly  after  the  1929 
restructuring  of  the  industrial  economy. 
186  The  development  of  the  enterprise  and  trust  separately  from  the  syndicate  or  association  gave  rise  to  the 
so  called  "double  link"  system  of  administration  (state  agency-enterprise)  and  the  "treble  link"  (state 
agency-trust-enterprise)  (see  also  supra  n.  175,  p.  72).  Later  the  "quadruple  link"  was  introduced  in  certain 
sectors  of  the  economy  such  as  coal  and  oil  production,  (state  agency-combine-trust-enterprise) 
(S.  S.  Studenkin,  Sovetskoe  Administrativenoe  Pravo  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Politicheskoi 
Literatury:  1954),  p.  136). 
187  Supra  n.  57  (1948),  pp.  484-494. 
-65- central  state  agencies"  when  the  management  of  industry  and  production  was  transferred  to  the 
soviets  of  the  national  economy.  "'  As  part  of  this  decentralisation,  the  management  of  the 
economy  was  reorganised  on  the  basis  of  territory  governed  by  the  soviets,  as  opposed  to  on 
the  basis  of  branches.  189 
The  legislation  on  the  eve  of  perestroika  contemplated  both  of  these  two  different  types  of 
industrial  organisation;  however  the  law  of  the  1920s  and  1930s  had  been  replaced  by  two 
further  periods  of  legislative  reform:  one  in  the  late  1960s  which  established  the  legislation  on 
"enterprises",  and  the  second  in  the  early  1970s  which  established  the  legislation  on 
"production  associations". 
State  Socialist  Enterptises  Despite  the  reforms  in  the  administration  of  the  economy  in  1957, 
the  operation  of  the  economy  remained  highly  regulated  and,  as  Ioffe  and  Maggs  noted,  the 
"extremely  centralised  management  of  the  economy,  established  by  Stalin  and  actually  left 
unchanged  by  Khrushchev,  led  to  persistent  economic  stagnation,  which  presaged  inevitable 
disaster,  if  some  drastic  steps  were  not  taken".  "'  Pursuant  to  the  resolutions  of  the  1965 
September  Plenum  of  the  Communist  Party,  there  began  a  twin  policy  of  increasing 
centralisation  of  the  administration  of  the  economy  by  restoring  centralised  industrial 
ministries,  while  at  the  same  time  decreasing  their  right  to  control  the  day-to-day  activities  of 
enterprises  within  their  competence.  "'  The  aim,  once again,  was  to  make  the  entire  planned 
economy  more  flexible  and  responsive  to  demand.  '9'  This  was  furthered  through  the  adoption 
of  two  decrees,  first,  on  the  Perfecting  of  Planning  and  Strengthening  of  the  Economic 
Stimulation  of  Industrial  Production  in  October  1965,  and  then  through  the  adoption  of  a 
General  Statute  on  Ministries  in  USSR  in  1967.  '9' 
The  reforms  of  the  mid-1960s  saw  the  individual  de-centralised  state  enterprises  as  the  key  to 
re-invigorating  the  Soviet  economy.  The  centrepiece  of  the  reforms  was  the  Enterprise  Statute 
188  Supra  n.  41  (1982),  p.  34-35. 
189  V.  A.  Vlasov,  SS.  Studenkin,  Sovetskoe  Administrativnoe  Pravo  (Gosyurizdat:  1959),  pp.  321-326. 
190  Supra  n.  172,  p.  140. 
191  See,  Alec  Nove,  An  Economic  History  of  the  USSR  1917-1991  (Penguin  Books:  1992),  p.  378.  This 
decentralising  trend  was  noted  in  the  new  1961  Communist  Party  Programme  -  "The  economic  autonomy 
and  rights  of  local  agencies  and  enterprises  will  continue  to  expand  within  the  framework  of  the  single 
national  economic  plan.  Plans  and  recommendations  made  at  a  lower  level  beginning  with  enterprises 
shall  have  an  increasing  role  to  play  in  planning.  "  (supra  n.  5  8,  p.  262). 
192  Supra  n.  6  (1985),  pp-364-5. 
193  0  Sovershenstvovanii  Planirovaniya  i  Usilenii  Ekonomicheskogo  Stimulirovaniya  PromysWennogo 
Proizvodstva,  (1965)  4  SDZ  SSSR  5;  Obshchee  Polozhenie  o  Ministerstvakh  SSSR,  (1967)  25  SDZ  SSSR 
99. 
-66- adopted  by  a  decree  of  the  Cabinet  of  Ministers  in  1965.194  It  was  the  first  time  during  the 
Soviet  period  that  a  specific  legislative  statute  was  adopted  dedicated  solely  to  the  regulation 
and  juridical  status  of  the  enterprise  (as  opposed  to  the  trust,  syndicate  or  association).  In  line 
with  the  policy  of  decentralisation,  article  I  provided  that  the  enterprise  was  to  be  "the  basic 
link  in  the  national  economy  of  the  USSR".  The  Enterprise  Statute  aimed  at  devolving  broad 
control  to  the  management  in  a  number  of  areas  including  price  setting,  determining 
production  output  and  hiring  and  dismissing  its  employees.  Furthermore,  plans  became  more 
generic  and  thereby  seemed  to  increase  the  formal  opportunity  for  "contracting"  and 
exercising  individual  discretions. 
Production  and  Industrial  Associations  Predictably,  this  decentralising  trend  did  not  last 
long.  The  administrative  structure  of  the  Soviet  economy  was  again  reorganised  as  soon  as 
1973.1"  Once  again  consolidation  and  economies  of  scale  were  stressed  as  theory  harked  back 
to  the  centralisation  of  the  economy  in  the  late  1920s  with  its  vast  state  trusts  and  syndicates. 
loffe  and  Maggs  attributed  this  further  change  in  policy  to  the  rapid  effect  that  the  reforms  of 
1965  had  on  consumer  demand  which  "threatened  with  immediate  collapse  the  always  feeble 
system  of  supply"  coupled  with  the  failure  of  the  simplification  of  planning.  "'  In  the  tradition 
of  the  principles  set  out  in  the  decree  of  December  1929,  state  enterprises  were  reorganised 
into  "production  associations",  which  in  turn  were  sometimes  subordinated  to  new  "industrial 
associations  ".  197  These  new  industrial  and  production  associations  were  created  respectively 
pursuant  to  Decree  139  "On  Some  Measures  on  the  Further  Perfecting  of  the  Management  of 
Industry  ",  198  and  Decree  140  confirming  the  Industrial  Association  Statute. 
Article  2  of  Decree  139  provided  for  two  types  of  vertical  relationships  in  the  Soviet 
economy:  the  double  link  (Ministries  (all-union  or  republican)  -  production  association 
194  On  the  substantive  legal  reforms  of  the  late  1960s,  with  particular  reference  to  Kazakhstan,  see 
Khozyaistvennaya  Reforma  i  Prava  Predpriyatii,  Tom  1i2  (Izdatel'stvo  Kazakhstan:  1969,1971).  See, 
generally,  Alec  Nove,  Yhe  Soviet  Econonry,  An  Introduction  (George  Allen  &  Unwin  Ltd:  1968),  pp.  31- 
44. 
195  Ioffe  has  argued  that  the  process  of  recentralisation  was  even  more  rapid  and  in  practice  began  within  a 
year  or  so  after  the  1965  reforms  (see  O.  S.  Ioffe,  Law  and  Economy  in  the  USSR,  (1982)  95  Harv.  L.  Rev. 
159  1,  pp.  1621-23). 
196  Supra  n.  172,  p.  140. 
197  On  the  context  of  these  reforms  within  the  prevailing  Soviet  and  western  theories  of  management,  see 
William  J.  Conyngham,  77ze  Modemization  of  Soviet  Industrial  Management  (Cambridge  University 
Press:  1982). 
198  0  Nekotorykh  Meropriyatiyakh  po  Dal'neishemu  Sovershenstvovaniyu  Upravleniya  Promyshlennost'yu, 
(1973)  25  SDZ  SSSR  122. 
-67- (combine)  or  enterprise)  and  the  treble  link  (Ministries  (all-union  or  republican)  -  industrial 
association  -  production  association  (combine)  or  enterprise).  '99 
Industrial  associations  created  by  Decree  140  were  to  make  up  a  "unified  production- 
economic  complex"  being  more  administrative  in  their  nature  than  the  production 
associations  . 
200  They  were  juridical  persons  with  their  own  property  and  management  organs. 
Enterprises  operating  on  the  basis  of  the  Enterprise  Statute,  and  other  organisations  operating 
on  a  different  basis,  were  located  within  their  structure.  201 
A  year  later  the  Production  Association  Statute  was  adopted.  "'  In  accordance  with  article  1, 
production  associations  were  to  be  the  "basic  (primary)  link  of  industry".  'O'  Throughout  the 
1970s  many  smaller  enterprises  were  reorganised  and  merged  into  production  associations 
thereby  losing  their  separate  juridical  personality.  However  some  enterprises,  operating  on  the 
basis  of  the  Enterprise  Statute  and  retaining  juridical  personality,  remained  in  existence  after 
this  restructuring  of  the  economy  either  directly  subordinate  to  a  Ministry  (the  "double-link") 
or  within  a  production  association.  "' 
By  1985,  the  Enterprise  Statute,  the  Industrial  Association  Statute  and  the  Production 
Association  Statute  were  still  the  basic  statutory  enactments  on  Soviet  industrial  organisations 
operating  on  the  basis  of  khozraschet.  In  economic  terms  the  emphasis  on  associations 
gradually  waned.  In  volume  12  of  the  SDZ  SSSR  on  civil  law  published  in  1976,  the 
Enterprise  Statute  was  cited  before  the  Production  Association  Statute,  which  in  turn  was  cited 
before  the  Industrial  Association  Statute 
. 
20'  Despite  the  initiatives  in  the  early  1970s,  by  1979, 
199  Supra  n.  60  (1973),  p.  339.  This  division  was  based  on  the  link  system  of  management  developed  in  the 
1930s  (supra  n.  186). 
200  Industrial  Association  Statute,  article  1. 
201  Industrial  Association  Statute,  article  7.  Supra  n.  41  (1986),  p.  140. 
202  Similar  statutes  were  passed  to  regulate  other  areas  of  the  economy  such  as  the  Polozhenie  o  Nauchno- 
Proizvodstvennom  Ob''edinenii,  (1975)  9(11)  SDZ  SSSR  330. 
203  Cf.  article  1  of  the  Enterprise  Statute  which  remained  in  force  and  provided  that  enterprises  would  be 
"the  basic  link  in  the  national  economy". 
204  Article  I  of  the  Production  Association  Statute  set  out  the  general  principle  that  enterprises  "within" 
production  associations  would  not  be  juridical  persons  and  that  the  Enterprise  Statute  would  not  apply  to 
them.  However,  article  6  provided  an  exception  that,  by  decision  of  the  appropriate  Ministry  or  Council 
of  Ministers,  enterprises  that  were  juridical  persons  could  operate  within  associations.  Production 
associations  containing  such  enterprises  operating  on  the  basis  of  the  Enterprise  Statute  within  them  were 
termed  "associations  of  a  mixed  type"  (see  V.  V.  Laptev,  Pravovye  Voprosy  Sovershenstvovaniya 
Rukovodstva  Promyshlennost'yu  in  Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaya  Revolyutsiya,  Upravienie  i  Pravo 
(Niimash:  1975),  p.  88).  On  the  relationship  between  associations  and  enterprises  "within"  them,  see  infra 
Section  6.5.1. 
205  12  SDZ  SSSR  94,103,109.  The  order  in  which  provisions  appeared  in  Soviet  statutes,  or  sections 
appeared  in  textbooks,  was  generally  an  indication  of  their  relevant  importance.  Furthermore  the  SDZ 
-68- in  purely  economic  terms,  production  associations  accounted  for  just  less  than  half  of  the 
output  of  all  industrial  production  in  the  Soviet  economy.  206  By  1985/86  official  policy 
formally  shifted  to  recognise  this  change  in  emphasis,  and  the  restructuring  of  the  national 
economy  was  declared  to  be  based  on  state  enterprises  . 
20'  A  textbook  on  Soviet  civil  law 
published  in  1986  even  incorrectly  referred  to  "enterprises  -  the  basic  (primary)  link  in  the 
national  economy  of  the  USSR"  thereby  giving  enterprises  a  designation  that  was  reserved  for 
productions  associations  . 
20'  After  an  extensive  section  on  the  operation  of  enterprises,  the 
textbook  then  referred  to  production  associations  almost  as  a  derivative  form  of  enterprise:  "in 
the  organisational  structure  of  the  economy  there  also  operates  production  associations 
(combines)  in  the  same  place  as  the  enterprises".  209  Of  course,  as  originally  conceived  in  the 
early  1970s,  the  situation  was  to  be  the  reverse:  the  production  association  was  to  be  the  over- 
arching  economic  organisation  within  which  enterprises  would  be  located. 
As  has  been  outlined,  in  economic  terms,  the  difference  between  the  production  association 
and  the  enterprise  reflected  primarily  the  difference  between  two  competing  theories  of 
industrial  organisation  and  management.  The  one,  which  gave  rise  to  the  production 
association,  trust  or  syndicate,  stressed  the  centralisation  of  units  of  production,  horizontal 
and  vertical  integration,  and  simplification  of  branches  within  the  national  economy.  The 
other,  which  gave  rise  to  the  enterprise,  stressed  de-centralisation  and  flexibility  within  units 
of  production.  Despite  this  difference  in  economic  approach,  from  a  legal  point  of  view,  the 
state  enterprises  and  the  production  associations  were  remarkably  similar.  Juridical  personality 
and  khozraschet,  together  with  the  management  organs,  were  simply  abstracted  to  a 
consolidated  entity:  from  the  state  enterprise  to  the  production  association.  "O 
Due  to  their  increasing  importance  in  economic  terms  throughout  the  late  1970s  and  1980s, 
and  given  their  legal  similarity  with  the  production  association,  this  Chapter  focuses  on  the 
SSSR  contained  an  extensive  footnote  covering  three  pages  which  set  out  the  extent  to  which  the 
Enterprise  Statute  continued  to  apply  to  industrial  organisations  in  various  sectors  of  the  national 
economy  (12  SDZ  SSSR  94-96,  footnote  1). 
206  See  article,  Proizvodstvennye  Ob  "  edineniya,  Pravda  (3  July  1979),  p.  1. 
207  See,  Report  of  Ryzhkov  to  the  Politburo  "On  the  Restructuring  of  the  Administration  of  the  National 
Economy  to  an  Advanced  Stage  of  Economic  Development  of  the  Country"  (Izvestiya  (29  June  1987), 
pp.  1-4).  The  nature  of  these  "new"  state  enterprises  are  analysed  within  the  participation  model  (infra 
Section  6.3). 
208  Supra  n.  41  (1986),  p.  135,137-8.  The  term  "(primary)  link"  was  only  used  in  article  1  of  the  Production 
Association  Statute  and  not  article  I  of  the  Enterprise  Statute. 
209  Ibid. 
210  As  Butler  noted:  "the  functions  of  enterprise  independence  were  principally  elevated  to  the  productIon 
association  or  even  the  industrial  association"  (supra  n.  21,  p.  251). 
-69- state  enterprise  in  the  elaboration  of  the  confirmation  model.  However,  the  framework  of  the 
confirmation  model  is  equally  applicable  to  the  production  association,  and  the  peculiarities 
and  provisions  of  the  Production  Association  Statute  are  referred  to  as  relevant.  "' 
3.1  The  Role  of  the  Soviet  State  and  the  Confirmation  Model  -  General  Principles 
Irrespective  of  any  specific  macro-economic  trend  or  initiative  of  the  Soviet  regime  at  any 
particular  time,  it  shall  be  argued  that  there  was  always  a  constant  and  distinct  role  that  the 
state  enterprise  and  production  association  fulfilled  within  the  operation  of  the  Soviet  economy 
as  a  whole.  And  it  is  this  particular  role  that  perhaps  best  defines  the  nature  of  these  industrial 
organisations  and  is  the  basis  for  the  elaboration  of  the  confirmation  model. 
In  accordance  with  Marxist-Leninist  ideology,  almost  from  its  inception  the  Soviet  state  was 
built  upon  a  dictatorship  by  the  Communist  Party  and  a  rapid  extension  of  direct  state 
ownership  over  the  industrial  economy.  This  situation  necessitated  the  development  of  a  state 
policy  that  not  only  regulated  the  macro-economy,  but  also  that  determined  the  matrix  of  all 
industrial  activity  at  the  level  of  the  micro-economy,  given  that  the  means  of  production  were 
entirely  in  the  hands  of  a  single  person  -  the  state. 
During  the  early  years  of  Soviet  power,  it  was  unclear  as  to  how  these  two  functions  could 
have  been  accommodated  within  a  single  state  structure  and  ideology.  However,  as  described 
above,  by  the  late  1920s  a  policy  was  settled  upon  that  was  to  endure,  almost  intact,  through 
to  1991;  and  it  shall  be  argued  that  this  involved  the  Soviet  state  acting  in  four  quite  distinct 
capacities. 
State  as  Legal  and  Economic  Sovereign  The  Soviet  state  was  not  only  the  basis  for  the 
Hartian  "rule  of  recognition"  in  the  Soviet  legal  system,  it  was  also  the  owner  of  the  entire 
economy.  This  enabled  it,  as  "legal  sovereign",  to  adopt  legislation  that  was  binding  upon  all 
persons  and,  as  "economic  sovereign"  (or  feudal  overlord),  to  promulgate  plans  and  issue 
administrative  instructions,  that  were  binding  on  all  persons  owned  by,  or  using  assets  that 
were  owned  by,  the  state. 
These  two  capacities  enabled  the  state  to  adopt  legislation,  devise  plans  and  issue  instructions 
in  the  running  of  the  macro  economy.  However,  the  decision  to  run  the  economy  on  the  basis 
of  an  economic  plan  still  left  open  the  question  as  to  the  nature  of  the  matrix  of  the  micro- 
economy  and  thereby  the  nature  of  industrial  activity  -  ie  who  would  be  the  addressees  of  the 
....  ......  . .............  ...  ---  Iý  11  ...........  ......  ....  ........ 
211  In  fact,  as  an  illustration  of  their  legal  similitude,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  of  1987  included  both  the 
production  association  and  state  enteprise  within  a  single  legal  framework.  This  is  considered  in  more 
detail,  infra  Section  6.1.2  et  seq. 
-70- planned  instructions?  This  was  particularly  problematic  in  a  state  where  entrepreneurial 
activity  was  illegal,  "'  where  the  scope  of  property  that  could  be  held  in  personal  ownership 
was  severely  limited,  "'  and  where  the  vast  majority  of  the  wealth  in  the  economy,  the  means 
of  production,  was  located  in  the  ownership  of  the  state 
The  early  nationalisation  decrees  side-stepped  this  issue.  For  example,  one  of  the  first 
nationalisation  decrees  adopted  on  28  June  1918,  relating  to  nationalising  important  areas  of 
industry,  provided  that  ownership  was  to  be  nationalised,  but  that  the  management  structure 
was  explicitly  expressed  to  be  unaffected  by  this  change  in  ownership  until  Vesenkha  had 
issued  specific  instructions  to  specific  enterprises  . 
2"  Hence  while  nationalisation  was 
vigorously  pursued,  the  nature  of  the  matrix  of  the  organisation  of  the  micro-economy  was 
deferred  until  an  appropriate  framework  could  be  developed. 
A  possible  solution  would  have  been  for  state  agencies  themselves  to  have  been  the  addressees 
of  the  plan  and  carry  out  the  day-to-day  running  of  the  economy.  This  would  probably  have 
resulted  in  the  state  underwriting  their  balance  sheets,  and  an  element  of  civil  law  relations 
being  ceded  to  the  arnbit  of  administrative  law.  No  doubt  this  would  have  been  the  most 
attractive  method  of  organising  the  matrix  of  the  micro-economy  and  the  nature  of  industrial 
activity  because  it  rather  crudely  preserved  the  role  of  the  dictator  state  and  state  ownership 
while  at  the  same  time  would  have  been  capable  of  accommodating  the  notion  of  state 
planning.  Ioffe  noted  that  such  centralisation  would  have  been  "most  appropriate  to  the 
demands  of  unrestricted  political  power";  215  and  indeed  during  the  period  of  war  communism, 
the  Soviet  regime  flirted  with  the  notion  of  a  matrix  for  the  micro-economy  based  on 
institutions  of  state  administration.  216 
However,  as  a  matter  of  pure  economics,  the  "administrative  state"  as  attempted  during  the 
period  of  war  communism  failed  and  the  Soviet  regime  was  therefore  forced  to  contemplate  a 
212  See,  for  example,  1960  RSFSR  CrimC,  article  153  on  "Private  Entrepreneurial  Activities  and 
Commercial  Middlemen"  and  article  154  on  "Speculation"  (see  Kommentarii  k  Ugolovnomu  Kodeksu 
RSFSR  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1984),  pp.  304-312).  The  criminal  codes  of  the  other  republics 
contained  similar  provisions. 
213  Supra  Section  2.4.3. 
214  Supra  n.  111  (1967),  p-  95. 
215  Olimpiad  S.  loffe,  Soviet  Law  and  Soviet  Reality  (Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers:  1985),  p.  124. 
216  Chamberlin  included  in  his  "six  principles"  of  war  communism:  "the  state  through  its  central  and  local 
organs  took  over  all  the  means  of  production  and  reduced  the  sphere  of  private  ownership  to  the 
narrowest  possible  limits";  "state  control  over  the  labour  of  every  citizen";  and  "extreme  centralisation" 
(William  Henry  Chamberlin,  Ae  Russian  Revolution  1917  -1921,  Volume  Two  (Macmillan  &  Co., 
Limited:  1935),  pp.  97-98). 
-  71 
- level  of  decentralisation.  "'  The  solution  therefore  to  the  question  of  the  nature  of  the  matrix  of 
the  micro-economy  and  the  nature  of  industrial  activity  was  found  by  "developing"  two 
additional  capacities  through  which  the  Soviet  state  could  operate,  based  on  the  concept  of 
"owner"  as  opposed  to  "sovereign".  These  capacities  were  particularly  apposite  in  the  context 
of  the  NEP  economy  and  enabled  a  "state  sector"  to  be  developed  in  "competition"  with  the 
private  sector. 
State  as  Creator-Owner  The  Soviet  state  founded  state  trusts,  associations,  syndicates  and 
enterprises.  Despite  the  fact  that  they  were  created  by  the  state  and  hence  remained  in  state 
ownership,  they  were  characterised  as  separate  subjects  of  civil  law  in  their  own  right  with  the 
legal  capacity  to  bear  rights  and  assume  obligations.  As  described  by  article  19  of  the  1922 
RSFSR  Civil  Code,  they  were  "autonomous  juridical  persons"  with  responsibility  for  the 
obligations  that  they  assumed,  separated  from  that  of  the  administrative  state.  218 
The  establishment  of  state  enterprises  provided  an  addressee  of  the  plan  which  was  a 
specialised  industrial  organisation,  a  separate  subject  of  civil  law,  capable  of  operating  and 
being  evaluated  as  an  independent  economic  unit  on  the  basis  of  khozraschet  with  a  separate 
balance  sheet.  This  therefore  enabled  the  state  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  each  industrial 
organisation  on  its  own  terms,  separate  from  the  responsibilities  of  the  state. 
State  as  Propeny-Owner  Having  created,  as  addressees  of  the  plan  and  the  principal  actors  in 
the  new  Soviet  Stalin  economy,  the  concept  of  state-owned  juridical  persons  which  were 
"organs  of  the  national  economy  and  not  agencies  of  state  power",  "'  a  method  had  to  be 
found  by  which  property  could  be  used  by  these  organisations  without  prejudicing  the 
principle  of  state  ownership  of  the  means  of  production.  The  solution  was  found  in  the  Soviet 
law  on  ownership  which  contemplated  the  "allocation"  of  state-owned  property  to  state-owned 
juridical  persons  for  their  possession,  use  and  disposition  but  without,  in  legal  doctrinal  terms, 
the  transfer  of  "ownership".  Therefore  while  property  in  the  "operative  management"  of  state- 
217  The  catastrophe  of  war  communism  has  been  widely  documented:  "...  war  communism  ... 
did  not  work, 
because  it  deprived  producers  of  all  possible  incentives"  (ibid);  "The  economic  consequences  of  war 
communism,  whose  bankruptcy  was  revealed  by  these  events[:  ] 
...  a  catastrophic  decline  in  industrial 
production  ... 
followed  by  a  virtual  breakdown  of  state  or  state-controlled  distribution 
... 
leading  to  ...  wild 
currency  inflation  ...  goods  famine 
...  a  worthless  currency  ...  and  industrial  production  brought  still  nearer 
to  a  standstill"  (E.  H.  Carr,  77ze  Bolshevik  Revolution  1917-1923,  Volume  Two  (1952,  reprinted 
Macmillan:  1994),  p.  272);  and  "war  communism  ... 
left  Russia's  economy  in  shambles  ... 
A  contemporary 
Communist  economist  called  the  economic  collapse  a  calamity  "unparalleled  in  the  history  of 
mankind  .......  (Richard  Pipes,  Russia  Under  the  Bolshevik  Regime  1919-1924  (Fontana  Press:  1995), 
p.  371). 
218  This  formulation  of  the  nature  of  the  state  trusts  was  expressed  in  article  1  of  the  1923  Trusts  Dekret 
which  provided  that  "the  State  treasury  shall  not  be  responsible  for  the  debts  of  trusts". 
219  Explanatory  note  to  article  1  of  the  1923  Trusts  Dekret. 
-72- owned  juridical  persons  appeared  on  their  balance  sheets  as  "belonging"  to  them,  "'  such 
property  remained  in  state  ownership. 
The  state-owned  industrial  organisation  therefore  gave  rise  to  an  individual  unit  that  was 
owned  by  the  state  and  whose  property  remained  in  state-ownership  and  that  acted  as  the 
addressee  of  planned  instructions.  However,  at  the  same  time)  it  was  a  legally  autonomous 
civil  law  person  separated  from  the  administrative  state  and  operating  on  the  basis  of  "its" 
separate  balance  sheet.  The  solution  to  the  question  of  the  nature  of  the  matrix  of  the  micro- 
economy  and  the  nature  of  industrial  activity  through  the  use  of  the  juridical  person  in  its 
capacity  as  an  organ  of  the  national  economy  was  ingenious  for  it  did  not  determine  the  extent 
to  which  any  centralising  or  decentralising  policy  would  prevail,  but  merely  acted  as  a  pivot 
on  which  the  balance  could  be  adjusted,  "'  accommodating  within  its  formulation  the  trust,  the 
association,  the  syndicate  and  the  enterprise.  Many  commentators,  both  lawyers  and 
economists,  have  noted  the  centralisation/decentralisation  tension  within  the  Soviet  economy, 
and  in  the  abstract,  the  role  of  the  Soviet  state  both  in  planning  and  in  production.  "' 
220  The  phrase  "belonging  to"  and  "allocated  to"  were  used  interchangeably  in  legislation;  see  for  example 
1961  FPCivL,  article  13  (quoted  infra  Section  3.3  under  the  heading  "Autonomous  Property 
Responsibility"). 
221  Ioffe  referred  to  this  balance  as  the  "golden  mean  ... 
based  upon  the  plan  and  khozraschet 
... 
The  plan 
represents  the  centralizing  trend  ... 
imperative  and  detailed 
... 
[and]  khozraschet,  represents  the 
decentralising  trend  ... 
legal  security  and  economic  freedom 
... 
[and  the]  Soviet  leadership  insists  upon  "the 
correct  combination"  of  plan  and  khozraschet"  (supra  n.  215,  p.  125-126).  On  this  balance  and  the  Stalin 
economic  settlement,  see  supra  Section  2.2. 
222  loffe  and  Maggs  distinguished  between  the  "agencies  of  planning"  and  the  "agencies  of  production" 
(supra  n.  137,  p.  105  and  115). 
Textbooks  on  Soviet  civil  law  both  within  the  Soviet  Union  and  outside  acknowledged  the  special  status 
of  the  Soviet  state  and  indeed  most  contained  a  separate  chapter  on  "The  Soviet  State  as  the  Subject  of 
Civil  Rights"  which  was  aimed  at  explaining  the  unique  status  of  the  Soviet  state,  as  owner  of  the  means 
of  production  on  the  one  hand,  but  not  the  direct  bearer  of  civil  rights  on  the  other.  Reference  was 
therefore  made  to  juridical  persons  and  the  fact  that  while  property  was  allocated  to  them  by  way  of 
operative  management,  it  remained  in  the  ownership  of  the  state  (for  example:  "The  Soviet  socialist  state 
is  a  single  owner  of  all  state  property"  (art  21,1961  FPCivL)).  The  principal  mass  of  property  belongs  to 
the  state  and  is  distributed  among  state  organisations  -  juridical  persons  -  which  manage  it  on  its  behalf' 
(supra  n.  41  (1986),  p.  105)). 
However  despite  this  debate  as  to  the  nature  of  the  Soviet  state  and  the  usual  explanations  of  the  uniquely 
socialist  nature  of  state  ownership  and  operative  management,  it  is  rare  to  find  in  this  context  an  analysis 
of  the  nature  and  rationale  of  the  state  industrial  organisation  itself  and  the  way  in  which  it  could  be 
viewed  as  the  tool  by  which  the  state  in  its  four  capacities  could  plan  the  national  economy  on  the  basis  of 
some  level  of  decentralised  economic  activity  without  compromising  the  ability  to  apply,  as  necessary, 
continued  central  control.  One  allusion  to  this  argument  was  made  by  loffe  and  Maggs:  "...  ownership  of 
the  means  of  production  must  be  used  for  productive  tasks.  And  since  these  tasks  cannot  be  accomplished 
by  the  state  as  a  political  organisation,  it  has  no  other  way  out  than  to  create  numerous  economic 
organisations  for  the  aims  of  production.  These  organisations  must  use  certain  property  if  they  are  to 
produce,  and  the  State  must  distribute  among  them  sufficient  property  if  it  has  to  be  used  productively" 
(supra  n.  172,  p.  133).  However  Ioffe  and  Maggs  were  less  interested  in  an  analysis  of  state-owned 
-73- However,  this  Chapter  3  has  gone  further  and  has  argued  that  the  industrial  organisation 
should  be  conceptualised  as  a  puppet  of  the  Soviet  state  whose  role  was  as  an  adjunct  to  the 
planned  economy,  cast  as  the  addressee  of  planned  instructions  and  elaborated  on  the  basis  of 
the  state  acting  in  four  distinct  capacities  (as  legal  sovereign,  economic  sovereign,  creator- 
owner  and  property-owner).  The  confirmation  model  has  been  developed  on  the  basis  of  these 
four  faces  of  the  Soviet  state  and  reconceptualises  the  place  and  significance  of  the  then 
prevailing  legislation  in  this  light. 
Once  it  was  decided  to  organise  the  industrial  economy  on  the  inter-locking  principles  of  state 
ownership  of  the  means  of  production,  national  planning  and  state-owned  juridical  persons, 
the  question  of  the  creation  of  those  juridical  persons  was  little  more  than  a  formality  and 
would  always  be  carried  out  by  a  state  act  adopted  by  the  duly  empowered  state  agency  in 
accordance  with  the  current  state  plan.  The  notion  of  corporate,  or  juridical,  status  conferred 
by  state  act  or  royal  charter  has  given  rise  to  a  number  of  heuristic  theories  and  models,  many 
developed  in  terms  of  a  "concession  from  the  state":  corporate  status  being  a  privilege  granted 
by  the  state  to  certain  types  of  association  . 
21'  However  the  concept  of  juridical  status  resulting 
from  a  "concession"  or  "privilege"  is  singularly  inappropriate  in  the  context  of  a  unitary  state 
owning  all  the  means  of  production  and  where  the  possibility  of  founders  petitioning  the  state 
for  the  granting  of  juridical  personality  upon  their  informal  contract-based  association  is 
chimerical.  Rather,  by  the  act  of  "confirmation"  the  unitary  state  itself  created  enterprises  and 
controlled  their  activities  by  acting  in  the  four  separate  capacities.  To  this  extent  Gsovski  was 
right  to  point  out  that  "the  legal  entities  of  the  soviet  government"  bore  little  resemblance  to 
the  juridical  persons  in  market  economies.  Accordingly,  it  will  be  argued  that  the  state 
enterprise  and  production  association,  distinctly  Soviet  forms  of  association,  are  best  analysed 
in  terms  of,  what  has  been  called,  "the  model  of  confirmation". 
The  model  of  confirmation  was  derived  from  an  understanding  of  the  separated  industrial 
juridical  person  as  the  "addressee"  of  planned  instructions  operating  within  a  single  state 
owned  unified  national  economy.  The  leitmotif  of  "confirmation"  encompasses  all  of  the  four 
capacities  of  the  state,  for  the  state:  as  legal  sovereign  confirmed  the  civil  law  legislation 
setting  out  the  legal  framework  for  these  industrial  organisations;  as  economic  sovereign 
confirmed  the  state  plan  which  set  out  the  necessity  for  their  creation  and  the  nature  of  their 
operations;  as  economic  sovereign  and  creator-owner  confirmed  the  decision  to  create  them, 
industrial  organisations  and  more  in  developing  the  argument  that  an  element  of  decentralisation  within  a 
functioning  economy  was  inevitable  despite  a  political  system  unwilling  to  accommodate  such. 
223  Sally  Wheeler  (ed.  ),  A  Reader  on  The  Law  of  the  Business  Enterprise  (Oxford  University  Press:  1994), 
p.  7.  The  concept  of  the  "concession"  and  its  role  in  analysing  certain  types  of  association  is  considered  in 
more  detail  infra  Chapter  5. 
-74- by  order  of  the  relevant  state  agency;  as  creator-owner  drafted  the  contents  of  their  charters; 
as  property-owner  confirmed  the  designation  of  the  organisations'  property  and  the  allocation 
of  such  property  to  them  (as  set  out  in  the  applicable  charter);  upon  confirmation  of  the 
charter  by  registration,  as  legal  sovereign  conferred  juridical  personality  upon  the 
organisations;  and  finally  as  economic  sovereign  and  creator-owner  would  confirm,  when  it 
deemed  expedient,  the  decision  for  any  of  them  to  be  terminated.  Therefore,  the  model  of  the 
confirmation  enterprise  displays  a  number  of  hallmark  characteristics:... 
0)  creation  and  termination  by  diktat  as  determined  by  the  plan  (with  few  legal 
procedural  requirements); 
autonomy  and  separate  status as  a  consequence  of  juridical  personality  with 
solitary  property  (operating  on  the  basis  of  khozraschet)  and  with  autonomous 
property  responsibility;  and 
a  crude  governance  structure  characterised.  by  the  unitary  state  acting  in  each 
of  its  capacities: 
as  creator-owner,  responsible  for  the  drafting  of  a  charter  that  carefully 
detailed  its  capacity,  and  the  appointment  of  the  single  one-man 
manager; 
as  property-owner,  retaining  the  right  of  ownership  of  the  property 
allocated  to  the  enterprise  which  was  held  by  way  of  operative 
management;  and 
(C)  as  legal  sovereign  and  as  economic  sovereign,  both  in  the  form  of  the 
polity  and  the  party,  through  legislation,  instruction,  and  the  elaboration 
of  the  central  state  plan. 
The  creation  of  these  confirmation  enterprises  was  a  relatively  straightforward  matter  as  the 
state  owned  all  the  means  of  production  (and  hence  all  industrial  enterprises).  There  were  no 
legislative  or  other  impediments  to  their  creation.  There  were  no  individuals  petitioning  for 
the  granting  of  corporate  status  upon  their  informal  association.  The  creation  of  state 
enterprises  had  nothing  to  do  with  a  negotiation  between  the  state  and  a  third  party  (the  so- 
called  "promoters"  or  "founders"),  as  described  in  the  various  concession  theories.  Instead,  it 
was  the  product  of  simple  confirmation  based  on  "objective  necessity"  as  identified  in  the 
plan.  If  the  plan  so  provided,  the  creation  of  the  state  enterprise  would  be  assured.  It  was 
simply  "confirmed"  in  the  appropriate  manner.  Similarly,  the  termination  of  these  enterprises 
followed  the  same  model.  As  a  result,  the  law  governing  the  creation  and  termination  of  state 
enterprises  was  underdeveloped,  for  it  was  more  a  question  of  pure  politics  rather  than  law 
224  Each  are  considered  in  more  detail  in  the  following  Sections  of  this  Chapter. 
-75- that  was  the  overriding  determinant:  law  is  only  necessary  if  there  is  scope  for  negotiation  or 
application,  but  less  so  in  the  context  of  simple  confirmation. 
As  aforementioned,  the  creation  of  these  separate  industrial  organisations  by  confirmation 
necessarily  presented  a  "governance  problem".  Once  created,  a  Soviet  industrial  organisation 
had  separate  civil  law  status;  was  separated  from  the  institutions  of  the  administrative  state; 
had  a  separate  balance  sheet  (operating  on  the  basis  of  khozraschet),  solitary  property  and 
autonomous  property  responsibility.  The  Soviet  state  therefore  had  to  find  appropriate 
techniques  to  allow  it,  as  appropriate,  to  control  and  restrict  their  activities  so  that  while 
retaining  a  civil  law  mask  of  autonomy,  these  state-owned  industrial  organisations  could  be 
compelled  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  objective  requirements  of  the  Soviet  state  as  expressed 
in  the  state  plan.  This  was  essentially  achieved  in  four  ways:  a  charter  that  carefully  detailed 
its  capacity  (coupled  with  a  strong  ultra  vires  rule);  property  without  ownership  (held  by  way 
of  operative  management);  one-man  management;  and  general  legal  and  administrative 
diktats.  This  governance  regime  should  not  appear  strange  once  it  is  understood  that  its  design 
was  to  regulate  an  entity  that  was  the  product  of  mere  confirmation  -a  puppet  with  its  own 
head  and  costume,  but  always  intended  to  bow  and  move,  as  necessary,  in  accordance  with 
the  movements  of  the  invisible  hand  of  the  puppeteer  -  the  Soviet  state. 
The  constitutive  documents  of  the  state-owned  industrial  organisation  generally  set  out  the 
internal  framework  for  its  operation.  In  the  Soviet  context  there  were  only  two  "interests":  the 
state  and  its  appointee  (the  director  of  the  enterprise)  . 
22'  This  can  be  contrasted  with  the 
constitutive  documents  of  market  economy  juridical  persons  which  generally  have  to  balance  a 
variety  of  interests  including  those  of  majority  shareholders,  minority  shareholders,  directors, 
creditors,  workers  etc.  The  principal  constitutive  document  of  the  state  enterprises,  the 
charter,  was  above  all  a  control  mechanism  to  ensure  that  the  appointee  of  the  state,  the  one- 
man  manager,  acted  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  purpose  for  which  the  state  enterprise  was 
created.  The  purpose  clause  in  the  charter  was  critical  for  under  Soviet  civil  law  a  juridical 
person  was  only  permitted  to  carry  out  an  activity  to  the  extent  it  was  expressly  contemplated 
in  the  charter.  In  the  absence  of  a  special  permission,  an  activity  was  prohibited.  Purpose 
clauses  were  usually  sufficiently  precise  to  ring-fence  activities  as  well  as  sufficiently  vague  so 
as  to  be  open  to  ex  post  facto  interpretation  should  the  state  wish  to  limit  further  or  to  broaden 
further  the  discretions  of  its  appointee. 
........... 
225  The  Soviet  ideology  of  the  "all-people's  state"  explained  that  not  only  had  class  conflict  been  abolished  in 
the  Soviet  Union,  but  also  that  there  was  a  coincidence  of  interests  between  the  interests  of  the  state  and 
the  interests  of  the  people  (see  supra  n.  92  et  seq.  and  infra  n.  538  et  seq). 
-76- In  addition  to  specifying  the  contents  of  the  charter,  control  over  the  activities  of  the 
confirmation  enterprise  by  the  state  was  also  effected  through  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  Soviet 
law  on  ownership.  For  while  the  concept  of  operative  management  preserved  in  ideological 
terms  state  ownership  of  the  means  of  production,  it  also  meant,  as  a  practical  matter,  that  the 
property  "of"  a  state  enterprise  was  never  owned  by  it.  Therefore,  the  state  agency 
responsible  for  the  creation  of  a  state  enterprise  and  the  allocation  to  it  of  state  property,  could 
designate  restrictions  on  the  use  of  that  state  property  by  the  state  enterprise  due  to  its 
continuing  ownership  of  that  property.  As  such,  in  addition  to  controlling  the  activities  of  the 
state  enterprise  in  the  more  "traditional"  ways  as  "owner  of  the  organisation"  (through  the 
charter  and  appointment  and  removal  of  the  management),  the  state  retained  control  over  its 
activities  through  being  at  all  times  the  direct  and  continuing  owner  of  "its"  property- 
State  control  was  further  achieved  by  way  of  the  management  structure.  One-man 
management  allocated  power  in  a  single  source.  This  facilitated  an  efficient  framework  for  the 
implementation  of  state  policy  without  committee  deliberation  or  debate,  and  enabled  the 
entire  management  of  an  enterprise  to  be  instructed  with  relative  ease.  There  was  a  single 
owner,  the  Soviet  state,  which  had  one representative,  a  single  director.  Political  dictatorship 
was  reproduced  as  economic  dictatorship.  Orders  confirmed  from  above  would  be  confirmed 
by  the  director  and  implemented  by  the  workers.  One-man  management  also  meant  one-man 
accountability  and  responsibility.  Therefore  if  an  enterprise  was  performing  below  its  targets 
as  set  by  the  plan,  there  was  only  one-manager  or  director  that  would  need  to  be  replaced, 
thereby  further  facilitating  central  control. 
There  was  a  final  control  mechanism  at  the  disposal  of  the  Soviet  state  which,  strictly 
speaking,  fell  outside  the  "governance  structure"  itself.  The  Soviet  state  could  use  its  position 
as  11sovereign"  to  ensure  that  its  enterprises  acted  in  accordance  with  its  requirements. 
Therefore,  as  legal  sovereign,  the  state  could  have  adopted  generic  or  specific  legislation  of 
all  types,  including  the  Enterprise  Statute  itself,  aimed  at  compelling  the  directors  of  its  state 
enterprises  to  act  in  a  particular  way.  Furthermore,  as  economic  (or  feudal)  sovereign,  general 
plans  and  planning  instructions  could  have  been  elaborated  by  duly  empowered  state  agencies, 
including  Gosplan,  and  would  have  been  binding  on  the  state  enterprises.  226 
226  As  loffe  explained,  "Perhaps  no  Soviet  enterprise  has  managed  to  work  even  one  year  in  its  entire  history 
without  suffering  economic  damage  and  production  arrhythmia  due  to  the  abrogation  or  modification  of 
its  production  or  other  plans  by  planning  agencies  of  various  levels"  (Olimpiad  S.  Ioffe,  Soviet  Law  and 
the  New  Economic  Experiment  in  supra  n.  174,  p.  13).  The  1965  legislative  initiatives  tried  to  introduce  a 
mechanism  by  which  planning  agencies  could  be  responsible  for  damage  caused  to  addressees  of  planned 
tasks.  This  was  rarely  used  in  practice  and  was  complicated  by  the  edict  of  Jan  1967  which  provided  that 
Ministries  had  to  set  up  reserve  funds  from  which  these  compensation  payments  would  be  made  but  that 
-77- Finally,  in  addition  to  the  formal  law-making  controls  that  were  available  as  sovereign,  the 
Soviet  state  (in  the  widest  sense  of  the  term)  also  exercised  control  over  the  activities  of  its 
industrial  organisations  through  the  "shadow  agencies"  of  the  Communist  Party.  As  loffe  and 
Maggs  noted,  "direct  subordination  means  nothing  else  than  subordination  of  economic 
organizations  to  the  Communist  Party's  instructions.  In  order  to  keep  a  close  watch  on  the 
Soviet  economy,  the  Party  maintains  its  own  economic  bureaucracy,  which  parallels  that  of 
the  government  ...  [in  fact] 
...  all  ... 
hirings  and  firings  [of  general  directors]  are  predetermined 
by  competent  Party  agencies.  ""' 
In  short,  the  development  of  this  multi-faceted  Soviet  state  presented  a  number  of  overlapping 
ways  that  the  state  and  Party  could  have  ensured  compliance  by  the  confirmation  enterprise 
with  its  instructions,  and  there  was  therefore  no  necessity  to  identify  the  specific  mechanism 
that  was  being  adopted  in  any  individual  case.  There  was  certainly  no  need  to  develop  in 
particular  a  governance  framework  based  solely  on  the  role  of  the  state  as  creator-owner  with 
a  developed  understanding  of  the  concept  of  an  ownership  interest  of  the  state  enterprise  and 
of  the  nature  of  the  rights  and  obligations  arising  in  connection  with  such  interest.  As  a  result, 
the  logic  of  the  confirmation  model  provided  an  inappropriate  foundation  or  starting  point  for 
the  development  of  industrial  organisations  based  on  fragmented  ownership  and  the  attraction 
of  equity  capital. 
The  confirmation  enterprise  is  perhaps  a  uniquely  Soviet  phenomenon  and  lends  support  to  the 
view  that  the  Soviet  legal  system  spawned  a  very  distinct  set  of  legal  principles  and 
creations.  "'  The  concept  of  state  control  over  the  national  economy  and  ownership  of  the 
means  of  production  (by  way  of  the  plan  and  state  ownership)  gave rise  to  an  enterprise  that 
could  be  created  and  liquidated  by  mere  confirmation,  that  can  be  conceptualised  with 
reference  to  the  civil  law  concept  of  juridical  personality  and  whose  operations  were 
controlled  by  a  peculiar  system  of  governance  based  on  vires,  operative  management  and  one- 
man  management,  coupled  with  pervasive  influence  of  the  Soviet  polity  as  legal  and  economic 
sovereign  and  through  the  party. 
all  disbursements  would  be  at  the  discretion  of  the  appropriate  ministry  (thereby  leaving  enterprises  with 
the  right  to  claim  but  without  the  right  to  be  compensated). 
227  Supra  n.  172,  p.  148  et  seq,  15  1.  In  another  work,  Ioffe  described  the  "unwritten  part  of  civil  law  "  as 
consisting  "by  and  large,  of  oral  Party  directives"  which  "has  superior  force  over  published  legal  norms" 
(supra  n.  123  (1988),  p.  13). 
228  See  supra  Section  2.2. 
-78- 3.2  Formation,  Reorganisation  and  Liquidation  by  Conrirmation 
Juridical  personality  throughout  pre-revolutionary  Russian  legal  history  was  perhaps  best 
regarded  in  terms  of  a  grant  from  the  state.  229  In  contrast  with  "general  incorporation  statutes  it 
where  the  establishment  of  juridical  personality  is  a  right  (provided  that  the  certain  general 
procedural  formalities  are  followed),  230  juridical  personality  conferred  by  an  individual  state 
act  necessitates  a  specific  exercise  of  discretion  by  the  state  (or  its  sub-division)  on  a  case-by- 
case  basis.  As  discussed,  under  Soviet  law,  the  decision  to  create  industrial  organisations  was 
taken  within  the  framework  of  the  state  plan  and  the  requirements  of  the  national  economy. 
Where  the  objective  needs  of  the  economy  required  the  creation  of  an  enterprise  in  a 
particular  branch  of  the  economy  to  fulfil  a  specific  function  then  that  enterprise  would  be 
created  by  the  appropriate  state  agency  as  a  matter  of  simple  confirmation. 
The  1961  FPCivL  did  not  provide  any  specific  method  or  procedure  for  the  establishment  of 
juridical  persons  (including  state  enterprises  and  associations)  and  the  civil  codes  contained  the 
broad  principle  that  the  formation  of  juridical  persons  should  be  carried  out  "in  the  procedure 
established  by  legislation"  of  the  USSR  and  the  relevant  union  republic.  "'  Soviet  legal 
doctrine  however  contemplated  three  procedures  ("tri  poryadka")  for  the  formation  of 
juridical  persons  in  general:  (i)  by  order  ("rasporyaditel'nyi");  (ii)  by  permission 
("raueshitel'nyi");  and  (iii)  normatively  by  initiative  ("normativno-yavochnyi").  232 
In  theory,  the  particular  procedure  that  was  applicable  depended  upon  the  identity  of  the 
creator  of  the  juridical  person  and  the  nature  of  the  resulting  juridical  person.  "'  Therefore  in 
doctrinal  terms:  the  first  procedure  was  reserved  for  state  enterprises  created  by  order  of  the 
duly  empowered  state  agency;...  the  second  procedure  was  to  be  used  where  a  voluntary 
association  sought  permission  for  juridical  status;  and  the  third  procedure  covered  the  situation 
where  citizens  had  created  juridical  persons  by  their  own  initiative  (and  was  particularly 
associated  with  the  "spontaneous"  formation  of  collective  farms).  loffe  as  a  practical  matter 
229  On  the  creation  of  pre-revolutionary  joint-stock  societies,  see  L.  E.  Shepelev,  Aktsionemye  Compand  v 
Rossii  (Izdatel'stvo  Nauka:  1973),  pp.  20-2  1. 
230  Examples  of  general  incorporation  statutes  include  the  English  Companies  Act  1985  (as  amended)  and  the 
General  Corporation  Law  of  the  State  of  Delaware  contained  in  Title  8,  Chapter  I  of  the  Delaware  Code 
of  1951  (as  amended). 
231  See,  for  example,  RSFSR  CC,  article  27. 
232  Supra  n.  27  (1950),  p.  15  1. 
233  Supra  n.  41  (1986),  p.  125-126. 
234  While  some  civil  codes  simply  referred  to  formation  in  accordance  with  the  procedures  established  by 
legislation,  others  such  as  the  Kazakh  civil  code  went  further  and  referred  specifically  to  creation  of 
"state  juridical  persons"  by  "order  of  the  duly  empowered  state  agency"  (Kaz  CC,  article  26). 
-79- rejected  the  notion  of  collective  farms  as  having  been  created  "voluntarily",  "'  and  concluded 
that  "the  system  of  commands,  although  formally  compatible  only  with  state  organisations,  is 
in  fact  the  universal  system  for  the  creation  of  juridical  persons  of  all  types  in  the  USSR".  "' 
This  view  was  broadly  (albeit  differently)  confirmed  by  Soviet  civil  law  textbooks  which 
stressed  the  guiding  influence  of  the  state  in  the  creation  of  all  juridical  persons  and  thus 
concluded  generically  that  "a  juridical  person  may  not  arise  other  than  from  state  power.  The 
state  regulates  and  controls  the  process  of  arising  of  the  juridical  person  in  this  or  any  other 
form.  ,  237 
There  was  only  one  article  of  the  Enterprise  Statute  that  governed  the  question  of  formation 
and  it  reflected  the  general  position  outlined  above  providing  that  "an  enterprise  shall  be 
formed  by  order  (decision)  of  a  superior  agency  in  accordance  with  legislation  of  the  USSR  or 
union  republic".  "'  The  superior  state  agency  itself  was  not  identified  but,  as  set  out  in 
subordinate  legislation,  it  was  usually  the  relevant  ministry  responsible  for  the  specific  branch 
of  the  economy.  "'  The  competences  of  the  ministries  were  set  out  in  article  20  of  the  General 
Statute  on  Ministries  of  the  USSR  which  directed  ministries  to  act  in  accordance  with  their 
work  plan  (budgetary  assignations)  . 
240  The  position  was  confirmed  by  the  decree  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers  "On  the  Procedure  for  the  Creation,  Reorganisation  and  Liquidation  of 
Enterprises,  Associations,  Organisations  and  Institutions"  which  provided  that  "the  creation  of 
enterprises,  associations,  organisations  and  institutions  shall  be  made  by  state  agencies  within 
the  limits  of  the  financial  and material  resources  assigned  to  them,  the  work  plans,  budgetary 
assignations  and  other  established  limits  and  norms"  . 
21'  Therefore  in  practice  the  process  of 
forming  state  enterprises  started  with  the  adoption  of  the  decision  to  create  them,  promulgated 
by  the  duly  empowered  state  agency  on  the  basis  of  the  requirements  of  the  plan  and  the 
235  On  the  "voluntary"  nature  of  the  creation  of  collective  farms,  see  supra  Sections  2.4.1  and  4.1.3. 
236  Supra  n.  123  (1988),  p.  35. 
237  Supra  n.  27  (1950),  p.  151. 
238  Enterprise  Statute,  article  6.  The  Production  Association  Statute  provided  for  formation  by  decision  of 
the  duly  empowered  ministry  or  Council  of  Ministers.  In  addition  it  listed  a  number  of  considerations  that 
should  have  been  taken  into  account  when  considering  whether  to  create  a  production  association.  These 
stressed  the  advantages  of  economies  of  scale,  integration  and  centralisation  of  procedures  and 
management  (Production  Association  Statute,  article  5). 
239  On  the  superior  organs  of  state  economic  organisations  see,  Osnovy  Upravleniya  Narodnym  Khozyaistvom 
(Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  198  1),  pp.  49-52. 
240  Obshchego  Polozheniya  o  Ministerstvakh  SSSR  (1  SDZ  SSSR  236).  Footnote  1  to  article  20  in  the  SDZ 
SSSR  (I  SDZ  SSSR  241)  traces  the  development  of  subordinate  legislation  regulating  the  formation  of 
enterprises. 
241  Polozhenie  o  Poryadke  Sozdaniya,  Reorganizatsii  i  Likvidatsii  Predpriyatii,  Ob''edinenii,  Organizatsii  i 
Uchrezhdenii,  SP  SSSR  (1982),  no.  25,  item  130,  article  3. 
-80- resources  allocated  to  it  from  the  state  budget.  This  then  led  to  the  drawing  up  of  a  charter 
which  was  then  registered  and  confirmed.  Juridical  personality  arose  upon  registration.  "' 
Soviet  civil  law  adopted  the  term  "termination"  to  describe  the  circumstances  when  a  juridical 
person's  existence  was  discontinued.  An  enterprise  could  have  been  "terminated"  by  one  of 
243  two  means:  "reorganisation"  or  "liquidation".  A  reorganisation  (through  merger,  separation 
or  accession)  always  resulted  in  a  successor  organisation,  whereas  a  liquidation  did  not.  The 
1961  FPCivL  was  silent  on  the  question  of  termination  and  the  civil  codes  did  not  provide  any 
specific  instances  when  termination  would  be  required,  or  for  a  particular  procedure  to  be 
adopted.  Furthermore,  the  decree  "On  the  Procedure  for  the  Creation,  Reorganisation  and 
Liquidation  of  Enterprises,  Associations,  Organisations  and  Institutions"  only  contained 
passing  references  to  liquidation  and  again  did  not  set  out  the  grounds  for  liquidation. 
Reflecting  an  equivalent  provision  in  the  civil  codes,  article  105  of  the  Enterprise  Statute 
merely  provided  that  enterprises  may  be  "reorganised  or  liquidated  by  decision  of  the  agency 
which  is  empowered  to  form  the  respective  enterprise.  " 
A  commentary  to  the  RSFSR  civil  code  noted  that  "the  grounds  for  liquidation  are:  the 
achievement  of  the  purpose  for  which  the  juridical  person  was  formed,  the  expiry  of  the 
period  for  its  activities,  the  inexpediency  of  its  further  existence  and  activity  and  other 
reasons".  "  A  commentary  to  the  Enterprise  Statute  explained  further  that  "liquidation  of  an 
enterprise  takes  place  in  the  event  that  its  continued  existence  is  deemed  inexpedient.  ""'  The 
Soviet  civil  law  textbooks  of  the  period  rarely  elaborated  further,  sometimes  noting  only  that  a 
liquidation  commission  (the  body  which  carried  out  liquidation)  was  appointed  by  the  superior 
state  agency  or  by  the  director  of  the  organisation  (where  so  duly  empowered  by  the  superior 
state  agency).  "' 
The  absence  of  any  detailed  discussion  on  the  procedure  for  liquidation,  or  when  it  was 
required,  suggests  that  the  decision  to  liquidate  an  enterprise,  like  its  formation,  was,  as  a 
practical  matter,  simply  a  matter  of  policy,  an  exercise  of  discretion,  a  mere  confirmation, 
242  Enterprise  Statute,  articles  6  and  7;  Production  Association  Statute,  article  8. 
243  RSFSR  CC,  article  37. 
244  Kommentaiii  k  Grazhdanskomu  Kodeksu  RSFSR  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1982),  p.  65. 
245  Kommentarii  k  Polozheniyu  o  Sotsialisticheskom  Gosudarstvennom  Proizvodstvennom  Predpriyatii 
(Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1968),  p.  297. 
246  See,  for  example,  Sovetskoe  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo,  Tom  I  (Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1979), 
p.  153. 
-  81 
- taken  without  the  need  for  a  detailed  legal  procedure  - 
247  And  as  has  been  argued  from  within 
the  model  of  confirmation,  the  creation  and  liquidation  of  the  state  enterprise  was  more  a 
question  of  policy  than  law.  The  Soviet  state  was  omnipotent  -  the  representative  of  the 
working  class  interests  and  the  single  owner.  In  accordance  with  official  ideology,  its  state 
plan  produced  the  optimal  allocation  of  resources  and  was  drawn  up  on  the  basis  of  objective 
economics.  The  profitability  of  any  single  unit  in  the  economy  was  of  secondary  importance 
as  compared  to  its  role  and  function  within  the  economy  as  a  whole  -  indeed  the  test  of 
"profitability"  was  not  mentioned  within  the  traditional  grounds  for  liquidation. 
The  market  economy  concept  of  liquidation  conditions,  an  inability  to  pay  or  service  debts, 
was  therefore  an  irrelevance  within  the  Soviet  context.  As  loffe  pointed  out  in  his  treatise  on 
Soviet  civil  law  that  "Although  numerous  state  economic  entities  cannot  exist  without 
governmental  subsidies,  and  numerous  collective  farms  cannot  make  ends  meet  when  totalling 
their  financial  achievements  for  the  economic  year,  bankruptcy  as  a  purely  capitalist 
phenomenon  is  alien  to  socialism  and,  as  a  result,  it  has  been  left  out  of  Soviet  law.  tv248  it 
seems  that  this  was  not  entirely  inaccurate.  In  1987  Nikolai  Ryzhkov,  the  then  prime  minister, 
estimated  that  approximately  13%  of  all  industrial  enterprises  were  "unprofitable",  that  is 
reliant  on  state  subsidies  . 
24'  As  such  it  was  rare  that  enterprises  were  ever  liquidated,  and  it 
was  f1more  common  iv250  to  terminate  enterprises  by  reorganisation  which  would  result  in  a  legal 
successor  and  thereby  ensure  continued  use  of  the  existing  industrial  complex  and  employment 
for  its  employees. 
3.3  Juridical  Personality  -  The  Veil  of  Legal  Autonomy 
There  was  very  little  discussion  in  Soviet  law  textbooks  as  to  why  the  state  enterprise  was 
given  the  status  of  a  juridical  person  . 
25  '  Generally,  textbooks  only  described  the  positive  law 
247  Despite  a  lack  of  discussion  on  the  rules  for  liquidation  in  most  Soviet  civil  law  textbooks,  Soviet  law  did 
in  fact  contain  rudimentary  procedures  for  the  liquidation  of  enterprises  and  in  particular  a  list  of  assets 
against  which  claims  could  be  levied  (see,  for  example,  RSFSR  CCP,  articles  408-411).  See  also  infra 
n.  270. 
248  Supra  n.  123  (1988),  p.  37. 
249  Izvestiya  (30  June  1987),  p.  4. 
250  Kommentarii  k  Grazhdanskomu  Kodeksu  Kazakhskoi  SSR  (Izdatel'stvo  Kazakhstan:  1988),  p.  75.  One 
textbook  noted  "at  the  present  time,  juridical  persons  are  usually  terminated  through  reorganisation 
resulting  from  new  requirements  in  the  area  of  economic,  cultural  and  state  construction"  (supra  n.  41 
(1986),  p.  127). 
251  There  was  no  a  ptiori  reason  why  state  enterprises  "had"  to  be  juridical  persons  -  as  Teubner  noted 
"nothing  prevents  the  legal  system  from  taking  any  object  whatever  -  divinities,  saints,  temples,  plots  of 
land,  article  objects  -  as  points  of  attribution  and  giving  them  legal  capacity.  Trees  particularly  are 
prominent  candidates.  "  (Gunther  Teubner,  "Enterprise  Corporatism:  New  Industrial  Policy  and  the 
Essence  of  the  Legal  Person",  supra  n.  223,  p.  59). 
-82- which  stated  that  juridical  personality  was  conferred  upon  a  state  enterprise  following  the 
confirmation  of  its  charter  by  the  applicable  state  agency.  -"'  It  has  been  suggested  in  this 
Chapter  that  juridical  personality  was  used  as  the  framework  to  develop  a  legally  separate 
addressee  of  the  plan  with  the  ability  to  operate  on  the  basis  of  a  separate  balance  sheet,  and 
in  the  case  of  industrial  organisations,  on  the  basis  of  khozraschet.  It  is  perhaps  for  this  reason 
that.,  as  one  civil  law  textbook  noted,  "juridical  personality  (a  legal  subject  of  civil  law)  is  the 
necessary  and  essential  element  of  an  enterprise".  . 253  The  ingeniousness  of  this  approach  was 
that  although  juridical  personality  meant  "separation",  providing  a  separate  vehicle  for 
economic  activity,  it  did  not  entail  any  specific  governance  regime  per  se  and  therefore  did 
not  require  the  state  to  cede  any  more  control  over  the  micro-economy  to  this  vehicle  than  it 
211  considered  appropriate  at  any  particular  time. 
Juridical  personality  created  pursuant  to  a  state  act  has  traditionally  been  viewed  in  terms  of 
the  "granting"  of  a  "concession".  However  in  the  Soviet  context,  as  has  been  argued,  it  is 
more  appropriate  to  understand  the  conferring  of  juridical  personality  in  terms  of 
"confirmation"  or  "delegation"  as  opposed  to  "granting".  The  state  was  acting  as  a  "creator" 
of  enterprises,  carving-out  separated  entities  from  the  administrative  state  and state  ownership 
of  the  means  of  production,  created  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  certain  defined  activities. 
These  juridical  persons  were  very  clearly  not  the  result  of  an  independently  formed 
association  created  by  third  parties  petitioning  the  state  as  sovereign  for  the  grant  of  legal 
recognition  as  a  collective  subject  of  civil  law. 
While  the  rationale  for  juridical  personality  was  undeveloped  in  Soviet  law,  the  essential 
features  of  a  juridical  person  were  a  matter  of  much  debate.  Article  11  of  the  1961  FPCivL 
(repeated  in  the  civil  codes)  set  out  some  of  these:  "Juridical  persons  shall  be  deemed  to  be 
organisations  which  possess  solitary  property,  may  acquire  property  and  personal  non- 
property  rights  and  bear  obligations  in  their  own  name,  and  be  plaintiffs  or  defendants  in 
court,  arbitrazh  or  arbitration",  255  and  later  noted  as  juridical  persons:  "state  enterprises  and 
other  state  organisations  which  are  on  khozraschet  and  having  basic  and  circulating  assets 
........  . .... 
252  Supra  n.  242.  "In  cases  where  the  need  arises  to  ascertain  whether  the  given  collective  organisation  is  a 
legal  person  ...  one  must  turn  to  the  constituent  instrument  on  the  basis  of  which  this  organisation  was  set 
up.  Not  infrequently  this  document  contains  a  direct  reference  to  the  fact  that  the  given  organisation  is  a 
legal  person.  The  rights  of  a  legal  person  may  also  be  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  the  organisation  (its 
constituent  instrument)  has  been  registered  by  competent  bodies"  (supra  n.  182  (1988),  pp.  15-16). 
253  Supra  n.  41  (1986),  p.  137. 
254  "The  institute  of  juridical  personality  is  above  all  a  civil  law  designation  and  results  in  operative 
autonomy  of  the  enterprise  in  the  carrying  out  of  its  planned  economic  activities",  [emphasis  added] 
(ibid,  p.  117). 
255  Repeated  verbatim  in  RSFSR  CC,  article  23. 
-83- allocated  to  them  and  a  separate  balance  sheet".  256  Article  2  of  the  Enterprise  Statute  expanded 
on  the  general  law  providing  that:  "The  socialist  state  production  enterprise,  using  state 
property  allocated  to  its  operative  management  or  use,  shall  carry  out,  with  the  efforts  of  its 
collective  under  the  direction  of  a  superior  agency,  its  production-economic  activities 
(manufacture  of  products,  fulfilment  of  works,  rendering  of  services)  in  accordance  with  the 
national-economic  plan,  on  the  basis  of  khozraschet,  shall  fulfil  obligations  and  enjoy  the 
rights  connected  with  such  activities,  shall  have  a  separate  balance  sheet  and  shall  be  a 
juridical  person.  , 257 
In  summary,  Soviet  textbooks  generally  noted  that  juridical  status  entailed  the  following  four 
features:  (i)  organisational  unity,  (ii)  solitary  property,  (iii)  autonomous  property 
responsibility;  and  (iv)  the  ability  to  enter  into  civil  law  relations  in  its  own  name.  "'  While 
there  was  much  debate  as  to  whether  these  characteristics  were  in  fact  distinct,  "  it  is  probably 
more  useful  to  view  them  as  interlocking  and  interdependent  features  of  an  organisation 
created  to  give  rise  to  a  separate  person  capable  of  acting  as  the  addressee  of  the  state  plan 
while  at  the  same  time  cradled  by  a  governance  regime  that  sufficiently  ring-fenced  any 
discretions  that  arose  by  virtue  of  this  formal  legal  autonomy.  " 
256  The  following  were  also  mentioned  in  that  article  as  juridical  persons  in  article  11:  "institutions  and  other 
state  organisations  which  are  on  the  state  budget  and  have  a  separate  estimate  and  whose  directors  enjoy 
the  rights  of  disposing  of  credits  ...  ;  state  organisations  financed  at  the  expense  of  other  sources  and 
having  a  separate  estimate  and  separate  balance  sheet;  collective  farms,  inter-collective  farms,  and  other 
cooperative  organisations  and  their  associations  ...  state-collective  farms  and  other  state-cooperative 
organisations....  [and]  other  organisations  in  the  instances  provided  for  by  the  legislation  of  the  USSR". 
257  This  provision  was  reproduced  almost  verbatim  in  article  2  of  the  Production  Association  Statute. 
258  For  example,  supra  n.  246,  p.  1136-138;  and  nAl  (1986),  pp.  117-119. 
259  The  fourth  characteristic,  the  ability  to  enter  into  civil  law  turnover  was,  until  the  adoption  of  the  1961 
FPCivL,  particularly  contentious.  Bratus  argued  that  "the  deciding  precondition  and  basis  [for  juridical 
personality]  ...  was  solitary  property"  (supra  n.  27  (1950),  pp.  146)  and  that  there  was  no  need  to  introduce 
this  fourth  characteristic  which  was  in  essence  a  summary  of  the  other  three.  By  contrast,  first  Genkin 
(see  D.  M.  Genkin,  Yuridicheskie  Litsa  v  Sovetskom  Grazhdanskom  Prave,  Problemy  Sotsialisticheskogo 
Prava  (1939),  no.  1,  pp.  91-93)  and  then  Venediktov  argued  that  "autonomous  participation  in  civil  law 
turnover  in  the  capacity  as  a  separate  (particular)  holder  of  civil  rights  and  obligations  and  consequently 
act  in  its  own  name  is  the  decisive  criteria"  (supra  n.  57  (1948),  p.  705). 
260  The  interdependence  of  the  various  features  was  particularly  evident  as  the  legislation  when  describing 
the  relevant  organisation  (see  supra  n.  257)  never  set  out  which  elements  of  the  description  arose  as  a 
consequence  of  its  juridical  personality  and  which  were  simply  characteristics  of  the  organisation  per  se. 
This  distinction  was  particularly  opaque  in  article  2  of  the  Enterprise  Statute  quoted  above.  As  a  legal 
matter  there  was  no  necessary  link  between  solitary  property,  khozraschet  and  autonomous  responsibility 
on  the  one  hand,  and  juridical  personality  on  the  other.  This  was  recognised  by  Venediktov  who  cited  the 
example  of  various  partnerships  in  "bourgeois  law"  which  despite  having  juridical  status,  also  had 
unlimited  responsibility  of  the  partners  for  its  debts  (supra  n.  57  (1948),  p.  695). 
-84- Solitary  Property  and  Khozraschet  The  basic  principle  was  that  "in  order  to  autonomously 
participate  in  goods-money  relationships  and  exist  as  a  subject  of  civil  law,  an  organisation 
must  possess  property  separated  from  property  of  other  persons  -  citizens,  organisations  and 
the  state".  261  The  term  "solitary"  was  used  to  indicate  that  although  state  property  was 
allocated  to  the  enterprise  (ie  "separated  out"),  the  ownership  thereof  always  remained  with 
the  state.  262  The  property  of  a  state  enterprise  was  made  up  of  a  number  of  funds  or  reserves. 
The  charter  fund  comprised  basic  and  circulating  assets  of  the  enterprise.  Other  funds 
included  the  monetary  funds  (such  as  a  fund  for  capital  investment,  and  amortisation  fund); 
and  incentive  funds  (such  as  the  production  development  fund,  the  fund  for  social-cultural 
measures  and  housing  construction).  263 
By  conceiving  of  the  industrial  organisation  in  terms  of  an  addressee  of  the  plan,  the 
confirmation  model  explains  the  necessity  for  the  "separation"  of  the  property  of  the  state 
enterprise  from  that  of  the  state.  While  juridical  personality,  strictly  construed,  was  a  method 
for  separating  out  the  legal  status  of  the  industrial  organisation  thereby  giving  it  civil  law 
standing,  solitary  property  enabled  the  juridical  person  to  have  the  capacity  for  economic 
autonomy.  "'  First,  it  meant  that  it  could  act  as  a  separate  economic  unit  with  a  separate 
balance  sheet;  and  secondly,  it  enabled  operation  on  the  basis  of  khozraschet.  Enterprises 
could  be  allocated  separate  property  and  then  were  required  to  cover  the  costs  of  all  future 
operations  from  within  this  property  and  any  revenues  generated  . 
26'  Finally,  it  facilitated  the 
separate  evaluation  of  the  economic  activity  of  this  organisation;  for  without  solitary  property 
and  a  separate  balance  sheet,  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  have  tested  whether  its  revenue 
covered  its  costs. 
Autonomous  Property  Responsibility  Autonomous  property  responsibility  was  a  peculiar 
feature  of  the  confirmation  model  that  should  not  be  confused  with  the  "market  economy" 
concept  of  "limited  liability".  Article  13  (as  amended)  of  1961  FPCivL  provided  two 
principles  of  responsibility  :  266  First,  "a  juridical  person  shall  be  responsible  for  its  own 
obligations  with  property  belonging  to  it  (allocated  to  it)  on  which  execution  may  be  levied  on 
the  basis  of  legislation  of  the  USSR  and  union  republics",  and  secondly,  "the  state  shall  not  be 
responsible  for  the  obligations  of  state  organisations  having  juridical  personality  and  these 
I.........  .. 
261  Supra  n.  41  (1986),  p.  118. 
262  The  concepts  of  ownership  and  operative  management  are  considered  in  more  detail  infra  Section  3.4.2. 
263  The  list  of  funds  was  more  clearly  set  out  in  the  Production  Association  Statute  at  article  39. 
264  The  extent  of  such  autonomy  would  be  determined  by  the  governance  regime. 
265  On  khozraschet  see  supra  Section  2.2. 
266  1961  FPCivL,  article  13;  and  RSFSR  CC,  articles  32  and  33. 
-85- organisations  shall  not  be  responsible  for  the  obligations  of  the  state".  The  civil  codes  added  a 
third  principle:  "a  state  organisation  shall  not  be  responsible  for  the  obligations  of  an 
enterprise  subordinate  to  it  having  juridical  personality  and  this  enterprise  shall  not  be 
267  responsible  for  the  obligations  of  organisations  to  which  it  is  subordinate".  On  the  basis  of 
these  basic  rules  the  Soviet  law  principle  of  autonomous  property  responsibility  seemed  in 
form  to  be  similar  to  the  concept  of  "limited  liability";  however,  in  substance,  they  were  very 
different. 
Limited  liability  is  essentially  a  rule  relating  to  insolvency  and  therefore  to  risk  allocation.  As 
long  as  a  company  is  paying  its  debts  as  they  fall  due,  the  status  of  limited  liability  is  an 
irrelevance.  If  however  a  company  is  being  wound-up,  limited  liability  ensures  that  creditors 
of  that  organisation  cannot  seek  satisfaction  for  the  debts  incurred  by  that  organisation  from 
the  separate  assets  of  its  owners.  From  a  practical  and  economic  point  of  view  there  are  a 
number  of  additional  consequences  associated  with  limited  liability  status  in  the  market 
economy:  the  principle  of  limited  liability  encourages  investment  in  equity  capital  (eliminating 
the  risk  that  other  assets  of  investors  could  become  attached  on  an  insolvency)  and  it  also 
provides  creditors  with  a  "bright  line  test"  as  to  the  financial  condition  of  the  juridical  person 
which  must  be  calculated  on  the  basis  of  its  financial  condition  (as  set  out  in  its  accounts). 
Therefore  owners  of  the  company  do  not  need  to  spend  time  and  costs  monitoring  the  assets  of 
other  owners  as  this  will  not  affect  the  "credit"  of  the  organisation.  "' 
Such  considerations  were  largely  irrelevant  within  the  context  of  the  Soviet  economic  system 
which  was  based  on  a  single  owner  of  the  means  of  production,  determining  industrial  activity 
by  diktat  principally  in  the  form  of  the  state  plan.  Liquidation  was  not  used  as  a  method  for 
imposing  economic  discipline  through  a  "market  of  corporate  control"  such  as  in  market 
economies  and  it  was  often  that  Soviet  state  enterprises  unable  to  pay  their  debts  when  they 
fell  due  were  generally  either  reorganised  or  re-labelled  an  "unprofitable  enterprise"  and  the 
appropriate  subsidies  were  made  from  the  state  budget.  "'  Where  liquidation  did  occur,  Soviet 
267  RSFSR  CC,  article  34. 
268  For  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  function  of  limited  liability  in  market  economies  see  Frank  H. 
Easterbrook  and  Daniel  R.  Fischel,  Ae  Economic  Structure  of  Corporate  Law  (Harvard  University 
Press:  199  1),  pp.  41-44. 
269  The  disciplines  of  khozraschet  and  self-sufficiency  were  generally  subordinated  to  the  needs  of  the  plan  if 
necessary.  Indeed  in  the  early  days  of  Soviet  industrialisation,  all  industry  was  financed  from  state 
subsidies  as  access  to  foreign  capital  was  restricted  and  there  was  no  general  internal  non-state  capital 
market.  As  Davies  noted  of  the  year  1929-1930:  "The  legislation  on  khozraschet  was  almost  entirely 
ignored  in  practice  ... 
This  reflected  the  widespread  view  that  with  the  growth  of  comprehensive  physical 
planning  no  real  distinction  could  be  made  between  establishments  financed  from  the  state  budget  and 
enterprises  financed  by  khozraschet  "  (supra  n.  12,  p.  3  15  -3  16). 
-86- law  provided  that  creditors  usually  only  had  recourse  to  cash  assets,  and  not  to  other  property 
and  basic  assets  that  had  been  allocated  to  it  by  way  of  operative  management.  "O 
The  Soviet  concept  of  autonomous  property  responsibility  was  more  of  an  accounting 
principle  than  a  procedural  rule  relating  to  the  liquidation  of  an  enterprise  and  the  division  of 
assets.  As  it  has  been  argued,  the  rationale  behind  solitary  property  and  autonomous  property 
responsibility  as  elements  of  juridical  status  was  to  create  an  organisation  that  could  act  as  an 
appropriate  addressee  of  planned  instructions,  capable  of  operating  and  being  evaluated  on  its 
own  terms  through  the  concept  of  a  separate  balance  sheet  and  khozraschet.  Khozraschet 
would  simply  not  have  been  able  to  operate  effectively  unless,  as  an  accounting  matter,  the 
industrial  organisation  was  treated  as  a  separate  organisation.  Autonomous  property 
responsibility  was  aimed  at  facilitating  the  day-to-day  evaluation  of  its  economic  performance 
and  role  by  the  state  planners. 
And  so  while  the  "principles"  of  autonomous  property  responsibility  and  limited  liability  seem 
to  set  out  a  similar  attribute,  the  model  of  confirmation  and  its  explanation  of  the  role  of  the 
confirmation  enterprise  illustrates  that  in  functional  terms  both  these  rules  were  used  by 
different  types  of  economy  to  address  different  concerns. 
3.4  Governance  -  Economic  Dependence 
Four  distinct  roles  of  the  state  have  been  identified  in  this  Chapter.  Each  of  them  distinguish  a 
different  element  of  a  governance  regime  by  which  the  Soviet  state  ensured  the  capacity  to 
exercise  near  total  control  over  its  "autonomous"  juridical  persons.  Furthermore,  by  focusing 
on  each  role  and  its  evolution  during  the  period  to  1990,  the  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the 
"new"  industrial  organisations  introduced  during  this  period,  and  the  retreat  of  the  state  from 
direct  management  of  the  industrial  economy,  becomes  deeper  and  sharper. 
270  See  RSFSR  CC,  article  101.  Primary  recourse  of  "creditors"  for  unsatisfied  debts  was  to  the  monetary 
assets  in  credit  institutions  and  only  then  could  creditors  seek  recourse  against  the  property  in  operative 
management  of  the  enterprise  (RSFSR  CCP,  articles  408-411).  Nevertheless  there  were  certain  assets  of 
the  enterprise  upon  which  execution  could  never  be  levied.  Article  22  of  1961  FPCivL  provided  that 
"enterprises,  buildings,  installations,  equipment,  and  other  property  relegated  to  the  basic  assets  of  state 
organisations  may  not  be  the  subject  of  pledge  and  execution  may  not  be  levied  thereon  in  respect  of  the 
claims  of  creditors.  "  (This  provision  was  reproduced  verbatim  in  the  civil  codes:  RSFSR  CC,  article  98). 
This  part  of  article  22  of  the  1961  FPCivL  was  amended  by  deleting  the  word  "enterprises"  from  the  list 
by  an  edict  of  the  Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  USSR  (Vedomosti  SSSR  (1981),  no.  44,  item  1184). 
The  amendment  was  then  made  to  the  corresponding  provisions  of  the  civil  codes.  The  codes  of  civil 
procedure,  while  reflecting  the  substance  of  article  22,  went  further,  prohibiting  any  claims  against  the 
seed  and  fodder  reserves,  as  well  as  other  reserves  and  assets  necessary  for  the  carrying  out  of  their 
normal  activities.  Levying  execution  on  property  of  state  enterprises  (except  monetary  assets)  located 
within  the  state  budget  was  also  prohibited. 
-87- State  as  Creator-Owner  The  state  as  creator  or  founder  of  the  enterprise  had  available  to  it  the 
"traditional"  governance  structures  for  maintaining  control.  As  founder,  the  state  could  draw- 
up  the  charter  and  could  specify  therein  the  purposes  of  its  activities  and  ensure  that  the  scope 
of  the  management's  discretion  was  suitably  ringfenced. 
State  as  Propeny-Owner  In  addition  to  being  the  founder  of  the  enterprise,  the  state  retained 
ownership  of  all  of  the  property  allocated  to  the  enterprise.  Therefore  in  addition  to  possessing 
the  right  to  impose  limits  on  management's  powers  in  the  charter,  the  state  could  also  impose 
limits  on  the  way  that  the  management  used  the  property  "of"  the  enterprise  -  for  although  it 
was  "separated"  from  the  state,  it  remained  in  the  ownership  of  the  state. 
State  as  Legal  Sovereign  The  state  was  also  the  legal  sovereign  and  therefore  could  enact 
legislation  to  determine  the  framework  of  the  industrial  organisations  generally,  as  well  as  to 
require  specific  conduct  by  legal  diktat. 
State  as  Economic  Sovereign  In  addition  to  being  the  source  of  all  law,  the  Soviet  state  (as 
quasi  feudal  overlord)  was  also  the  single  unitary  owner  of  all  of  the  means  of  production.  As 
owner  not  just  of  the  property  of  the  enterprise  but  also  of  the  entire  economy,  it  could 
promulgate  general  plans  and  issue  specific  administrative  instructions  that  bound  every 
enterprise  with  each  other  in  a  single  economic  network  of  economic  contracts. 
3.4.1  The  Charter  and  Special  Legal  Capacity 
The  Enterprise  Statute  required  each  enterprise  to  have  a  charter  confirmed  by  the  state 
agency  which  took  the  decision  on  its  formation.  "'  The  charter  was  to  contain:  the  name  (or 
number)  of  the  enterprise  and  its  location  (postal  address);  the  name  of  the  state  agency  to 
which  the  enterprise  was  directly  subordinate  (the  superior  state  agency);  the  subject  and 
purpose  of  the  activities  of  the  enterprise;  details  of  its  charter  fund;  a  provision  that  the 
enterprise  operated  on  the  basis  of  the  Enterprise  Statute  and  that  it  was  a  juridical  person; 
and  the  name  of  the  official  heading  up  the  enterprise  (the  director,  manager,  boss).  "'  The 
charter  was  also  permitted  to  contain  additional  provisions  "not  contrary  to  legislation".  These 
usually  specified  any  peculiarities  relating  to  the  activities  of  the  enterprise. 
As  an  alternative  to  a  charter,  but  only  in  the  specific  instances  provided  for  by  legislation, 
enterprises  could  be  governed  by  "general  statute".  "'  A  general  statute  was  used  as  the  basic 
271  Enterprise  Statute,  article  7;  Production  Association  Statute,  article  8. 
272  Ibid. 
273  Enterprise  Statute,  article  7.  There  was  no  equivalent  for  the  production  association  (see  Production 
Association  Statute,  article  8).  Sometimes  they  were  referred  to  as  "Model  Charters". 
-88- constitutional  document  for  all  state  enterprises  operating  within  a  particular  sector  of  the 
economy  . 
27'  Braginsky  noted  that  "...  the  difference  between  a  charter  and  a  statute  is  purely 
terminological  and  in  content,  both  acts  fully  coincide.  "27'There  was  however  one  important 
difference  in  their  process  of  adoption:  a  general  statute  had  to  be  adopted  by  decree  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers  (ie  the  government)  of  the  USSR.  While  the  Soviet  "general  statute" 
seemed  similar  in  form  to  "model  articles  of  association"  in  market  economies,,  276  the  function 
of  these  general  statutes  was  very  different.  Soviet  general  statutes  should  be  understood  in 
terms  of  restriction  rather  than  prescription.  Market  economy  model  charters  generally 
provide  default  rules  that  apply  where  owners  do  not  "contract  out"  of  them.  By  contrast, 
rather  than  aiming  at  the  devolution  of  discretions  to  the  lowest  level,  the  Soviet  general 
statutes  simply  abstracted  and  elevated  the  responsibility  for  drafting  the  constitutive 
documents  of  state  enterprises  in  a  particular  sector  from  the  local  duly  empowered  state 
agency  to  the  government  of  the  USSR  itself.  Inferior  state  agencies  had  no  right  to  contract 
out  of  terms  of  the  general  statutes  when  creating  state  enterprises  subordinate  to  them  and 
established  in  a  sector  governed  by  a  statute,  other  than  where  residual  discretion  was 
expressly  provided  for  by  legislation. 
After  having  taken  the  decision  to  create  a  state  enterprise  in  accordance  with  the 
requirements  of  the  relevant  plan,  the  charter  was  adopted,  confirmed  and  registered  as  a  pre- 
condition  to  juridical  status.  "'  The  drawing-up  of  the  contents  of  the  charter  provided  the  first 
opportunity  of  the  state  to  ensure  that  discretions  delegated  to  the  manager  of  the  state 
enterprise  were  carefully  crafted  and  restricted  as  appropriate.  Control  was  then  achieved  by 
the  operation  of  the  Soviet  law  of  vires. 
The  first  aspect  of  the  ultra  vires  rule  applied  generally.  Under  Soviet  law,  all  "rights"  of  any 
civil  law  subject,  including  of  a  state  enterprise,  were  conditional,  restricted  by  reference  to 
the  way  that  they  were  exercised.  As  article  5  of  the  1961  FPCivL  provided  that  "civil  rights 
shall  be  protected  by  law,  except  in  the  instances  when  they  are  exercised  contrary  to  the 
purpose  of  those  rights  in  a  socialist  society  in  the  period  of  the  construction  of  communism". 
Furthermore,  transactions  "performed  with  a  purpose  contrary  to  the  interests  of  a  socialist 
274  Supra  n.  244,  p-52- 
275  Supra  n.  182  (1988),  p.  17. 
276  See,  for  example,  "Table  A"  in  English  company  law  (Companies  Act  1985,  Table  A  (Sl  1985/805, 
Schedule)). 
277  Supra  n.  242. 
-89- state  and  society"  were  simply  void  . 
27'  These  provisions  were  an  expression  of  the  wider 
Soviet  law  principle  that  everything  was  prohibited  unless  it  was  expressly  permitted. 
The  second  aspect  of  the  ultra  vires  rule  was  more  specific  and  was  developed  through  the 
concept  of  "special  legal  capacity".  Each  charter  had  to  include  a  purpose  clause  specifying 
the  purpose  and  subject  of  activity  of  the  particular  juridical  person.  Article  12  of  the  1961 
FPCivL  provided  that  "a  juridical  person  shall  possess  civil  legal  capacity  in  accordance  with 
the  purposes  established  for  its  activities.  "279  Transactions  "performed  contrary  to  these 
specific  purposes"  were  void.  280 
A  reading  of  the  Soviet  law  commentaries  on  special  legal  capacity  reaffirmed  the  argument 
that  this  is  best  understood  as  a  part  of  the  governance  regime  of  state  juridical  persons  rather 
than  simply  as  an  abstract  principle  of  civil  law.  Venediktov  explicitly  noted  that  "the 
principle  of  special  legal  capacity  of  juridical  persons  was  in  the  USSR  (in  contrast  with 
bourgeois  countries)  a  direct  consequence  and  reflection  of  socialist  planning".  "'  Another 
textbook  explained  that  "juridical  persons  are  created  for  definite  purposes  and  the  state 
controls  how  and  in  what  amount  they  are  carried  out...  ".  "'  Limitations  on  capacity  ensured 
that  "the  possibility  of  deviation  from  the  tasks  set  for  it  is  removed.  ""'  The  1965 
commentary  to  the  Kazakhstan  Civil  Code  noted  simply  that  "the  nature  of  a  planned  economy 
necessitates  a  precise  delineation  of  the  sphere  of  legal  actions  which  must  and  may  be 
performed  by  socialist  organisations,  using  all  their  resources  on  the  initiative  of  the  entire 
collective  for  the  effectuation  of  their  purposes.  , 284  However,  although  such  commentaries 
hint  at  its  importance,  it  is  only  when  the  state  enterprise  is  presented  within  the  confirmation 
model  that  the  notion  of  special  legal  capacity  can  clearly  be  viewed  as  a  key  element  in  a 
governance  regime  that  extends  beyond  the  idea  of  mere  vires,  to  an  explanation  based  on  the 
function  of  juridical  personality  itself  as  the  addressee  of  the  plan  balancing  autonomous  and 
controlling  influences. 
Soviet  law  distinguished  conceptually  between  rights  based  on  "material  criteria"  (the 
derivation  of  rights  from  the  subject  and  purpose  of  its  activities)  and  those  based  on  "formal 
278  RSFSR  CC,  article  49. 
279  This  provision  was  reproduced  in  the  various  civil  codes  without  substantial  amendment:  RSFSR  CC, 
article  26. 
280  RSFSR  CC,  article  50. 
281  Supra  n.  57  (1948),  p.  686. 
282  Supra  n.  41  (1986),  p.  120. 
283  Ibid.,  p.  120. 
284  Kommentarii  k  Grazhdanskomu  Kodeksu  Kazakhskoi  SSR  (Izdatel'stvo  Kazakhstan:  1965),  p.  57. 
-90- criteria"  (a  list  of  fixed  rights  independent  of  purpose)  . 
28'  As  we  have  seen,  civil  law  rights 
under  Soviet  law  were  based  on  a  material  criteria  and  were  therefore  always  derivative, 
constrained  by  the  purpose  for  which  they  were  intended  to  be  exercised.  It  is  perhaps  for  this 
reason  that  Soviet  legislation  on  enterprises  only  required  the  "subject  of  activity"  to  be 
included  in  the  charter  and  not  a  list  of  rights. 
A  purposive  theory  of  the  existence  of  rights,  coupled  with  the  operation  of  the  ultra  vires 
rule,  meant  that  the  Soviet  regime  had  the  flexibility  both  to  curtail  and  to  broaden  permitted 
discretions  of  a  juridical  person  merely  by  changing  the  official  "interpretation"  of  the  purpose 
clause.  A  strict  approach  could  be  taken  as  was  illustrated  by  decisions  of  the  Soviet  courts  in 
invalidating  transactions  as  contrary  to  the  purposes  specified  in  the  charter.  "'  Alternatively 
an  expansive  approach  could  be  taken,  illustrated  by  the  doctrine  of  "associated" 
C'soputstvuyushchyi")  purposes  and  rights:  activities  "associated"  with  the  purposes  specified 
in  the  charter  would  therefore  be  valid  and  permitted.  "'  Such  "associated  actions"  were 
typically  activities  aimed  at  providing  workers  with  certain  benefits  such  as  schooling,  housing 
and  the  like.  Article  2  of  the  Enterprise  Statute  and  Production  Association  Statute  was 
explicit  on  this  point  and  provided  that  an  enterprise  or  association  shall  "enjoy  the  rights 
connected  with  such  activities". 
Any  "formal"  list  of  rights  contained  in  the  legislation  and  in  the  charters  of  the  time  should 
be  understood  in  this  context.  As  a  commentary  to  the  RSFSR  civil  code  noted  "it  is  not 
possible  to  provide  in  the  charter  an  exhaustive  list  of  transactions  that  may  be  performed  in 
accordance  with  the  purposes  of  the  juridical  person  and  deemed  to  be  valid:  a  detailed  list  is 
in  any  event  incomplete 
...  a  juridical  person  may  act  in  any  legal  relations  corresponding  to 
the  purposes  specified  in  the  charter".  '"  Therefore  it  was  not  any  list  of  rights  in  the  charter 
that  would  be  determinative,  instead,  the  enterprise  simply  possessed  all  those  rights 
associated  with  its  purpose  of  activities  and  had  to  exercise  such  rights  consistently  therewith. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  note  that  both  the  Enterprise  Statute  and  the  Production 
Association  Statute  devoted  an  entire  section  (Section  IV)  to  the  rights  of  the  enterprise  (or 
285  Supra  n.  182  (1988),  p-18. 
286  See,  for  example,  the  use  of  the  ultra  vires  decision  to  invalidate  a  contract  made  between  a  collective 
farm  and  a  citizen  as  being  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  its  charter.  (Sbomik  Postanovlenii  Plenuma 
Verkhovnogo  Suda  SSSR  1924-1963  (Izdatel'stvo  Izvestiya  Sovetov  Narodnykh  Deputatov  SSSR:  1964), 
p.  78). 
287  Supra  n.  27  (1958),  p.  211. 
288  Supra  n.  94,  p.  53. 
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- association).  2'9  These  included,  in  the  Enterprise  Statute,  rights  in  the  domain  of  planning;  in 
the  domain  of  capital  construction  and  capital  repair;  in  the  domain  of  improving  technology 
and  production  technology;  in  the  domain  of  material-technical  supply  and  sale;  in  the  domain 
of  finances;  and  in  the  domain  of  labour  and  wages.  As  a  matter  of  practice,  the  charter  often 
also  contained  a  list  of  rights.  It  is  curious  within  the  context  of  Soviet  law  and  the  rejection  of 
"formal  criteria"  as  the  basis  for  rights  that  such  lists  in  both  the  legislation  and  the  charter 
should  have  been  set  forth  in  such  detail.  The  listing  of  rights  in  this  way  was  probably  used 
to  indicate  an  attempt  to  decentralise  discretions,  but  more  often  that  not,  the  rights  were  not 
just  permissive,  but  were  expressed  as  requirements  to  act  in  a  particular  way,  and  therefore 
were  a  function  of  the  third  feature  of  the  governance  regime,  coercive  law.  " 
Despite  the  fact  that  both  Soviet  legislation  and  the  charters  were  essentially  state  acts,  the 
listing  of  rights  was  in  no  way  an  attempt  to  create  exceptions  to  the  general  concept  that 
rights  were  derivative.  There  were  no  discussions  in  the  Soviet  legal  literature  of  the  time  that 
suggested  that  these  lists  constituted  official  recognition  of  special  regimes  of  operation  and 
the  existence  of  inalienable  rights.  "'  In  the  opinion  of  loffe  and  Maggs,  "despite  the  great 
number  of  such  norms,  they  do  not  give  the  impression  of  real  autonomy  of  production 
associations.  Numerous  economic  actions  demand  direct  permission  or  coming  to 
agreement".  "' 
While  the  charter,  through  the  ultra  vires  rule,  was  the  legal  straightjacket  for  the  exercise  of 
discretions  by  management,  it  also  set  out  the  other  elements  of  the  governance  regime:  the 
nature  of  the  property  allocated  to  the  enterprise  and  the  management  structure. 
3.4.2  Operative  Management  -  Property  Without  Ownership 
One  of  the  unique  aspects  of  the  governance  regime  of  the  confirmation  model  was  the 
concept  of  the  continuing  ownership  "of"  the  property  of  the  confirmation  enterprise  by  its 
founder,  the  state.  This  allowed  for  control  over  its  activities  through  the  direct  ownership  of 
289  This  represented  a  significant  part  of  each  of  those  statutes  as  the  Enterprise  Statute  was  divided  up  into 
only  six  sections  and  the  Production  Association  Statute  into  five.  The  listing  of  rights  in  legislation  dates 
to  the  decree  "On  the  Broadening  of  Rights  of  Directors  of  Enterprises"  adopted  in  1955  which  similarly 
set  out  the  parameters  of  the  discretions  of  the  director  (0  Rasshirenii  Prav  Direktorov  Predpriyatii  (9 
August  1955)  in  Resheniya  Partii  i  Pravitel'stva  po  Khozyaistvennym  Voprosam,  Tom  4  (Izdatel'svto 
Politicheskoi  Literatury:  1968),  p.  244). 
290  See  infra  Section  3.4.3. 
291  The  question  of  whether  a  charter  approved  and  registered  by  the  Soviet  state  could  contain  exceptions 
from  prevailing  legislation  that  had  the  status  of  law  is  discussed  ftirther  in  the  context  of  joint 
enterprises,  infra.  Section  5.3.3. 
292  Supra  n.  172,  p.  151  et  seq. 
-92- its  property  and  the  ability  therefore  to  place  an  additional  layer  of  restrictions  upon  the 
management's  use  of  it. 
The  "orthodox"  explanation  for  continued  state  ownership  of  the  property  allocated  to 
industrial  organisations  was  developed  in  Soviet  legal  literature  in  terms  of  the  Marxist 
ideological  necessity  to  preserve  state  ownership  of  the  means  of  production. 
It  has  however  been  argued  that  operative  management  had  two  additional  functions.  First, 
operative  management  was  an  integral  part  of  the  solution  to  the  question  of  the  management 
of  the  micro-economy  posed  in  the  context  of  a  macro-economy  based  on  the  plan.  Operative 
management,  while  preserving  state  ownership,  enabled  the  "separating  out"  of  property  to 
juridical  persons.  This  in  turn  facilitated  operation  as  discrete  actors  and  addressees  of  the 
plan  based  on  separate  balance  sheets  and  khozraschet.  Secondly,  operative  management 
provided  an  additional  element  in  the  governance  regime  of  the  confirmation  enterprise. 
The  term  "operative  management"  appeared  in  the  1961  FPCivL  by  virtue  of  an  amendment 
in  1981  to  article  26 
'29'  although  the  theoretical  framework  had  been  developed  much  earlier, 
with  the  classic  elaboration  by  Venediktov  in  his  work  on  state  socialist  ownership.  294  Indeed 
subordinate  legislation  had  for  some  time  contained  references  to  the  term  (including  the 
Enterprise  Statute  and  the  Production  Association  Statute).  295 
Having  proposed  in  this  Chapter  the  four  different  roles  of  the  Soviet  state  and  how  each  role 
was  identified  with  a  particular  element  of  the  governance  regime  of  the  confirmation 
enterprise,  it  is  immediately  (and  curiously)  apparent  that  the  drafting  of  the  amended  article 
26  of  the  1961  FPCivL  implicitly  incorporated  each  of  these:  it  provided  that  "property, 
allocated  to  state  ...  organisations,  shall  be  in  the  operative  management  of  these  organisations 
who  shall  carrying  out  the  right  of  possession,  use  and  disposition  of  the  property  [11  within 
the  limits  established  by  law,  [2]  in  accordance  with  the  purposes  of  its  activities,  [3]  planning 
tasks  and  [4]  the  designation  of  the  property.  "216  The  limits  established  by  law  reflected  the 
state's  role  as  legal  sovereign,  the  purposes  of  activities  reflected  the  state's  role  as  creator- 
........  ... 
293  0  Vnesenii  Izmenenii  i  Dopolnenii  v  Osnovy  Grazhdanskogo  Zakonodatel'stva  Soyuza  SSR  i  Soyuznykh 
Respublik,  Vedomosti  SSSR  (1981),  no.  44,  item  1184.  Corresponding  amendments  were  later  made  to  the 
civil  code  provisions. 
294  Supra  n.  57  (1948),  p.  323  et  seq. 
295  On  operative  management  generally,  see  V.  S.  Yakushev,  Pravo  Operativnogo  Upravleniya  kak  Institut 
Khozyaistvennogo  Zakonodatel'stva,  SGiP  (1978),  no.  4,  p.  78;  S.  N.  Bratus,  0  Sootnoshenii 
Sotsialisticheskoi  Sobstvennosti  i  Prava  Operativnogo  Upravleniya,  SGiP  (1986),  no.  3,  p.  19. 
296  This  provision  was  included  almost  verbatim  in  article  8  of  the  Enterprise  Statute  and  article  14  of  the 
Production  Association  Statute. 
-93- owner;  the  planning  tasks  reflected  the  state's  role  as  economic  sovereign  and  the  designation 
of  property  reflected  the  state's  role  as  property-owner.  More  broadly,  operative  management 
was  a  product  of  the  basic  principle  of  the  Soviet  state  that  everything  was  prohibited  unless 
permitted,  and  as  such,  state  property  allocated  to  the  state  enterprise  could  therefore  not  be 
used  for  any  purpose,  other  than  as  prescribed  by  law,  its  purposes,  planning  and  designation. 
These  restrictions  on  "the  operative  manager"  can  be  contrasted  with  the  restrictions  imposed 
on  an  "owner"  by  article  19  of  the  1961  FPCivL  which  stated  only  that  "the  right  of 
possession,  use  and  disposition  of  property  within  the  limits  established  by  law  shall  belong  to 
the  owner".  Therefore  as  Ioffe  explained  "the  owner  can  be  limited  in  his  triad  of  rights  only 
by  the  law,  while  other  holders  of  the  right  to  possess,  use  and  dispose  can  be  restricted  not 
only  by  the  law  but  also  by  the  owner  himself".  "  This  explanation,  while  accurate,  should  be 
expanded  in  its  understanding  by  taking  into  account  the  multi-faceted  features  of  the  "owner 
himself"  (ie  the  different  roles  of  the  state)  and  the  fact  that  each  of  those  features  was 
actually  expressed  in  the  amended  drafting  of  article  26. 
The  argument  that  operative  management  must  also  be  understood  as  an  element  of  the 
governance  regime  is  strengthened  by  an  understanding  of  the  procedure  for  the  "allocation" 
of  property  into  the  operative  management,  and  the  law  relating  to  the  obligations  of  the 
operative  manager.  Allocation  of  property  into  operative  management  was  effected  not  by  the 
civil  law  of  contract  but  by  an  "administrative  act".  "'  As  a  consequence,  the  legal 
characterisation  of  the  relationship  between  the  state  (owner  of  property)  and  the  enterprise 
(operative  manager)  was  not  a  civil  law  relationship  between  equals  (such  as  between  parties 
to  a  contract  of  lease)  but  an  administrative  relationship  between  superior  and  inferior  parties. 
It  followed  that  an  enterprise  to  which  property  was  allocated  by  way  of  operative 
management  "shall  not  only  have  the  right  but  also  the  obligation  to  use  the  property  allocated 
to  it  in  accordance  with  the  purposes  of  its  activities,  planning  tasks  and  the  designation  of  the 
property.  Failure  to  comply  with  the  designation  of  the  property  will  be  a  violation  of  state 
discipline  and  shall  result  in  responsibility.  ,  299 
297  Supra  n.  123  (1988),  p.  93. 
298  The  procedure  for  the  disposition  of  state  property  to  organisations  as  basic  or  circulating  assets  was  set 
out  in  article  22  of  1961  FPCivL  and  then  developed  in  the  civil  codes  (RSFSR  CC,  articles  96  and  97) 
as  well  as  subordinate  legislation  (eg  0  Poryadke  Peredachi  Predpriyatii,  Ob''edinenii,  Organizatsii, 
Uchrezhdeni  i,  Zdani  ii  Sooruzhenii,  SP  SSSR  (1979),  no.  26,  item  172  and  SP  SSSR  (1980),  no.  11,  item 
85  (with  the  same  name)).  See  as  to  the  detail  of  the  procedure,  supra  n.  41  (1986),  pp.  347-350. 
299  Supra  n.  250,  p.  135.  [emphasis  added]  - 
-94- Therefore,  while  indeed  operative  management  was  used  within  the  Soviet  law  on  ownership 
to  preserve  the  ideological  requirement  of  state  ownership  of  the  means  of  production,  at  the 
same  time  it  functioned  to  enable  state-owned  juridical  persons  to  operate  within  the  national 
economy  with  separate  balance  sheets,  and  perhaps  more  importantly,  was  a  key  component 
in  the  governance  regime  of  those  enterprises  embodying  all  four  roles  of  the  state  within  it. 
3.4.3  Unitary  Ownership,  One-Man  Management  and  Coercive  Law 
Juridical  persons  have  to  exercise  their  civil  law  capacity  through  representative  bodies  of 
natural  persons  -  collective  or  individual.  Companies  in  a  market  economy  are  the  focal  point 
for  numerous  different  interests  including  those  of  its  shareholders,  directors,  creditors  and 
employees,  and  therefore  the  structure  of  these  representative  bodies  and  the  theories 
explaining  the  nature  of  their  various  discretions  and  competences  are  often  complex.  By 
contrast,  the  Soviet  state  enterprise  had  a  much  simplified  structure  which  reflected  the  logic 
of  the  confirmation  model  and  the  unitary  state. 
There  was  no  concept  of  shareholder  or  equity  participation  by  a  fragmented  group  of 
interests  including  directors  and  workers.  The  state  was  the  single  owner  of  the  means  of 
production  and  the  state  represented  the  interests  of  all-people.  Article  2  of  the  1927  Trusts 
Dekret  stated  that  "a  state  industrial  trust  shall  be  deemed  to  be  a  state  industrial  enterprise 
organised  on  the  basis  of  a  special  charter  in  the  form  of  a  separate  economic  unit  with  the 
rights  of  a  juridical  person  and  a  capital  structure  not  divided  into  shares"  [emphasis  added]. 
Consequentially  Venediktov  noted  that  "workers  and  employees  of  a  state  juridical  person  do 
not  directly  participate  in  the  formation  of  its  property  through  contributions,  shares  etc  and 
have  no  rights  to  its  property;  they  [only]  receive  wages  as  compensation  for  their  work  and 
not  in  the  form  of  a  proportionate  share  in  the  revenues  of  the  juridical  person;  and  if  they 
participate  in  the  management  of  the  business  of  the  juridical  person  then  it  is  in  the  capacity 
of  an  official  fulfilling  the  administrative  and  labour  duties  allocated  to  them  by  the  state,  and 
not  as  a  member  of  the  juridical  person.  ,  300 
The  concept  of  the  unitary  owner  was  reflected  in  the  principle  of  one-man  management, 
thereby  allocating  primary  responsibility  for  the  operations  of  the  enterprise  in  a  single  person 
who  was  an  administrative  appointee.  This  structure  facilitated  the  alignment  on  an  on-going 
basis  between  the  actions  of  management  and  the  requirements  of  the  state. 
300  Supra  n.  57  (1948),  p.  688.  This  (perhaps)  can  be  contrasted  with  the  internal  organisation  of  the  collective 
farm  (see  supra  Section  2.4.2). 
-95- The  1961  FPCivL  did  not  mention  the  management  structure  of  juridical  persons,  and  the  civil 
codes  only  briefly  provided  that  "juridical  persons  shall  acquire  civil  rights  and  bear  civil 
obligations  through  its  organs  acting  within  the  limits  of  the  rights  granted  to  them  by  law  or 
charter  (or  statute)"  and  that  "the  procedure  for  the  appointment  ...  of  the  organs  of  juridical 
persons  shall  be  determined  by  the  charter  (or  statute)"  - 
301  The  state  acting  as  legal  sovereign 
through  the  provisions  of  the  Enterprise  Statute  set  out  the  structure  in  more  detail.  Article  89 
provided  that  "the  director  (or  head,  manager)  shall  head  an  enterprise"  and  that  "the  director 
of  an  enterprise  shall  be  appointed  to  or  removed  from  the  post  by  the  superior  agency". 
Article  90  then  set  out  the  principle  of  one-man  responsibility:  "the  director  shall  organise  all 
the  work  of  the  enterprise  and  bear  JWl  responsibility  for  its  condition  and  activities" 
[emphasis  added];  and  further  that  "the  director  shall  act  in  the  name  of  the  enterprise  without 
a  power  of  attorney  represent  it  in  all  institutions  and  organisations,  dispose  of  the  property 
and  assets  of  the  enterprise  in  accordance  with  the  law,  conclude  contracts  and  issue  powers 
of  attorney  (including  the  right  of  delegation),  open  checking  accounts  and  other  accounts  of 
the  enterprise  at  banks.  "  The  Enterprise  Statute  also  contemplated  the  appointment  of  "deputy 
directors  and  other  leading  workers",  however  it  was  clear  that  the  "administration  of  the 
enterprise"  was  "in  the  person  of  the  director".  302 
The  Production  Association  Statute  provided  a  similar  structure  although  this  statute  did 
appear  to  contain  more  references  to  the  concept  of  collegiality  and  rights  of  the  labour 
collective  through  the  introduction  of  a  "council"  as  a  decision-making  body.  Article  17 
provided  for  the  concept  of  a  one-man  manager,  303  and  article  18  provided  for  equivalent  rules 
on  one-man  management  and  one-man  responsibility  to  those  of  article  90  of  the  Enterprise 
Statute.  However,  this  was  tempered  by  the  provision  that  stated  "a  production 
association  ...  shall  be  managed  on  the  basis  of  the  proper  combination  of  one-man 
management  and  collegiality  in  the  discussion  and  decision  of  all  questions  relating  to 
directing  the  activity  of  the  association".  3"  Despite  these  references  to  a  "council"  and  the 
principal  of  collegiality  along  the  lines  of  the  collective  farm  type  structure,  the  principle  of 
one-man  management  was  still  directly  referred  to  in  the  Production  Association  Statute.  The 
council  was  in  fact  chaired  by  the  general  director,  its  decisions  were  generally  implemented 
by  the  general  director,  and  in  the  event  of  a  disagreement  between  the  general  director  and 
301  RSFSR  CC,  article  28. 
302  Enterprise  Statute,  articles  92  and  95. 
303  "A  director  general  (or  director)  acting  on  the  basis  of  one-man  management  shall  head  the 
association  ... 
[and]  shall  be  appointed  to  and  removed  from  the  post  in  the  procedure  determined 
respectively  by  the  ministry  (or  department)  of  the  USSR  or  the  union  republic  council  of  ministers". 
304  Production  Association  Statute,  article  16. 
-96- the  council,  the  view  of  the  general  director  prevailed.  305  It  is  for  this  reason  that  Ioffe  and 
Maggs  concluded  that  "from  all  possible  viewpoints,  production  associations  are  managed  by 
one-man  leadership  and  not  by  combination  of  one-man  leadership  with  collegiality  as  it  is 
provided  by  Art.  16  of  the  Statute  on  the  Production  Association".  306 
The  concept  of  unitary  ownership  and  one-man  management  made  the  issue  and  structure  of 
management  relatively  straightforward.  There  was  no  need  for  a  complex  structure  of 
balancing  different  interests.  The  state  nominated  its  single  appointee,  as  political  dictatorship 
was  replicated  at  the  level  of  the  enterprise.  Western  corporate  law  governance  questions  such 
as  monitoring,  the  separation  of  ownership  from  control,  collective  action  and  the  like  were 
collapsed  within  a  structure  that  was  defined  by  its  relative  simplicity  and  crude  strength:  one 
owner  appoints  one  manager.  And  it  was  of  course  unitary  ownership  that  enabled  Soviet  law 
to  dispense  with  the  concept  of  the  ownership  interest  and  with  it  a  critical  legal  device  that 
would  have  necessitated  a  precise  elaboration  of  the  nature  of  the  legal  relationship  between 
the  owner  (qua  owner)  and  the  juridical  person. 
As  has  been  stressed  throughout  this  Chapter,  the  state  as  unitary  owner  acted  in  various 
capacities.  It  was,  at  the  same  time,  the  owner  of  the  enterprise,  its  property,  and  legal  and 
economic  sovereign.  Perhaps  the  most  powerful  lever  open  to  the  Soviet  state  was  its  capacity 
to  act  in  its  dual  sovereign  role.  The  use  of  legislation  and  planning  instructions  meant  that  the 
sovereign  state  could  adopt  enactments  either  on  state  enterprises  generally,  through  adoption 
of  generally  applicable  statutes  and  the  state  plan,  or  specifically  by  edicts  and  decrees 
addressed  only  to  an  individual  enterprise.  Such  enactments  coerced  management  with  the  full 
force  of  law  or  administrative  order  to  act  in  a  specific  manner  and  further,  could  be  used  to 
provide  the  legal  legitimation  for  the  replacement  of  management. 
In  a  market  economy,  the  economic  stimuli  (including  the  market  for  corporate  control) 
incentivise  certain  types  of  economic  behaviour  such  as  profit  maximisation,  increase  in 
efficiency,  investment  in  technology  and  the  like.  As  has  been  described,  the  Soviet  economy 
constantly  struggled  to  engender  systemic  incentivisation  of  this  type  of  economic  behaviour. 
While  the  market  economy  provides  structural  incentives  for  certain  "economic"  behaviour, 
the  Soviet  state  found  this  very  difficult  to  reproduce  within  the  system  of  a  command 
economy.  As  such,  the  Soviet  state  sought  to  coerce  this  type  of  "economic"  behaviour  by 
diktat  through  the  crude  governance  regime  which  included  simple  legal  and  administrative 
commands  to  act  "economically". 
305  Production  Association  Statute,  articles  26  and  27. 
306  Supra  n.  172,  p.  15  1. 
-97- The  Enterprise  Statute  contained  a  whole  section  (Section  111)  devoted  to  "Production  and 
Economic  Activity  of  the  Enterprise".  This  section  simply  listed  the  types  of  behaviour  that 
the  state  enterprises  were  "obliged"  to  pursue  as  a  matter  of  legal  obligation.  For  example,  the 
Enterprise  Statute  provided  that  "the  enterprise  shall  ensure  high  quality,  reliability,  and 
durability  of  products".  Such  a  legislative  requirement  was  considered  necessary  (in  addition 
to  the  other  elements  of  the  governance  regime  open  to  the  state)  presumably  because  this  type 
of  behaviour  ran  contrary  to  the  structural  incentives  of  the  command  economy  where  orders 
were  guaranteed,  the  liquidation  of  enterprises  was  exceptional,  and  workers'  jobs  were 
secure.  It  is  probably  in  light  of  such  adverse  economic  stimuli  that  Section  III  was  inserted 
which  also  included  obligations  on  the  enterprise  to  make  capital  repairs  to  equipment,  carry 
out  research  and  development,  build  up  reserves  of  raw  materials,  produce  and  deliver  goods 
in  a  timely  manner,  "dispose  of  its  own  financial  resources,  ensuring  the  maximum  economies 
in  the  expenditure  of  assets",  improve  its  management  structure  and  labour  conditions,  train 
workers  and  provide  them  with  housing.  "' 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  governance  structure  of  the  state  enterprises  is  best  understood  by 
distinguishing  the  four  roles  of  the  Soviet  state  (as  creator-owner,  as  property-owner,  as  legal 
sovereign  and  as  economic  sovereign)  and  broadly  conceptualising  the  state  enterprise  within 
the  context  of  the  model  of  confirmation.  Traditional  governance  structures  based  initially 
upon  the  adoption  of  a  charter,  and  then  upon  continued  monitoring  by  way  of  the  voting 
system,  were  obviated  in  the  context  of  an  enterprise  where  monitoring  was  carried  out 
through  particular  Soviet  methods  of  control.  Although  constituted  as  a  separate  juridical 
person  for  reasons  already  discussed,  the  Soviet  state  retained  direct  control  of  this 
organisation  through  confirmation  -  confirmation  of  the  contents  of  the  charter,  including  the 
description  of  its  subject  and  purpose  of  activity;  the  confirmation  of  the  designation  of  its 
property  thereby  imposing  direct  limits  on  the  use  of  its  property  held  by  way  of  operative 
management;  confirmation  of  the  appointment  and  dismissal  of  its  one-man  manager;  and 
finally,  the  confirmation  of  legislation  and  administrative  orders  which  as  a  matter  of  law  and 
diktat  imposed  obligatory  requirements  upon  the  management  of  these  enterprise. 
307  This  section  did  not  appear  in  the  Production  Association  Statute,  although  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
these  economic  and  social  obligations  were  still  relevant.  The  Production  Association  Statute  did  have  an 
article  relating  to  "the  principle  tasks  of  a  production  association"  (article  3)  where  many  of  the  same 
types  of  issues  were  mentioned. 
-98- 3.5  Conclusion 
The  question  of  the  nature  of  the  Soviet  state  enterprises  and  associations  can  be  tackled  from 
various  perspectives.  This  Chapter  has  sought  to  develop  a  model  through  which  the  essential 
elements  of  their  function  and  operation  can  best  be  analysed  and  explained.  The  aim  has  been 
to  provide  an  heuristic  tool  that  highlights  the  unique  and  central  characteristics  of  the  state 
enterprise  and  production  association,  a  number  of  which  have  broadly  been  overlooked  by 
commentators  to  date. 
It  is  hoped  that  the  reconceptualisation  of  the  Soviet  state  enterprise  and  production  association 
within  the  confirmation  model  will  lead  to  a  better  understanding  of  their  nature  as  well  as 
provide  a  starting  point  for  their  comparison  with,  not  only  functionally  equivalent  industrial 
associations  in  market  economies,  but  also  with  the  new  industrial  organisations  that  were  to 
emerge  in  the  Soviet  economy  during  its  final  years. 
-99- 4.  THE  BRIDGE  -  CONTRACT-BASED  ASSOCIATIONS  WITHOUT 
JURIDICAL  PERSONALITY 
"Like  a  bridge  over  troubled  waters... 
Paul  Simon 
The  role  of  the  contract  for  joint  activity  has  largely  been  overlooked  in  the  "history"  of 
Soviet  industrial  organisations.  After  all,  in  1985,  Soviet  law  classified  this  form  of 
association  simply  as  a  special  type  of  contract  without  giving  rise  to  a  juridical  person  . 
108  It 
was  not  mentioned  in  the  1961  FPCivL,  and  its  regulation  was  only  set  out  in  a  short  chapter 
in  the  civil  codes  on  "Joint  Activity".  It  was  presumably  considered  to  be  too  specific  to  merit 
a  reference  in  the  1961  FPCivL,  indicating  that  in  conceptual  terms,  the  contract  for  joint 
activity  was  more  a  question  of  detail  in  the  Soviet  law  of  obligations,  rather  than  a  basis  for 
the  elaboration  of  principle. 
However,  by  analysing  the  development  of  the  industrial  organisation  in  terms  of  the  models 
proposed  in  this  study,  it  will  become  apparent  that  the  "new"  industrial  organisations  which 
emerged  in  the  Soviet  economy  during  the  perestroika  era  owed  an  enormous  debt  to  the 
contract  for  joint  activity.  This  somewhat  ignored  form  of  association  provided  the  conceptual 
thread  between  what  has  been  called  the  confirmation  model,  the  contract-based  concession 
model,  and  the  participation  model.  And,  in  theoretical  and  historical  terms,  the  contract  for 
joint  activity  linked  not  only  these  three  models,  but  also  provided  the  only  bridge  between 
pre-revolutionary  Russian  associations  and  Soviet  industrial  organisations;  as  well  as  between 
Soviet  agricultural  organisations  and  Soviet  industrial  organisations.  For  despite  the  change  in 
terminology,  a  "new"  history  of  the  contract  for  joint  activity  can  be  written,  tracing  its  roots 
back  to  the  artel  partnership  of  pre-revolutionary  Russian  law  which  both  fathered  the 
collective  farm  organisations  as  well  as  the  simple  partnership  of  the  Soviet  1922  RSFSR  Civil 
Code. 
4.1  Background  -  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code,  Chapter  X:  The  Shnple  Partnership 
Pre-revolutionary  Russian  law  distinguished  a  number  of  different  types  of  trade  partnership 
including  the  artel  partnership,  the  full  partnership,  the  partnership  on  belief,  and  the  joint- 
stock  partnership.  "9  The  artel  partnership  was  defined  in  Section  2198  of  Volume  X,  Part  I  of 
308  Therefore,  in  this  Chapter  4,  the  contract  for  joint  activity  is  referred  to  as  an  "association"  rather  than 
an  "organisation"  (the  latter  being  the  generic  term  used  in  Soviet  law  for  the  juridical  person). 
309  Supra  n.  20,  p.  110. 
-100- the  1914  edition  of  the  Digest  of  Laws  as  "a  partnership  organised  for  the  performance  of 
definite  works  or  the  pursuit  of  definite  trades,  as  well  as  for  the  rendition  of  services  and  the 
performance  of  duties  by  the  personal  labour  of  the  partners  on  their  common  account,  all  of 
them  being  responsible  jointly  and  severally".  "O  It  was  an  association  whose  rationale  was 
based  upon  personal  participation,  combining  the  complementary  skills  of  the  partners 
themselves,  rather  than  an  association  of  capital  for  investment  purposes.  Although 
Shershenevich  was  of  the  view  that  pre-revolutionary  trade  partnerships  generally  gave  rise  to 
juridical  persons,  he  did  note  that  there  was  some  debate  as  to  the  particular  juridical  status  of 
the  artel  partnership  and  the  full  partnership.  "' 
Drawing  upon  this  body  of  pre-revolutionary  law,  Chapter  X  of  the  Soviet  1922  RSFSR  Civil 
Code  on  "Partnerships"  included  provisions  relating  to  the  simple  partnership  (the  new  name 
for  the  artel  partnership)  as  well  as  the  full  partnership,  the  partnership  on  belief,  the 
partnership  with  limited  responsibility  and  the  joint-stock  society  (share  partnership). 
The  simple  partnership  was  defined  in  article  276  of  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  as  a 
312  th  the  contract,  whereby  two  or  more  persons  joined  their  contributions  toge  er  for 
achievement  of  a  common  economic  goal.  313  Again  this  contractual  association  stressed  the 
element  of  personal  participation.  The  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  was  silent  on  the  question  as 
to  whether  this  contract  gave  rise  to  a  juridical  person. 
The  provisions  of  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  on  the  simple  partnership"'  broadly  adopted 
the  terminology  of  contract  and  common  ownership  rather  than  juridical  personality  . 
3"  They 
referred  to  "contributions"  ("vkladi")  of  partners  which  became  the  "common  ownership  of 
the  partners"  ("obshchei  sobstvennostyu  tovarishchei")  in  which  each  partner  had  a 
310  Quoted  supra  n.  22  (1948),  p.  701,  n.  42  therein). 
311  Supra  n.  309,  pp.  107-9.  The  concept  of  the  "  artel  form"  in  pre-revolutionary  Russian  law  not  only  found 
expression  in  the  artel  partnership  of  the  industrial  economy  as  regulated  by  Section  2198,  but  also  in  a 
specific  type  of  cooperative  agriculture  which  was  later  to  become  the  basis  for  the  structuring  of  Soviet 
collective  farms.  This  Chapter  focuses  on  the  development  of  the  pre-revolutionary  artel  in  the  industrial 
economy  through  the  simple  partnership  and  eventually  to  the  contract  of  joint  activity.  The  significance 
of  the  artel  in  the  agricultural  sector  is  outlined  briefly  supra  Section  2.4.1  and  infra  Section  6.1.3. 
312  Article  284  of  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  explicitly  referred  to  the  "partnership  contract";  and  indeed, 
Chapter  X  was  contained  within  Section  3  of  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  on  "The  Law  of  Obligations" 
thereby  hinting  at  the  contractual  basis  for  all  partnerships  created  thereunder. 
313  On  the  question  of  what  was  sufficient  to  constitute  a  "common  economic  goal",  see  supra  n.  182  (1928), 
pp.  773-774. 
314  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code,  articles  276,278-281,286  and  287. 
315  See  supra  Section  2.6.  The  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  also  contained  provisions  generally  on  common 
ownership  (article  61  et  seq). 
-  101 
- participatory  share  ("dolei").  However,  the  provisions  also,  in  places,  referred  to  a  reffied 
concept  of  the  partnership  thereby  suggesting  that  perhaps  it  did  after  all  have  juridical 
personality  (for  example  through  the  use  of  phrases  such  as  "the  contributed  property  of  the 
partnership"  ("skladochnogo  imushchesva  tovarishchestva")  (which,  in  the  absence  of  juridical 
personality,  "should"  have  been  a  reference  to  contributed  property  of  the  partners)).  Voting 
was  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  unanimity  unless  the  partnership  contract  specifically 
contemplated  majority  voting,  in  which  case  it  was  required  to  take  place  on  the  basis  of  one 
partner-one  vote  "and  not  according  to  the  amount  of  contributions".  "'  Partners  bore 
responsibility  for  obligations  in  proportion  to  their  "participatory  share  participation  in  the 
partnership"  ("s  dolei  uchastiya  v  tovarishchestve").  Again  this  reference  to  participating  share 
participation  in  the  partnership  suggested  a  reified  association  (i.  e.  the  existence  of  a  juridical 
person).  In  addition  to  the  provisions  relating  to  the  status  and  property  regime  of  the  simple 
partnership,  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  also  included  rules  relating  to  the  sharing  of  profits 
and  losses,  and  for  liquidation.  "' 
The  silence  in  the  civil  code  on  the  fundamental  question  of  juridical  personality  precluded  a 
clear  analysis  of  the  legal  structure  of  the  simple  partnership.  While  the  terminology  suggested 
a  common  ownership  structure  based  on  contract  without  giving  rise  to  a  juridical  person,  the 
legislation  did  not  expressly  state  this.  The  analysis  was  also  confused  by  references  to  the 
reified  partnership  as  if  it  had,  or  could  have  had,  independent  juridical  status  coupled  with 
the  use  of  inconsistent  terminology  that  might  have  been  construed  as  terms  to  be  used  for  the 
ownership  interest  of  this  reified  simple  partnership  (such  as  "participatory  share"  or 
"participatory  share  participation"). 
Ultimately,  the  silence  as  to  the  juridical  status  of  the  simple  partnership  in  the  1922  RSFSR 
Civil  Code  (and  the  fact  that  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  explicitly  stipulated  that  the  other 
types  of  partnership  did  give  rise  to  juridical  persons)  was  interpreted  to  mean  that  the 
formation  of  a  simple  partnership  did  not  result  in  the  creation  of  a  juridical  person.  In  fact 
316  The  structure  of  one  partner-one  vote  irrespective  of  size  of  any  contribution  was  also  evident  in  the 
internal  structure  of  the  artel-based  collective  farm  where  collective  farmers  had  one  vote  at  the  general 
meeting  irrespective  of  the  size  of  their  membership  fee  paid  or  the  amount  of  their  property  socialised 
upon  entry  into  the  farm  (see  supra  Sections  2.4.1  and  2.4.2). 
317  Termination  was  specified  to  occur  as  a  result  of  various  circumstances  including  the  death  of  a  partner, 
the  expiration  of  the  specified  term  of  the  contract,  the  achievement  of  the  purposes  for  which  the 
contract  was  entered  into  and,  in  certain  circumstances,  upon  the  demand  of  creditors  (1922  RSFSR  Civil 
Code,  article  289). 
-102- the  Plenum  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  its  decision  of  21  July  1924  even  held  that  juridical 
persons  could  not  participate  as  partners  in  a  simple  partnership.  318 
The  legislation  on  the  simple  partnership  was  an  early  example  of  the  failure  of  Soviet  law  to 
sufficiently  characterise  the  ownership  relationship  between  participants  in  an  association  and 
the  association  itself.  This  failure  more  generally  can  be  seen  in  part  as  a  consequence  of  the 
failure  to  develop  an  understanding  of  the  concept  of  the  ownership  interest  of  an  association 
where  ownership  is  fragmented  and  a  juridical  person  is  formed.  While  unimportant  in  the 
context  of  the  command  economy  where  the  logic  of  the  overlapping  governance  regimes  of 
the  confirmation  model  prevailed,  this  myopia  in  relation  to  the  concept  of  the  ownership 
interest  would  endure  through  into  the  contract  for  joint  activity  and  thereafter  into  the 
economy  of  the  perestroika  years  with  profound  significance  for  the  history  of  the  foundations 
of  the  industrial  organisations  of  the  1990s. 
Chapter  X  was  amended  extensively  in  the  late  1920s,  broadly  as  a  result  of  the  increasing 
importance  of  "new"  state-owned  socialist  industrial  organisations:  the  trust,  the  syndicate,  the 
association  and  the  state enterprise.  "'  Almost  all  references  to  joint-stock  partnerships  were 
removed  by  1931  and  the  provisions  relating  to  the  other  types  of  partnership  (the  simple 
partnership,  the  full  partnership,  the  partnership  on  belief  and  the  partnership  with  limited 
responsibility)  were  also  amended  but  not  in  such  a  radical  fashion.  120 
Although  Chapter  X  was  never  amended  again,  in  practice,  from  the  1930s  onwards,  these 
partnerships  were  rarely  created.  As  one  commentator  put  it  "in  1929  in  connection  with  the 
liquidation  of  the  capitalist  elements  in  the  USSR,  all  private  partnership  associations,  created 
for  entrepreneurial  activity,  terminated  their  activity.  In  1930,  joint-stock  societies,  both  state 
and  mixed,  were  re-organised  into  enterprises  with  capital  undivided  into  shares.  In  this 
manner,  all  forms  of  partnership  contracts,  created  for  entrepreneurial  activity,  lost  their 
significance  in  Soviet  law.  "32'  However,  although  this  suggests  that  all  partnership  contracts 
318  Supra  n.  22  (1928),  p-775. 
319  These  are  examined  supra  Chapter  3. 
320  In  1928  section  5  of  Chapter  X  of  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  on  the  "Joint-Stock  Society  (Share 
Partnership)"  was  almost  deleted  in  its  entirety  (Ob  Izmenenii  Statei  322,323,324,325  i  326,  Otmene 
Statei  323-a,  323-b,  323-v,  323-g,  327-366  Grazhdanskogo  Kodeksa  RSFSR  i  ob  Utverzhdenii  Prilozhenii  k 
Statei  322  i  326  Grazhdanskogo  Kodeksa  RSFSR,  SU  (1928),  no.  38,  item  282,  and  Ob  Izmenenii 
Grazhdanskogo  Kodeksa  RSFSR,  SU  (193  1),  no.  72,  item  509)  leaving  its  legal  status  to  be  governed  by  the 
1927  Joint-Stock  Societies  Statute.  During  the  1920s  sections  14  of  Chapter  X  were  also  amended,  but  not 
quite  so  extensively. 
321  M.  V.  Gordon,  Lektsii  po  Sovetskomu  Grazhdanskomu  Pravu,  Chast'  Vtoraya  (Izdatel'stvo  Khar'kovskogo 
Universiteta:  1960),  p.  237. 
-  103- were  dead  letter,  there  was  one  type  of  partnership  that  did  survive  the  1930s,  albeit  in  a  very 
different  role  -  the  simple  partnership.  "' 
4.2  Background  -  1961  FPCivL  and  the  Civil  Codes:  The  Contract  for  Joint  Activity 
Most  of  the  Chapter  X  partnerships  were  replaced  in  functional  terms  by  the  introduction  of 
the  new  socialist  industrial  organisations  based  on  the  confirmation  model.  By  contrast,  the 
simple partnership  still  retained  a  possible  role  in  the  new  Stalin  economic  settlement  by 
providing  a  method  by  which  these  socialist  organisations  could  co-operate  for  the 
achievement  of  specific  common  goals.  "'  Although  instances  of  such  cooperation  were  more 
prevalent  in  the  agrarian  economy,  the  simple  partnership  continued  to  be  acknowledged  by 
civil  law  as  a  legitimate  form  of  association:  "whereas  the  simple  partnership  still  has  some 
examples  in  everyday  life,  the  norms  of  the  [1922  RSFSR]  Civil  Code,  devoted  to  the  other 
types  of  partnership  (the  full  partnership,  the  partnership  on  belief,  the  partnership  with 
limited  responsibility  and  the  joint-stock  society)  on  the  whole  lost  any  significance.  ,  324 
In  1961,  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  was  replaced  as  the  primary  framework  for  civil  law  by 
the  all-union  1961  FPCivL  which  set  out  the  general  principles  of  civil  legislation.  On  the 
basis  of  the  1961  FPCivL,,  each  union  republic  adopted  its  own  civil  code  with  more  detailed 
provisions  . 
12'  The  1961  FPCivL  contained  no  references  to  any  of  the  partnerships  detailed  in 
Chapter  X  of  the  old  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code.  The  general  regulation  of  juridical  persons  was 
set  out  in  brief  in  Section  1  of  the  1961  FPCivL  entitled  "General  Provisions",  "'  but  no 
mention  was  made  of  partnerships  or  other  juridical  persons  in  the  section  on  the  "Law  of 
Obligations"  where  the  provisions  of  the  old  Chapter  X  were  found  in  the  former  1922 
RSFSR  Civil  Code.  This  might  have  indicated  the  regime's  desire  to  remove  the  old  then 
defunct  provisions  of  Chapter  X  from  the  main  framework  of  civil  law,  or  more  conceptually, 
may  have  been  used  to  indicate  that  the  theoretical  basis  of  juridical  persons  was  no  longer  to 
be  linked  to  the  law  of  obligations  (ie  contract). 
322  There  were  very  exceptional  instances  where  state  joint-stock  societies  continued  to  exist,  operating  on 
the  basis  of  1927  Statute;  for  example  the  state  organisation  "Inturist"  (responsible  for  tourism  in  the 
USSR). 
323  This  continued  on  the  basis  of  the  Decree,  Ob  Uchastii  Gosudarstvennikh  Uchrezhdenii  i  Predpriyatii  v 
Prostykh  Tovarishchestvakh,  SU  (1926),  no.  29,  item  184. 
324  Sovetskoe  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo,  Tom  II  (Gosyurizdat:  196  1),  p.  3  64. 
325  See  supra  Section  2.1. 
326  The  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  also  contained  general  provisions  relating  to  juridical  persons  in  Chapter  11 
of  the  "General  Part". 
-104- The  civil  codes  of  each  of  the  union  republics  adopted  during  the  early  1960s  on  the  basis  of 
the  1961  FPCivL  also  did  not  refer  explicitly  to  any  of  the  old  Chapter  X  partnerships.  They 
did  however  contain  provisions  relating  to  an  apparently  new  type  of  contractual  relationship 
that  was  not  referred  to  at  all  in  the  1961  FPCivL,  or  by  name  in  the  old  Chapter  X.  This  was 
the  Contract  for  Joint  Activity 
. 
32'  The  chapter  of  the  union  republics'  civil  codes  of  the  1960s 
on  "Joint  Activity"  was  contained  in  the  sub-section  of  the  codes  on  "Specific  Types  of 
Obligations".  This  chapter  contained  five  articles  and  its  wording  in  the  code  was  almost 
identical.  However,  the  substance  of  this  "new"  contract  for  joint  activity  revealed  that  it  was 
a  type  of  association  that  was  identical  to  the  old  "simple  partnership"  -  the  change  had  been 
almost  entirely  one  of  terminology.  "' 
The  restructuring  of  the  economy  in  the  early  1960s  led  to  a  more  diverse  approach  to 
economic  management,  and  once  again,  joint  activity  was  seen  as  a  mechanism  by  which  the, 
now  socialist,  enterprises  could  be  encouraged  to  construct  buildings  for  social  purposes  and 
work  together  for  mutual  gain.  A  number  of  pieces  of  legislation  were  enacted  over  the  next 
ten  years  that  contemplated  "joint  operations"  by  Soviet  organisations.  References  in  this 
legislation  to  acting  "jointly"  and  "joint  operations"  seemed  to  presuppose  that  the  legal  basis 
for  such  co-operation  was  the  contract  for  joint  activity,  "'  although  this  was  rarely  mentioned 
specifically. 
The  first  was  a  decree  passed  in  August  1964  allowing  for  the  funds  of  enterprises  to  be 
joined  in  order  to  construct  "objects  of  cultural-domestic  designation,  health-protection  and 
communal  economy".  "O  This  was  seen  as  a  way  to  ease  the  pressures  on  the  central  state 
budget.  Subsequent  legislation  expanded  on  this  right.  The  Enterprise  Statute  explicitly 
provided  for  the  right  of  enterprises  "to  join  with  other  enterprises  and  organisations  the  assets 
of  the  fund  of  the  enterprise  and  other  special  assets,  at  its  disposal,  for  joint  (in  the  procedure 
of  participatory  share  participation)  construction  of  residential  houses,  medical  and  child  pre- 
school  institutions,  pioneer  camps  and  other  objects  of  cultural-domestic  designation.  ,  33'  A 
similar  provision  was  included  in  the  decree  "On  Perfecting  Planning  and  Strengthening  the 
327  RSFSR  CC,  chapter  38. 
328  This  was  akin  to  the  change  in  terminology  from  the  artel  partnership  to  the  simple  partnership  made 
thirty  years  earlier  when  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  itself  was  adopted. 
329  This  inference  was  made  particularly  due  to  the  use  in  these  contexts  of  the  term  "participatory  share 
participation"  ("dolevoe  uchastie")  which  was  the  hallmark  of  this  type  of  association. 
330  0  Stroitel'stve  Ob"ektov  Kul'turno-bytovogo  Naznacheniya,  Zdravookhraneniya  i  Kommunal'nogo 
Khozyaistva  za  Schet  Netsentralizovannikh  Istochnikov  Finansirovaniya  i  Assignovanii,  Vydelennikh  na 
eti  Tseli  po  Gosudarstvennomu  Planu,  16  SDZ  SSSR  544  (article  1). 
331  Enterprise  Statute,  article  56. 
-  105- Economic  Stimulation  of  Industrial  Production",  passed  on  the  same  day.  "'  Joint  operations 
were  further  contemplated  in  the  1974  Production  Association  Statute  which  provided  that  the 
construction  of  residential  homes,  communal  apartments,  schools  and  medical  facilities  for 
children,  pioneer  camps  and  other  such  objects  of  cultural-domestic  designation  may  be 
carried  out  "jointly".  333 
4.3  The  Legacy  -A  Contract-based  Association  without  Juridical  Personality 
The  significance  and  history  of  the  contract  for  joint  activity,  as  developed  in  this  Chapter, 
was  generally  ignored  by  Soviet  civil  law  literature.  The  Soviet  regime  may  have  been 
anxious  to  rewrite  the  history  of  this  form  of  contract  in  light  of  the  fact  that  it  constituted  the 
only  pre-revolutionary  form  of  association  to  survive  the  recodification  of  Soviet  civil  law  in 
196  1.  For  despite  the  fact  that  the  contract  for  joint  activity  had  a  different  name  and  function, 
in  purely  legal  terms,  it  was  almost  identical  to  the  simple  partnership,  and  the  artel 
partnership  which  preceded  it. 
By  changing  the  name  of  this  type  of  association  once  again  (from  simple  partnership  to  the 
contract  for  joint  activity),  by  removing  all  references  to  partnerships  in  the  new  1961 
FPCivL  and  civil  codes,  and  by  making  no  reference  at  all  to  this  contract  for  joint  activity  in 
the  new  1961  FPCivL,  it  seems  that  there  was  an  attempt  to  de-emphasise  its  importance  and 
re-characterise  its  significance.  In  one  of  the  few  references  to  its  "true"  history  in  Soviet 
legal  literature,  Ioffe,  in  his  definitive  study  on  the  "Law  of  Obligations",  noted,  albeit  almost 
in  passing,  that:  "in  the  course  of  the  liquidation  of  the  private-capitalist  economic  structure 
and  the  establishment  of  the  unrivalled  supremacy  of  the  socialist  system  of  economy,  the 
norms  of  the  [1922  RSFSR]  Civil  Code  relating  to  the  above-listed  types  of  partnership  [ie  full 
partnership,  partnership  on  belief  partnership  with  limited  responsibility  and  joint-stock 
partnership]  ceased  to  have  any  effect  in  practice.  However  the  Civil  Code  also  provided  for 
the  contract  of  simple  partnership  for  the  achievement  of  aims  which  are  now  served  by  the 
contract  r  joint  activity. 
iv334 
In  addition  to  its  general  historical  significance,  from  the  perspective  of  the  development  of 
the  law  on  industrial  organisations,  the  contract  for  joint  activity  provided  the  bare  conceptual 
and  legal  framework  for  the  elaboration  of  the  new  forms  of  industrial  organisation  introduced 
332  0  Sovershenstvovanii  Planirovaniya  i  Usilenii  Ekonomicheskogo  Stimulirovaniya  Promyshlennogo 
Proizvodstva,  4  SDZ  SSSR  5  (article  15). 
333  Production  Association  Statute,  article  91.  See,  Kommentafii  k  Polozheniyu  o  Proizvodstennom 
Ob  "e&nenii  (Kombinate)  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1979),  p-  160. 
334  0.  S.  loffe,  Obyazatel'stvennoe  Pravo  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1975),  p.  765. 
-106- during  the  perestroika  era.  It  stressed  "contracting"  between  participants,  "'  the  concept  of 
legislation  as  providing  default  rules,  336  and  the  principle  of  personal  participation.  337  In 
addition,  the  contract  for  joint  activity  provided  the  theoretical  link  with  the  Soviet  collective 
farm  structures  which  were  introduced  directly  into  the  industrial  sector  with  the  adoption  of 
the  1988  Cooperatives  Law.  338  While  the  confirmation  enterprise  was  rooted  in  the  socialist 
theories  of  juridical  personality  and  state  ownership,  the  simple  partnership  (or  contract  for 
joint  activity),  characterised  merely  as  a  type  of  contract,  rather  than  a  form  of  organisation 
(albeit  without  juridical  personality),  remained  relatively  "untainted"  by  these  debates  and 
Marxist  doctrines. 
Pre-revolutionary  and  Chapter  X  partnerships  comprising  juridical  persons  were  clearly 
understood  in  terms  of  contract-based  organisations,  and  therefore  were  contained  within  the 
civil  law  of  obligations.  By  contrast,  orthodox  Soviet  legal  theory  introduced  the  socialist 
concept  of  "forms  of  ownership"  and  re-conceptualised  juridical  personality  within  the 
"general"  provisions  of  civil  law  by  reference  to  the  law  on  ownership.  The  contract-based 
rationale  for  juridical  personality  disappeared  within  a  Soviet  economic  system  based  on  state 
ownership  of  the  means  of  production  and  central  planning  . 
3'9  As  has  been  argued,  juridical 
personality  was  used  to  fashion  an  organisation  capable  of  remaining  in  state  ownership  and  of 
acting  as  the  addressee  of  the  state  plan,  while  at  the  same  time  operating  on  the  basis  of 
311  khozraschet  with  a  separate  balance  sheet. 
However,  a  contract-based  association  did  survive  this  socialist  ideological  revolution.  As 
described  above,  the  contract  for  joint  activity  was  considered  still  to  have  a  role  within  the 
new  Stalin  command  economy.  Furthermore,  there  was  little  need  to  change  its  legal 
characterisation.  Under  the  previous  legislation  the  simple  partnership  did  not  give  rise  to  a 
juridical  person  and  therefore  this  form  of  association  could  be  marginalised  within  the  Soviet 
civil  law  of  obligations  without  presenting  a  theoretical  problem  to  the  new  Soviet 
understanding  of  juridical  personality. 
335  A  principle  that  was  developed  in  particular  in  the  context  of  joint  enterprises  (infra  Chapter  5)  and 
leased  enterprises  (infra  Section  6.5). 
336  While  this  principle  became  more  developed  after  1990  (which  falls  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study),  the 
coercive  law  governance  principle  began  to  give  way  to  a  more  "permissive  regime"  with  the 
introduction  of  the  participation  enterprises  (infra  Chapter  6)  and  was  formalised  in  the  1990  Ownership 
Law  (infra  Section  7.4.1). 
337  The  principle  of  participation  was  latent  in  all  of  the  new  industrial  organisations  of  the  perestroika 
period  to  1990  but  was  the  cornerstone  of  the  "participation  model"  developed  infra  Chapter  6. 
338  Infra  Section  6.1.3. 
339  Infra  Section  7.4.2.1. 
-107- In  common  with  the  simple  partnership,  the  contract  for  joint  activity  had  the  following  legal 
characteristics:  (i)  formation  on  the  basis  of  the  general  law  of  contract;  (ii)  personal 
participation  and  management  based  on  the  provisions  of  the  contract;  (iii)  a  system  of  legal 
C7-- 
regulation  based  on  default  rules;  and  (iv)  property  in  common  ownership. 
But  while  the  substance  of  the  legislation  remained  unchanged,  the  contract  for  joint  activity 
bore  little  functional  resemblance  to  the  pre-revolutionary  artel  partnership  or  the  NEP-era 
simple  partnerships.  And  perhaps  the  change  of  name,  from  simple  partnership  to  contract  for 
joint  activity,  was  aimed  at  highlighting  this  change  in  function:  the  artel  trade  partnership  and 
early  simple  partnerships  were  essentially  associations  developed  as  a  result  of  negotiation  and 
the  elaboration  of  a  common  ground  for  activity  between  two  independent  set  of  interests 
represented  by  private  actors  doing  business  in  the  economic  marketplace.  By  contrast,  the 
Soviet  concept  of  joint  activity  between  socialist  organisations  was  situated  within  the  strict 
formal  and  informal  governance  regimes  of  all  Soviet  economic  arrangements.  As  a  practical 
matter,  there  was  little  negotiation  of  the  contract  itself  as  both  participants  were  generally 
"controlled"  by  the  same  entity,  the  state;  and  it  was  the  state  that  determined  the  extent  to 
which  co-operation  for  the  achievement  of  mutual  goals  was  necessary.  As  a  consequence,  the 
Soviet  law  on  the  contract  for  joint  activity  was  very  brief  and  in  some  cases  confusing  -  the 
need  for  an  elaborate  legal  framework  is  of  course  less  important  when,  due  to  extra-legal 
control  mechanisms,  parties  contract  on  the  basis  of  diktat  rather  than  "real"  negotiation. 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  contract  for  joint  activity  was  in  practice  simply  another  tool  in  the 
hands  of  the  economic  planners,  its  mere  presence  was  of  immense  importance;  for  deep  in 
the  detail  of  the  Soviet  civil  law  of  contract  lay  the  seeds  of  a  contract-based  association, 
inherited  from  pre-  revolutionary  times,  in  an  almost  identical  legal  form. 
4.4  Formation  and  Participants 
The  contract  for  joint  activity,  like  the  simple  partnership,  was  expressed  to  be  a  "contract- 
based"  form  of  co-operation.  The  change  of  name  to  the  "contract  for  joint  activity"  left  the 
question  of  its  nature  beyond  doubt.  Under  Soviet  law  a  contract  arose  upon  "reaching 
341 
agreement  as  to  all  its  essential  points"  . 
Despite  the  legal  niceties  which  may  have  suggested 
a  contract  law  based  on  volus,  the  conclusion  of  contracts  for  joint  activity  must  be  understood 
within  the  context  of  the  Stalin  economic  settlement.  For  in  economic  terms,  joint  activity  was 
340  Supra  Section  3.1. 
341  1961  FPCivL,  article  34;  RSFSR  CC,  article  160.  In  common  with  civil  law  systems,  Soviet  contract  law 
had  no  doctrine  of  consideration  (see  Arthur  Taylor  von  Mehren  and  James  Russell  Gordley,  7he  Civil 
Law  System  (Little,  Brown  and  Company:  1977),  section  13). 
-  108- most  significantly  carried  out  by  actors  within  the  command  economy.  In  a  command 
economy,  the  decision  to  contract  had  little  to  do  with  autonomous  subjects  of  civil  law  guided 
by  the  "invisible  hand".  After  all,  private  ownership  had  been  abolished  in  the  early  years  of 
the  Soviet  regime  and  was  viewed  as  a  bourgeois  tool  which  facilitated  exploitation  of  the 
proletariat.  In  general,  "contracts  had  as  their  purpose  the  consolidation  of  the  respective  parts 
of  the  national-economic  plan  and  the  ensuring  of  the  fulfilment  of  the  plan";  "'  and  the 
requirement  to  contract  was  usually  guided  by  the  "visible  hand""'  of  the  state,  either  through 
the  adoption  of  general  plans  with  obligatory  economic  contracts,  344  or,  more  specifically, 
through  other  governance  techniques  described  within  the  confirmation  model  . 
34'  As  loffe  and 
Maggs  ironically  noted  "planning  had  become  so  detailed  that  there  was  nothing  about  which 
to  contract  at  all".  346  In  short,  this  form  of  contractual  association  was  rarely  the  result  of  hard 
and  genuine  negotiation  between  two  independent  parties,  but  an  arrangement  required  to  be 
entered  into  at  the  ultimate  behest  of  the  Soviet  state. 
Soviet  law  characterised  the  contract  for  joint  activity  as  "consensual",  not  simply  because  it 
was  contract  based,  but  because  it  was  defined  in  the  civil  codes  as  a  contract  entered  into  for 
the  "achievement  of  a  common  goal".  This  "consensual  contract"  was  distinguished  from  the 
"creditor-debtor"  relationship  arising  out  of  a  contract  based  on  "exchange".  Reasoning  from 
this  Soviet  notion  of  "consensuality",  loffe  argued  that  therefore  the  parties  to  a  contract  for 
joint  activity  were  known  as  "participants"  ("uchastniki")  instead  of  the  "debtor"  and  the 
"creditor".  "'  This  seems  an  unlikely  explanation  for  the  terminology,  particularly  because 
there  is  of  course  nothing  per  se  more  consensual  about  negotiating  the  terms  of  a  joint 
activity  agreement  than  the  terms  of  a  loan  agreement.  There  are  perhaps  other  more  plausible 
alternative  explanations:  The  use  of  the  term  participant  may  have  been  an  attempt  to  move 
away  from  the  language  used  in  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  (which  used  the  term  "partner" 
("tovarishch")),  in  the  same  way  as  the  name  of  the  contract  itself  was  changed  from  "simple 
partnership"  to  "joint  activity".  Alternatively  the  use  of  the  term  participant  may  have  been 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  law  of  common  ownership  governed  this  type  of  association;  "'  and 
342  Prof.  I.  B.  Novitskii,  Prof.  L.  A.  Lunts,  Obshchee  Uchenie  ob  Obyazatel'stve  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo 
Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1950),  p.  95- 
343  To  borrow  the  famous  pun  of  Alfred  D.  Chandler,  Jr.. 
344  1961  FPCivL,  article  33;  RSFSR  CC,  article  159.  See,  V.  N.  Mozheiko,  Khozyaistvennyi  Dogovor  v  SSSR 
(Gosyurizdat:  1962). 
345  See  supra  Section  3.4. 
346  Supra  n.  172,  p.  139. 
347  Supra  n.  123  (1988),  p.  298. 
348  Supra  Section  2.6  and  infra  Section  4.6. 
-109- because  the  section  of  the  civil  codes  regulating  "Common  ownership"  referred  to  each  of  the 
it 
34 
common  owners  as  participants".  9  The  reference  to  the  term  "participantil  could  have  been 
used  to  stress  the  underlying  concept  of  if  personal  participation"  that  was  the  basis  for  this 
type  of  association.  Finally,  the  change  from  the  term  "partner"  to  "participant"  may  have 
been  made  to  highlight  the  fact  that  this  form  of  co-operation  was  now  to  be  available  not  just 
for  cooperation  between  natural  persons  (ie  partners)  but  also  between  juridical  persons. 
While  the  old  Chapter  X  was  silent  on  the  point  as  to  whether  juridical  persons  could 
participate  in  the  simple  partnership,  needing  an  explanation  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  settle 
the  position,  350  the  new  provisions  of  the  1960s  civil  codes  specified  that  both  citizens  and 
juridical  persons  could  be  participants,  however  the  contracts  could  not  be  mixed  (ie  formed 
between  citizens  and  juridical  persons).  "'  Indeed,  as  described  above,  after  the  enactment  of 
the  1961  FPCivL  and  the  restructuring  of  the  economy  in  the  1960s,  subordinate  legislation 
frequently  referred  to  organisations  acting  "jointly". 
4.5  Charter  and  Termination 
A  charter  was  a  feature  of  a  juridical  person  and  was  required  to  include  certain  basic 
information  which  in  part  was  aimed  at  reinforcing  the  Soviet  system  of  enterprise  governance 
through  the  general  civil  law  of  vires.  "'  Mainstream  Soviet  law  characterised  the  contract  for 
joint  activity  merely  as  a  type  of  contract  that  did  not  constitute  a  juridical  person,  "'  and  the 
question  of  a  governance  regime  was  probably  overlooked  and  considered  as  simply  not 
relevant  (particularly  in  view  of  the  fact  that  each  of  the  participants  themselves  would  usually 
have  been  in  any  event  subject  to  state  control  either  directly  or  indirectly).  Therefore  the  civil 
codes  did  not  expressly  include  the  concept  of  "a  charter"  for  the  association  based  on  the 
contract  for  joint  activity.  They  did  however  set  out  a  few  limited  requirements  as  to  the 
procedure  for  concluding  the  contract  (primarily  that  they  had  to  be  in  writing),  "'  but  there 
were  no  mandatory  requirements  as  to  its  content.  355 
................  .I............  .  .......  ........  .........  ....  .....  .  .........  ...........  .....  .  ........  .  ....  .  ...  .....  .  .....  .  --------  ...  ...  ...... 
349  The  use  of  the  term  "participant"  with  respect  to  common  ownership  can  be  traced  directly  to  the  1922 
RSFSR  Civil  Code,  article  63. 
350  Supra  n.  318. 
351  RSFSR  CC,  article  434.  This  distinction  between  contracts  between  citizens  and  between  juridical 
persons  was  also  present  in  the  law  of  common  ownership  upon  which  the  contract  for  joint  activity  was 
based  (see  supra  Section  2.6). 
352  Supra  Section  3.4.1. 
353  Infra  Section  4.6. 
354  RSFSR  CC,  article  44. 
355  An  exception  to  this  general  position  was  the  requirement  that  joint  activity  between  citizens  had  to  be 
carried  out  with  the  aim  of  "satisfaction  of  their  personal  domestic  needs"  (RSFSR  CC,  article  434). 
-110- As  the  contract  was  by  definition  "for  the  achievement  of  a  common  economic  purpose",  legal 
practice  was  in  any  event  to  include  in  the  contract  a  precise  description  of  the  purpose  for 
which  the  association  had  been  entered  into.  It  was  unclear  as  to  how  specific  or  even  how 
necessary  such  a  purpose  clause  had  to  be.  Would  the  purpose  of  simply  generating  cash 
revenue  have  been  sufficient?  Laasik,  the  Estonian  Soviet  civil  law  jurist,  argued  that  the 
contract  should  have  specified  not  only  the  exact  activities  but  also  those  obligations  assumed 
by  each  of  the  participants.  "'  Of  course,  due  to  the  brevity  of  the  default  rules  in  the  civil 
codes,  genuine  co-operation  by  way  of  joint  activity  based  on  purely  legal  criteria  could  only 
have  been  possible  where  the  terms  of  the  actual  contract  itself  were  relatively  detailed. 
In  contrast  to  the  provisions  of  Chapter  X,  there  were  no  articles  of  the  civil  codes  relating  to 
the  termination  of  the  joint  activity.  This  omission  in  the  legislation  was  presumably  part  of 
the  attempt  to  recharacterise  this  arrangement  as  a  mere  "contract"  as  opposed  to  a  method  for 
creating  a  permanent  "organisation".  Termination  of  the  contract  for  joint  activity  was 
therefore  governed  simply  by  the  ordinary  law  of  contract.  "' 
4.6  Juridical  Personality  -  Ownership  Interests,  Vires  and  Responsibility 
The  question  of  juridical  personality  (ownership,  vires  and  responsibility)  should  have been 
relatively  straightforward:  as  part  of  the  1960s  recodification  of  Soviet  civil  law,  all 
references  to  juridical  persons  were  removed  from  the  section  of  the  civil  codes  on  the  law  of 
obligations  and  a  "new"  contract,  the  contract  for  joint  activity,  was  included  in  that  section. 
This  contract  for  joint  activity  should  therefore  have  been  understood  simply  as  a  contract  that 
did  not  give  rise  to  a  juridical  person  in  its  own  right;  property  contributed  by  the  participants 
therefore  should  have  remained  in  their  ownership  combined  by  way  of  common  ownership; 
vires  should  therefore  have  been  irrelevant  as  no  separate  juridical  person  was  created;  and 
responsibility  should  therefore  have  been  a  matter  for  the  mainstream  Soviet  law  of 
obligations  where  the  law  would  "look  through"  the  association  and  fix  rights  and  obligations 
upon  the  individual  participants. 
However,  the  question  of  the  juridical  status  of  the  contract  for  joint  activity  was  a  matter  of 
some  uncertainty,  primarily  due  to  the  existence  of  inter-collective  farm  organisations,  which 
356  Endel'  Laasik,  Sovetskoe  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo,  Chast'  Osobennaya  (Valgus:  1980),  p.  3  87. 
357  Most  Soviet  textbooks  explained  that  this  contract  came  to  an  end  when  the  purpose  of  the  joint  activity 
had  been  achieved,  or  became  impossible;  or  when  there  was  a  reorganisation  of  one  of  the  participants, 
in  the  case  of  a  juridical  person,  or  death,  in  the  case  of  a  natural  person  (Sovetskoe  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo, 
Chast'ff  (Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1987),  p.  374-5).  In  addition,  termination  could  have 
occurred  upon  agreement  of  the  parties  in  accordance  with  prevailing  Soviet  contract  law.  This 
formulation  in  the  textbooks  bore  a  remarkable  similarity  to  the  express  provisions  of  Chapter  X  on 
termination  of  simple  partnerships  (supra  n.  317). 
- 
ill 
- were  juridical  persons,  358  and  were  created  by  a  contract  (and  a  charter)  between  existing 
juridical  persons  for  the  purpose  of  collaborative  activities  ;  35'  and  hence  had  certain  theoretical 
similarities  with  the  contract  for  joint  activity.  Furthermore,  the  articles  of  the  civil  codes 
regulating  the  contract  for  joint  activity  specifically  referred  to  inter-collective  farm 
organisations.  "0 
Before  the  recodification.  of  civil  law  in  the  1960s  it  was  relatively  clear  that  simple 
partnerships  were  different  from  inter-collective  farm  organisations:  first,  only  citizens  (ie 
natural  persons)  could  have  been  members  of  simple  partnerships  (whereas  inter-collective 
farm  organisations  had  collective  farms  (ie  juridical  persons)  as  members);  and  secondly, 
doctrine  had  become  relatively  settled,  and  the  simple  partnership  was  considered  not  to  give 
rise  to  a  juridical  person,  (and  the  inter-collective  farm  organisation  was  a  juridical  person  361) 
. 
In  fact,  there  were  generally  no  references  to  inter-collective  farm  organisations  in  sections  of 
112  Soviet  civil  law  textbooks  dealing  with  the  nature  of  the  simple  partnership.  One  exception 
was  loffe's  books.  First,  he  referred  explicitly  to  the  term  "contract  for  joint  activity"  before 
the  recodification  of  Soviet  civil  law,  despite  the  fact  that  this  term  did  not  appear  in  the 
Soviet  primary  civil  law  legislation  of  the  time.  "'  Secondly,  loffe  understood  "the  contract  for 
joint  activityll  as  an  umbrella  term  to  encompass  the  simple  partnership  contract  and  the 
contract  for  inter-collective  farm  activity.  These  two  contracts  were  then  distinguished  on  the 
basis  that  the  simple  partnership  contract  did  not  give  rise  to  a  juridical  person  and  could  be 
concluded  between  citizens,  whereas  the  inter-collective  farm  contract  did  give  rise  to  a 
juridical  person  and  could  only  be  concluded  between  juridical  persons. 
loffe  in  his  works  after  the  adoption  of  the  1960s  civil  codes  still  retained  this  understanding 
of  the  "contract  of  joint  activity"  (now  present  in  the  civil  codes)  as  encompassing  contract 
based  cooperative  associations  between  natural  persons  (previously  simple  partnerships)  which 
358  See  RSFSR  CC,  article  24. 
359  Supra  n.  120,  chapter  VIII. 
360  RSFSR  CC,  article  434:  "Under  the  contract  for  joint  activity,  parties  shall  be  obliged  to  act  jointly  for 
the  achievement  of  a  common  economic  purpose:  such  as  the  construction  and  exploitation  of  inter- 
collective  farm  or  state-collective  farm  enterprises  ...... 
361  As  Gordon  argued  in  1960  with  respect  to  inter-collective  farms:  "these  associations  of  a  new  type  differ 
from  simple  partnerships  in  that  they  are  juridical  persons  and  simple  partnerships  under  the  civil  code  do 
not  enjoy  these  rights,  "  (supra  n.  32  1,  p.  240). 
362  See,  for  example,  Sovetskoe  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo,  Tom  2  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi 
Literatury:  195  1),  pp.  283-285. 
363  O.  S.  1offe,  Sovetskoe  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo  II  (Izdatel'stvo  Leningradskogo  Universiteta:  1961),  pp.  454- 
469. 
-112- did  not  give  rise  to  a  juridical  person,  and  "inter-collective  farm  organisations"  between 
juridical  persons  which  did.  '64This  understanding  was  developed  from  the  drafting  of  the  new 
RSFSR  CC.  In  contrast  to  the  previous  articles  on  the  simple  partnership  in  the  1922  RSFSR 
Civil  Code,  article  434  of  the  new  RSFSR  CC  directly  contemplated  the  existence  of  inter- 
collective  farm  organisations  within  the  contract  for  joint  activity;  and  also  permitted  juridical 
persons  (as  well  as  citizens)  to  be  participants  in  the  contract  for  joint  activity  (but  precluded 
mixed  forms  of  contract  between  citizens  and  natural  persons).  This  analysis  seemed  also  to 
be  supported  by  article  438  of  the  RSFSR  CC  which  provided  that  the  Council  of  Ministers  of 
the  union  republics  had  the  right,  on  the  basis  of  the  general  rules,  to  promulgate  "rules 
concerning  individual  types  of  joint  activity";  365  and  some  commentaries  and  textbookS366 
regarded  the  General  Statute  on  the  Inter-Economic  Enterprise  (Organisation)  in  Agriculture 
as  a  special  type  of  contract  for  joint  activity,  resulting  in  the  establishment  of  a  juridical 
person,  adopted  on  the  basis  of  this  article.  367 
Despite  the  analysis  presented  by  loffe,  the  more  orthodox  understanding  was  that  the 
conclusion  of  a  contract  for  joint  activity,  whether  between  citizens  or  juridical  persons, 
precluded  the  creation  of  an  association  that  could  be  recognised  as  an  independent  juridical 
person.  Laasik  explained:  "when  associating  two  or  more  persons  on  the  basis  of  a  contract 
for  joint  activity  ...  a  new  subject,  a  juridical  person,  does  not  arise  ... 
But  if  the  associated 
persons  form  a  juridical  person,  the  contract  for  joint  activity  may  not  be  used  to  regulate  the 
assets.  ""'  The  inter-collective  farm  organisation  was  simply  just  a  different  type  of 
association.  Thus  Kalandadze  distinguished  between  agreements  between  collective  farms 
regulated  by  the  civil  codes  ("civil-legal  agreements"  (ie  contracts  for  joint  activity))  and  those 
made  on  the  basis  of  constitutive  contracts  for  the  creation  of  inter-collective  farm 
364  Supra  n.  334,  p.  769,  and  supra  n.  123  (1988),  pp.  298-301. 
365  RSFSR  CC,  article  438. 
366  Sovetskoe  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo,  Chast'  2  (Izdatel'stvo  Leningradskogo  Universiteta:  1982),  p.  287. 
367  Opinion  however  was  divided.  A  1982  Commentary  to  the  RSFSR  CC  noted  that  the  General  Statute  on 
Inter-Economic  Enterprises  (Organisations)  in  Agriculture  (Obshchee  Polozhenie  0 
Mezhkhozyaistvennom  Predpriyatii  (Organizatsii)  v  Sel'skom  Khozyaistve,  53  SDZ  SSSR  57)  was 
adopted  on  the  basis  of  article  438.  As  such,  the  1982  Commentary  thereby  acknowledged  that  the 
contract  for  joint  activity  could  give  rise  to  a  juridical  person  (supra  n.  244,  p.  513). 
Article  438  only  contemplated  union-republic  (ie  RSFSR)  legislation  being  adopted  on  the  basis  of  its 
provisions,  and  the  General  Statute  was  a  piece  of  all-union  legislation  and  therefore  did  not  striclty  fall 
within  the  ambit  of  article  438.  This  conclusion  seemed  to  contradict  a  literal  reading  of  article  438. 
By  contrast,  a  1988  Commentary  to  the  Kaz  CC  on  the  equivalent  article  noted  that  no  decrees  of  the 
Cabinet  of  Ministers  of  the  Kazakh  SSR  had  been  adopted  pursuant  to  this  article  and  did  not  refer  to  the 
General  Statute  as  a  source  for  the  creation  of  contracts  of  joint  activity  giving  rise  to  a  juridical  person 
(supra  n.  250,  p.  486). 
368  Supra  n.  356,  pp.  386-387. 
-  113- organisations  governed  by  "Model  Charters"  and  other  collective  farm  legislation  ("inter- 
collective  farm-legal  agreements").  "' 
Collective  farm  (as  opposed  to  civil)  legislation  also  made  this  distinction  between  (i)  joint 
activity  between  collective  farms  without  the  formation  of  a  juridical  person,  conceptualised 
within  the  terms  of  the  contract  for  joint  activity,  "'  and  (ii)  co-operation  between  collective 
farms  leading  to  the  creation  of  separate  inter-collective  farm  juridical  persons.  "'  As  one  civil 
law  textbook  explained:  "if  inter-collective  farm  enterprises  or  organisations  are  provided  with 
the  rights  of  a  juridical  person,  their  activities  shall  be  regulated  by  the  corresponding  charter 
or  statute  and  not  by  a  contract  for  joint  activity.  tv  372 
This  orthodox  understanding  was  also  consistent  with  the  approach  to  the  ownership  regime 
for  the  participants  as  set  out  in  the  provisions  of  the  RSFSR  CC.  Similar  to  the  articles  on  the 
simple  partnership  in  the  former  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code,  the  RSFSR  CC  adopted  expressly 
the  regime  of  "common  ownership"  ("obshchei  sobstvennostyu")  for  the  contract  for  joint 
activity,  whereby  participants  contributed  fees  ("vznosy")  to  "common  property"  in  which 
participants  had  participatory  shares  ("doier).  373  This  property  was  used  to  cover  losses  and 
obligations;  and  if  not  sufficient,  in  the  absence  of  a  different  procedure  specified  in  the 
contract,  outstanding  debts  would  be  divided  between  the  participants  "proportionately  to  their 
fees"  to  the  common  property  - 
374 
Unfortunately,  as  with  the  question  of  juridical  status,  the  reference  to  operations  on  the  basis 
of  "common  ownership"  was  also  not  free  from  ambiguity.  In  particular,  certain  aspects  of  the 
provisions  of  the  civil  codes  on  common  share  ownership  generally"'  seemed  to  contradict 
corresponding  specific  provisions  on  the  contract  for  joint  activity.  For  example,  the  law  of 
common  ownership  allowed  for  the  right  of  any  participant  to  require  the  separation  out  of  its 
property;  whereas  the  articles  of  the  civil  code  on  joint  activity  only  allowed  for  "disposition 
369  A.  M.  Kalandadze,  Pravovie  Formi  Khozyaustvennoi  Deyatel'nosti  Kolkhzov  (Gosyurizdat:  1959),  p.  95. 
370  The  1967  Collective  Farm  Charter  (article  19)  allowed  collective  farms  to  "join  part  of  its  assets  with 
assets  of  local  Soviets  of  deputies  of  the  workers,  collective  farms  and  other  state  and  cooperative 
enterprises  and  organisations,  for  the  construction,  on  participatory  principles,  of  objects  of  cultural- 
domestic  designation  ...... 
371  In  fact  the  "intercollective  farm  organisation"  as  a  juridical  person  was  explicitly  provided  for  in  article 
II  of  the  1961  FPCivL  and  the  corresponding  provisions  of  the  civil  codes,  and  the  "contract  for  joint 
activity"  was  not. 
372  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo  Kazakhskoi  SSR,  Chast'  II  (Izdatel'stvo  Mektep:  1980),  p.  228.  For  the  orthodox 
position  generally  on  inter-economic  organisations  see,  supra  nAl  (1986),  pp.  154-158. 
373  RSFSR  CC,  article  436. 
374  RSFSR  CC,  article  437. 
375  RSFSR  CC,  article  116  et  seq. 
-114- of  its  participatory  share  "  with  the  consent  of  all  the  remaining  participants;  and  the  law  of 
common  ownership  provided  that  expenses  relating  to  the  property  were  to  be  paid 
proportionally  to  the  participants'  "fees"  in  the  common  property;  whereas  provisions  of  the 
civil  code  specifically  on  joint  activity  stipulated  that  the  actual  provisions  of  the  contract 
could  provide  otherwise. 
The  uncertain  nature  of  the  property  relations  and  juridical  status  of  the  contract  for  joint 
activity  can  be  traced  to  the  law  of  its  predecessor,  the  simple  partnership:  both  avoided  a 
clear  statement  that  no  juridical  person  was  created;  both  resulted  in  the  general  understanding 
that  no  juridical  person  was  created;  and  both  provided  for  a  property  regime  based  on 
common  ownership.  However  this  was  confused:  In  the  case  of  the  simple  partnership  this 
was  as  a  result  of  the  introduction  of  the  concept  of  the  reffied  partnership  and  inconsistent 
terminology;  and  in  the  case  of  the  contract  for  joint  activity  this  was  as  a  result  of  direct 
references  in  the  section  of  the  civil  codes  on  joint  activity  to  the  inter-collective  farm 
organisations  (which  were  juridical  persons),  and  furthermore,  due  to  the  contradictions 
between  that  section  and  the  general  law  on  common  ownership. 
While  Shershenevich  had  expressly  acknowledged  the  ambiguities  in  the  legislation  on  the 
artel  partnership  of  pre-revolutionary  law,  civil  law  textbooks  of  the  Soviet  period  generally 
adopted  one  of  the  interpretations  and  presented  it  as  free  from  doubt.  There  was  almost  no 
acknowledgement  that  there  may  even  have  been  any  room  for  discussion  on  these  issues  and 
certainly  no  textbook  framed  the  debate  in  the  terms  presented  in  this  Section  3.6  and  in  this 
Chapter  3  generally. 
Once  again,  this  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  ambiguities  latent  in  the  legislation  may  have  been 
due  to  the  fact  that  Soviet  law  did  not  have  a  developed  concept  of  the  ownership  interest, 
preferring  instead  to  finesse  some  of  the  finer  points  of  the  distinctions  raised  while  pursuing 
the  development  of  a  regime  based  on  forms  of  ownership.  "'  The  legislation  on  the  bridge 
merely  reaffirmed  an  existing  approach  to  ownership  interests  that  resulted  in  a  law 
sufficiently  developed  for  a  quasi-feudal  state  ownership  regime  based  on  Marxist  legal 
theory,  but  hopelessly  ill-prepared  for  the  perestroika  economy  where  state  ownership  was  to 
give  way  to  the  possibility  of  separate  interests  and  fragmental  ownership. 
4.7  Management 
The  provisions  of  the  civil  codes  relating  to  the  management  of  the  activities  of  the 
participants  in  the  contract  for  joint  activity  were  relatively  brief  and  were  once  again 
376  See  supra  Section  2.5. 
-  115- inherited  from  the  law  on  simple  partnerships  set  out  in  Chapter  X.  In  short,  business  was  to 
be  conducted  by  the  "common  consent"  of  the  participants;  however,  the  participants  had  the 
right  to  empower  through  a  power  of  attorney  "one  of  the  participants"  to  carry  out  the 
general  business  and  administration  of  the  joint  activity  on  behalf  of  the  others.  "' 
The  requirement  for  unanimity  was  not  subject  to  any  qualification,  as  had  been  the  case 
under  Chapter  X  where  majority  voting  was  permitted  in  the  simple  partnership  to  the  extent 
contemplated  in  the  constitutive  contract.  However  the  empowerment  of  one  of  the 
participants  as  a  sort  of  managing  director  did  enable  a  streamlining  of  operations  within  the 
limits  of  delegated  competences  as  set  out  in  the  power  of  attorney.  The  unanimity 
requirement  can  perhaps  be  viewed  again  as  a  result  of  the  philosophy  of  personal 
participation  and  joint  endeavour  through  complete  mutuality  of  interest.  In  such  a  regime, 
there  was  no  room  for  dissent  or  majority  decision  making.  Furthermore  there  was  no 
possibility  for  separate  management  organs  of  participants  and  directors.  To  this  extent  the 
bridge  presented  a  rather  rudimentary  governance  framework. 
4.8  Conclusion 
The  simple  partnership  became  the  contract  for  joint  activity  with  the  1960s  civil  law  reform 
and  adoption  of  civil  codes.  Despite  the  fact  that  it  specifically  contemplated  juridical  persons, 
as  well  as  citizens,  acting  as  participants,  this  association  was  generally  regarded  as  not  giving 
rise  to  a  juridical  person.  Joint  activity  was  conceptualised  purely  in  terms  of  the  Soviet  law  of 
obligations  providing  a  basic  contractual  mechanism  for  associating  in  order  to  carry  out  a 
common  specific  purpose  by  pooling  resources. 
It  is  perhaps  for  this  reason  that,  while  the  contract  for  joint  activity  was  clearly  a  form  of 
association,  Soviet  civil  law  never  explicitly  classified  the  contract  for  joint  activity  together 
with  the  forms  of  organisation  which  constituted  juridical  persons.  As  such,  the  contract  for 
joint  activity  avoided  much  of  the  ideological  baggage  that  was  constantly  associated  with 
socialist  juridical  persons  and  their  rationale.  For  while  Venediktov  and  his  successors 
developed  the  theory  of  the  Soviet  industrial  juridical  person  based  on  the  concept  of  state 
ownership,  they  failed  to  take  into  account  the  position  of  the  remaining  form  of  association 
that  was  contract-based  and  was  not  a  juridical  person. 
Therefore  the  contract  for  joint  activity  remained,  hidden  deep  within  the  Soviet  civil  codes, 
classified  within  the  law  of  obligations  -  the  only  form  of  association  that  was  capable  of 
bridging  all  the  major  upheavals  in  Russian  law  ftom  pre-revolutionary  times  to  the  present 
377  RSFSR  CC,  article  435. 
-  116- day.  For  although  both  its  name  and  function  changed,  its  legal  basis  remained  broadly 
untouched.  So  throughout  the  Soviet  period,  there  persisted  in  the  civil  codes  a  form  of 
association  that  would  become  the  seed  of  destruction  for  the  theory  of  the  socialist  industrial 
organisation,  budding  and  blooming  into  a  contract-based  association,  based  on  personal 
participation  and  regulated  by  default  rules:  an  "association"  that  would  form  the  basis  for 
new  "organisations"  (ie  juridical  persons)  that  would  eventually  usurp  the  position  of  the 
traditional  socialist  forms  and  herald  in  a  new  ideology  of  the  juridical  person  based  on  volus, 
contract  and  the  market. 
The  presence  of  the  bridge  explains  why  the  introduction  of  the  "joint  enterprise"  during  the 
perestroika  years  should  not  have  been  regarded  with  surprise.  378  At  the  time  of  its 
introduction,  the  joint  enterprise  was  regarded  as  a  wholly  "new"  organisational  form 
introduced  into  the  area  of  foreign  relations  law.  However,  that  understanding  ignored  the  fact 
that  there  was  an  existing  associational  form  within  the  Soviet  law  of  obligations,  operating 
alongside  the  confirmation  enterprises,  that  also  was  contract-based.  Therefore,  the  joint 
enterprise  and  the  other  new  organisations  of  the  perestroika  era  based  on  contract  did  not 
represent  a  total  break  from  the  traditional  Soviet  civil  law  of  associations  understood  in  its 
broadest  sense.  For  it  was  the  contract  for  joint  activity  that  provided  the  historical  and 
conceptual  bridge  between  the  model  of  the  confirmation  enterprise  and  the  model  of  the 
contract-based  concession  enterprise  -  between  the  command  economy  and  the  market- 
orientated  economy. 
The  legacy  of  the  contract  for  joint  activity  however  was  more  specific  and  more  pervasive: 
not  only  did  it  incubate  within  Soviet  law  an  association  governed  by  contract,  but  it  also 
preserved  the  role  of  personal  participation,  a  permissive  law  based  on  the  right  to  "contract 
out"  of  default  rules.  Finally,  there  was  an  ownership  framework  that  was  decidedly 
ambiguous.  And  all  of  these  elements  carried  through  the  legislation  from  the  joint  enterprises 
to  the  participation  enterprises  which  followed  them  and  became  key  points  of  principle  in  the 
new  economic  constitution  that  emerged  in  the  Spring  of  1990. 
378  See  infra  Chapter  5. 
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JOINT  ENTERPRISES 
"We  had  adopted  an  essentially  piecemeal 
strategy  that  tackled  isolated  problems 
without  providing  a  comprehensive 
solution.  Moreover,  some  of  these  measures 
bore  the  stamp  of  traditional  methods  and 
eventually  had  to  be  abandoned.  " 
Mikhail  S.  Gorbachev 
The  joint  enterprise  was  a  contract-based  concession  enterprise  which  operated  on  the  basis  of 
legislation  adopted  in  January  1987.379  Under  Decree  49,  as  it  was  known,  firms  of  capitalist 
and  developing  countries  were  permitted  to  establish,  jointly  with  Soviet  organisations,  a 
Soviet  juridical  person  created  for  the  achievement  of  certain  economic  goals.  As  with  many 
of  the  perestroika  era  legislative  enactments,  Decree  49  only  had  significance  in  practice  for  a 
limited  period  of  time,  after  which  it  became  anachronistic  and  was  replaced  by  subsequent 
legislation.  By  the  end  of  1990,  after  the  adoption  of  new  legislation  in  the  areas  of  foreign 
relations  and  civil  law,  new  forms  of  investment  vehicles  were  permitted  to  be  created  in  the 
379  Two  decrees  were  adopted  in  January  1987,  commonly  referred  to  as  Decree  48  and  Decree  49.  Decree 
48  provided  for  the  establishment  of  joint  economic  organisations  (being  joint  enterprises,  international 
associations  and  joint  organisations  (on  the  differences  between  these  forms,  see  infra  n.  403)  with 
members  of  SEV);  and  Decree  49  provided  for  the  establishment  of  joint  enterprises  with  firms  of 
capitalist  and  developing  countries:  0  Poryadke  Sozdaniya  na  Territorii  SSSR  i  Deyatel'nosti 
Sovmestnykh  Predpriyatii,  Mezhdunarodnykh  Ob''edinenii  i  Organizatsii  SSSR  i  Drugikh  Stran  - 
Chlenov  SEV,  Postanovleniya  (January  1987),  no.  48,  p.  76;  0  Poryadke  Sozdaniya  na  Territorii  SSSR  i 
Deyatel'nosti  Sovmestnykh  Predpriyatii  s  Uchastiem  Sovetskikh  Organizatsii  i  Firm  Kapitalisticheskikh  i 
Razvivayushchikhsya  Stran,  Postanovleniya  (January  1987),  no.  49,  p.  88. 
There  were  at  least  three  versions  of  Decree  49:  (i)  the  official  published  version  (SP  SSSR  (1987),  no.  9, 
item  40)  where  article  2  consisted  of  three  paragraphs,  and  article  3  of  one  paragraph;  (ii)  a  second 
version  "for  internal  use  only"  (Postanovleniya  (January  1987),  no.  49,  p.  88)  where  the  Russian  word 
"sekretno"  appeared  after  the  second  paragraph  of  article  2  and  after  the  first  paragraph  of  article  3;  and 
(iii)  a  third  version  containing  the  text  noted  as  "secret"  in  the  second  version.  The  author  understands 
from  discussions  with  employees  at  the  Ministry  of  Justice  in  the  Republics  of  Kazakhstan  and 
Tadjikistan  that  the  third  version  contained  provisions  for  use  by  the  KGB  and  copies  of  this  text  were 
only  made  available  to  the  relevant  agencies  of  that  institution. 
Not  only  did  the  "second  version"  of  Decree  49  include  references  to  "secret"  provisions,  but  so  did  the 
decrees  which  amended  it.  For  example  the  last  paragraph  of  the  amendments  to  Decree  49  annexed  to 
Decree  385  (infra  n.  407)  in  the  version  "for  internal  use  only"  was  also  simply  noted  as  "secret". 
-  118- Soviet  Union  and  these  broadly  presented  more  advantages  than  the  Decree  49  joint 
enterprises.  "' 
The  significance  of  the  joint  enterprise  in  history  of  the  foundations  of  the  industrial 
organisation  cannot  be  overstated.  Despite  earlier  forms  of  association  that  resembled  in  some 
respects  the  joint  enterprise,  "'  it  will  be  argued  that  Decree  49  should  be  viewed  as  a 
watershed  in  the  restructuring  of  the  law  on  industrial  organisations  in  the  Soviet  Union:  the 
joint  enterprise  was  the  first  Soviet  juridical  person  to  emerge  from  Gorbachev's  "new 
thinking"  that  exhibited  some  of  the  characteristics  of  the  western-style  corporation.  However, 
the  joint  enterprise  was  schizophrenic,  unsure  of  its  legal  foundation  and  unsure  of  its 
"corporate"  identity.  It  was  intended  to  operate  within  the  sphere  of  foreign  relations  law,  but 
in  fact  had  its  basic  legal  foundations  in  domestic  Soviet  civil  law.  Thus  it  straddled  two 
branches  of  Soviet  law  which  had  for  over  fifty  years  been  strictly  separated.  While  straddling 
two  branches  of  Soviet  law,  it  also  straddled  two  conceptions  of  the  industrial  organisation. 
The  joint  enterprise  was  formed  on  the  basis  of  a  concession,  but  operated  on  the  basis  of  a 
contract  negotiated  between  the  parties.  In  order  to  understand  the  nature  of  the  joint 
enterprise  and  its  unique  and  pivotal  role  in  the  history  of  the  law  on  industrial  organisations, 
we  shall  first  need  to  outline  briefly  the  environment  in  which  it  arose: 
The  Soviet  regime  had  flirted  with  the  concept  of  joint  ventures  with  other  countries 
throughout  its  history,  but  rarely  were  such  joint  ventures  permitted  to  be  created  on  the 
territory  of  the  USSR  itself.  "'  This  was  principally  due  to  the  fact  that  Soviet  foreign  relations 
law  and  policy  was  based  upon  a  state  monopoly  -a  principle  that  can  be  traced  back  to 
380  The  adoption  in  1990  by  Gorbachev  of  an  edict  that  allowed  for  the  creation  of  Soviet  juridical  persons 
wholly-owned  by  foreign  firms  removed  the  necessity  for  setting  up  "joint"  operations  (in  the  absence  of 
specific  considerations)  (Ob  Inostrannykh  Investitsiyakh  v  SSSR,  Vedomosti  SAD  SSSR  (1990),  no.  44, 
item  944).  This  edict  was  followed  by  the  adoption  of  the  1990  FPInvA  and  the  1991  FPForInv  (and 
corresponding  foreign  investment  legislation  in  each  of  the  union  republics)  which  set  out  a  new  basis  for 
the  regulation  and  conduct  of  foreign  investment;  however  neither  of  these  enactments  introduced  a  new 
form  of  association  into  domestic  law  in  the  way  that  Decrees  48  and  49  had  done  three  years  earlier.  See 
generally,  M.  I.  Braginskii,  W.  E.  Butler,  A.  A.  Rubanov,  ne  Butler  Commentaries  on  Soviet  Law: 
Fundamental  Principles  of  Legislation  on  Investment  Activity  in  the  USSR  and  Republics  (Interlist:  1991); 
and  M.  I.  Braginskii,  W.  E.  Butler,  A.  A.  Rubanov,  Yhe  Butler  Commentaries  on  Soviet  Law:  Foreign 
Investment  Legislation  in  the  Republics  of  the  Former  Soviet  Union  (Interlist:  1993). 
381  See  for  example  the  contract  for  joint  activity  (analysed  in  Chapter  4)  and  the  1983  joint  economic 
organisations;  (see  infra  n.  400  below). 
382  See,  infra  n.  399. 
-  119- 1918ý  383  and  was  considered  to  be  "one  of  the  deciding  conditions  for  the  success  of  socialist 
construction.  ,  38'  The  most  notable  exception  was  the  "concessions"  of  the  NEP  era, 
introduced  in  the  early  1920s  when  the  Soviet  policy  on  foreign  trade  was  still  unsettled, 
embroiled  in  the  debate  over  the  relative  merits  of  an  "absolute"  state  monopoly  as  against  a 
more  "liberal"  one.  38'  Foreign  investment  was  permitted  under  the  Dekret  on  Concessions 
adopted  in  1920 
'386  or  through  the  creation  of  "specially  chartered  joint-stock  enterprises, 
Russian,  Foreign  and  Mixed,  having  the  purpose  of  attracting  foreign  capital.  it387  Where 
mixed,  the  Soviet  side  had  to  hold  at  least  51  %  of  the  stocks.  388  The  institutional  framework 
for  the  granting  of  concessions  was  set  up  in  1922  in  the  form  of  the  Concession  Committee 
attached  to  Gosplan  and  the  Commission  for  Mixed  Societies  attached  to  the  Soviet  of  Labour 
and  Defence.  These  were  eventually  merged  in  1923  to  form  the  Main  Concession  Committee 
attached  to  the  USSR  Council  of  People's  Commissars.  389 
Soviet  literature  of  the  post-NEP  era  emphasised  the  fact  that  these  concessions  were  only 
intended  at  the  time  to  be  a  temporary  measure  and  had  little  real  significance  in  economic 
terms.  In  total  from  the  period  1921  -  1926,  out  of  1,937  "offers"  to  conclude  concession 
contracts,  only  135  were  in  fact  concluded.  "  By  1928  Soviet  policy  had  in  any  event  shifted 
yet  again  moving  towards  what  John  Quigley  described  as  "extreme  centralisation  in  both 
trade  and  industry";  391  and  between  1928  -  1929  no  new  concessions  were  granted,  and 
several  were  even  terminated  . 
3'  This  change  in  policy  was  formalised  by  a  decree  of  the  All- 
Union  Soviet  of  People's  Commissars  on  27  December  1930  which  ended  the  granting  of 
foreign  concessions  for  mining  and  manufacturing.  393  As  Pedersen  writing  in  1975  noted, 
11  since  that  date  the  Soviet  Union  has  followed  a  policy  of  prohibiting  the  participation  by 
..........  --  .........  ........  ......  .......  I--  . ..........  I-I.  -  - ..........  --  -.  1 . ...  . .................  ......  ....  . ........... 
383  0  Natsionalizatsii  Vneshnei  TorgovIi,  SU  (1918),  no.  33,  item  432.  See,  Pravovye  Voprosy  Vneshnei 
Torgovli  SSSR  (Vneshtorgizdat:  195  5),  p.  6  and  p.  54. 
384  S.  S.  Studenkin,  Sovetskoe  Administrativnoe  Pravo  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi 
Literatury:  1949),  p.  185. 
385  John  Quigley,  The  Soviet  Foreign  Trade  Monopoly,  Institutions  and  Laws  (Ohio  State  University 
Press:  1974),  p.  25. 
386  Obshchie  Ekonomicheskie  i  Yuridicheskie  Usloviya  Kontsessii,  SU  (192  1),  no.  9  1,  item  18  1. 
387  0  Vneshnei  Torgovle,  13  Marta  1922,  supra  n.  111  (1967),  p.  293. 
388  M.  M.  Boguslavskii,  Mezhdunarodnoe  Chastnoe  Pravo  (Mezhdunarodnye  Otnosheniya:  1977),  p.  137. 
389  M.  M.  Boguslavskii,  Inostrannye  Investitsii:  Pravovoe  Regulirovanie  (Izdatel'stvo  BEK:  1996),  p.  5. 
390  Supra  n.  178,  p.  162. 
391  Supra  n.  385,  p-61. 
392  Ibid.,  p.  6. 
393  James  F.  Pedersen,  Joint  Ventures  in  the  Soviet  Union:  A  Legal  and  Economic  Perspective  (1975)  16 
HarvAternational  LJ  390. 
-120- foreign  firms  in  the  management  and  sharing  of  profits  in  economic  organisations  within  the 
USSR 
... 
Consequently  there  are  today  no  economic  associations  in  the  USSR  between  Western 
firms  and  Soviet  economic  organizations  involving  joint  management  and  the  sharing  of 
profits  and  losses".  "'  This  situation  was  to  continue  until  January  1987.  However,  joint 
ventures  as  creatures  of  public  international  law  had  been  in  existence  for  a  number  of  years 
prior  to  that  date. 
The  Soviet  policy  in  international  relations  changed  radically  after  the  death  of  Stalin  when 
foreign  trade  increased  and  Comecon  became  a  more  active  body.  "'  With  the  opening  up  of 
the  economy,  the  question  of  joint  ventures  was  raised  again  and  a  number  were  established, 
particularly  with  member  countries  of  SEV.  Section  15,  article  7  of  The  Complex  Programme 
of  SEV  provided  that  member  countries  should  prepare  the  necessary  legislation  to  facilitate 
the  creation  of  "international  economic  organisations"  in  the  fields  of  production,  trade, 
scientific-technological  co-operation  and  other  areas.  116  As  a  result,  in  January  1973,  the 
Executive  Committee  of  SEV  adopted  the  "Model  Statute  on  the  Conditions  for  the 
Establishment  and  Activity  of  International  Economic  Organisations  in  the  Member  Countries 
of  SEV";  in  January  1975  the  "Model  Statute  on  the  Financing  and  Effectuation  of  Expenses 
of  International  Organisations  of  the  Interested  Member  Countries  of  SEV";  and  in  January 
1976  the  "Uniform  Statute  on  the  Establishment  and  Activity  of  International  Economic 
Organisations.  "'9'  Cooperation  among  the  members  of  SEV  increased  still  further  after  the 
December  1985  (Extraordinary)  Meeting  of  the  Session  of  SEV,  and  between  1986  and  1987 
a  number  of  bilateral  international  treaties  were  signed  relating  to  the  establishment  of 
international  economic  organisations  and  setting  out  the  basic  norms  for  their  operations.  398  A 
number  of  joint  ventures  were  therefore  established  pursuant  to  these  enactments.  However, 
all  of  them  were  set  up  outside  the  Soviet  Union  and  were  only  engaged  in  trade  and  fishing, 
399  never  in  the  sphere  of  industry 
. 
394  Ibid. 
395  Supra  n.  19  1,  p.  358. 
396  OsnoVnYe  Dokumenty  Soveta  Ekonomicheskoi  Vzaimopomoshchi,  Tom  1  (Sekretariat  SEV:  198  1),  p.  117. 
397  G.  D.  Golubov,  Sovmestnye  Predptiyatiya  Mezhdunarodnye  Ob"edineniya  i  Organizatsii  na  Terfitorii 
SSSR  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1988),  pp.  14-15. 
398  Treaties  were  signed  with  Poland  (15  October  1986),  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Czechoslovakia  (4 
November  1986)  and  East  Germany  (17  December  1986)  before  the  adoption  of  Decree  48  in  January  of 
the  following  year.  These  treaties  set  out  the  basic  provisions  upon  which  co-operation  would  proceed 
and  charters  would  be  drawn  up.  Supra  n.  397,  pp.  536-537. 
399  M.  M.  Boguslavskii,  joint  Ventures  in  the  Soviet  Union  (I.  B.  Tauris  &  Co  Ltd:  1991),  pp.  14-15.  On  the 
role  of  Soviet  state  participation  in  foreign  companies  see,  William  B.  Simons,  Soviet  Foreign  Trade: 
Economic,  Legal  and  Political  Aspects  in  supra  n.  174,  pp.  270-75. 
-  121- Building  upon  these  developments  in  international  cooperation,  in  the  domestic  sphere  the 
presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  the  USSR  passed  in  1983  the  Edict  "On  the  Procedure  for 
the  Effectuation  of  Activities  on  the  Territory  of  the  USSR  by  Joint  Economic  Organisations 
of  the  USSR  and other  Member  Countries  of  SEV".  "  Three  principal  points  expressed  in  the 
edict  should  be  noted:  first,  these  'Joint  economic  organisations"  were  authorised  to  be 
established  on  the  territory  of  the  USSR;  secondly,  they  operated  broadly  on  the  basis  of 
USSR  legislation  (other  than  as  specifically  provided  for  by  the  applicable  treaties  between  the 
relevant  governments  and  states);  and  finally,  "their"  property  remained  in  the  "common 
socialist  ownership"  of  the  contracting  parties  allocated  to  the  joint  organisation  by  way  of 
"operative  management".  While  this  edict  provided  for  the  possibility  of  the  establishment  of 
joint  ventures  on  the  territory  of  the  USSR  for  the  first  time  since  the  NEP  era  concessions 
and  associations,  they  still  operated  essentially  within  the  confirmation  model  in  that  their 
creation  was  based  upon  the  diktat  of  the  relevant  member  states  and  the  governance  regime 
of  the  confirmation  model  applied  to  their  operation,  including  the  socialist  concept  of 
"operative  management"  and  thereby  continued  the  Soviet  tradition  of  finessing  the  proper  and 
complete  analysis  of  the  concept  of  ownership  interests.  "'  However  this  edict  did  re-open  the 
debate  on  the  structure  of  foreign  trade  and  prepared  the  way  for  the  reform  of  foreign  trade 
institutions  in  1986,  "'  as  well  as  the  introduction  of  joint  enterprise  legislation  in  1987. 
400  0  Poryadke  Osushchestvleniya  Deyatel'nosti  na  Territorii  SSSR  Sovmestnykh  Khozyaistvennykh 
Organizatsii  SSSR  i  Drugikh  Stran  -  Chlenov  SEV,  Vedomosti  SSSR  (1983),  no.  22,  item  330;  confirmed 
by  the  Supreme  Soviet  (Vedomosti  SSSR  (1983),  no.  25,  item  385).  See  N.  V.  Mironov,  Pravovoi  Status 
Sovmestnykh  Kozyaistvennykh  Organizatsii  Stran  -  Chlenov  SEV  na  Territorii  SSSR,  SGiP  (1984),  no.  3, 
p.  43. 
401  See  supra  Chapter  3  on  the  confirmation  model.  Despite  this  initiative  by  Andropov  in  1983,  there  was 
no  attempt  to  move  the  law  on  industrial  organisations  towards  a  more  flexible  contract  based  model. 
Andropov's  brief  tenure  as  General  Secretary  of  the  CPSU  was  more  clearly  identified  with  initiatives 
aimed  at  "strengthening  control  over  and  increasing  responsibility  for  breaches  of  discipline  at 
enterprises"  and  raising  "the  level  of  discipline,  vigilance  and  intolerance"  as  means  of  improving 
productivity.  (Mikhail  Heller  and  Alexandr  Nekrich,  Utopia  in  Power  -  the  History  of  the  Soviet  Union 
from  1917  to  the  Present  (Summit  Books:  1986),  p.  709  and  p.  7  10). 
402  The  reform  of  the  framework  of  foreign  trade  began  in  August  1986  with  the  adoption  of  Decrees  991 
and  992  on  19  August  1986:  0  Merakh  po  Sovershenstvovaniyu.  Upravleniya  Vneshneekonomicheskimi 
Svyazi,  SP  SSSR  (1986),  no.  33,  item  172;  and  0  Merakh  po  Sovershenstvovaniyu  Upravleniya 
Ekonomicheskimi  i  Nauchno-tekhnicheskim  Sotrudnichestvorn  s  Sotsialisticheskimi  Stranami, 
Postanovleniya  (August  1986),  no.  992,  p.  244.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  only  the  very  briefest  of 
extracts  of  these  two  decrees  was  published  in  the  official  SP  SSSR,  and  that  the  chronological  set  of 
decrees  "for  internal  use  only"  omitted  the  text  of  Decree  991  in  its  entirety.  A  very  brief  reference  was 
subsequently  made  in  Izvestiya  (17  August  1986),  p.  1.  The  lack  of  a  complete  published  text  perhaps 
evidenced  the  sensitivity  of  these  first  tentative  reforms.  On  the  reform  of  foreign  relations  law  and 
institutions  generally,  see  William  B.  Simons,  The  Reform  of  Soviet  Foreign  Trade  Through  Perestroika: 
Decentralisation  without  Deregulation,  in  A.  J.  Schmidt  (ed.  ),  The  Impact  of  Perestroika  on  Soviet  Law 
(Kluwer:  1990),  p.  3  87. 
-  122- "Joint  enterprises  iv4O3  were  directly  introduced  into  domestic  Soviet  law  in  January  1987  by 
Decrees  48  and  49  and  by  an  Edict  of  the  Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  passed  on  the 
same  day.  '  Decree  49  defined  joint  enterprises  as  entities  "with  the  participation  of  soviet 
organisations,  and  firms  of  capitalist  and  developing  countries  ...  created  on  the  territory  of  the 
USSR 
...  on  the  basis  of  contracts  concluded  with  the  participants.  ""  Their  purpose  was  to 
facilitate  the  "further  developing  of  trade-economic  and  scientific-technical  cooperation  with 
capitalist  and  developing  countries  on  a  stable  and  mutually-advantageous  basis".  40' 
Decree  49  was  amended  six  times,  most  dramatically  by  Decree  385  of  May  1989.  "  In 
addition  to  these  amendments,  the  legal  regulation  of  joint  enterprises  and  foreign  relations 
law  was  significantly  affected  indirectly  by  the  adoption  of  the  1987  Law  on  Enterprises  and 
the  1990  Ownership  Law,  408  and  more  directly  by  the  1990  FPInvA  and  the  1991  FPForInv. 
The  detail  of  the  law  on  joint  enterprises  was  further  elaborated  in  subordinate  legislation  and 
instructions  of  state  agencies.  "' 
403  Strictly  speaking,  Decrees  48  and  49  distinguished  joint  enterprises,  international  associations  and  joint 
organisations.  The  joint  enterprise  was  the  only  permitted  form  of  association  for  creating  a  Soviet 
juridical  person  with  the  participation  of  firms  from  capitalist  and  developing  countries.  The  international 
association  could  only  be  created  with  member  countries  of  SEV  and  was  used  merely  to  "coordinate"  the 
economic  activity  of  its  participants  generally,  without  the  establishment  of  a  common  property  fund.  The 
joint  organisation  was  also  only  permitted  to  be  created  between  member  countries  of  SEV,  but  by 
contrast,  had  common  property  held  on  the  basis  of  socialist  ownership  and  was  formed  for  the  purpose 
of  research  rather  than  for  economic  activity. 
404  0  Voprosakh,  Svyazannykh  c  Sozdaniem  na  Territorii  SSSR  i  Deyatel'nostyu  Sovmestnykh  Predpriyatii, 
Mezhdunarodykh  Ob"edinenii  i  Organizatsii  s  Uchastiem  Sovetskikh  i  Inostrannykh  Organizatsii,  Firm  i 
Organov  Upravleniya,  Vedomosti  SSSR  (1987),  no.  2,  item  35. 
405  Decree  49,  article  1. 
406  Decree  49,  preamble. 
407  The  relevant  decrees  being:  Ob  Izmenenii  i  Priznanii  Utrativshimi  Silu  Reshenii  Pravitel'stva  SSSR  v 
Svyazi  s  Sovershenstvovaniem  Vneshneekonomicheskoi  Deyatel'nosti,  Postanovleniya  (March  1988), 
no.  352,  p.  238;  Ob  Izmenenii  i  Priznanii  Utrativshimi  Silu  Nekotorykh  Reshenii  Pravitel'stva  SSSR  po 
Voprosam  Vneshneekonomicheskoi  Deyatel'nosti,  Postanovleniya  (May  1989),  no.  385,  p.  11;  Ob 
Izmenenii  i  Priznanii  Utrativshimi  Silu  Nekotorykh  Reshenii  Pravitel'stva.  SSSR  po  Voprosam 
Vneshneekonomicheskoi  Deyatel'nosti,  Postanovleniya  (July  1989),  no.  574,  p.  99;  Ob  Izmenenii 
Utrativshimi  Silu  Reshenii  Pravitel'stva  SSSR  v  Svyazi  s  Zakonom  SSSR  0  Podokhodnom  Naloge  s 
Grazhdan  SSSR,  Inostrannykh  Grazhdan  i  Lits  Bez  Grazhdanstva,  Postanovleniya  (August  1990), 
no.  780,  p.  37;  0  Vnesenii  Izmenenii  i  Priznanii  Utrativshimi  Silu  Nekotorykh  Reshenii  Pravitel'stva 
SSSR  po  Voprosam  Nalogooblozheniya,  Postanovleniya  (September  1990),  no.  884,  p.  5.  In  addition:  0 
Dal'neishem  Razvitii  Vneshneekonomicheskoi  Deyatel'nosti  Gosudarstvnnykh,  Kooperativnykh  i  Inykh 
Obshchestvennykh  Predpriyatii,  Ob''edinenii  i  Organizatsii,  Postanovleniya  (December  1988),  no.  1405, 
p.  93. 
408  See  infra  Chapter  7. 
409  Subordinate  legislative  acts  included  Instruction  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  of  the  USSR  No  224  of  24 
November  1987,0  Poryadke  Registratsii  Sovmestnykh  Predpriyatiyii,  Mezhdunarodnykh  Ob"edinenii  i 
Organizatsii,  Sozdavaemykh  na  Terrritorii  SSSR  s  Uchastiem  Sovetskikh  i  Inostrannykh  Organizatsli, 
-  123- The  framework  of  Soviet  legislation  had  so  developed  since  the  1920s  that  by  1987  it  was 
difficult  to  point  to  any  basic  provision  of  Soviet  law  that  contemplated  specifically  the 
existence  of  "foreign-owned"  Soviet  civil  law  juridical  persons.  Although  the  provisions  of 
Decree  49  broke  new  ground  at  the  level  of  principle,  they  were  not  however  entirely 
inconsistent  with  existing  norms  of  Soviet  law  as  set  out  in  the  USSR  Constitution  and  1961 
FPCivL.  The  Brezhnev  Constitution  was  silent  as  to  the  creation  of  Soviet  juridical  persons  by 
foreign  firms,  and  article  29  actually  provided  for  "cooperation  between  states",  which  was 
then  (re)interpreted  as  permitting  cooperation  by  means  of  joint  enterprise.  The  joint 
enterprise  was  not  mentioned  in  the  original  list  of  permissible  juridical  persons  in  article  11 
of  the  1961  FPCivL;  however  article  11  was  amended  in  1981  by  adding  at  the  end  of  that  list 
the  phrase  "...  and  other  organisations  in  the  instances  provided  by  the  legislation  of  the  USSR 
shall  be  juridical  persons".  "'  As  such,  the  joint  enterprise  as  a  domestic  Soviet  civil  law 
juridical  person  could  conveniently  fall  within  this  catch-all  amendment.  Unfortunately  while 
the  joint  enterprise  could  fall  within  the  catch-all  category  in  the  article  11  list  of  juridical 
persons,  there  was  no  "catch-all"  category  for  the  forms  of  ownership.  As  such,  the 
ownership  regime  of  the  joint  enterprise  was  condemned  to  an  uncertain  civil  law  footing  and 
this  created  an  instability  that  would  eventually  lead  to  a  revaluation  of  the  whole  ownership 
law  regime  in  the  Spring  of  1990. 
5.1  The  Model  of  the  Contract-Based  Concession  Enterprise  -  General  Winciples 
Soviet  law  distinguished  the  branch  of  civil  law,  from  that  of  foreign  relations  law  -  the 
former  related  to  the  internal  economic  monopoly  (regulated  specifically  by  Gosplan  and 
Gossnab)  while  the  latter  related  to  the  external  economic  monopoly  (regulated  specifically  by 
the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade).  This  bifurcated  structure  made  some  sense  in  the  context  of 
the  Soviet  command  economy  and  was  developed  in  response  partly  to  historical,  partly  to 
Firm  i  Organov  Upravleniya;  Instructive  Letter  of  the  Minstry  of  Finance  of  the  USSR  and  Central 
Statistical  Administration  of  the  USSR  No  53/13-09  of  27  February  1987,0  Vedenii  Ucheta  i  Otchetnosti 
na  Sovmestnykh  Predpriyatiyakh,  v  Mezhdunarodnykh  Ob"edineniyakh  i  Organizatsiyakh, 
Sozdavaemykh  na  Territorii  SSSR;  Instruction  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  of  the  USSR  No  124  of  4  May 
1987,0  Nalogooblozhenii  Sovmestnykh  Predpriyatii";  Decree  of  Gossnab  of  USSR  No  74  of  4  June 
1987,  Poryadok  Material'no-Tekhnicheskogo  Snabzheniya  Sovmestnykh  Predpriyatii,  Sozdavaemykh  na 
Territorii  SSSR  s  Uchastiem  Drugikh  Stran  i  Zarubezhnyk  Firm,  i  Sbyta  ikh  Produktsii;  Instruction  of 
the  Ministry  of  Finance  of  the  USSR  No  45-15-1  of  5  June  1987,0  Poryadke  Strakhovaniya 
Imuchshestva  i  Interesov  Sovmestnykh  Prepriyatii  (see  Sovemesmye  Predpfiyatiya,  Sozdanie  i 
Deyatel'nost'  (Lybid':  1990),  p.  7-8). 
410  0  Venesenii  Izmenenii  i  Dopolnenii  v  OsnOvY  Grazhdanskogo  Zakonodatel'stva  Soyuza  SSR  i  Soyuznykh 
Respublik,  Vedomosti  SSSR  (1981),  no.  44,  item  1184.  Corresponding  amendments  were  made  to  the 
union  republic  civil  code  provisions. 
-  124- ideological,  factors.  411  Soviet  law  located  the  joint  enterprise  firmly  within  the  law  of  foreign 
relations;  "'  and  it  was  introduced  in  1987  specifically  as  a  vehicle  for  the  carrying  out  of 
foreign  economic  activities  in  the  tradition  of  the  previous  joint  ventures  with  member 
countries  of  SEV 
. 
4"  The  main  difference  from  the  former  SEV  regime  usually  noted  was  that 
Decree  49  permitted  participants  from  capitalist  and  developing  countries  to  form  joint 
enterprises  whereas  previously  joint  ventures  were  generally  only  permitted  to  be  established 
with  organisations  of  member  countries  of  SEV.  Therefore  many  of  the  legal  theoretical 
debates  surrounding  the  nature  of  joint  enterprise  focused  on  private  international  law 
issues.  414 
The  adoption  of  the  joint  enterprise  into  Soviet  law  and  its  "perceived"  role  must  be 
understood  within  the  context  of  the  perestroika  reforms.  The  entire  legislative  programme  of 
the  early  perestroika  period  broadly  proceeded  on  the  basis  of  existing  categories  and 
branches  of  law,  and  attempted  to  "tinker"  or  amend  them  by  ad  hoc  measures.  There  was 
initially  no  real  attempt  to  reconstruct  Soviet  law  at  the  level  of  principle  and  then  to  enact 
consequential  reform  of  the  positive  law  from  the  top  down.  "'  To  this  extent  the  perestroika 
..................  ...  ----  ..........  111111  -.  11-11-11-.  1-  ........  . ...........  I..  " ....  ......................  11  11  ---  .........  . ..................  ------ 
411  On  the  establishment  of  the  internal  monopoly  see  Robert  Service,  A  History  of  Twentieth  Century  Russia 
(Allen  Lane,  The  Penguin  Press:  1997),  chapter  9;  and  on  the  establishment  of  the  external  monopoly  see 
supra  n.  385. 
412  For  example,  Boguslavskii,  the  Soviet  private  international  law  scholar,  noted  that  joint  enterprises  could 
be  seen  in  three  ways:  (a)  as  a  form  of  international  economic  cooperation;  (b)  as  a  form  of  involving 
foreign  investment;  (c);  as  a  form  of  organising  pertinent  economic  activity:  supra  n.  399,  p.  15.  There 
was  however  no  mention  by  Boguslavskii  of  their  role  in  the  context  of  civil  law  (ie  as  a  "new"  Soviet 
juridical  person).  Consistent  with  this  approach,  Soviet  civil  lawyers  generally  made  little  or  no  mention 
of  joint  enterprises  in  their  treatment  of  article  11  of  the  1961  FPCivL  or  the  development  of  the  Joint- 
stock  society  and  other  industrial  organisations.  For  example,  a  1993  textbook  on  Russian  civil  law 
contained  an  extensive  chapter  on  types  and  classifications  of  juridical  persons  without  any  consideration 
of  the  joint  enterprise  or  juridical  persons  with  foreign  participation.  Where  "economic  associations  of 
juridical  persons"  were  discussed,  the  text  limited  itself  to  domestic  "unions"  and  "concerns"  without 
mentioning  the  possibility  of  forming  "joint  enterprises"  (Grazhdanskoe  Pravo  (Izdatel'stvo  BEK:  1993), 
pp.  86-107).  Examples  of  this  treatment  of  joint  enterprises  in  western  literature  include  supra  n.  34 
(where  joint  enterprises  are  mentioned  in  the  chapter  on  "Foreign  Economic  Relations"  (p.  272)  and  not  in 
the  chapter  on  "Enterprises"  (p.  257)).  For  exception,  noting  the  domestic  law  juridical  status  and 
significance  of  the  joint  enterprise,  see  supra  n.  409,  p.  12  et  seq  and  p.  39  et  seq. 
413  See  N.  N  Vosnesenskaya,  Sovmestnye  Predpriyatiya  s  Uchastiem  Firm  Kapitalisticheskih  i 
Razvivayushchikhsya  Stran  na  Territorii  SSSR,  SGiP  (1988),  no.  1,  p.  117. 
414  Soviet  lawyers  raised  a  number  of  procedural  issues  relating  to  the  constitutive  documents,  especially 
from  the  point  of  view  of  foreign  relations  law.  For  example,  many  Soviet  private  international  lawyers 
argued  that  the  constitutive  contract  of  the  joint  enterprise  was  a  "foreign-trade  transaction"  and  thus  had 
to  be  signed  by  two  signatories  from  each  participant  in  compliance  with  the  established  USSR  foreign 
relations  law  rule  (0  Poryadke  Podpisaniya  Vneshnetorgovykh  Sdelok,  (1978)  Postanovleniya,  no.  122, 
p.  128). 
415  Most  of  the  legislation  of  the  perestroika  period  was  adopted  to  address  a  specific  issue  by  a  specific 
enactment  rather  than  an  attempt  to  develop  and  rationalise  a  new  set  of  legal  principles  consistent 
throughout  all  branches  of  Soviet  law.  For  example,  the  1990  Ownership  Law  was  adopted  to  address  the 
-  125- reforms  resembled  more  the  "common  law"  organic  approach  to  legal  systemic  evolution  as 
416  opposed  to  the  more  holistic  Romanist  civil  law  approach.  Joint  enterprises  were  also 
conceived  narrowly,  introduced  simply  as  part  of  the  reform  of  foreign  relations  law. 
However,  the  joint  enterprise  was  a  foreign  investment  vehicle  with  a  difference  -  it  was  a 
Soviet  juridical  person  and  hence  a  subject  of  Soviet  domestic  civil  law  operating  on  the 
territory  of  the  USSR.  Unfortunately  though,  for  as  long  as  the  Soviet  regime  characterised 
the  joint  enterprise  narrowly  as  a  foreign  investment  vehicle  within  the  law  of  foreign 
relations,  the  place  of  the  joint  enterprise  within  the  Soviet  domestic  economy  and  supply 
system  remained  ambiguous. 
This  Chapter  attempts  to  reposition  the  place  of  the  joint  enterprise  within  the  history  of 
industrial  organisations  in  the  Soviet  Union,  Russia  and  the  other  former  Soviet  republics.  For 
the  significance  of  the  joint  enterprise  is  not  really  to  be  found  by  understanding  it  as  a  foreign 
investment  initiative.  In  summary,  Decree  49  was  the  first  enactment  perhaps  since  the  1920s 
that  contemplated  a  truly  new  model  of  industrial  organisation.  with  an  independent  civil  law 
juridical  personality.  Decree  49  radicalised  the  existing  contract  for  joint  activity,  reviving  its 
role  in  functional  terms  as  initially  contemplated  by  the  simple  partnership  in  the  1922  RSFSR 
Civil  Code 
. 
4"  But  the  gap  between  the  perceived  role  of  the  joint  enterprise  and  its  real 
significance,  between  its  place  within  foreign  relations  law  and  within  domestic  civil  law, 
highlights  its  schizophrenic  nature.  The  joint  enterprise  also  straddled  two  concepts  of  the 
industrial  organisation  and  of  juridical  personality;  for  on  the  one  hand  it  arose  by  virtue  of  a 
"concession"  or  state  authorisation,  while  on  the  other  hand,  its  operations  and  constitutive 
documents  were  based  on  the  civil  law  of  contract. 
In  western  Europe  the  concession  corporation  was  a  product  of,  what  Adam  Smith  called,  the 
mercantile  economy  of  the  late  nineteenth  century.  "'  The  mercantile  economy  was  not 
sufficiently  complex  to  incentivise  large-scale  financings  through  private  capital  without  state 
intervention.  One  way  the  state  encouraged  such  investment  in  key  sectors  of  the  economy 
was  to  grant  the  "privilege"  of  limited  liability  or  a  monopoly  status  upon  associations  of 
question  of  relations  of  ownership  in  Soviet  law,  notwithstanding  its  provisions  were  inconsistent  with  the 
1961  FPCivL  which  never  were  amended.  This  unsatisfactory  situation  was  dealt  with  in  the 
implementing  Decree  which  provided  in  article  2  that  "Until  legislation  of  the  USSR  and  union  republics 
is  brought  into  conformity  with  the  Law  of  the  USSR  "On  Ownership  in  the  USSR",  prevailing  acts  of 
legislation  of  the  USSR  and  union  and  autonomous  republics  shall  apply  insofar  as  they  are  not  contrary 
to  this  Law"  (Vedomosti  SA7D  SSSR  (1990),  no.  11,  item  165). 
416  See,  Gyula  Eorsi,  Comparative  Civil  (Private)  Law  (Akademiai  Kiado:  1979),  p.  542. 
417  Sections  4.1  and  4.2. 
418  See  Adam  Smith,  An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of  Nations,  Book  IV,  chapters  I 
and  VIH,  in  particular  with  reference  to  the  status  of  the  East  India  Company. 
-126- investors.  This  privilege  however  would  not  be  granted  without  a  price,  and  the  price  was  that 
such  association  would  only  be  "permit-ted"  to  carry  out  a  specifically  agreed  list  of  activities 
that  ensured  the  development  of  these  key  sectors  of  the  economy  in  the  mutual  interests  of 
the  state  and  the  investors. 
This  concept  of  the  mercantile  concession  corporation  provides  a  rationale  for  the  pre- 
revolutionary  Tsarist  corporations.  Under  the  Russian  legislation  of  1836,  corporate  status 
was  granted  as  a  privilege  and  each  charter  was  negotiated  and  agreed  with  the  state  on  a  case 
by  case  basis  and  then  adopted  as  a  legislative  state  act.  As  has  been  described,  for  similar 
reasons,  the  Soviet  regime  itself  flirted  with  the  concept  of  the  concession  in  the  early  1920s. 
In  1987  the  joint  enterprise  reintroduced  the  concept  of  the  concession:  this  time  the  privilege 
of  juridical  status  was  granted  in  order  to  encourage  foreign  capital  to  be  invested  in  "further 
developing  of  trade-economic  and  scientific-technical  cooperation  ...  on  a  stable  and  mutually 
advantageous  basis" 
. 
419  The  concession  approach  was  noted  by  Boguslavskii:  "Western 
countries  have  introduced  the  normative  method  of  founding  enterprises  ...  without  prior 
permission,  while  the  USSR  has  adopted  the  authorisation  method.  v1420 
The  concession  introduced  by  Decree  49  should  be  understood  as  a  grant  to  specific  non- 
Soviet  organisations  of  the  right  to  form  a  joint  enterprise  with  a  Soviet  organisation  for 
specific  purposes  (as  requested  in  the  application,  enshrined  in  the  charter  and  agreed  by  the 
state).  In  this  way,  the  Decree  49  concession  gave  rise  to  a  new  subject  of  civil  law  owned  by 
third  parties,  and  therefore,  most  significantly,  introduced  an  exception  to  the  principle  of 
state  ownership  of  the  means  of  production.  It  was  not  intended  however  to  create  an 
exception  to  state  control  over  the  operation  of  the  macro  economy  generally  nor  over  state 
monopolies  in  the  micro  economy  (such  as  banking  and  insurance  activities). 
The  differences  between  the  confirmation  model  and  the  contract-based  concession  model  can 
best  be  elaborated  by  using  the  prism  of  "interests":  the  former  organisation  is  an  arena  for 
the  elaboration  of  a  single  interest  (that  of  the  state),  whereas  the  latter  is  an  arena  for  the 
regulation  and  balancing  of  three  separate  interests  (that  of  the  state,  the  founders  and  the 
management). 
The  confirmation  model  contemplates  an  organisation  formed  on  the  basis  of  a  single  interest. 
This  therefore  enables  the  blurring  of  ownership  relations,  management  functions  and 
governance:  the  state  is  at  the  same  time  the  creator-owner  of  the  enterprise;  the  property- 
419  Decree  49,  preamble. 
420  Supra  n.  399,  p-20. 
-127- owner  of  the  property  "allocated  to"  the  enterprise;  and  legal  and  economic  sovereign  . 
42  '  As 
such,  in  the  confirmation  enterprise,  there  is  no  conflict  between  different  interests  in  the 
ownership  structure  of  the  enterprise,  for  the  state  is  the  only  owner;  no  conflict  over  the 
property  of  the  enterprise,  for  the  state  is  the  only  owner  of  its  property  (allocated  by  way  of 
operative  management);  no  conflict  between  rights  to  profits,  for  the  state,  being  the  sole 
owner  of  the  enterprise,  had  no  need  to  share  the  profits  with  another  party;...  and  finally  no 
conflict  in  management,  for  management  was  based  on  the  principle  of  one-man  management. 
The  sole  function  of  the  governance  regime  therefore  was  to  align  the  activities  of  this 
centralised  management  structure  with  that  of  the  state. 
The  contract-based  concession  model  is  marked  by  a  retreat  by  the  state  from  its  role  as  direct 
creator-owner  and  perhaps  also  from  its  role  as  property-owner.  The  analytical  framework 
comprising  the  contract-based  concession  model  is  built  upon  this  change  in  role  and  a 
rationale  based  on  the  concept  of  "concession"  and  the  implicit  admission  in  Decree  49  that 
the  Soviet  state  needed  to  attract  "foreign  techniques"  into  the  Soviet  economy  to  ensure  its 
continued  development 
. 
42'  As  such,  the  Soviet  state  had  to  ensure  that  joint  enterprises  only 
carried  out  operations  that  would  be  beneficial  to  the  Soviet  economy  and  hence  only  these 
joint  enterprises  would  be  permitted  to  be  established.  Unfortunately  the  Soviet  state  could  not 
on  an  on-going  basis  monitor  and  direct  their  operations  through  the  confirmation  model 
governance  regime  or  through  the  confirmation  model  ownership  regime  because  the  Soviet 
state  was  no  longer  the  direct  or  sole  creator  and  was  no  longer  the  owner  of  all  of  their 
property. 
The  state  therefore  had  to  rely  in  the  first  instance  upon  its  remaining  role  as  sovereign,  both 
economic  and  legal.  This  was  effected  by  using  three  principal  techniques:  first  by  specifying 
in  the  legislation  a  detailed  authorisation  procedure  and  thereby  directly  controlling  which 
joint  enterprises  were  permitted  to  be  established  and  for  what  specific  purposes;  secondly  by 
using  its  role  as  legal  sovereign  to  provide  for  mandatory  legal  rules  that  were  required  to  be 
complied  with  as  a  matter  of  law;  and  thirdly  by  using  its  role  as  economic  sovereign:  joint 
enterprises  operated  within  the  wider  Soviet  domestic  economy  that  was  otherwise  ultimately 
421  Supra  Section  3.4. 
422  Indeed  there  was  no  real  concept  at  all  of  "profit"  in  Soviet  economics. 
423  The  grounds  for  authorising  the  registration  of  a  joint  enterprise  are  considered  further  in  Section  5.2.1 
below. 
-  128- owned  and  controlled  by  one  owner,  the  Soviet  state;  and  therefore  their  activities  could  be 
limited  by  virtue  of  the  exogenous  economic  forces  of  that  wider  state  controlled  economy.  "' 
State  control  was  also  effected  indirectly  in  cases  where  the  Soviet  participant  was  state 
owned.  In  these  circumstances,  the  state  retained  influence  indirectly  as  creator-owner, 
through  its  ownership  of  the  Soviet  participant,  and  as  property-owner  because  it  most 
probably  retained  ownership  of  the  property  contributed  to  the  joint  enterprise  by  the  Soviet 
participant.  "' 
Although  the  need  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  state  was  perhaps  inherent  in  the 
concessionary  nature  of  the  joint  enterprises,  the  state  still  had  to  provide  the  appropriate 
conditions  in  the  legislation  to  encourage  the  submission  by  foreign  persons  of  applications  to 
set  up  joint  enterprises.  The  principal  inducement  offered  was  the  grant  of  the  right  of 
juridical  personality  and  the  right  to  operate  its  activities  within  the  Soviet  domestic  economy 
but  outside  the  scope  of  planning  instructions.  Once  established,  the  protection  of  the  interests 
of  the  participants  (Soviet  and  foreign)  as  between  themselves  was  ensured  by  the  provisions 
of  the  constitutive  (or  founding)  contract  which  set  out  their  mutual  rights  and  responsibilities. 
More  generally,  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  participants  as  against  the  directorate,  due 
to  the  separation  of  ownership  from  control,  was  ensured  by  the  governance  regime  outlined 
in  the  charter. 
The  elements  of  the  contract-based  concession  model  can  therefore  be  summarised  as  follows: 
Protection  of  the  interests  of  the  state  through: 
control  over  purposes:  the  authorisation  procedure. 
control  over  activities:  the  constitutive  documents,  the  ultra  vires  rule 
and  other  techniques. 
mandatory  requirements  and  economic  sovereignty 
indirect  control  through  ownership  of  the  Soviet  participant. 
Inducement  -  the  nature  of  the  concession: 
juridical  personality  within  the  framework  of  civil  law. 
"full"  khozraschet,  non-subsidy  and  self-financing  and  operating 
outside  the  state  plan. 
charter  privileges. 
dispute  resolution. 
424  This  aspect  of  the  contract-based  concession  model  has  certain  similarities  with  the  second  expression  of 
the  participation  model  (infra  Section  6-4) 
-129- Governance  -  the  regulation  and  protection  of  the  interests  of  the  participants 
and  the  directorate: 
the  constitutive  contracts. 
the  property  regime. 
the  operation  of  the  board  and  the  directorate,  and  the  governance 
regime. 
Each  of  the  above  features  of  the  contract-based  concession  enterprise  are  elaborated  and 
analysed  in  the  subsequent  Sections  of  this  Chapter.  The  term  "enterprise"  however  is  still 
retained  for  this  model.  Despite  the  explosion  of  interests  in  the  contract-based  concession 
model  and  its  resulting  differences  from  the  confirmation  model,  there  still  remained  one  basic 
theoretical  and  fundamental  similarity.  Both  the  state  enterprise  and  the  joint  enterprise  were 
organisations  that  were  defined  not  by  reference  to  ownership  interests  that  characterised  the 
"nature"  of  the  specific  juridical  person  (or  otherwise),  but  by  reference  to  the  identity  of  their 
owners:  state  enterprises  were  defined  by  reference  to  their  ownership  by  the  state,  and  joint 
enterprises  were  defined  by  reference  to  being  owned  jointly  by  Soviet  and  foreign 
participants.  Soviet  legislation  and  principle  classified  and  analysed  these  vehicles  not  in  terms 
of  the  specific  nature  of  ownership  interests,  nor  in  terms  of  function,  nor  in  terms  of  a 
governance  regime,  but  in  terms  of  forms  of  ownership.  The  traditional  Soviet  link  between 
the  nature  of  juridical  personality  and  the  nature  or  identity  of  its  owner,  dating  back  to  the 
works  of  Venediktov,  still  remained.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  this  model  has  been  called  "the 
contract-based  concession  enterprise".  As  will  be  argued  later  in  this  study,  the  concept  of 
corporate  status  can  only  arise  within  the  framework  of  ownership  interests  that  facilitates  a 
liquid  market  for  investment  equity  and  a  precise  understanding  of  the  mutual  property  and 
contractual  rights  and  obligations  between  owners  and  the  judicial  person.  In  this  way,  the 
classification  of  the  juridical  person  would  be  elaborated  by  reference,  not  to  the  identity  of 
the  owners  (based  on  forms  of  ownership),  but  by  reference  to  the  rights  and  obligations  that 
are  associated  with  the  specific  ownership  interests  issued  by 
it.  426 
Nevertheless,  the  contract-based  concession  model  represents  the  first  step  in  the  later  Soviet 
period  towards  the  development  of  the  corporation.  The  significance  of  the  joint  enterprise 
therefore  lies  not  in  the  fact  that  it  contributed  to  the  erosion  of  the  state  monopoly  of  foreign 
trade,  which  it  surely  did;  nor  in  the  fact  that  it  was  the  first  time  since  the  1920s  that  Soviet 
organisations  could  form  vehicles  with  participants  from  capitalist  countries  on  the  territory  of 
the  Soviet  Union;  which  it  surely  was.  It  is  argued  that  the  "real"  significance  of  the  joint 
425  Infra  Section  5.4.2. 
426  Infra  Section  7.2. 
-  130- enterprise  was  that  it  gave  rise  to  a  new  domestic  juridical  person  and  a  new  subject  of  civil 
law  conceived  within  the  contract-based  concession  model  and  that  the  future  development  of 
Soviet  and  Russian  "corporate"  law  was  built  upon  the  path  cleared  thereby. 
5.2  Protection  of  the  Interests  of  the  State 
As  has  been  argued,  the  introduction  of  a  juridical  person  not  wholly  owned  by  the  state 
entailed  a  reorientation  of  the  techniques  by  which  the  state  had  traditionally  controlled  its 
confirmation  enterprises.  As  its  roles  as  "creator"  and  "property  owner"  were  by  definition 
curtailed,  the  state  had  to  focus  on  its  remaining  role  as  "sovereign".  This  necessitated  an 
elevation  of  the  importance  of  law,  for  law  is  the  primary  tool  by  which  a  sovereign  seeks  to 
protect  its  position;  and  also  an  elevation  of  the  importance  of  maintaining  control  over  the 
planned  economy,  for  this  was  the  principal  method  by  which  an  economic  sovereign 
maintains  its  hegemonic  position  in  the  wider  economy. 
The  protection  of  the  interests  of  the  state  in  the  contract-based  concession  model  are 
therefore  effected  by  way  of  an  elaborate  authorisation  procedure  and  legislative  determinants 
generally  which  provided  both  mandatory  requirements  and ensured  the  continuance  of  state 
monopolies. 
5.2.1  Control  over  Purposes  -  The  Authorisation  Procedure 
The  purposes  for  which  a  joint  enterprise  was  created  was  central  to  the  permit-ting  process. 
The  state  would  only  grant  the  concession  of  juridical  personality  to  an  association  of  founders 
where  there  was  a  co-incidence  of  interest  between  the  founders  of  the  joint  enterprise  and  the 
state.  The  preamble  to  Decree  49  provided  explicitly  that  joint  enterprises  were  to  be  admitted 
into  the  framework  of  Soviet  civil  law  "for  the  purpose  of  further  developing  of  trade- 
economic  and  scientific-technical  cooperation  with  capitalist  and  developing  countries  on  a 
stable  and  mutually-advantageous  basis".  Article  3  additionally  provided  that  Ministries,  when 
evaluating  the  possibility  for  the  creation  of  joint  enterprises  by  Soviet  participant  enterprises 
within  their  control,  should  ensure  that  the  proposed  joint  enterprises  facilitated  "the  ftiller 
satisfaction  of  the  needs  of  the  country  for  specific  types  of  industrial  products,  raw  materials, 
foodstuffs,  attraction  to  the  national  economy  of  the  USSR  of  progressive  foreign  techniques 
and  technology,  management  expertise,  additional  material  and  financial  resources,  the 
development  of  the  export  base  of  the  country  and  the  reduction  of  irrational  imports".  By 
reading  Decree  49  one  gets  an  immediate  sense  of  the  realisation  by  the  Soviet  regime  that 
autarky  within  the  socialist  world  was  chimerical  and  there  was  a  "real  need"  for  "foreign 
-  131  - techniques"  to  be  introduced  into  the  Soviet  economy,  provided  that  those  techniques  could  be 
introduced  in  a  controlled  manner. 
427 
With  the  general  interests  of  the  Soviet  state  stated  clearly  in  Decree  49,  the  legislation  went 
on  to  provide  a  framework  for  ensuring  that  those  interests  were  protected.  Initially  this  was 
achieved  through  the  authorisation  process.  The  first  redaction  of  Decree  49  provided  that  the 
USSR  Council  of  Ministers  (ie  the  government)  had  to  approve  the  creation  of  each  joint 
enterprise.  428  in  a  move  that  echoed  the  requirement  for  the  approval  of  the  Tsar  of  each 
charter  of  pre-revolutionary  joint-stock  societies,  429  the  involvement  of  the  government  of  the 
country  in  the  permitting  process  illustrated  the  exceptional  nature  of  the  joint  enterprise  and  a 
general  wariness  of  allowing  the  creation  of  spontaneous  formations  without  careful 
consideration  of  the  merits  on  a  case-by-case  basis. 
More  generally  Decree  49  provided  a  four  stage  formation  process:  application,  approval, 
consent  and  registration  . 
430  The  proposal  for  the  creation  of  the  joint  enterprise,  together  with 
the  feasibility  study  ("TEO"),  431  and  draft  constitutive  documents  had  to  be  submitted  by  the 
Soviet  party  to  the  relevant  Ministry  and  state agencies  to  which  it  was  affiliated  for  their 
approval.  The  TEO  was  particularly  significant  as  it  was  the  document  that  set  out  the 
rationale  for  the  creation  of  the  joint  enterprise,  implicitly  making  the  argument  that  its 
activities  would  fall  within  those  areas  of  activity  that  the  Soviet  state  and  economy  needed 
foreign  techniques  to  develop 
. 
43'  After  approval  by  the  relevant  Ministry,  the  consent  of  the 
USSR  government  was  sought.  Finally,  the  constitutive  documents  had  to  be  registered  at  the 
USSR  Ministry  of  Finance  and  then  published  in  the  press.  433 
427  The  "necessity"  of  attracting  foreign  capital  into  the  Soviet  economic  system  was  noted  at  the  27' 
Communist  Party  Congress  in  1986:  "in  modern  times  there  is  no  alternative  to  cooperation  and  mutual- 
assistance  between  all  states.  In  this  manner,  objective  ...  conditions  arose  in  which  the  conflict  between 
capitalism  and  socialism  may  continue  only  exclusively  through  the  forms  of  peaceful  competition  and 
peaceful"  (Materialy  XXVII  S  "ezda  Kommunisticheskoi  Partii  Sovetskogo  Soyuza  (Polizdat:  1986),  p.  65). 
428  Decree  49,  article  2. 
429  Thomas  C.  Owen,  The  Corporation  under  Russian  Law,  1800-1917,  A  Study  in  Ysarist  Economic  Policy 
(Cambridge  University  Press:  199  1),  p  . 
23. 
430  On  the  registration  procedure  see,  N.  N.  Voznesenskaya,  Sovmestnye  Predpriyatiya  kak  Forma 
Mezhdunarodnogo  Ekonomicheskogo  Sotrudnichestva  (Nauka:  1989),  pp.  214-219. 
431  See  G.  D.  Golubov  (ed.  ),  Joint  Ventures  and  International  Associations  in  the  USSR  (Intershelf:  1989), 
p.  24-28. 
432  On  the  drawing  up  of  the  TEO,  see  supra  n.  397,  pp.  43-49. 
433  Decree  49,  article  9.  The  fact  that  a  notice  of  the  registration  of  each  joint  enterprise  had  to  be  published 
in  the  national  press  illustrated  again  how  they  were  originally  conceived  as  entities  authorised  on  an 
occasional  basis  with  a  unique  and  exceptional  role  to  play. 
-132- Decree  49  provided  few  guidelines  on  the  criteria  and  procedure  for  the  granting  of 
permission.  Perhaps  some  of  the  detail  was  set  out  in  the  "secret"  provisions  of  article  3. 
Subsidiary  enactments  elaborated  little  further.  Of  particular  importance  was  the  November 
1987  Instruction  of  the  USSR  Ministry  of  Finance  on  the  registration  procedure.  434  The 
Instruction  provided  that  the  USSR  Ministry  of  Finance  had  the  right  to  halt  or  refuse 
registration  "in  the  instances  where  the  documents  submitted  do  not  conform  to  USSR 
legislation  on  the  creation  and  activities  in  the  USSR  of  joint  enterprises...  ".  Once  again  the 
relevant  Ministry  was  directed  to  ensure  that  before  a  joint  enterprise  was  authorised  to  be 
created,  its  purposes  had  to  be  in  the  interests  of  the  Soviet  state. 
The  exceptional  nature  of  the  joint  enterprise  is  best  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  by  October 
1987  only  12  joint  enterprises  had  been  registered,  and  by  January  1988  this  figure  increased 
to  only  23 
. 
43'  The  joint  enterprise  was  truly  regarded  as  a  concession,  permitted  to  be  created 
after  much  consideration  within  the  Soviet  polity  and  this  no  doubt  was  partly  due  to  an 
acknowledgement  that  once  a  permission  had  been  granted,  the  mechanisms  available  to  the 
Soviet  state  to  control  their  activities  on  an  on-going  basis  were  much  more  limited  than  in  the 
case  of  the  confirmation  state  enterprises. 
Although  the  permitting  process  continued  to  ensure  that  the  purpose  of  any  joint  enterprise 
was  in  the  interests  of  the  Soviet  state,  over  time,  the  relevant  authorising  state  entity  became 
more  devolved.  Decree  1074  of  September  1987  already  provided  that  "Ministries  and 
agencies  of  the  USSR  and  Councils  of  Ministers  of  the  union  republics  shall  be  granted  the 
right  to  autonomously  adopt  decisions  regarding  questions  of  creation  of  joint  enterprises  with 
capitalist  and  developing  countries".  43'  This  position  was  formally  changed  by  an  amendment 
to  article  2  of  Decree  49  by  Decree  352  in  March  1988  and  then  by  Decree  385  in  May  1989 
which  substituted  the  requirement  for  the  consent  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  (ie  government) 
of  the  USSR  for  the  establishment  of  a  joint  enterprise  for  the  consent  of  the  relevant  superior 
agency  of  administration  . 
43'  As  the  perestroika  reforms  deepened,  a  less  cautious  approach 
was  taken  to  registration  and  the  presence  of  foreign  capital  in  the  Soviet  economy;  and  by 
.  .................  . ..  --  111.1  . ..............  -  -.  1.1  -  111.11.1  .............  ----  .............  ----  ....  .---  ----------  -  -----  ....  .  ......  ..........  ..... 
434  0  Poryadke  Registratsii  Sovmestnykh  Predpriyatii,  Mezhdunarodykh  Ob"edinenii  i  Organizatsii, 
Sovdavaemykh  na  Territorii  SSSR  s  Uchastiem  Sovetskikh  i  inostrannykh  Organizatsii  Firm  i  Organov 
Upravleniya;  supra  n.  397,  p.  386. 
435  Supra  397,  p.  5- 
436  0  Dopolnitel'nykh  Merakh  po  Sovershenstvovaniyu  Vneshneekonomichesoi  Deyatel'nosti  v  Novykh 
Usloviyakh  Khozyaistvovaniya,  Postanovleniya  (September  1987),  no.  1074,  p.  222,  article  6.  See  also  0 
Del'neishern  Razvitii  Vneshneekonomichesoi  Deyatel'nosti  Gosudarstvennykh,  Kooperativnykh  i  Inykh 
Obshchestvennykh  Predpriyatii,  Ob"edinenii  i  Organizatsh,  Postanovleniya  (December  1988),  no.  1405, 
p.  93. 
437  Supra  n.  407. 
-  133  - mid-1991  more  than  3,000  joint  enterprises  were  registered.  438  However,  although  more  joint 
enterprises  were  permitted  and  although  the  authorising  procedure  as  originally  set  out  in 
Decree  49  had  been  substantially  modified,  the  basic  concept  of  the  "concession"  remained. 
5.2.2  Control  over  Activities  -  Constitutive  Documents,  Utra  Vires  and  Other  Techniques 
The  authorisation  process  ensured  that  the  founders  were  required  to  detail  clearly  the  purpose 
for  the  creation  of  the  proposed  joint  enterprise  in  the  TEO.  This  provided  the  state  with  the 
opportunity  to  evaluate  the  proposed  purpose  and  to  decide  whether  such  a  joint  enterprise 
would  be  advantageous  in  light  of  the  objective  requirements  of  the  Soviet  economy. 
Once  authorised  the  state  had  to  devise  a  mechanism  to  ensure  that  the  joint  enterprise's  on- 
going  activities  continued  to  be  based  on  the  approved  purposes.  For  reasons  already  outlined, 
this  had  to  be  achieved  primarily  through  law  and  the  state's  role  as  sovereign,  and  was 
effected  by  requiring  the  constitutive  documents  of  the  joint  enterprise  to  include  a  statement 
of  the  purposes  of  activity  and  then  by  relying  on  the  Soviet  law  of  vires. 
Therefore,  in  addition  to  evaluating  the  TEO  generally,  the  approval  process  included  a 
consideration  of  the  draft  "constitutive  documents".  Decree  49  provided  that  the  constitutive 
documents  were  "the  contract  creating  the  enterprise"  (or  constitutive  contract)  and  "the 
charter"  . 
43'  There  were  few  references  to  the  constitutive  contract  in  Decree  49  and  it  was  not 
explicitly  required  by  the  legislation.  However,  in  practice,  most  joint  enterprises  had  a  short 
form  constitutive  contract  (in  addition  to  a  charter)  setting  out  the  basic  commercial  terms  of 
the  joint  activity  between  the  participants.  440  By  contrast,  Decree  49  provided  that  "a  joint 
enterprise  must  have  a  charter  ... 
[which]  shall  determine"  and  set  out  the  subject  and  purpose 
of  the  activities  of  the  enterprise;  its  location;  the  composition  of  the  participants;  the  amount 
of  the  charter  fund;  the  amount  of  the  participatory  shares  of  the  participants;  the  procedure 
for  forming  the  charter  fund  (including  in  foreign  currency);  the  structure,  composition  and 
competence  of  the  organs  of  management  of  the  enterprise;  the  procedure  for  the  adoption  of 
resolutions  and  the  questions  for  which  a  unanimous  decision  is  required;  the  procedure  for 
liquidation  of  the  enterprise;  and  other  provisions  not  contrary  to  Soviet  legislation  and 
relating  to  the  peculiarities  of  the  joint  enterprise.  " 
438  Supra  n.  399,  p-11. 
439  Decree  49,  article  8. 
40  For  a  history  of  the  use  of  the  constitutive  contract  in  Soviet  domestic  associations  before  and  after  the 
joint  enterprise  legislation  see  N.  V.  Kozlova,  Uchre&tel'nyi  Dogovor  o  Sozdanii  Kommercheskikh 
Obshchestv  i  Tovatishchestv  (Izdatel'stvo  BEK:  1994),  pp.  5-23. 
441  Decree  49,  article  7. 
-  134- Soviet  legal  textbooks  elaborated  on  the  kinds  of  provisions  that  should  have  been  included  in 
the  charter;  most  of  which  were  drawn  from  the  charters  of  the  former  joint  economic 
organisations  established  pursuant  to  international  treaties  with  countries  of  SEV.  A  Model 
Constitutive  Contract  and  Charter  for  a  joint  enterprise  were  exan-dned  and  approved  by  the 
State  Foreign-Economic  Commission  of  the  USSR  Council  of  Ministers  for  use  by  ministries 
and  agencies.  "  The  importance  of  these  Models  lay  far  beyond  their  substantive  provisions. 
Previously  "model  statutes"  did  exist  for  state  enterprises,  "  however  these  were  obligatory 
documents  for  use  in  connection  with  enterprises  operating  in  specific  sectors.  By  contrast,  the 
joint  enterprise  Model  Charter  represented  a  move  towards  a  state  approved  form  of 
"precedent  document"  which  was  a  starting  point  for  negotiation.  In  this  way,  the  joint 
enterprise  legislation  built  on  the  existing  legal  permissive  regime  for  the  contract  of  joint 
activity'  and  began  to  erode  the  concept  of  mandatory  state  dictated  enterprise  law  towards  a 
more  flexible  contract  based  approach,  setting  out  certain  default  rules. 
Of  particular  importance  in  the  charter  was  the  purpose  clause.  It  was  derived  from  the  TEO 
and  would  have  been  subject  to  careful  scrutiny  through  the  authorisation  procedure.  Its 
importance  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  provided  the  linchpin  for  the  future  control  or  monitoring  by 
the  state  over  the  activities  of  the  joint  enterprise  by  virtue  of  the  operation  of  the  general  law 
on  vires.  Due  to  its  status  as  a  Soviet  civil  law  juridical  person,  those  articles  of  the  civil 
codes  relating  to  the  vires  of  juridical  persons  in  general  also  applied  to  joint  enterprises.  "' 
The  state  as  legal  sovereign  bolstered  this  general  position  by  further  providing  in  Decree  49 
specifically  that  "a  joint  enterprise  may  be  liquidated 
... 
if  its  activities  do  not  correspond  to  the 
purposes  and  tasks  provided  in  those  [constitutive]  documents".  "  As  has  been  described,  the 
question  of  vires  was  determined  by  reference  to  the  specified  purpose  of  activities  rather  than 
through  an  elaboration  and  listing  of  individual  rights.  The  purpose  could  not  have  been  stated 
to  be  "universal  (unlimited)",  and  acts  done  contrary  to  the  stated  purposes  could  be  deemed 
void. 
While  the  state  principally  relied  upon  the  ultra  vires  rule  as  a  method  for  ringfencing  the 
activities  of  the  joint  enterprise,  it  did  retain,  albeit  in  a  reduced  capacity,  some  of  its 
"traditional  Soviet"  governance  techniques.  Three  particular  governance  techniques  were 
important.  First,  the  state  as  owner  of  the  Soviet  participant  had  an  indirect  control  over  the 
442  Supra  n.  397,  pp.  487-504. 
443  Supra  n.  273  and  associated  text. 
4U  Supra  n.  336. 
445  Supra,  Section  3.4.1. 
446  Decree  49,  article  51. 
-  135- day-to-day  activities  of  the  joint  enterprise  to  the  extent  that  the  Soviet  participant  was,  or  was 
required  by  legislation,  to  be  involved  in  those  operations.  44'  Secondly,  the  state  arguably 
retained  the  right  of  ownership  over  certain  property  of  the  joint  enterprise.  While  the  joint 
enterprise  created  a  new  subject  of  civil  law,  it  was  not  intended  to  challenge  the  existing  law 
on  ownership  and  in  particular  the  extent  of  state  ownership  of  the  means  of  production 
generally.  As  such,  the  use  of  state  property  would  have  been  restricted  by  its  "designation" 
prior  to  its  allocation  to  the  operative  management  of  the  Soviet  participant  and  these 
restrictions  should  have  continued  to  have  applied  upon  the  contribution  of  such  property  by 
the  Soviet  participant  to  the  joint  enterprise.  448  Indeed  article  15  of  Decree  49  hinted  at  the 
basic  governance  techniques  of  vires  and  property  "designation"  by  providing  that  "the  joint 
enterprise  shall  carry  out  in  agreement  with  Soviet  legislation  the  possession,  use  and  disposal 
of  its  property  in  accordance  with  the  purposes  of  its  activity  and  the  designation  of  its 
property"  [emphasis  added].  This  statement  in  Decree  49  also  illustrated  a  third  technique  - 
legal  diktat. 
5.2.3  Mandatory  Requirements  and  Economic  Sovereignty 
As  the  joint  enterprise  was  the  first  non-state  owned  industrial  organisation  introduced  into  the 
economy  since  the  late  1920s,  it  had  the  capacity  to  undermine  the  state's  existing  economic 
sovereignty  effected  by  way  of  state  planning.  Furthermore,  it  represented  an  anomaly  in  an 
economy  that  was  otherwise  wholly  owned  by  the  state.  Clearly  therefore  the  interaction 
between  the  joint  enterprise  and  the  wider  Soviet  economy,  both  in  terms  of  theory  and  in 
terms  of  practice,  was  a  critical  issue  for  the  founders.  While  the  joint  enterprise  was  to  be 
exempt  from  mandatory  planning  instructions,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  Decree  49  was  not 
intended  to  provide  a  bridgehead  for  the  gradual  erosion  of  state  ownership  of  all  of  the  means 
of  production  or  of  state  control  over  the  other  actors  within  that  economy.  As  a  practical 
matter,  state  control  over  the  wider  economy  did  of  course  raise  concerns  for  the  founders, 
such  as  their  ability  to  access  raw  materials  within,  and  sell  their  production  to,  the  domestic 
Soviet  "market" 
. 
449 
In  Decree  49  and  other  ancillary  legislation,  the  Soviet  state  used  its  role  as  legal  sovereign  to 
impose  mandatory  legal  requirements  to  ensure  that  it  maintained  its  position  as  economic 
sovereign  and  had  a  continuing  role  in  monitoring  and  controlling  the  activities  of  the  joint 
.............  .  ..............  --.  1-1111,  ..........  --  ....  . ......  -  --  .  ........  - ...  . ..........  ............  ---  .........  .......  ......  1111,  .  ......  11.11I.  -I--ý  ---  .  ......  .......... 
447  The  rights  of  the  Soviet  participant  as  set  out  in  Decree  49  are  considered  in  more  detail  infra  Section 
5.2.4  below. 
448  The  property  regime  of  joint  enterprises  is  considered  in  more  detail  infra  Section  5.4.2. 
449  See  infra  Section  5.3.2. 
-  136- enterprise.  Decree  49  did  not  however  explicitly  acknowledge  the  need  to  regulate  the  detail 
of  the  relationship  between  the  joint  enterprise  and  the  wider  Soviet  economy  nor  the  fact  that 
it  was  intended  that  the  state  monopoly  in  all  branches  of  the  industrial  economy  would  be 
maintained  notwithstanding  the  presence  of  non-state  owned  joint  enterprises.  It  is  probable 
that  this  lack  of  express  acknowledgement  in  the  legislation  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  joint 
enterprise  was  introduced  and  characterised  as  a  feature  of  foreign  relations  law,  and 
extensive  provisions  relating  to  its  relationship  within  the  domestic  economy  would  have  made 
it  more  difficult  for  legislators  to  have  finessed  its  "real"  significance  as  a  domestic  Soviet 
juridical  person  and  as  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  of  state  ownership  of  the  means  of 
production.  Furthermore,  it  is  unlikely  that  in  1987  the  Soviet  polity  was  sure  of  exactly  how 
the  joint  enterprise  was  intended  to  operate  as  a  general  matter  within  an  otherwise  command 
economy. 
Although  there  was  no  express  regulation  of  the  relationship  between  the  joint  enterprise  and 
the  wider  Soviet  economy  in  a  specific  section  of  the  decree,  Decree  49  did  contain  a  number 
of  relevant  provisions  that  were  scattered  throughout  the  enactment  that  addressed  the  question 
of  the  preservation  of  the  state's  monopolies  generally  and  the  state's  ability  to  monitor  and 
thereby  control  any  activities  of  the  joint  enterprises.  450 
Preservation  of  the  state  monopoly  of  banking  operations  and general  monitoring  and  control 
over  the  assets  and  responsibilities  of  joint  enterprises  was  ensured  by  the  terms  of  articles  27- 
29  of  Decree  49.  These  provisions  required  cash  assets  of  a  joint  enterprise  to  be  deposited  in 
a  ruble  or  currency  account  with  the  State  Bank  of  the  USSR  or  the  Foreign  Trade  Bank  of  the 
USSR,  and  then  gave  the  state  the  right  to  have  direct  access  to  information  relating  to  the 
accounts  of  the  joint  enterprise  and  the  right  to  effect  control  over  its  use  and  repayment  of 
loans. 
Article  45  went  on  to  require  that  the  joint  enterprise  keep  operational,  bookkeeping  and 
statistical  records  in  the  procedure  prevailing  in  the  USSR  for  Soviet  state  enterprises  and  that 
"the  forms  for  such  records  and reports  shall  be  confirmed  by  the  USSR  Ministry  of  Finance 
jointly  with  the  Central  Statistical  Administration  of  the  USSR.  "  The  article  then  explicitly 
noted  that  breach  of  these  bookkeeping  and  filing  requirements  would  lead  to  "responsibility 
in  accordance  with  Soviet  legislation.  "  Further  monitoring  was  provided  for  by  article  38 
which  stated  that  financial  agencies  shall  have  the  right  to  verify  the  correctness  of  the 
calculation  of  tax  by  joint  enterprises. 
...........  . 
450  These  are  also  ftirther  considered  infra  Section  5.3.2. 
-  137- In  terms  of  general  operations  and  its  nexus  with  the  state  plan  and  ancillary  monopolies, 
Decree  49  reminded  the  participants  in  various  different  places  of  the  need  to  obtain  the 
relevant  consents:  imports  and  exports  could  only  be  carried  out  "on  the  basis  of 
authorisations  issued  in  the  procedure  established  by  legislation  of  the  USSR"  ;  451  the  building 
of  plants  and  installations  "shall  be  subject  to  consent  in  the  procedure  established  by  the  State 
Construction  Committee  of  the  USSR";  452  and  "carriage  of  goods  of  joint  enterprises  shall  be 
effectuated  in  the  procedure  established  for  Soviet  organisations".  453  Perhaps  the  most  telling 
provision  of  Decree  49  in  relation  to  the  operations  of  the  joint  enterprise  was  not  a 
restrictive,  but  a  permissive  article:  article  24  provided  that  "a  joint  enterprise  shall  have  the 
right  to  carry  on  correspondence,  telegraph,  teletype  and  telephone  communications  with 
organisations  of  other  countries.  "  The  regime  of  state  control  over  the  economy  was  so  tight 
that  it  was  considered  necessary  to  provide  explicitly  for  something  that  would  seem  to  any 
foreign  investor  as  a  basic  and  almost  "assumed"  right  -  the  right  to  communicate  with  the 
wider  international  market.  However,  the  Soviet  state  was  still  concerned  about  information 
on  the  domestic  economy  being  made  available  other  than  through  official  state  channels;  and 
as  such,  article  45  provided  as  an  exception  to  this  right  to  communicate  that  "joint  enterprises 
may  not  distribute  any  reports  or  information  to  states  and  other  agencies  of  foreign  states". 
While  securing  the  state  monopoly  over  banking  activities,  access  to  information  and  ensuring 
general  compliance  with  prevailing  authorisation  requirements,  the  mandatory  rules  for  the 
operations  of  the  joint  enterprise  also  initially  included  the  requirement  to  take  out 
"compulsory  insurance  at  the  insurances  agencies  of  the  USSR";  454  the  requirement  that  the 
sale  of  products  shall  be  in  the  Soviet  market  and  "effected  by  payment  in  roubles  through  the 
corresponding  Soviet  foreign  trade  organisations  at  contractual  prices  taking  into  account 
prices  on  the  world  market";  455  and  the  requirement  that  "the  personnel  of  joint  enterprises 
shall  be  made  up  principally  of  Soviet  citizens".  456  Decree  49  elaborated,  noting  that  joint 
enterprises  were  obliged  to  conclude  "collective  contracts  with  the  trade  union  organisation  at 
the  enterprise"  and  that  general  labour  protection  legislation  applied  in  addition  to  the 
451  Decree  49,  article  24. 
452  Decree  49,  article  34. 
453  Decree  49,  article  35. 
454  Decree  49,  article  14.  Although  this  article  was  amended  by  Decree  385  to  provide  that  the  risks  of  joint 
enterprises  "shall  be  insured  by  agreement  of  the  parties". 
455  Decree  49,  article  26.  Although  this  was  amended  by  Decree  352  to  provide  that  such  realisation  "shall 
be  determined  by  the  joint  enterprise  by  agreement  with  Soviet  enterprises  and  organisations". 
456  Decree  49,  article  47. 
-  138- requirements  to  make  deductions  to  the  USSR  State  Budget  for  social  insurance  and  pension 
contributions  of  the  workforce.  "' 
Although  seemingly  randomly  placed  throughout  the  decree  and  rudimentary  in  their  scope, 
all  of  the  above  mentioned  provisions  should  be  regarded  as  addressing  the  fundamental  issue 
of  the  preservation  of  the  role  of  the  state  as  economic  sovereign  and  the  right  of  the  state  to 
monitor  activities  of  the  joint  enterprise.  Their  brevity  and  place  within  Decree  49  only  attests 
to  the  fact  that  this  relationship  was  not  entirely  developed  at  the  time  of  drafting  the 
legislation  and  evidenced  the  need  to  finesse  the  real  significance  of  the  joint  enterprise. 
However  what  is  consistently  apparent  from  all  these  provisions  is  that  there  was  no  intention 
in  1987  of  the  joint  enterprise  becoming  the  first  step  to  a  two  tier  economy,  one  controlled  by 
the  state  and  one  that  was  not. 
5.2.4  Indirect  Control  -  The  Exclusive  Rights  of  the  Soviet  Participant 
While  the  contract-based  concession  model  gives  rise  to  a  state  governance  regime  based  on 
its  retreat  from  its  place  as  sole  and  direct  owner  of  the  enterprise,  one  of  the  participants  of 
the  joint  enterprise  was  of  course  always  Soviet  and  invariably  this  participant  was  state- 
owned.  As  such,  in  addition  to  its  role  as  sovereign,  the  state  had  the  opportunity  in  part  to 
maintain  its  influence  over  the  activities  of  a  joint  enterprise  through  its  ownership  of  the 
Soviet  participant. 
This  additional  role  of  the  state  and  its  place  in  the  governance  regime  of  the  contract-based 
concession  enterprise  was  developed  through  the  granting  of  various  "exclusive"  rights  of  the 
Soviet  party.  Within  the  contract-based  concession  model,  this  governance  technique,  which 
used  legislative  rights  to  favour  one  participant  over  another,  was  broadly  anachronistic 
because  the  relationship  between  the  participants  was  intended  to  be  "on  the  basis  of 
contracts".  And  as  perestroika  deepened,  these  "exclusive"  rights  were  gradually  removed. 
Decree  49  provided  that  participants  had  to  be  "juridical  persons"  in  their  own  right,  and  on 
the  Soviet  side  these  were  invariably  state-owned.  "'  The  Soviet  participant  was  given  control 
over  the  application  process,  "'  and  its  subsequent  position  within  the  enterprise  was 
entrenched  by  the  requirement  that  the  Soviet  participant  had  to  have  at  least  a  51% 
participatory  share  in  the  charter  fund.  "'  Decree  49  also  required  the  chairman  and  the 
457  Decree  49,  Part  VI. 
458  Decree  49,  articles  1  and  4. 
459  Decree  49,  article  2,  paragraph  1. 
460  Decree  49,  article  5.  See  also  infra  Section  5.4.2. 
-  139- director  general  to  be  Soviet  citizens  . 
46'  The  participatory  share  of  the  Soviet  participant  in  the 
enterprise  was  protected  by  restrictions  on  transfer  of  participatory  shares  and  pre-emption 
rights,  462  and  article  16  provided  that,  following  agreement  between  the  participants,  a  transfer 
of  a  participatory  share  in  the  joint  enterprise  "in  each  separate  instance  shall  take  place  [only] 
with  the  authorisation  of  the  State  Foreign-Economic  Commission  of  the  Council  of  Ministers 
of  the  USSR  [ie  the  government]  -" 
However,  in  almost  every  instance  where  the  original  version  of  Decree  49  provided  more 
favourable  treatment  for  the  Soviet  participant,  amendments  were  subsequently  made  to 
redress  the  balance.  463  Decree  385  removed  the  51  %  requirement,  providing  that  participatory 
shares  in  the  charter  fund  would  be  "determined  by  arrangement  between  them  [the 
participants]  "  and  also  provided  that  a  foreign  citizen  could  take  the  post  of  either  the 
chairman  or  the  director  general.  The  involvement  of  a  commission  of  the  USSR  government 
in  relation  to  each  participatory  share  transfer,  as  in  the  case  of  the  government's  involvement 
in  the  authorisation  procedure  itself,  was  soon  recognised  as  impractical,  and  Decree  352  gave 
the  right  to  authorise  participatory  share  transfers  to  ministries  and  agencies  of  the  USSR,  or 
the  governments  of  the  various  union  republics  which  had  adopted  the  resolution  on  the 
creation  of  the  relevant  joint  enterprise.  Finally,  the  transfer  provisions  were  amended  yet 
again  by  Decree  385  in  May  1989  which  removed  completely  the  requirement  for 
authorisation  of  transfers. 
5.3  Inducement  -  The  Nature  of  the  Concession 
While  the  Soviet  state  weaved  a  new  control  regime  based  upon  authorisations,  legal 
imperatives  and  its  role  as  sovereign,  it  also  had  to  provide  the  necessary  conditions  and 
incentives  for  attracting  foreign  investors  to  participate  within  the  economy  in  the  manner 
envisaged.  This  was  primarily  achieved  by  creating  the  opportunity  for  "doing  business" 
within  the  domestic  Soviet  economy  on  the  basis  of  an  association  that  was  recognised  as  a 
juridical  person,  free  from  compulsory  state  planning  instructions,  with  limited  responsibility. 
5.3.1  Juridical  Personality 
Joint  ventures,  even  with  capitalist  countries,  were  not  unknown  within  the  socialist  legal 
systems  of  the  1970s  and  1980s.  During  that  time  there  were  a  variety  of  approaches  taken, 
including  the  setting  up  of  joint  ventures  which  operated  wholly  outside  the  internal  planned 
461  Decree  49,  article  21. 
462  Decree  49,  article  16.  The  foreign  participant  was  not  given  a  corresponding  pre-emption  right. 
463  For  references  to  amending  decrees,  see  supra  n.  407. 
-140- system,  such  as  in  Rumania,  and  those  that  were  more  integrated,  such  as  in  Yugoslavia.  ' 
Decree  49  took  the  radical  approach  of  providing  explicitly  that  joint  enterprises  "shall  be 
juridical  persons  according  to  Soviet  legislation"  and  shall  "acquire  the  rights  of  a  juridical 
person  from  the  moment  of  registration"  with  the  USSR  Ministry  of  Finance 
. 
46'  This  both 
brought  the  joint  enterprise  firmly  within  the  mainstream  of  Soviet  domestic  civil  law  and  at 
the  same  time  distinguished  the  joint  enterprise  from  its  roots  in  the  contract  for  joint  activity 
that  was  not  a  juridical  person.  It  was  the  characteristic  of  juridical  personality  that  was  the 
key  element  of  the  concession:  it  was  the  first  time  since  the  1920s  that  juridical  personality 
had  been  conferred  by  Soviet  law  upon  an  association  operating  within  the  industrial  economy 
that  was  not  wholly  owned  by  the  state.  There  were  no  provisions  of  the  1961  FPCivL  that 
contemplated  its  creation  and  thus  its  status  fell  within  the  residual  category  of  the  list  in 
Article  11  of  the  1961  FPCivL.  466  Braginskii  noted  of  joint  enterprises  "firstly  they  are 
deemed  to  be  juridical  persons  in  the  USSR  in  accordance  with  prevailing  legislation  in  our 
country,  secondly  they  are  domestic  legal  persons  [as  opposed  to  international  legal  entities] 
and  thirdly  ...  they  must  be  guided  by  prevailing  norms  in  the  USSR  unless  inter-state  or  inter- 
governmental  agreements  provide  otherwise.  "46'  As  a  juridical  person,  the  joint  enterprise  was 
deemed  to  have  organisational  unity  (ie  a  charter  (in  addition  to  a  constitutive  contract)); 
solitary  property  ;  468  autonomous  property  responsibility  ;  46'  and  the  right  to  act  on  its  own 
behalf  in  economic  turnover  and  bear  consequential  responsibilities  . 
4"  General  norms  relating 
to  its  operation  and  details  of  the  authorisation  process  were  set  out  in  specific  provisions  of 
Decree  49  itself.  471 
While  the  joint  enterprise  was  a  juridical  person  that  operated  within  the  framework  of  Soviet 
civil  law,  it  was  a  rather  "special"  juridical  person  in  two  ways:  first,  although  it  was  subject 
to  the  general  and  mandatory  rules  of  civil  law,  it  operated  on  the  principle  of  "full 
khozraschet,  non-subsidy  and  self-financing",  carrying  on  its  activities  outside  the  system  of 
464  On  different  types  of  joint  ventures  within  the  socialist  legal  systems  and  outside,  see  N.  N. 
Voznersenskaya,  Pravovye  Formy  Sovmestnogo  Predprinimatel'stva  i  Praktika  SSSR,  SGiP  (1985),  no.  3, 
p.  59. 
465  Decree  49,  articles  6  and  9. 
466  Supra  n.  410. 
467  Supra  n.  397,  p.  89. 
468  The  nature  of  this  "solitary  property"  is  considered  in  more  detail  below  in  Section  5.4.2.2. 
469  The  nature  of  this  "autonomous  property  responsbility"  is  considered  in  more  detail  infra  Section  5.3.2. 
470  On  the  juridical  personality  generally,  see  supra  Section  3.3. 
471  Supra  Section  5.2.3. 
-141- compulsory  state  planning  instructions;  and  secondly,  Decree  49,  and  additionally  the  charter, 
provided  for  "special  privileges"  in  particular  relating  to  tax. 
5.3.2  Full  Khozraschet,  Non-Subsidy  and  Self-financing  -  Responsibility  and  Insolvency 
Decree  49  provided  that  joint  enterprises  "shall  operate  on  the  basis  of  full  khozraschet,  non- 
subsidy  and  self-financing".  472  While  the  concept  of  khozraschet  had  been  in  existence  since 
the  1920s  and  had  developed  into  "internal"  and  other  types  of  khozraschet,  473  and  while  the 
development  of  "genuine  khozraschet  and  self-financing"  specifically  had  been  a  feature  of 
recent  reforms  in  the  industrial  economy,  474  the  formulation  of  "full  khozraschet,  non-subsidy 
and  self-financing"  was  entirely  new  in  the  area  of  foreign  trade  law.  Although  there  was  no 
express  definition,  in  the  context  of  the  joint  enterprise,  this  formulation  was  probably 
intended  to  highlight  the  joint  enterprise's  exceptional  character  as  operating  outside  the 
command  economy  and  the  system  of  state  subsidies.  It  set  out  the  cornerstones  for  the  basis 
of  operations:  a  joint  enterprise  had  to  have  sufficient  assets  necessary  for  its  activities,  and 
those  activities  were  to  be  carried  out  free  from  the  constraints  of  state  orders  based  in  the 
context  of  a  responsibility  regime  more  akin  to  "real"  limited  liability.  475 
Article  23  of  Decree  49  explicitly  stated  the  general  principle  that  "a  joint  enterprise  shall 
independently  work  out  and confirm  the  program  of  its  economic  activities.  State  agencies  of 
the  USSR  shall  not  establish  binding  planning  tasks  for  a  joint  enterprise  and  the  sale  of  its 
products  shall  not  be  guaranteed".  It  was  therefore  intended  that  the  joint  enterprise  would 
operate  on  the  basis  of  the  general  rules  of  civil  law  and  within  the  domestic  economy  but 
outside  the  planning  system.  Unfortunately,  as  has  been  noted,  Decree  49  did  not  include  any 
coherent  attempt  to  set  out  the  way  in  which  these  "autonomous"  juridical  persons  would 
carry  out  operations  in  an  otherwise  command  economy.  In  the  same  manner  that  Decree  49 
had  included  in  an  ad  hoc  way  references  that  placed  the  joint  enterprise  within  the  constraints 
of  the  wider  Soviet  command  economy,  476  Decree  49  and  subordinate  legislation  also 
contained,  in  a  somewhat  random  fashion,  a  number  of  provisions  aimed  at  facilitating  the 
operations  of  joint  enterprises  within  that  economy.  For  example,  the  "Procedure  for  the 
Material-Technical  Supply  of  Joint  Enterprises,  Created  on  the  Territory  of  the  USSR  with 
Participation  Of  Other  Countries  and  Foreign  Firms  and  Sale  of  their  Products"  was  adopted  to 
472  Decree  49,  article  6. 
473  See  supra  Section  2.2. 
474  For  a  summary  of  the  development  of  the  "new  economic  conditions"  and  the  introduction  of  the  concept 
of  "full  khozraschet  and  self-financing"  during  mid  1985  and  1986,  see  infra  Section  6.3.2. 
475  Cf  the  regime  of  autonomous  property  responsibility  in  the  confirmation  model  supra  Section  3.3. 
476  Supra  Section  5.2.3. 
-142- provide  a  framework  for  the  sale  to  joint  enterprises  of  supplies  through  contracts  with  state 
agencies.  "'  As  perestroika  advanced  and  state  enterprises  were  given  more  control  over  their 
operations  following  the  1987  State  Enterprise  Law,  478  joint  enterprises  became  increasingly 
able  to  source  goods  directly  from  state  enterprises  on  the  basis  of  the  civil  law  of  contract. 
Furthermore,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  operations  of  joint  enterprises  within  the  Soviet 
economy  but  outside  the  plan,  a  number  of  legislative  enactments  were  adopted,  aimed  at 
ensuring  that  arrangements  of  some  kind  were  in  place  to  regulate  the  areas  of  import-export 
activities,  currency  regulation,  prices  and  banking,  in  addition  to  the  Supply  Of  goodS.  479 
Economic  autonomy  of  joint  enterprises  was  evidenced  by  the  first  steps  in  the  legislation  on 
industrial  organisations  of  the  perestroika  period  away  from  a  regime  of  autonomous  property 
responsibility  towards  a  regime  of  "real"  limited  liability.  Decree  49  set  out  two  rules  relating 
to  their  responsibility:  first,  the  joint  enterprise  shall  be  "responsible  for  its  obligations  with 
all  the  property  which  belongs  to  it"  [emphasis  added];  and  secondly,  the  state  and 
participants  shall  not  be  responsible  for  the  liabilities  of  the  joint  enterprise  and  vice  versa.  480 
"Autonomous  property  responsibility"  understood  within  the  framework  of  the  confirmation 
model  did  not  have  its  functional  genesis  from  within  the  insolvency  context  -  indeed  few  state 
enterprises  were  liquidated  -  most  were  reorganised  . 
41'  By  contrast,  full  khozraschet,  non- 
subsidy  and  self-financing  indicated  a  move  towards  a  rule  of  "real"  limited  liability 
understood  by  reference  to  the  insolvency  situation:  the  joint  enterprise  should  not  rely  on  the 
state  to  act  as  a  de  facto  "guarantor"  of  its  operations  ;  412  all  the  assets  of  the  joint  enterprise 
were  to  be  available  to  creditors  ;  4"  and  its  responsibilities  were  to  be  separated  from  those  of 
477  Poryadok  Material'no-tekhnicheskogo  Snabzheniya  Sovrnestnykh  Predpriyatii,  Sozdavaemykh  na 
Territorii  SSSR  s  Uchastiern  Drugikh  Stran  i  Zarubezhnykh  Finn,  i  Sbyta  ikh  Produktsii,  Vneshnaya 
TorgovIa  (1988)  no.  1,  p.  45.  Due  to  presence  of  the  joint  enterprise  as  outside  the  planned  economy,  one 
commentator  noted  "in  economic  life  however,  it  is  evident  that  the  joint  enterprise  is  not  able  to  function 
as  a  normal  subject  of  economic  activities",  see  supra  n.  409,  p.  50. 
478  Infra  Section  6.3. 
479  On  the  problematic  nature  of  the  regime  of  supply  of  goods  to  and  from  joint  enterprises  generally,  see 
supra  n.  409,  pp.  47-60. 
480  Decree  49,  article  18. 
481  Supra  Section  3.3. 
482  In  relation  to  state  enterprises  operating  within  the  planned  economy,  the  state,  while  separated  as  a 
matter  of  law  from  the  responsibility  of  the  enterprise,  in  practice  supported  its  activities  where  the 
existence  of  the  enterprise  was  deemed  necessary  (supra  n.  269). 
483  The  availability  of  "all"  assets  was  a  significant  departure  from  the  autonomous  property  responsibility 
regime  of  the  confirmation  enterprise  where  most  fixed  assets  of  state  enterprise  were  excluded  from  the 
pool  of  funds  to  which  creditors  could  seek  recovery  for  outstanding  debts  (see,  supra  n.  270).  However, 
the  status  of  the  joint  enterprise's  property  and  its  availability  in  the  context  of  a  liquidation  needs  also  to 
be  understood  within  the  context  of  its  ownership  regime.  In  particular,  the  concept  of  "all"  assets  may 
-  143- its  participants.  The  independent  property  status  of  the  joint  enterprise  was  further  ensured  by 
article  15  of  Decree  49  which  provided  that  "its  property  shall  not  be  subject  to  requisition  or 
confiscation  in  an  administrative  proceeding". 
With  a  shift  towards  the  notion  of  non-subsidy  and  self-financing,  the  insolvency  situation 
became  a  more  distinct  possibility  in  practice.  Although  the  state  no  longer  owned  the  joint 
enterprise  directly  or  outright,  it  was  clearly  "interested"  in  ensuring  the  continued  successful 
operation  of  the  joint  enterprises  in  general.  However  the  exclusion  of  the  roles  of  the  state  as 
creator-owner,  and  arguably  as  property-owner,  made  it  more  difficult  for  the  state  to  control 
the  activities  of  the  joint  enterprise;  and  furthermore,  the  move  to  full  khozraschet,  non- 
subsidy  and  self-financing  made  its  operations  increasingly  vulnerable  to  market  forces.  The 
state  therefore  by  legislative  diktat  in  Decree  49  (adopting  its  role  as  legislative  sovereign) 
attempted  to  reduce  the  insolvency  risk  through  the  requirement  of  a  reserve  fund,  and  the 
allocation  of  any  residual  risk  first  to  the  foreign  participant. 
Soviet  law  conceived  of  charter  capital  as  protection  for  creditors  and  hence  as  protection 
against  insolvency.  484  On  this  basis,  in  addition  to  the  charter  fund,  Decree  49  required  the 
setting  up  of  "a  reserve  fund  and  other  funds  needed  for  the  activities  thereof  and  for  the 
social  development  of  the  [labourl  collective.  "4"  Deductions  to  the  reserve  fund  were  required 
to  be  made  until  it  reached  25  %  of  the  charter  fund.  The  concept  of  a  reserve  fund  was  novel 
to  the  extent  that  it  did  not  appear  in  either  the  Enterprise  Statute  or  the  Production 
Association  Statute.  It  was  regarded  as  a  fund  for  additional  protection  against  downturns  in 
the  economy  that  could  be  debited  to  meet  the  demands  of  creditors  if  necessary  so  as  to 
mitigate  against  the  risk  of  insolvency.  There  were  also  other  mandatory  provisions  of  Decree 
49  that  seemed  to  be  aimed  at  protecting  the  joint  enterprise  from  insolvency  under  this  new 
regime  of  full  khozraschet,  non-subsidy  and  self-financing.  For  example,  article  25  required 
that  "all  currency  expenditures  of  a  joint  enterprise  ...  must  be  ensured  by  the  joint  enterprise 
from  receipts  from  the  realisation  of  its  products...  ".  This  statement  can  be  viewed  as  a 
have  been  severely  limited  if  the  joint  enterprise  did  not  have  the  right  of  ownership  (see  infra  Section 
5.4.2). 
484  This  is  a  view  which,  as  Butler  commented,  "has  long  been  overtaken  in  the  West  by  more  sophisticated 
structures"  (W.  E.  Butler,  Russian  Law  (Oxford  University  Press:  1999),  p.  427).  Black,  Kraakman  and 
Tarassova  noted  that  "charter  capital  has  two  central  weaknesses  as  a  device  for  protecting  investors  in  a 
joint  stock  company:  (i)  it  establishes  a  floor  on  the  company's  shareholder  capital  (the  amount  of  the 
company's  net  assets)  that  may  have  little  relationship  to  a  company's  actual  shareholder  capital;  and  (ii) 
it  establishes  this  floor  based  on  the  book  value  of  a  company's  assets,  which  may  be  very  different  from 
the  assets'  real  value"  (Bernard  S.  Black,  Reinier  Kraakman,  Anna  S.  Tarassova,  Guide  to  the  Russian 
Law  on  Joint  Stock  Companies  (Kluwer  Law  International:  1998),  pp.  207-208). 
485  Decree  49,  article  30.  On  participatory  shares  in  the  charter  ftind,  see  infra  n.  506. 
-144- declaration  of  what  it  means  to  operate  on  the  basis  of  full  khozraschet,  but  may  also  have 
been  included  as  a  direction  to  act  in  what  the  Soviet  state  considered  to  be  an  economically 
prudent  manner,  "'  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  state  in  the  Enterprise  Statute  had  directed 
its  state  enterprises  to  "ensure  high  quality  ...  of  products".  "' 
In  addition  to  requiring  by  diktat  that  participants  make  provision  for  downturns  in  the 
business  cycle,  the  state  also  "adjusted"  the  insolvency  waterfall,  to  allocate  insolvency  risk 
first  upon  the  foreign  participant.  Upon  a  liquidation  of  the  joint  enterprise,  article  52  of 
Decree  49  provided  that  the  "foreign  participant  ...  shall  receive  the  right  to  the  return  of  his 
contribution  in  cash  or  in  the  form  of  goods  in  accordance  with  the  remaining  value  of  the 
contribution  at  the  moment  of  liquidation  of  the  enterprise  after  payment  of  his  obligations  to 
Soviet  participants  and  third  persons"  [emphasis  added].  The  position  of  the  foreign 
participant  was  therefore  compromised:  first  by  suggesting  that  contributions  may  be  subject 
to  some  form  of  reduction  or  amortisation  (hence  the  reference  to  "the  remaining  value");  and 
secondly,  by  placing  the  foreign  participant  in  a  "super-subordinated"  position,  with  a  right  to 
be  paid  a  liquidation  dividend  only  after  obligations  to  the  Soviet  participant  had  been 
satisfied. 
5.3.3  Charter  Piivileges 
In  addition  to  the  right  of  juridical  personality  and  limited  liability,  the  concession  of  the  joint 
enterprise  provided  a  number  of  privileges,  principally  in  the  area  of  taxation.  These  were  as 
a  matter  of  practice  generally  reflected  in  the  drafting  of  the  charters.  A  basic  rate  of  30%  of 
tax  on  profit  after  deductions  was  levied;  however  Decree  49  provided  that  a  joint  enterprise 
was  exempt  from  paying  this  tax  "for  the  first  two  years  of  its  activity"  and  further  gave  the 
USSR  Ministry  of  Finance  the  right  to  decrease  the  amount  of  tax,  or  completely  exempt 
specific  tax  payers  from  tax  . 
4"  To  incentivise  the  creation  of  joint  enterprises  still  further, 
Decree  352  of  1988  increased  the  duration  of  the  tax  holiday  by  providing  that  the  two  year 
period  commenced  at  a  later  date  -  "from  the  moment  of  receiving  a  declared  profit".  This 
addressed  the  concern  that  joint  enterprises  may  not  have  made  any  profits  during  their  first 
486  Article  25  can  also  be  more  radically  interpreted  as  limiting  the  availability  of  debt  financing,  requiring 
that  all  expenditure  be  financed  solely  out  of  cash  flow. 
487  Supra  Section  3.4.3  which  develops  this  idea  of  coercive  law. 
488  Decree  49,  article  36.  The  concept  of  tax  privileges  was  also  established  in  the  implementing  Edict  of  13 
January  1987  and  the  amendments  thereto. 
-  145- two  start-up  years.  Other  privileges  and  guarantees  included  the  right  to  transfer  abroad 
foreign  currency  distributions  of  profits.  489 
The  approval  of  the  charter  by  the  USSR  goverment  during  the  authorisation  procedure" 
raised  the  question  as  to  whether  the  charter  had  a  quasi-  legislative  status.  The 
characterisation  of  the  charter  as  a  quasi-legislative  document  was  not  without  precedent  (for 
example,  pre-revolutionary  Russian  charters,  "'  and  the  NEP  era  legislation  on  concessions 
were  deemed  to  have  quasi-legislative  status"').  This  quasi-legislative  status  of  the  charter 
opened  up  the  possibility  for  providing  for  special  privileges  in  the  charter  that  sought  to 
supplement,  and  in  some  instances  even  vary,  prevailing  legislation  itself. 
The  status  of  the  constitutive  documents  of  the  joint  enterprise  was  always  a  matter  of  Soviet 
"doctrine"  which  itself  varied  over  time.  The  interpretation  of  their  status  as  a  "quasi- 
legislative  act"  was  generally  accepted  during  the  first  few  years  after  1987  when  participants 
often  attempted  to  include  in  the  provisions  of  their  charters,  privileges  and  guarantees  or 
clarifications"  of  existing  legislation  (such  as  a  statement  giving  the  joint  enterprise  the  right 
113  of  ownership).  Doctrine  then  changed,  partly  as  a  result  of  the  numbers  of  joint  enterprises 
being  registered,  partly  as  a  result  of  the  streamlined  registration  procedure  for  joint 
enterprises  which  removed  the  need  for  USSR  Council  of  Ministers  approval,  and  partly  as  a 
result  of  the  introduction  of  other  forms  of  foreign  investment  vehicles.  Gradually  therefore 
the  ambiguity  of  the  status  of  the  charter  became  resolved  and  further  privileges  became 
increasingly  rare  as  state  agencies  demanded  compliance  with  prevailing  legislation 
notwithstanding  any  provisions  to  the  contrary  as  set  out  in  charters  that  had  been  registered. 
489  Decree  49,  article  32. 
490  Supra  Section  5.2.1. 
491  Charters  of  the  pre-revolutionary  corporations  of  nineteenth  century  Russia  frequently  provided  for  all 
sorts  of  opt-outs  from  prevailing  norms.  Owen  noted  that  "the  irony  was  that,  in  one  sense  the 
[Corporate]  law  of  1836  was  totally  unnecessary,  Every  corporate  charter  bore  the  emperor's  signature 
and  thus  it  was  regarded  by  most  jurists  as  having  "the  force  of  law".  (supra  n.  429). 
492  The  1920  Dekret  on  Concessions  contained  a  grandfather  clause  guaranteeing  that  changes  in  legislation 
would  not  effect  the  operation  of  charters  that  had  been  approved  (supra  n.  386).  The  Main  Concessionary 
Committee  attached  to  the  USSR  Council  of  People's  Commissars  had  the  right:  to  review  draft  charters 
including  those  provisions  which  provided  for  exemptions  from  existing  legislation;  and  to  submit  them 
for  approval  by  the  USSR  Council  of  People's  Commissars  (the  then  USSR  Government)  (Ob 
Ychrezhdenii  Glavnogo  Kontsessionnogo  Komiteta  pri  Soveta  Narodnykh  Komissarov  Soyuza  Sovetskikh 
Sotsialisticheskikh  Respublik,  SU  (1923),  no.  96,  item  952).  The  decree  implementing  the  1927  Statute  on 
Joint-Stock  Societies  specifically  provided  in  article  11  that  in  the  event  that  the  provisions  of  charters  of 
concession  joint-stock  societies  contradicted  the  provisions  of  the  1927  Statute,  the  former  would  prevail 
notwithstanding  the  general  rule  set  out  in  article  6  that  all  joint-stock  societies  had  to  amend  their 
charters  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  1927  Statute  or  they  would  be  void. 
493  On  the  right  of  ownership  see  infra  Section  5.4.2. 
-  146- 5.3.4  Dispute  Resolution 
The  contract-based  concession  model  contemplated  within  the  organisational  forum  the 
presence  of  interests  other  than  the  Soviet  state.  The  logic  of  this  model  therefore  opened  up 
the  possibility  not  only  for  conflicts  between  participants  but  also  between  a  participant  (or  the 
joint  enterprise)  and  the  state  itself.  Any  procedure  for  the  resolution  of  disputes  against  the 
state  would  have  directly  compromised  the  principle  of  socialist  legality  and  the  place  of  the 
Soviet  state  as  the  source,  and  not  the  subject,  of  "legality".  494 
Despite  the  clear  possibility  of  its  occurrence,  Decree  49  stepped  back  from  openly 
contemplating  a  procedure  for  dispute  resolution  where  the  state  was  a  litigant.  Article  20 
provided  that  "disputes  of  joint  enterprises  with  Soviet  state,  cooperative  and  other  social 
organisations,  and  disputes  between  each  other  and  also  between  participants"  shall  be  decided 
"in  accordance  with  legislation  of  the  USSR  and  shall  be  considered  in  the  courts  of  the  USSR 
or  by  arrangement  of  the  parties  in  an  arbitration  tribunal.  "  This  envisaged  litigation  between 
juridical  persons  and  participants  inter  se  (and  even  between  juridical  persons  owned  by  the 
state)  but  not  with  the  state  itself.  It  took  several  more  years  before  the  Soviet  state  would 
explicitly  acknowledge  the  move  away  from  socialist  legality  to  the  principle  of  the  rule  of 
law  state,  and  the  right  of  action  against  the  state  itself.  However  before  the  erosion  of  the 
principle  of  socialist  legality,  culminating  in  the  1990  new  economic  constitution,  the  joint 
enterprise  was  the  first  organisational  forum  that  posed  questions  as  to  the  coherence  and 
applicability  of  the  doctrine  of  socialist  legality  in  an  economy  where  the  state  no  longer 
owned  all  the  means  of  production. 
5.4  Governance  -  The  Regulation  and  Protection  of  the  Interests  of  the  Participants 
The  governance  regime  of  the  contract-based  concession  enterprise  sought  to  provide  a 
framework  for  the  balancing  of  the  interests  of  the  various  participants  inter  se.  Traditionally 
a  governance  regime  of  a  body  corporate,  and  the  rights  and  obligations  associated  with  it, 
often  just  reflect  the  characteristics  of  the  particular  ownership  interest  issued  by  the 
applicable  juridical  person.  "'  Soviet  law  did  not  however  contain  a  developed  notion  of  the 
ownership  interest;  and  instead  these  were  structured  relationships  by  reference  to  the  quasi- 
feudal  concept  of  forms  of  ownership.  As  has  been  argued,  this  law  on  ownership  was 
particularly  unsuitable  for  the  legal  regulation  of  property  rights  between  an  owner  and  a 
juridical  person  in  a  regime  of  fragmented  ownership  based  on  the  need  to  attract  equity 
494  On  socialist  legality,  see  supra  Section  2.2. 
495  See  supra  Section  2.5. 
-  147- capital.  And  the  joint  enterprise  was  perhaps  the  first  example  of  such  a  juridical  person  since 
the  1920s. 
5.4.1  Negotiating  the  Constitutive  Contracts 
In  addition  to  providing  the  legal  basis  for  the  authorisation  procedure,  the  constitutive 
contract  and  charter  more  generally  set  out  the  basic  terms  for  the  co-operation  between  the 
participants  and  the  nature  of  their  interests.  496 
Soviet  legal  theory  as  a  matter  of  principle  divided  norms  into  "imperative"  and 
it  supplementary";  and  only  the  latter  were  able  to  be  varied  by  contract.  In  the  context  of  joint 
enterprises,  Professor  Braginskii  noted  that  "the  norms  of  Decrees  48  and  49  on  the  rights  and 
obligations  of  the  participants  of  joint  economic  organisations  have  an  imperative  character 
and  the  waiver  of  them  in  the  constitutive  documents  is  prohibited.  , 4"  However,  despite  the 
existence  of  these  imperatives,  in  common  with  the  law  relating  to  the  contract  for  joint 
activity,  Decree  49  contained  relatively  few  provisions  setting  out  the  rights  and  obligations  of 
the  participants.  Within  the  context  of  agreeing  the  constitutive  documents,  this  therefore  left 
much  room  for  negotiating  the  exact  nature  of  the  relationship  between  participants.  498  As  has 
been  noted,  subsequent  amendments  to  Decree  49  reduced  still  further  the  number  of  these 
mandatory  provisions  and  this  just  increased  the  possibility  for  "contracting".  4'9  The  only 
general  limitation  in  practice  on  the  scope  for  negotiations  may  have been  set  by  the  Model 
Charter,  "O  for  the  greater  the  departure  from  the  form  of  the  Model  Charter,  the  more 
difficult  it  may  have  been  to  register  the  charter  with  the  appropriate  agency. 
Decree  49  in  fact  explicitly  recognised  the  joint  enterprise  as  an  organisation  "created 
...  on  the 
basis  of  contracts  concluded  with  the  participants".  "'  This  was  of  enormous  significance  for 
the  history  of  the  Soviet  of  industrial  organisation.  It  was  the  first  time  since  the  1922  RSFSR 
Civil  Code  that  the  contractual  basis  for  a  domestic  juridical  person  was  recognised.  While  in 
1987  there  was  no  intention  of  redeveloping  the  basic  principles  of  juridical  personality,  the 
496  Decree  49,  article  7. 
497  Supra  n.  397,  P-66. 
498  As  noted  by  N.  N.  Voznesenskaya  "at  the  present  time,  concrete  legal  regulation  of  joint  enterprises  is 
extremely  incomplete  and  many  important  questions,  which  as  a  rule  are  regulated  by  law  in  other 
countries,  are  still  in  our  [legal  system]  regulated  by  agreement  [between  the  parties]" 
(N.  N.  Voznesenskaya,  Pravovoe  Status  Sovmestnykh  Predpriyatii,  Sozdavaeniykh  na  Territorii  SSSR  c 
Uchastiem  Firm  Kapitalisticheskykh  Stran",  p.  27). 
499  Supra  Section  5.2.4. 
500  See  supra  Section  5.2-2. 
501  Decree  49,  article  I- 
-  148- adoption  of  Decree  49  and  the  granting  of  juridical  personality  to  a  contract  based  association 
posed  a  fundamental  challenge  to  the  very  heart  of  Soviet  civil  law  theory  and  the  law  on 
ownership  which,  in  particular,  was  inadequate  to  regulate  coherently  legal  relations  based  on 
contract,  with  fragmented  interests  present  within  the  organisational  forum. 
5.4.2  Ownership  Interests  and  the  Joint  Enterprise 
Article  11  of  the  1961  FPCiviL  listed  specijk  Soviet  juridical  persons  and  implicitly 
102  categorised  them  by  reference  to  the  civil  law  forms  of  ownership.  As  already  noted,  there 
was  in  addition  to  this  specific  list,  a  "catch-all"  category  in  article  11  providing  for  the  right 
of  juridical  status  of  "other  organisations"  deemed  to  be  juridical  persons  in  accordance  with 
specific  pieces  of  USSR  legislation.  And  the  joint  enterprise  fell  into  this  catch-all  category. 
Unfortunately  there  was  no  attendant  form  of  ownership  that  was  linked  to  this  catch-all 
category  and  as  such,  at  the  level  of  primary  civil  law  legislation,  the  ownership  regime  of  the 
joint  enterprise  was  always  uncertain.  This  left  open  two  distinct  questions:  did  the 
participants  "own"  the  joint  enterprise?  and  did  the  joint  enterprise  have  the  right  of 
ownership? 
5.4.2.1  Ownership  of  the  Joint  Enterprise 
From  the  previous  analysis  presented  in  this  study,  'O'  it  should  come  as  no  surprise  that,  from 
the  perspective  of  developing  an  ownership  framework  for  a  juridical  person  with  multiple 
owners  and  foreign  investment,  Decree  49  was  hopelessly  inadequate.  Most  importantly, 
while  giving  the  joint  enterprise  juridical  personality,  Decree  49  did  not  explicitly  provide  for 
the  concept  of  an  ownership  interest  issued  by  the  joint  enterprise  to  the  participants  that  could 
have  provided  the  rationale  for  elaborating  a  set  of  rights  and  obligations  that  clearly 
established  the  legal  basis  of  the  relationship  between  the  participants  and  the  joint  enterprise 
itself;  and  furthermore  would  have  constituted  a  move  towards  the  concept  of  equity  capital. 
Unfortunately,  not  only  did  Decree  49  fail  to  provide  explicitly  for  the  existence  of  an 
ownership  interest  of  a  joint  enterprise  but,  like  the  1922  simple  partnership,  "'  it  also  adopted 
a  plethora  of  inconsistent  terminology  that  seemed  to  touch  upon  this  central  point  without 
502  Supra  Section  2.5. 
503  See  supra  Section  2.3  on  the  nature  of  the  Soviet  law  on  ownership,  Section  2.5  on  the  absence  of  the 
concept  of  the  ownership  interest  and  its  importance  for  a  body  corporate  with  fragmented  ownership, 
and  Sections  2.4.2  and  4.6  on  the  uncertain  regimes  relating  to  the  ownership  of  collective  farms  and 
associations  formed  on  the  basis  for  the  contract  for  joint  activity.  The  argument  is developed  more  fully 
in  Chapter  7. 
504  Supra  Section  4.1. 
-149- resolving  it.  In  particular  it  contemplated  a  "contribution"  ("vklad");...  a  "participatory  share" 
Cdolya"); 
506 
and  a  "participatory  share  participation"  ("doleVOMU  UChaStiyUiv).  507  Most 
importantly 
, 
in  relation  to  the  sale  of  the  interest  of  a  participant  in  a  joint  enterprise,  Decree 
49  provided  for  the  right  to  transfer  their  participatory  share  in  the  joint  enterprise  ("dotya  v 
somestnom  predpriyatii")  as  well  as  for  the  preferential  right  of  Soviet  citizens  to  acquire  the 
participatory  shares  (Volei")  of  the  foreign  participants.  "' 
Collective  farm  legislation  used  the  term  "share"  ("pai")  to  describe  the  interest  of  collective 
farmers  in  the  share  fund,  and  the  argument  that  references  to  "a  share"  in  the  context  of 
collective  farm  law  were  to  an  ownership  interest  of  the  collective  farm  has  already  been 
analysed.  'O'  Decree  49  by  contrast  used  the  terminology  of  "contributions"  and  "participatory 
shares"  (Volya")  (and  not  of  "shares").  Once  again,  albeit  with  different  terminology,  it  is 
tempting  to  consider  the  participatory  share  as  evidence  of  an  equity  ownership  interest, 
however,  for  different  reasons,  once  again,  this  was  unlikely. 
As  discussed,  as  a  general  matter,  the  concept  of  an  ownership  interest  of  a  juridical  person 
was  functionally  redundant  within  the  mainstream  Soviet  legal  and  economic  system.  More 
specifically,  in  the  context  of  the  joint  enterprise,  the  presence  of  ownership  interests 
characterised  as  tradable  equity  participations  would  have  undermined  the  rationale  for  the 
joint  enterprise  as  a  concession  granted  to  particular  investors  with  particular  skills,  a 
particular  approach  and  a  particular  business  plan  that  the  Soviet  authorities  were  prepared  to 
authorise. 
Under  the  quasi-feudal  Soviet  law  on  ownership,  the  state  retained  ownership  of  all  the  means 
of  production.  In  the  industrial  economy  this  was  preserved  through  the  concept  of  industrial 
juridical  persons  without  the  right  of  ownership,  allocated  property  by  way  of  operative 
management.  "O  Applying  this  paradigm  to  the  "new"  juridical  person  within  the  industrial 
economy,  the  joint  enterprise,  it  should  be  assumed  that  property  "contributed"  to  the  joint 
505  Decree  49,  article  10  (which  contemplated  a  charter  fund  "formed  at  the  expense  of  contributions  of  the 
participants"  which  could  be  increased  from  "profits"  and  "additional  contributions")  and  Decree  49, 
article  12  (contribution  to  the  charter  fund). 
506  Decree  49,  article  5  (which  contemplated  a  specific  participatory  share:  a  "participatory  share  in  the 
charter  fund")  and  Decree  49,  article  7  (which  did  not,  referring  only  to  "the  amount  of  the  participatory 
share  of  the  participants"  (without  stating  to  what  this  share  related)). 
507  Decree  49,  article  31  (which  provided  that  profits  were  to  be  divided  proportionally  to  each  participant's 
participatory  share  participation  (Volevomu  uchastiyu")  in  the  charter  fund). 
508  Decree  49,  article  16. 
509  Supra  Section  2.4.2. 
510  Supra  Sections  2.3.1  and  3.4.2. 
-  150- enterprise  by  the  participants  was  not  offered  up  in  exchange  for  an  ownership  interest  (ie 
equity),  but  rather  contributed  by  way  of  allocation  for  use,  possession  and  disposition  while 
ownership  was  retained  by  the  participants. 
Not  only  did  general  Soviet  legal  theory  support  this  view  of  the  "participatory  share",  not  as 
an  ownership  interest,  but  as  a  direct  right  to  the  property  allocated  to  the  joint  enterprise,  but 
also,  in  contrast  to  the  concept  of  the  "share"  used  in  collective  farm  law,  the  language  of  the 
"participatory  share"  and  "contributions"  incorporated  directly  the  terminology  of  common 
ownership  and  the  contract  for  joint  activity.  As  discussed,  common  ownership  was  a 
mechanism  for  the  pooling  of  resources  by  different  owners  where  ownership  was  retained  in 
the  common  fund,  either  on  a  joint  or  participatory  share  basis.  "'  This  analysis  is  further 
supported  by  the  ownership  regime  of  the  joint  economic  organisations  established  under  the 
1983  edict.  It  was  specifically  provided  that  contributed  property  remained  in  "common 
socialist  ownership"  by  way  of  "operative  management".  "' 
This  interpretation  of  participants  to  the  joint  enterprise  as  bereft  of  ownership  interests,  but 
as  continuing  owners  of  contributed  property,  is  consistent  with  the  analysis  presented  in  this 
study  of  ownership  relations  in  the  context  of  collective  farms,  the  contract  for  joint  activity 
and  the  relationship  between  the  state  and  state  enterprises.  Furthermore,  the  general  theory  of 
Soviet  ownership  law  and  the  concession  approach  is  consistent  with  this  view.  This  "look 
through"  of  ownership  rights  would  obviously  be  reinforced  by  a  conclusion  that  the  joint 
enterprise,  like  the  state  enterprise,  did  not  ever  have  the  right  of  ownership  and  never 
constituted  one  of  the  exceptions  to  the  principle  of  state  ownership  of  all  of  the  means  of 
production. 
5.4.2.2  Ownership  by  the  Joint  Enterprise 
The  joint  enterprise  was  a  juridical  person  with  the  right  to  possession,  use  and  disposition  of 
property.  "'  It  had  a  separate  balance  sheet,  and  as  such  Decree  49  explicitly  referred  to 
11 
514  it  515 
property  of  joint  enterprises"  and  "its  property  . 
More  generally,  Decree  49  provided 
for  "property  rights  of  a  joint  enterprise",  516  and  the  transfer  of  "industrial  property  rights  to  a 
511  Supra  Sections  2.6  and  4.6. 
512  Supra  n.  400. 
513  Decree  49,  article  15. 
514  Ibid. 
515  Decree  49,  article  44. 
516  Decree  49,  article  15. 
-  151  - joint  enterprise",  517  and  characterised  property  as  "belonging  to"  ("prinadlezhashchim  emu") 
the  joint  enterprise. 
This  drafting  may  have  suggested  that  the  joint  enterprise  had  the  right  of  ownership. 
However,  by  analysing  this  framework  within  the  existing  terminology  of  Soviet  law,  it  is 
more  probable  that  the  joint  enterprise  was  to  be  treated  like  the  state  enterprise  -  ie  as  an 
industrial  organisation  without  the  right  of  ownership  to  which  property  was  allocated  by  way 
of  operative  management.  In  fact  the  drafting  in  Decree  49  which  set  out  the  property  rights 
of  the  joint  enterprise  was  entirely  consistent  with  the  regime  of  operative  management  as 
applied  to  state  enterprises.  "' 
The  regime  of  operative  management  within  the  context  of  the  state  enterprise  also 
contemplated  the  right  of  possession,  use,  and  disposition  of  property.  However,  while  such 
rights  in  the  case  of  ownership  were  limited  only  by  general  principles  of  Soviet  civil  law,  in 
the  case  of  operative  management,  they  were  also  limited  by  restrictions  placed  by  the  owner 
through  the  concept  of  "designation".  The  characteristic  of  a  separate  balance  sheet,  and 
hence  the  references  to  property  "of"  a  state  enterprise,  was  also  a  feature  of  the  operative 
management  framework.  The  genitive  case  entailed  only  allocation  and  not  necessarily 
ownership.  Finally,  the  potential  to  acquire  rights  was  not  inconsistent  with  the  absence  of  the 
right  of  ownership,  as  Soviet  law  distinguished  rights  (that  could  be  acquired  by  any  person) 
from  property  (which  could  only  be  owned  by  persons  with  the  right  of  ownership).  "' 
References  to  "designation"  of  the  property  of  a  joint  enterprise  '520  and  the  absence  of  a  clear 
statement  that  the  joint  enterprise  had  the  right  of  ownership  leads  to  the  relatively  certain 
conclusion  that  joint  enterprises  did  not  have  the  right  of  ownership.  If  Decree  49  was  to 
create  a  new  form  of  ownership  for  the  joint  enterprise,  and  hence  create  such  a  fundamental 
change  or  challenge  to  the  existing  civil  law  framework,  it  is  unlikely  that  this  would  have 
sought  to  have  been  achieved  through  a  decree  (rather  than  a  law)  without  explicit  drafting  on 
the  point  and  through  an  enactment  that  strictly  fell  within  the  law  of  foreign  relations  (and 
not  civil  law).  However,  unfortunately,  while  Decree  49  used  terminology  and  understandings 
drawn  from  the  existing  operative  management  regime,  it  did  not  explicitly  provide  for  its 
application  and  hence  some  doubt  remained. 
517  Decree  49,  article  17. 
518  See  supra  Sections  2.3.1  and  3.4.2. 
519  Supra,  Section  2.5  and  supra  n.  160  and  infra  n.  859  and  912. 
520  Decree  49,  article  15. 
-  152- If  the  joint  enterprise  did  not  have  the  right  of  ownership,  the  property  contributed  to  it  would 
have  remained  in  the  direct  ownership  of  its  participants,  or  in  the  case  of  the  Soviet 
participant,  would  have  remained  in  state  ownership  (as  it  was  allocated  to  the  Soviet 
participant  by  the  state  for  operative  management  only).  Consistent  with  this  approach  was  the 
right  of  a  foreign  participant  to  withdraw  from  the  joint  enterprise  and  the  consequential  "right 
of  return  of  its  contribution  ("vozrat  svego  vk1ada")".  "  Not  only  does  the  reference  to 
"return"  imply  that  ownership  was  never  transferred,  but  also  the  right  of  withdrawal  was 
contemplated  in  the  law  of  common  ownership. 
Although  a  number  of  schools  of  thought  emerged  relating  to  the  question  of  joint  enterprises 
and  the  right  of  ownership,  "'  as  discussed  in  the  previous  Section  of  this  study,  the  logic  of 
understanding  the  ownership  question  within  the  framework  of  existing  Soviet  law  is 
inescapable.  First,  the  absence  of  the  right  of  ownership  of  a  joint  enterprise  notionally 
preserved  the  principle  of  state  ownership  of  the  means  of  production,  as  state  property 
contributed  to  the  joint  enterprise  would  have  still  remained  in  state  ownership.  Furthermore, 
the  Soviet  law  on  ownership  was  based  on  the  identity  principle.  The  law  was  not  concerned 
with  developing  a  legal  regime  for  fragmented  ownership  on  the  basis  of  ownership  interests 
of  juridical  persons.  As  such,  the  terminology  of  Decree  49  was  only  confusing  when  forced 
to  answer  a  question  that  the  legislation  was  never  designed  to  tackle  (ie  who  owned  the  joint 
enterprise?  ).  The  logic  of  the  Soviet  law  on  ownership  was  aimed  only  at  identifying 
"exceptions"  to  the  state ownership  regime  on  the  basis  of  forms  of  ownership.  Clearly  the 
joint  enterprise  did  not  fall  within  one  of  the  existing  exceptions  and  equally  clearly  it  was  not 
provided  in  Decree  49  as  constituting  an  additional  new  exception.  Hence  it  had  no  right  of 
ownership. 
Unfortunately,  while  this  regime  made  sense  within  the  logic  of  the  socialist,  quasi-feudal, 
law  on  ownership,  it  was  entirely  anachronistic  for  the  purposes  of  regulating  in  practice  a 
body  corporate  with  fragmented  ownership.  The  function  of  the  joint  enterprise  was  quite 
different  from  the  function  of  the  state  enterprise  and  this  change  in  function  necessitated  a 
change  in  law  and  theory.  And  so  the  systemic  flaw  within  the  Soviet  law  of  juridical  persons, 
the  absence  of  an  understanding  of  the  concept  of  the  ownership  interest,  condemned  the  joint 
enterprise  to  an  uncertain  foundation.  For  Soviet  law  to  break  loose  from  its  socialist  heritage, 
521  Decree  49,  article  51  [emphasis  added]. 
522  These  included  the  following  theories:  the  joint  enterprise  did  have  the  right  of  ownership;  the  state 
owned  the  property  and  transferred  it  to  the  joint  enterprise  to  be  held  by  way  of  a  right  akin  to  operative 
management;  ownership  was  based  on  some  kind  of  fiduciary  concept  ("fidutsiamaya  sobstvennost"');  or 
there  was  some  kind  of  separation  of  ownership  ("rasshcheplennaya  sobstvennost"')  (see  supra  n.  431, 
pp.  42-47). 
-  153  - it  would  have  to  re-evaluate  fundamentally  the  structure  of  its  ownership  law  and  reorientate 
the  classification  and  understanding  of  juridical  persons  towards  a  concept  based  not  on 
identity,  but  on  ownership  interests.  Only  in  that  way  could  the  Soviet,  or  feudal,  identity 
principle  be  avoided,  and  with  it  analysis  like  that  of  Golubov  when  he  concluded  that  "we 
must  recognise  joint  ventures  as  Soviet  legal  entities,  with  Soviet  law  as  their  personal  law. 
This  is  at  any  rate  apparent  when  the  overall  participatory  share  of  the  Soviet  side  in  the 
capital  fund  is  over  50  per  cent"  . 
5"  For  it  is  a  curiosity  of  socialist  law  that  fixes  the  nature 
and  classification  of  the  juridical  person  by  reference  to  the  identity  of  its  owners.  "' 
5.4.3  The  Operation  of  the  Board  and  the  Directorate  -  Governance  Regime  and 
Management 
The  provisions  of  Decree  49  relating  to  internal  governance  were  extremely  brief  and 
consisted  of  one  single  article  (article  21)  comprised  originally  of  four  brief  sentences. 
The  brevity  with  which  Decree  49  dispensed  with  the  issue  of  internal  governance  indicated 
again  that  the  joint  enterprise  was  a  product  of  mainstream  Soviet  understandings:  the 
rationale  of  legislation  was  to  protect  the  state  and  this  was  achieved  through  the  concession 
and  authorisation  process  and  other  mandatory  requirements  in  Decree  49.  As  the  state  was  no 
longer  directly  the  creator-owner,  it  was  less  concerned  with  the  nature  of  the  contractual 
arrangement  as  agreed  between  the  participants  on  the  question  of  governance.  Furthermore, 
Soviet  law  did  not  have  a  tradition  of  detailed  procedural  governance  frameworks:  the 
industrial  juridical  person  was  based  on  the  principle  of  one-man  management  and  in  that 
context  complex  governance  rules  were  simply  not  necessary.  As  has  been  suggested  above, 
the  Soviet  regime  did  not  fully  grasp  the  significance  of  the  joint  enterprise  as  a  juridical 
person  based  on  fragmented  ownership  and  therefore  its  challenge  to  the  existing  legal  civil 
law  structures.  The  rudimentary  provisions  on  governance  ftirther  reflected  this  myopia. 
The  legislation  did  however  take  two  important  and  fundamental  steps.  First,  it  recognised  the 
beginnings  of  the  separation  of  ownership  from  control  and  therefore  provided  for  two  bodies, 
a  board  (the  higher  organ)  consisting  of  representatives  of  the  participants,  and  the  directorate 
(the  executive  organ)  that  controlled  operations  on  a  day-to-day  basis.  "'  Secondly,  for  the  first 
time  in  relation  to  a  Soviet  industrial  juridical  person  since  the  1920s,  the  Model  Charter  did 
provide  some  further  detail  on  the  rules  and  procedures  for  internal  governance  and  these 
523  Ibid.,  p.  11. 
524  Infra  Sections  7.2  and  7.4.2.1. 
525  In  addition,  Decree  49,  article  44  contemplated  the  possibility  of  creating  an  audit  commission  (the 
control  organ). 
-  154- seemed  to  be  indebted  both  to  collective  farm  charters  (as  collective  farms  always  had  had 
collective  decision  making  bodies)  and  the  charters  of  the  international  joint  ventures  with 
members  of  SEV. 
Despite  the  brevity  of  article  21  and  hence  the  increased  scope  for  "contracting"  in  relation  to 
governance  procedures,  the  legislation  did  provide  some  mandatory  rules:  The  head  of  the 
board  was  the  chairman,  and  the  head  of  the  directorate  was  the  managing  director.  Initially 
Decree  49  provided  that  both  posts  had  to  be  filled  by  citizens  of  the  USSR.  526  Like  other 
mandatory  rules,  this  requirement  was  removed  by  Decree  385  which  stated  that  a  foreign 
citizen  could  hold  either,  but  only  one,  of  the  two  posts.  In  addition,  Decree  385  required  that 
"principal  questions  of  the  activities"  of  the  joint  enterprise  must  be  decided  at  sessions  of  the 
board  by  a  unanimous  vote.  However  Decree  385  was  silent  as  to  which  issues  constituted  "a 
principal  question"  - 
Once  again  this  was  elaborated  in  the  charter  and  subordinate  legislation. 
The  Model  Charter  did  provide  more  detail  on  these  governance  issues  and  in  particular 
included  "directions"  which  were  reminiscent  of  the  coercive  law  of  the  confirmation  model. 
Thus  article  5  of  the  Model  Charter  provided  that  each  participant  had  the  obligation  "to  make 
contributions  ...  to  the  charter  fund  in  accordance  with  this  Charter  and  resolutions  of  the 
superior  organ  of  the  enterprise"  and  that  late  payments  would  be  subject  to  a  3%  per  annum 
511  interest  amount  in  accordance  with  the  civil  codes.  In  addition,  article  5  provided  that  the 
participants  had  an  obligation  "to  participate  in  the  management  of  the  enterprise".  Professor 
Braginskii  explained  that  "participation  in  management  is  primarily  the  right  of  a  member  of  a 
joint  economic  organisation.  Additionally,  the  member  of  the  joint  economic  organisation  is 
obliged  at  the  same  time  to  participate  in  the  management  ... 
[because]  passive  conduct  of  the 
participants  may  paralyse  the  organization's  activities,  so  far  as  a  refusal  to  participate  in  the 
work  of  the  superior  organ  makes  it  practically  impossible  to  adopt  resolutions  important  for 
its  operation,  in  particular,  those  which  require  unanimity".  "'  Therefore,  rather  than  leaving 
systemic  and  economic  mechanisms  to  incentivise  participation,  Braginskii  noted  that this  was 
also  required  by  coercive  diktat. 
Despite  the  role  of  the  Model  Charter  in  providing  supplementary  provisions,  Decree  49 
essentially  left  the  elaboration  of  the  governance  regime  up  to  contract.  It  seems  as  if  the  state 
was  more  interested  in  protecting  "its"  position  rather  than  developing  a  sensible  internal 
526  Decree  49,  article  21.  Interestingly  (and  symptomatic  of  the  identity  principle)  Decree  49  did  not  specify 
which  participant  should  appoint  them,  but  merely  the  identity  of  their  nationality. 
527  RSFSR  CC,  article  226. 
528  Supra  n.  397,  P.  M. 
-  155- governance  system  for  a  body  corporate  with  fragmented  ownership.  The  legislation  was 
aimed  at  protecting  the  interests  of  the  state.  This  could  not  have  been  achieved  through  the 
internal  governance  regime  as  the  state  was  no  longer  the  sole  and  direct  owner  of  the  joint 
enterprise  and  was  no  longer  part  of  the  voting  mechanism.  As  a  consequence,  the  participants 
were  left  free  to  negotiate  the  terms  of  their  cooperation  and  governance  based  on  their 
relative  negotiating  strengths  (and  of  course  the  Soviet  participant  implicitly  had  as  an  ally  the 
superior  state  organ  which  had  to  approve  the  constitutive  documents).  Mandatory  rules  for 
governance,  including  for  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders,  were  simply  absent  and 
were,  like  the  ownership  interest,  overlooked  as  logic  of  the  command  economy,  the  legacy  of 
the  confirmation  model,  and  the  Soviet  forms  of  ownership,  prevailed. 
5.5  Joint  Enterprise  -  Enterprise  or  Corporation? 
This  Chapter  has  traced  the  development  of  a  new  form  of  juridical  person  based  on  a  retreat 
by  the  state  from  its  "traditional"  role  as  creator-owner,  and  arguably  from  its  role  as 
property-owner.  If  not  doctrinally,  then  at  least  in  practice,  an  exception  was  created  to  the 
general  rule  of  state  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  with  the  introduction  of  the  right  of 
third  persons  to  create  Soviet  industrial  organisations.  The  state  was  required  to  rely  on  legal 
mechanisms  to  protect  its  interests  through  the  concession  procedures.  The  participants  could 
then  rely  on  contract  to  elaborate  and  protect  their  rights  against  one  another,  and  against  the 
directorate.  While  this  model  radically  departs  in  these  fundamental  respects  from  the 
confirmation  model,  the  question  as  to  whether  both  models  gave  rise,  in  conceptual  terms,  to 
an  "enterprise"  has  so  far  been  avoided.  Purely  as  a  matter  of  terminology,  the  prevailing 
Soviet  legislation  referred  to  both  the  confirmation  enterprises  and  to  the  contract-based 
concession  enterprise  as  "enterprises"  ("predpriyatie").  The  question  is  whether  this  was  a 
coherent  and  consistent  use  of  the  term. 
It  shall  be  argued  that  this  terminology  was  correct,  and  for  this  reason,  the  term  "enterprise" 
has  been  retained  in  the  descriptions  of  both  models.  In  particular,  the  Soviet  concept  of  "the 
enterprise"  has  to  be  distinguished  from  the  concept  of  "the  corporation".  The  difference 
between  the  enterprise  and  the  corporation  is,  in  this  context,  best  understood  by  reference  to 
the  Soviet  law  on  ownership.  The  enterprise  was  a  traditionally  Soviet  concept  and  a  product 
of  an  essentially  Soviet  economy.  As  was  outlined  in  Chapter  2,  the  law  on  ownership  looked 
to  establish  the  fundamental  principle  of  state  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  and  set 
out  the  identity  of  specific  persons  that  were  exceptions  to  this  rule.  The  economy  was  then 
elaborated  on  the  basis  of  state  control  of  the  means  of  production  through  the  state  plan.  As 
was  argued  in  Chapter  3,  the  industrial  enterprise  was  born  of  the  need  to  preserve  state 
ownership  of  the  means  of  production  while  providing  for  a  separated  subject  of  civil  law  that 
-  156- could  act  as  the  addressee  of  the  plan,  with  a  separate  balance  sheet  that  enabled  its  economic 
"performance"  to  be  assessed  individually.  So  the  Soviet  if  enterprise"  evolved  as  a  product  of 
this  ownership  regime  existing  as  an  indivisible  object  of  the  law  on  ownership,  with  a  single 
owner  and  incapable  of  owning  property  in  its  own  right. 
The  joint  enterprise  posed  a  singularly  unique  problem  within  the  context  of  the  Soviet  law  on 
ownership.  The  Brezhnev  Constitution  did  not  contemplate  a  "form  of  ownership"  for  an 
industrial  juridical  person  owned  by  a  person  other  than  the  state:  Ownership  by  a  joint 
enterprise  neither  constituted  state  ownership,  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership  nor 
personal  ownership.  Moreover,  Soviet  law  in  general  did  not  contemplate  multiple  owners  of 
an  industrial  organisation.  Hence,  in  this  context,  it  had  no  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the 
ownership  interest,  no  precedent  for  dispute  resolution  between  participants  through  internal 
governance  structures,  and  no  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between 
different  owners  and  the  juridical  person.  As  such,  the  mere  existence  of  the  joint  enterprise 
forced  a  reassessment  of  the  ownership  regime  at  the  heart  of  Soviet  civil  law  as  established 
by  Venediktov  in  the  1930s. 
There  were  three  alternatives. 
First,  to  ignore  this  challenge  by  continuing  to  regulate  this  juridical  person  within  existing 
Soviet  law  theory  and  to  ignore  the  theoretical  problems  raised  by  fragmented  ownership 
through  de-emphasising  its  role  as  a  domestic  juridical  person  and  by  characterising  it 
essentially  as  a  vehicle  for  foreign  relations  law. 
Secondly,  to  amend  the  existing  law  on  ownership  to  contemplate  a  further  exception  to  the 
principle  of  state  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  (ie  to  give  the  joint  enterprise  the  right 
of  ownership). 
Thirdly,  to  recognise  that  forms  of  ownership  as  a  theoretical  framework  for  the  classification 
and  regulation  of  associations  and  property  rights  was  anachronistic  in  the  context  of  these 
new  industrial  organisations  and  to  develop  a  law  suitable  for  the  regulation  of  organisations 
with  fragmented  owners  providing  investment  capital. 
It  is  only  through  the  adoption  of  the  third  path  that  a  corporation  could  have  emerged:  a 
juridical  person  operating  in  a  regime  of  multiple  owners  unrestricted  by  their  identity,  with 
developed  rules  for  internal  governance  organs  and  procedures,  based  on  an  association  of 
-  157- capital  where  ownership  by  the  participants  of  ownership  interests  of  a  juridical  person  was 
separated  from  ownership  by  that  juridical  person  itself.  "' 
As  it  was,  Decree  49  opted  for  the  first  path  and  de-emphasised  the  "ownership  problem". 
The  analysis  presented  in  this  Chapter,  and  latent  in  the  drafting  of  the  legislation,  was  never 
explicitly  developed  in  any  of  the  Soviet  law  textbooks  or  treatises  which  generally  overlooked 
the  issue  or  merely  touched  upon  it  as  an  uncertain  area.  While  in  practice  the  challenge  to 
existing  principles  prevailed,  the  traditional  Soviet  "enterprise"  as  an  object  of  the  law  on 
ownership,  bereft  of  the  right  of  ownership,  and  founded  upon  an  ownership  framework 
structured  by  reference  to  the  identity  of  the  owner,  was  for  the  time  being  preserved. 
529  See  infra  Section  7.2  et  seq. 
-  158- 6  MODEL  3-  THE  PARTICIPATION  ENTERPRISES  (1987-1990):  1987  STATE 
ENTERPRISES,  1988  COOPERATIVE  ENTERPRISES  AND  1989  LEASED 
ENTERPRISES 
"In  proletarian  nationalisation,  obversely, 
the  workers  in  the  separate  factories  lose 
nothing  by  the  fact  that  they  are  not 
independent  nwsters  in  their  own  factories, 
by  the  fact  that  all  the  enterprises  belong  to 
the  working  class  in  its  entirety,  to  the 
greatest  of  all  workers'  organisations, 
which  is  known  as  the  Soviet  State.  " 
N.  Bukharin  and  E.  Preobrazhensky 
The  first  years  after  Gorbachev's  appointment  as  General  Secretary  were  characterised  by  a 
number  of  initiatives  that  picked  up  where  Andropov's  reforms  had  left  off.  These  included 
measures  on  tackling  corruption  and  alcoholism,  and  increasing  labour  discipline.  "O  The 
replacement  of  the  gerontocratic  bureaucracy  of  the  Brezhnev  state  continued  apace.  The  basic 
assumption  was  still  that  state  planning  was  the  most  efficient  framework  for  the  Soviet 
industrial  economy  but  that  the  Stalin  centralised  "command"  form  of  that  economy  had  to  be 
"restructured"  in  a  way  so  as  to  incentivise  the  workforce  and  "activate  the  human  factor". 
Towards  the  end  of  1986  this  developed  into  a  call  for  greater  democracy  and  openness 
Cglasnost")  and  with  it  came  the  possibility  for  individuals  to  exercise  increasing  autonomy 
both  in  political  and  economic  life.  The  Law  on  Individual  Labour  Activity  of  November  1986 
provided  a  limited  legal  regime  for  the  carrying  out  of  small  scale  entrepeneurship  -  an 
activity  that  had  been  prohibited  and  pushed  "underground"  since  the  early  1930s.  Gorbachev, 
in  his  keynote  speech  on  perestroika  to  the  January  1987  plenum,  expressly  called  for  steps 
"to  deepen  socialist  democratism  and  to  develop  self-management  of  the  people".  531  In  a 
striking  parallel  with  the  NEP  era  initiatives,  the  touchstones  again  were  discipline, 
responsibility  and  incentivisation. 
The  Gorbachev  reforms  first  attempted  to  "remedy  the  glaring  flaws  of  the  system  ...  within  the 
traditional  framework,  without  venturing  to  encroach  upon  the  fundamentals  of  the 
530  See  Richard  Sakwa,  Gorbachev  and  His  Reforms,  1985-1990  (Prentise  Hall:  1990),  pp.  65-125. 
531  0  Perestroike  i  Kadrovoi  Politike  Partii,  Doklad  na  Plenume  TsK  KPSS,  27  Yanvarya  1987,4  IRS  299, 
at  p.  316 
-  159- Communist  faith",...  before  moving  on  to  embrace  the  principles  of  democratisation  and 
533  glasnost  in  an  attempt  "to  wake  up  those  people  who  had  fallen  asleep".  It  was  however 
only  later,  in  what  Gorbachev  called  "the  third  period  from  1990  to  1991",  "'  that  the  actual 
basic  tenets  of  the  planned  economy  themselves  came  to  be  questioned.  Until  then,  Gorbachev 
persisted  with  policies  aimed  at  perfecting  state  planning  through  encouraging  greater 
participation  by  the  workforce  and  through  increasing  decentralisation.  As  Gorbachev 
explained,  it  was  imperative  "to  use  the  advantages  of  the  planned  development  of  the  socialist 
economy  -  that  is  our  approach.  Not  the  market,  not  the  anarchic  forces,  but  above  all  the  plan 
must  determine  the  basic  features  for  the  development  of  the  national  economy.  At  the  same  time 
we  must  carry  out  new  approaches  to  planning,  to  actively  adopt  economic  levers,  to  give  more 
scope  for  initiatives  for  the  labour  collectives".  "' 
This  whirlwind  environment  of  the  perestroika  years  to  1990  gave  rise  to  a  number  of 
seemingly  unconnected  organisational  forms  introduced  into  the  industrial  economy,  including 
the  1987  state  enterprises,  the  1988  cooperative  enterprises,  and  the  1989  leased  enterprises. 
Each  was  created  pursuant  to  discrete  legislation  (respectively,  the  State  Enterprise  Law,  the 
Cooperatives  Law  and  the  FP  Lease)  and  each  was  presented  as  a  separate  initiative  on  the 
road  to  further  perfecting  the  socialist  economy.  On  the  face  of  the  legislation,  each  of  these 
forms  appeared  as  structurally  quite  different.  However,  it  shall  be  argued  in  this  Chapter  that 
all  of  these  enterprises  were  born  from  within  a  single  unifying  policy  and  were  based  on 
conu-non  principles  underlying  their  organisational  role  and  operation. 
The  overarching  model  for  the  enterprises  of  this  period  has  been  called  the  "participation 
model".  This  is  for  two  reasons.  First,  in  this  model,  the  single  and central  role  of  the  state 
has  been  supplemented  by  a  new  interest,  that  of  the  "participant".  Secondly,  the  notion  of 
11  participation"  was  chosen  because  each  of  these  enterprises  seemed  to  emerge  from  a  policy 
of  attempting  to  ensure  "personal  participation"  in  the  organisational  forum.  Participants  were 
not  to  be  silent  holders  of  equity-like  ownership  interests,  providers  of  capital,  without  any 
further  role.  Instead,  their  very  presence  was  premised  upon  their  direct  involvement  in  the 
day-to-day  business  of  the  enterprises.  If  the  contract-based  concession  enterprises  radicalised 
the  "contract"  element  of  the  contract  for  joint  activity,  the  participation  enterprises  took  this  a 
stage  further  by  radicalising  the  "joint  activity"  element. 
532  Mikhail  Gorbachev,  Memoirs  (Doubleday:  1996),  p.  569. 
533  Mikhail  Gorbachev,  Perestroika,  New  Thinking  For  Our  Country  and  the  World  (Collins:  1987),  p.  29. 
534  Supra  n.  533. 
535  Reshitel'no  Provodut'  Namechennyi  Kurs,  Rech'  v  Gorode  Kieve  na  Sobranii  Aktiva  Respublikanskoi 
Partiinoi  Organizatsii  Ukrainy,  27  Iyunya  1985,2  IRS  303,  at  p.  317. 
-  160- Personal  participation  was  primarily  to  be  achieved  by  three  methods:  the  first  two  were 
rooted  in  the  principles  of  the  then  current  stage  of  perestroika,  and  the  third  was  based  on  a 
traditionally  Soviet  technique. 
The  Three  Pillars  of  the  Parlicipadon  Model  Participation  was  promoted: 
by  introducing  economic  incentives  which  gave  the  participants  a  stake  in  the 
profitability  of  the  enterprise  (ie  linking  their  wages  to  the  amount  of  the  residual  profit 
-  this  was  distributed  between  the  participants  in  accordance  with  their  labour 
contributions); 
by  giving  the  participants  some  control  over  the  activities  of  the  enterprise  and  hence 
control  over  its  profitability  (ie  democratisation  -  giving  the  participants  rights  in  the 
management  of  the  enterprise);  and 
through  the  traditional  "Soviet"  technique  of  legislative  coercion  (ie  directing  the 
participants  to  act  in  a  particular  way  through  legislative  diktat).  "' 
Theoretical  Imperatives  of  the  Participation  Model  These  "three  pillars"  of  the  participation 
model  were  founded  upon  two  underlying  theoretical  imperatives,  both  of  which  were  again 
derived  from  the  general  trend  of  the  perestroika  reforms  to  1990: 
(i)  The  first  was  the  preservation  of  the  Stalin  spine  of  state  ownership  and  control  of  the 
means  of  production  coupled  with  state  planning.  "'  This  imperative  therefore  required 
a  legal  framework  rooted  in  the  existing  Soviet  law  on  ownership. 
(ii)  The  second  was  the  development  of  the  concept  of  the  "interest  of  the  participant"  as 
separate  and  distinct  from  that  of  the  state. 
Traditionally,  within  the  Soviet  industrial  economy  and  within  the  confirmation  model  there 
had  been  no  acknowledgement,  or  possibility  for,  the  existence  of  any  "interests"  separate 
from  the  interests  of  the  state.  The  creation  of  an  "all-people's  state"  was  declared  in  the  1961 
Party  Programme,  538  and  this  was  then  reiterated  in  the  preamble  to  the  Brezhnev  Constitution 
adopted  in  October  1977 
. 
53'  Therefore  in  accordance  with  the  then  prevailing  ideology,  the 
Soviet  state  (as  directed  and  guided  by  the  Communist  Party)  represented  the  interests  of  all 
536  Examples  of  this  third  method  can  be  seen  in  the  confirmation  model,  supra  Section  3.4.3. 
537  On  the  Stalin  economic  settlement,  supra  Section  2.2. 
538  Istoriya  Kommunisticheskoi  Partii  Sovetskogo  Soyuza  (Izdatel'stvo  Politicheskoi  Literatury:  1980),  p.  593. 
539  The  preamble  acknowledged  that  the  Soviet  Union  had  reached  the  stage  of  "a  developed  socialist 
society"  with  the  establishment  of  a  "socialist  all-people's  state":  the  class  conflict  of  the  1920s  and  1930s 
was  declared  to  be  finally  at  an  end;  and  the  defeat  of  "the  power  of  the  capitalists  and  landowners"  and 
the  "coming  together"  ("sblizhenie")  of  the  working  class,  collective  farm  peasantry,  and  intelligentsia 
had  created  a  "socio-political  unity"  embodied  by  the  concept  of  the  "socialist  all-people's  state". 
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- Soviet  people  and  as  such  there  was  no  need  for  dissent  or  discussion,  nor  any  need  for 
interest  groups  to  debate  policies  in  a  democratic  forum.  Consequently,  there  was  no 
admission  of  the  presence  of  different  "interests"  in  the  confirmation  model,  either  within  the 
organisational  forum  or  external  to  it.  Internally,  the  state,  the  one-man  manager  and  the 
workforce  weretreated  as  having  a  coincidence  of  interests  and  the  crude  governance  system 
of  the  confirmation  model  in  part  reflected,  and  in  part  reinforced,  that  fact.  Externally,  there 
was  no  developed  law  of  "ownership  interests"  because  all  industrial  enterprises  were  owned 
entirely  by  the  state  and  as  such  were  treated  as  indivisible  objects  located  "in"  state 
ownership.  " 
During  the  perestroika  years,  the  concept  of  a  person  as  having  an  interest  separate  from  that 
of  the  state  was  first  implicitly  developed  in  the  legislation  giving  rise  to  the  contract-based 
concession  enterprises  (ie  Decree  49).  541  However,  these  joint  enterprises  presented  a  very 
different  framework  particularly  because  the  separate  interest  was  "foreign"  and  therefore  did 
not  conceptually  entail  the  fragmentation  of  the  Soviet  all-people's  state.  By  contrast,  the 
participation  model  transported  this  concept  of  "interest"  directly  into  Soviet  domestic 
economic  relations  thereby  enabling  the  development  and  official  recognition  of  the  possibility 
for  incentivising  interests  separate  from  that  of  the  state  -  ie  the  interests  of  participants. 
The  development  of  a  fragmentation  of  interests  was  never  mentioned  expressly  in  the  State 
Enterprise  Law;  however  it  shall  be  argued  that  it  was  implicit  throughout.  1987  state 
enterprises,  the  first  expression  of  the  participation  model,  then  gave  way  to  more  complex 
expressions,  particularly  in  the  form  of  the  1988  cooperatives  and  the  1989  leased  enterprises, 
which  consolidated  the  concept  of  "separate  interests"  and  further  developed  the  three  pillars 
of  the  participation  model.  These  later  expressions  each  began  to  erode  the  features  of  the 
governance  regime  of  the  confirmation  model.  In  this  way  it  shall  be  argued  that  the  notion  of 
the  separate  interest  of  the  participant  (ie  the  second  theoretical  imperative  of  the  participation 
model)  contained  the  seeds  of  the  destruction  of  the  socialist  state  owned  economy  (ie  the  first 
theoretical  imperative  of  the  participation  model).  An  economy  based  on  different  interests 
pursuing  independent  goals,  premised  upon  a  quasi  hidden  hand  analysis,  is  broadly  mutually 
exclusive  to  one  based  on  a  single  interest  "required"  to  be  pursued  by  all  components  of  a 
planned  economy. 
In  the  final  expression  of  this  model,  the  leased  enterprise,  the  dynamic  of  the  participation 
model  and  the  separation  of  interests  is  pushed  to  its  logical  conclusion,  resulting  in  the 
540  Supra  Sections  2.3.1  and  2.5. 
541  Supra  Section  5.1. 
-  162- complete  dismantling  of  the  confirmation  governance  regime.  Furthermore,  this  expression 
occasioned  a  change  to  the  nature  of  the  juridical  person  itself,  from  one  conceived  of  as  an 
indivisible  ob  ect,  to  an  organisation  constructed  by  contract  and  bound  by  the  rules  of  civil 
law. 
6.1  Foundations  and  Basic  Principles  of  the  Participation  Enterprises 
Unlike  the  organisational  forms  introduced  after  1990,  including  joint-stock  societies  and 
partnerships,  the  participation  enterprises  were  developed  from  within  traditional  aspects  of 
mainstream  Soviet  law  of  the  time.  The  state  enterprise,  the  cooperative  and  the  lease  contract 
were  all  features  of  the  prevailing  legal  system,  as  was  the  notion  of  participation.  The 
participation  enterprises  did  not  therefore  constitute  a  revolution  of  the  planned  economy  but, 
to  borrow  the  term  from  Garton  Ash,  should  be  regarded  as  a  "refolution".  "  In  the  years  to 
June  1990  there  was  no  intention  to  dismantle  the  socialist  nature  of  Soviet  industrial 
organisations  nor  the  pervasiveness  of  state  power,  but  merely  an  attempt  to  "refolute" 
existing  structures  from  within,  to  "further  perfect"  existing  mechanisms  and  to  improve 
productivity,  quality,  initiative,  incentives,  technological  renewal  and  large  scale  investment. 
It  was  only  the  unintended  consequences  of  this  model,  and  in  particular  the  fragmentation  of 
the  concept  of  the  all-people's  state,  that  was  to  lead  to  genuine  "revolution"  or  more 
accurately,  to  the  possibility  of  one,  in  June  1990. 
6.1.1  General  Theoretical  Foundations  -Constitutional  and  Collective  Farm  Law 
On  the  basis  of  the  declaration  of  the  "all-people's  state",  Chapter  1,  Section  I  of  the 
Brezhnev  Constitution  included  provisions  on  ensuring  the  protection  of  the  legal  order,  the 
interests  of  society  and  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  citizens.  While  much  attention  at  the  time 
of  its  adoption  was  focused  on  article  6  of  this  Chapter,  543  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  contained 
three  additional  articles  in  this  Chapter  that  were  not  present  in  the  former  Stalin  Constitution. 
The  constitutional  foundations  of  the  duty  to  participate,  and  hence  the  basis  for  the 
participation  model,  can  be  traced  to  these  articles.  "'  Article  7  provided  that  "trade 
unions  ...  cooperatives  and  other  social  organisations  in  accordance  with  their  charter  tasks 
shall  participate  in  the  administration  of  state  and  social  affairs  and  in  the  deciding  of 
542  A  midpoint  between  "reform"  and  "revolution".  Timothy  Garton  Ash,  Ae  Uses  of  Adversity  -  Essays  on 
the  Fate  of  Central  Europe  (Granta  Books:  1989),  p.  276. 
543  Article  6  provided  that  the  Communist  Party  was  the  "guiding  and  directing  force  of  Soviet  society".  It 
thus  elevated  the  Communist  Party  to  a  constitutional  status  which  had  previously  been  absent  in  the 
Stalin  Constitution. 
544  Emphasis  has  been  added  in  the  translation  of  each  of  the  following  extracts  of  the  articles  of  the 
Brezhnev  Constitution. 
-  163- political,  economic  and  socio-cultural  questions";  article  8  then  continued,  "Labour  collectives 
shall  participate  in  the  discussion  and  deciding  of  state  and  social  affairs,  in  the  planning  of 
production  and  social  development 
...  and  in  the  discussion  and  deciding  of  questions  of  the 
management  of  enterprises  and  institutions 
...  and  also  for  socio-cultural  measures  and  material 
incentive.  Labour  collectives  shall  develop  socialist  competition,  promote  the  dissemination  of 
progressive  work  methods  and  the  strengthening  of  labour  discipline...  ";...  and  article  9 
finally  reaffirmed  the  general  principle  of  "socialist  democracy"  as  "the  basic  orientation  for 
the  development  of  the  political  system  ...  more  extensive  participation  of  citizens  in  the 
administration  of  the  affairs  of  the  state  ... 
intensifying  people's  control-and  constantly  taking 
account  of  public  opinion". 
By  setting  out  the  ways  in  which  the  cooperative,  the  labour  collective  and  the  citizen  were  to 
participate  in  the  political  system,  these  constitutional  provisions  provided  the  theoretical  basis 
for  the  "democratisation  of  the  workplace"  that  formed  a  central  pillar  of  the  participation 
model.  Moreover,  they  hinted  at  the  identity  of  the  participant  for  each  of  the  three 
expressions  of  this  model  -  the  cooperative  or  citizen  as  in  the  cooperative  enterprise;  the 
labour  collective  as  in  the  state  enterprise;  and  the  citizen  or  labour  collective  as  in  the  leased 
enterprise. 
In  addition  to  participation  and  democracy,  the  other  pillars,  namely  economic  incentivisation 
and coercive  law,  were  also  present  in  the  Brezhnev  Constitution.  Article  40  provided  for  the 
right  of  citizens  to  work  and  to  receive  payment  in  accordance  with  quantity  and  quality  of 
work  done  and  article  60  provided  that  it  was  "the  duty  and  honour  for  every  citizen"  to 
engage  in  "conscientious  labour 
...  and  observance  of  labour  discipline".  What  of  course  the 
Brezhnev  Constitution  did  not  recognise  was  that  deepening  democratisation  and 
incentivisation  would  in  practice  lead  necessarily  to  a  questioning  of  the  very  concepts  upon 
which  the  Soviet  state  was  built  -  the  abolition  of  class  conflict  in  the  USSR;  central  planning; 
the  all-people's  state;  and  the  coincidence  of  interest  between  the  state  and  the  citizen. 
The  concept  of  the  interests  of  the  participant  as  separate  from  those  of  the  state,  and  the  three 
pillars  of  democracy,  incentivisation  and  coercive  law  were  not  only  latent  in  the  provisions  of 
the  Brezhnev  Constitution,  but  were  also  contemplated  by  the  prevailing  law  on  collective 
farms,  the  principal  form  of  juridical  person  in  the  agrarian  economy. 
545  A  commentary  to  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  noted  that  article  8  setting  out  the  rights  of  the  labour 
collectives  was,  in  an  earlier  draft  of  the  constitution,  placed  in  Chapter  2  on  the  Economic  System; 
however  it  was  moved  by  the  Constitutional  Drafting  Commission  to  Chapter  1  on  the  Political  System 
"to  reflect  the  participation  of  the  labour  collective  in  political  life"  (supra  n.  93,  p.  45). 
-  164- The  need  to  balance  social  (ie  state)  interests  with  personal  interests  (ie  those  of  the  collective 
farmer  (or  the  dvor))  developed  out  of  the  history  of  collectivisation  between  1929  and 
1935.  "'  What  emerged  was  a  settlement  that  conceded  certain  formal  legal  rights  to  the 
collective  farmers  (ie  the  participants).  Thus  (i)  the  collective  farm  of  1935  took  the  form  of 
the  artel  which  had  the  right  of  ownership  (cooperative-collective  farm  ownership)  separate 
from  state  ownership;  (ii)  collective  farmers  were  paid  in  accordance  with  the  quality  and 
quantity  of  their  work,  with  the  right  to  dispose  freely  of  excess  production  (incentivisation); 
(iii)  collective  farmers  had  the  right  to  participate  in  general  meetings  of  the  management  of 
the  farm  (collective  farm  democracy);  and  (iv)  collective  farmers  retained  the  right  to  farm 
subsidiary  personal  plots  side-by-side  with  those  of  the  collective  farm.  The  state  was  left  to 
protect  its  interests  principally  through  coercion  using  its  roles  as  legal  and  economic 
sovereign  (by  respectively  promulgating  laws  and  issuing  "administrative"  instructions). 
The  law  of  the  industrial  economy  was  not  burdened  by  the  need  to  legitimate  the  history  of 
collectivisation  and  therefore  gave  rise  to  organisations  with  a  stricter,  more  direct,  state 
governance  regime  which  ensured  state  control  through  overlapping  mechanisms  where  even 
the  formal  legal  rights  of  the  participants  (ie  the  workers)  were  extremely  limited. 
The  participation  model  adjusted  the  traditional  governance  framework  of  these  industrial 
confirmation  enterprises  and  incorporated  elements  of  the  collective  farm  compromise  as  well 
as  the  constitutional  principles  expressing  the  importance  of  "participation",  including  the  twin 
pillars  of  incentivisation  and  democracy. 
It  may  have  been  Gorbachev's  early  career  in  the  party  that  led  him  towards  transporting 
certain  aspects  of  the  agricultural  organisational  model  into  the  industrial  economy. 
Gorbachev  had  considerable  direct  experience  with  the  Soviet  agricultural  settlement  (both  its 
law  and  in  practice).  He  was  by  training  a  lawyer  and  was  appointed  to  the  post  of  first 
secretary  of  the  agricultural  province  of  Stavropol  in  1966.  In  1978  he  was  promoted  to  the 
Party  secretariat  in  Moscow  in  charge  of  agriculture. 
Indeed  the  pillars  of  incentivisation  and  democracy  can  be  traced  not  only  to  collective  farm 
law  generally,  but  also,  more  specifically,  to  Gorbachev's  initiatives  in  Stavropol  in  the  early 
1970s.  He  introduced  the  "team  contract"  system  where  small  teams  or  brigades  were 
allocated  land,  materials  and  resources  and  were  allowed  relative  freedom  to  organise  their 
546  Supra  Section  2.4.1  and  infra  Section  6.1-3. 
-  165- labour  and  were  paid  by  results.  "'  Gorbachev  later  returned  to  the  issue  of  incentivisation  in 
his  memorandum  of  May  1978  (published  only  after  he  became  general  secretary)  where  he 
suggested  that  "administrative  methods"  would  not  achieve  the  necessary  increase  in 
productivity  and  that  "material  and  moral  stimulation"  was  needed  -  "most  principally,  most 
importantly,  in  our  opinion,  is  to  reconstruct  a  mechanism  of  economic  stimulation  of 
agricultural  production  under  the  combination  of  general  state  interests  with  the  interests  of 
collective  farms  and  specific  workers  in  agriculture...  ".  "'  Gorbachev  again  stressed  the  role  of 
the  agricultural  model  in  October  1987  when  in  his  book,  "Perestroika",  he  referred  directly 
to  the  advantages  of  building  industrial  organisational  models  from  within  the  "agro-industrial 
complex".  He  explained:  "for  one  thing,  our  collective  farms  have  long-standing  traditions. 
For  another,  rural  folk  are  enterprising  and  resourceful.  All  this  makes  for  greater  social 
mobility  and  flexibility  when  applying  cost-accounting,  self  sufficiency  and  self-financing".  "' 
The  influence  of  the  principles  of  collective  farm  law  in  the  legislation  on  the  participation 
enterprises  will  be  illustrated  throughout  this  Chapter.  Most  obviously  the  Cooperatives  Law, 
as  well  as  introducing  a  "new"  organisation  into  the  industrial  economy,  also  provided  a  new 
basis  for  collective  farm  legislation  as  a  whole.  "'  And  so,  while  the  participation  model  posed 
a  threat  to  the  organisation  of  industry  as  conceived  within  the  confirmation  model,  its  basic 
tenets  had  been  for  some  time  latent  in  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  and  in  the  collective  farm 
law  of  the  parallel,  but  separate,  agrarian  sector  of  the  Soviet  economy. 
6.1.2  1987  State  Enterptises 
It  was  understandable  why  the  Soviet  regime  looked  to  state  enterprises  and  associations  as  the 
starting  point  for  the  development  of  the  participation  model  in  practice.  The  state  enterprise 
was  the  principal  organisation  within  the  industrial  economy  and  if  the  confirmation  model 
could  have  been  adjusted  to  produce  the  required  efficiency  gains,  without  prejudicing  the 
existing  external  structure  of  the  national  economy,  then  this  clearly  would  have  been  the  most 
uncontroversial  policy. 
547  Angus  Roxburgh,  The  Second  Russian  Revolution  -  The  struggle  for  power  in  the  Kremlin  (BBC 
Books:  1991),  p.  12.  In  1983  the  Politburo  permitted  Gorbachev  to  continue  with  the  collective  contract 
system  in  agriculture,  linking  wages  to  productivity  (see,  Pravda  20  March  1983). 
548  0  Nekotorykh  Merakh  Posledovatel'nogo  Osushchestvleniya  Agrarnoi  Politiki  KPSS  na  Sovremnennom 
Etape,  iz  zapiski  v  TsK  KPSS,  Mai  1987,1  IRS  180,  at  p.  184. 
549  Supra  n.  533,  p.  96 
550  As  the  collective  farm  was  a  type  of  "cooperative",  it  fell  within  the  framework  of  the  Cooperatives  Law 
and  indeed  the  adoption  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  was  accompanied  by  the  enactment  of  a  new  1988 
Model  Charter. 
-  166- The  State  Enterprise  Law  was  adopted  in  a  blaze  of  legislation  in  June  1987.  Following  the 
June  1987  Plenum  of  the  CPSU  and  the  1 
Vh  Congress  of  the  Th  Session  of  the  Supreme 
Soviet,  three  laws  were  adopted.  "'  Specific  aspects  of  these  laws  were  then  developed  in 
greater  detail  in  thirteen  decrees  enacted  at  the  same  time.  "' 
The  form  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law  was  to  set  the  trend  for  all  the  primary  laws  on  the 
participation  enterprises.  First  it  was  extremely  long,  covering  some  25  articles  with  each 
generally  having  at  least  4  sub-articles.  Secondly,  it  was  drafted  by  committee  following 
511  public  comment.  A  draft  was  published  for  discussion  in  February  1987.  In  the  process  of 
finalising  the  law  prior  to  its  enactment,  more  than  140,000  suggestions  and  comments  were 
submitted  and  considered.  554  Thirdly,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  was  the  first  time  in  the  Soviet 
period  that  "a  law"  ("zakon")  had  been  adopted  in  connection  with  a  single  industrial 
organisation.  In  the  past,  industrial  organisations  had  operated  on  the  basis  of  statutes  or 
decrees  (a  lesser  form  of  legislation).  The  status  of  a  "zakon"  indicated  the  overall  importance 
of  this  policy  initiative.  Fourthly,  this  law  regulated  both  the  enterprise  and  the  association, 
and  therefore  unified  the  treatment  and  approach  to  two  functionally  similar  entities  that  had 
555  previously  been  regulated  by  different  statutes.  Finally,  the  drafting  and  detail  of  the 
legislation  gave  the  impression  of  a  state  "feeling  its  way".  From  reading  the  State  Enterprise 
Law,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  exactly  how  many  of  the  provisions  were  intended  to  operate 
in  practice.  There  were  numerous  lists  that  read  like  a  manifesto,  setting  out  programmatic 
intentions  and  consequence.  There  were  many  basic  principles  but  few  detailed  rules.  This 
was  in  part  a  reflection  of  the  legacy  of  coercive  law:  directions  of  obligations  set  out  in  list 
form.  However  the  legislation  on  the  participation  enterprises  went  beyond  mere  coercion, 
and  the  drafting  seemed  to  betray  the  fact  that  the  legislator  was  almost  searching  for  solutions 
to  economic  problems  by  tinkering  and  by  stating  broad  policy  statements,  without  looking 
closer  at  how  these  were  to  be  implemented  in  practice.  And  therefore  much  of  this  legislation 
was  imprecise,  contradictory  and  reflected  the  inevitable  tensions  between  the  desire  to  retain 
551  The  State  Enterprise  Law;  the  Law  on  All  People  Discussion  of  Important  Questions  of  State  Life;  and 
the  Law  on  the  Procedure  for  the  Appeal  to  Court  of  Illegal  Actions  of  Officials  Encroaching  upon  the 
Rights  of  Citizens. 
552  See  Zakonodatel'stvo  o  Korennoi  Perestroike  Upravleniya  Ekonomikoi  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1988) 
for  a  collection  of  these  three  laws  and  the  thirteen  decrees  of  lr  and  30'  June. 
553  See  Pravda  and  Izvesdia  (8  February  1987). 
554  Supra  n.  552,  p.  3. 
555  The  Enterprise  Statute  and  the  Production  Association  Statute.  This  functional  similarity  is  recognised  in 
the  confirmation  model  which  is  intended  to  be  applied  in  understanding  the  legal  framework  of  both 
organisations. 
-  167- as  much  of  the  framework  of  the  existing  planned  economy  and  legal  structure  of  ownership 
relations  as  possible,  while  satisfying  the  need  to  encourage  real  participation. 
In  terms  of  substance,  the  traditional  view  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law  was  described  by 
Feldbrugge:  "most  of  its  progressive  sounding  innovations  were  counterweighed  by  the 
retention  of  traditional  mechanisms.  Prices  remained  centrally  controlled;  the  enterprise 
conducted  its  own  planning,  but  its  plans  had  to  incorporate  state  orders  (goszakazy);  the 
director  was  to  be  elected  by  personnel,  but  needed  confirmation  from  above.  The  Law,  in 
short,  was  a  damp  squib  ... 
[and]  yielded  almost  no  positive  results.  ""'  It  was  clearly  intended 
that  the  "new"  1987  state  enterprises  would  operate  broadly  within  the  planned  economy, 
however  this  did  not  mean  that  there  were  "almost  no  positive  results".  Feldbrugge  ignored 
perhaps  the  principal  significance  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law.  This  was  not  stated  explicitly 
in  the  positive  provisions  of  the  law  but  could  only  have  been  derived  from  the  theoretical 
implications  that  lay  beneath  those  provisions.  Within  domestic  Soviet  law,  the  State 
Enterprise  Law  took  the  first  radical  step  away  from  the  confirmation  model,  towards  a  new 
organisational  strategy  based  on  the  role  and  importance  of  the  participant,  which,  when 
developed  to  its  logical  conclusion,  posed  an  inescapable  dilemma  in  relation  to  state 
governance,  not  just  of  industrial  organisations  themselves,  but  of  the  national  economy  as  a 
whole.  The  contribution  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law  in  the  development  of  the  industrial 
organisation  during  the  perestroika  years  lay  not  in  the  way  it  changed  the  relationship 
between  the  enterprise  and  the  state  (for  state  planning  and state  orders  still  remained);  nor  in 
terms  of  altering  the  scope  of  the  state's  roles  in  the  basic  governance  system  (for  state 
ownership  of  the  enterprise,  its  property  and  the  state's  roles  as  legal  and  economic  sovereign 
remained);  but  in  the  acknowledgement  that  there  were  deep  systemic  economic, 
incentivisation  and  democratic  problems  at  the  heart  of  the  existing  structure  of  Soviet 
confirmation  enterprises  that  could  only  be  overcome  by  recognising  the  separate  interest  of 
"the  human  factor";  an  interest  that  was  independent  from  that  of  the  state  as  a  whole,  and 
that  needed  to  be  activated  in  order  to  make  the  industrial  organisation  a  more  efficient  unit  in 
a  coordinated  national  economy  capable  of  reproduction  and  development. 
For  the  purposes  of  the  participation  model,  the  relevant  "participant"  within  the  State 
Enterprise  Law  was  the  "labour  collective".  The  participatory  role  of  the  labour  collective  was 
specifically  mentioned  in  the  Brezhnev  Constitution,  557  and  its  importance  had  been  recently 
556  Supra  n.  34,  p.  59  and  p.  252. 
557  Supra  Section  6.1.1. 
-  168- acknowledged  in  Andropov's  Law  on  Labour  Collectives  of  1983.558  This  1983  law  attempted 
to  give  members  of  the  collective  (either  directly,  or  through  the  general  meeting  (conference) 
of  the  labour  collective)  increased  participation  in  formulating  the  overall  direction  of  the 
activities  of  the  enterprise,  including  matters  connected  with  pay,  labour  discipline  and 
protection  of  labour.  However  its  purpose  seemed  to  be  more  about  improving  efficiency  than 
about  creating  a  genuine  workers'  democracy. 
Gorbachev,  following  his  appointment  as  General  Secretary,  was  quick  to  assert  the  key  role 
of  the  labour  collective.  Decree  669  "On  Extending  the  Application  of  New  Methods  of 
Economic  Mechanisms  and  Strengthening  their  Influence  on  the  Acceleration  of  Scientific- 
Technical  Progress"  dating  to  July  1985  acknowledged,  in  the  context  of  developing  new 
economic  conditions,  the  necessity  of  ensuring  the  "interestedness  of  the  labour  collective";... 
and  out  of  the  three  sections  in  each  decree  enacted  during  1985  and  1986  to  implement 
Decree  669,  one  entire  section  was  devoted  to  "Increasing  the  Interestedness  of  the  Labour 
Collective  in  the  Growth  of  Efficient  Production  and  Strengthening  Khozraschet".  " 
Gorbachev  again  returned  to  the  importance  of  the  labour  collective  and  its  participation  and 
interestedness  in  the  results  of  their  work  in  his  speech  to  the  XXVII  Congress  in  February 
1986  where  he  noted  that  "in  the  use  of  social  ownership  it  is  necessary  to  raise  decisively  the 
role  of  the  labour  collective.  ""'  On  the  basis  of  the  decisions  of  the  XXVII  Party  Congress, 
the  decrees  enacted  during  the  course  of  1986  aimed  at  transferring  enterprises  and 
associations  within  various  Ministries  to  full  khozraschet  also  contained  a  section  on 
increasing  the  interestedness  of  the  labour  collective  in  broadly  similar  terms  to  those  decrees 
implementing  Decree  669.  "' 
Although  the  State  Enterprise  Law  continued  and  radicalised  this  trend  of  passing  control  to 
the  labour  collective,  this  was  intended  only  as  a  measure  to  be  developed  within  a  socialist 
framework.  Therefore  while  the  preamble  to  the  State  Enterprise  Law  referred  to  the  two 
558  0  Trudovykh  Kolleltivakh  i  Povyshenii  ikh  Roli  v  Upravlenii  Predpriyatiyami,  Uchrezhdeniyami, 
Organizatsiyami,  Vedomosti  SSSR  (1983),  no.  25,  item  382. 
559  0  Shirokom  Rasprostranenii  Novykh  Metodov  Khozyaistvovaniya  i  Uselenii  ikh  Vozdeistviya  na 
Uskorenie  Nauchno-Teklmicheskogo  Progressa,  PostanovIeniya  (July  1985),  no.  669,  p.  198. 
560  Unfortunately  none  of  the  implementing  decrees  of  1985  and  1986  were  published  in  the  official  gazette 
(SP  SSSR).  For  references  and  further  discussion  of  these  decrees,  see  infTa  Section  6.3.2. 
561  )ffVII  S'ezd  Kommunisticheskoi  Pardi  Sovetskogo  Soyuza  -  Stenograficheskii  Otchet  -I  (Izdatel'stvo 
Politicheskoi  Literaturi:  1986),  p-61. 
562  Supra  n.  560. 
-  169- principal  pillars  of  the  participation  model  (democratisation,  563  and  incentivisation),  it  then 
set  out  the  parameters  for  their  operation  in  practice,  noting  that  the  present  law  shall 
"determine  the  economic  and  legal  basis  of  the  economic  activities  of  the  socialist  state 
enterprises  ...  strengthen  state  (all-people's)  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  ...  deepen  the 
centralising  principles  in  the  resolution  of  important  tasks  of  the  development  of  the  national 
economic  as  a  single  unit"  . 
56'  This  was  then  developed  in  the  article  1  definition  of  the  state 
enterprise  as  a  "socialist  goods  producer"  whose  principal  role  was  in  the  achievement  of  the 
"supreme  goal  of  social  production  under  socialism".  566 
Despite  its  professed  socialist  orientation  and  its  aim  of  strengthening  state  ownership  within 
the  context  of  a  planned  unified  national  economy,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  can  be  viewed  as 
the  first  expression  of  a  distinct  and  new  model.  It  developed  the  concept  of  the  interest  of  the 
participant,  as  separate  from  that  of  the  state,  and  therefore  held  out  the  possibility  of  a 
fragmented  economy  founded  upon  different  interests.  It  introduced  incentives  in  an  attempt  to 
activate  the  participant's  interest  and  developed  a  democratic  internal  structure  to  enable  that 
interest  to  be  voiced.  Finally,  the  state  began  to  reorientate  its  governance  regime  toward  legal 
methods,  principally  based  on  legislative  diktat.  The  1988  cooperatives  then  built  upon  the 
steps  taken  by  the  1987  state  enterprises  by  moving  the  concept  of  participation  from  a  state- 
owned  juridical  person,  to  one  that  was  no  longer  state  owned. 
563  The  law  "shall  broaden  the  possibility  of  participation  of  labour  collectives  in  the  effective  use  of  its 
property,  in  the  management  of  the  enterprises  and  associations,  in  the  deciding  of  state  and  social 
affairs  ...... 
564  The  law  "shall  provide  for  the  strengthening  of  economic  methods  of  management,  the  use  of  full 
khozraschet  and  self-financing,  broaden  the  democratic  basis  and  development  of  self-management". 
565  Emphasis  added.  Interestingly  the  word  "socialist"  in  this  quotation  from  the  preamble  was  not  in  the 
February  draft  law  but  was  added  following  subsequent  discussions. 
566  Further  references  to  the  socialist  system  and  the  role  of  the  party  were  made  at  various  other  places 
throughout  the  State  Enterprise  Law. 
On  the  socialist  system,  see  for  example,  references  to:  "the  principle  of  socialist  self-management" 
(article  2(3))  and  "centralised  management  and  socialist  self-management"  (article  6(l));  the  planned 
economy  (infra  Section  6.3.4.4)  and  state  ownership  (infra  Section  6.3.4.3);  "socialist  legality"  (article 
2(5));  and  cooperation  with  socialist  countries  (article  19(2)). 
On  the  role  of  the  party,  see  for  example,  references  to:  its  role  generally  in  state  planning  (article  2(l)); 
the  "party  organisation,  as  the  political  core  of  the  labour  collective"  (article  6(l));  the  right  of  the  party 
to  submit  questions  to  the  meeting  of  the  labour  collective  (article  6(6));  its  role  in  confirming  the 
conditions  for  socialist  competition  (article  7(l));  the  right  of  party  representatives  to  be  elected  to  the 
collective  council  (article  7(3));  and  its  role  in  the  placement  and  selection  of  personnel  (article  8(1)). 
-170- 6.1.3  1988  Cooperative  Enterprises 
The  attempt  to  develop  the  industrial  organisation  by  looking  to  "refolute"  organisations 
already  present  within  the  mainstream  Soviet  economy  broadened  with  the  adoption  of  the 
1988  Cooperatives  Law.  Cooperatives,  like  state  enterprises,  were  a  key  existing  part  of  the 
national  economy.  The  Brezhnev  Constitution,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  and  the  Cooperatives 
Law  all  conceived  the  national  economy  as  divided  between  an  industrial  and  an  agricultural 
sector  and  built  respectively  upon  state  enterprises  and  cooperatives;  and  upon  state  ownership 
and  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership.  "'  While  the  echoes  of  the  collective  farm 
compromise  were  latent  in  the  1987  State  Enterprise  Law's  notion  of  the  separate  interest  of 
the  participant,  it  became  explicit  in  the  1988  Cooperatives  Law  which  took  the  cooperative 
form  from  the  agrarian  economy  and  introduced  it  directly  into  the  industrial  economy. 
Historically,  the  traditional  distinction  between  industry  and  agriculture  determined  the  two 
basic  worlds  and  the  two  legal  frameworks  within  which  the  cooperatives  developed  in  the 
early  years  of  Soviet  power.  The  agricultural  cooperatives  on  the  one  hand  were  a  legacy  of 
the  Tsarist  agrarian  economy.  While  developing  during  the  1920s  in  various  forms,  eventually 
they  came  to  be  dominated  by  the  "collective  farm"  form  after  1935.  The  industrial 
cooperatives  on  the  other  hand,  although  initially  established  during  the  years  of  war 
communism,  developed  most  visibly  during  the  NEP  years  of  the  early  1920s.  After  1925, 
with  the  advent  of  state  planning,  they  became  incorporated  into  the  state  internal  trade  and 
distribution  network  under  the  auspices  of  Tsentrosoyuz  and  were  eventually  abolished  in 
1959. 
Agficultural  Cooperadves  In  agriculture,  the  cooperative  movement  had  its  roots  in  the 
peasant  commune  of  Tsarist  Russia.  Attempts  were  made  to  break  up  this  system  of 
communal  holdings  following  Alexander  11's  emancipation  of  the  serfs  in  1861  and  Stolypin's 
decrees,  enacted  between  12  August  and  9  November  1906.568  However,  on  the  eve  of  1917 
the  role  of  the  peasant  and  the  form  of  the  agrarian  economy  were  still  very  much  open 
questions. 
567  Article  10  of  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  provided  that  "state  (all-people's)  and  collective  farm-cooperative 
ownership  shall  constitute  the  basis  of  the  economic  system  of  the  USSR";  article  l(l)  of  the  State 
Enterprise  Law  mentioned  cooperatives  as  well  as  enterprises  as  "the  basic  link  of  the  single  national- 
economic  complex";  and  article  1(4)  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  provided  that  "cooperative 
enterprises  ...  together  with  state  enterprises  ...  shall  be  the  basic  link  of  the  unified  national  economic 
complex". 
568  Edward  Crankshaw,  In  the  Shadow  of  the  Winter  Palace,  The  Drift  to  Revolution  1825-1917 
(Macmillan:  1986),  p.  168,368. 
-  171- Article  105  of  the  1922  RSFSR  Land  Code  provided  for  three  types  of  cooperation:  joint 
tillage  ("tovarishchestvo  c  obshchestvennoi  obrabotkoi  zemli")  (at  one  extreme,  the  loosest 
form  of  association,  under  which  the  dvory  operated  autonomously;  and  carried  out  only 
principal  activities,  such  as  ploughing  and  harvesting,  collectively);  the  agricultural  commune 
("cel'sko-khozyaistvennaya  kommuna")  (at  the  other  extreme,  where  all  assets  were  pooled 
and  income  was  divided  by  need,  regardless  of  contribution);  and  the  artel  ("artel"')  (a  middle 
form  of  cooperation,  where  only  principal  assets  were  pooled,  and  income  (usually  in  kind) 
was  distributed  in  accordance  with  labour  contributions).  The  detail  of  each  of  these  three 
forms  of  cooperation  was  set  out  in  subordinate  legislation.  In  addition,  the  code  provided  for 
the  possibility  of  the  continued  application  of  "local  customs  where  their  application  is  not 
contrary  to  the  law".  569  in  practice  therefore  during  the  early  1920s  a  vast  variety  of  types  of 
agricultural  cooperation  existed  throughout  Soviet  Russia,  sometimes  differing  only  by 
degree,  and  generally  active  in  the  production,  marketing  and  distribution  of  produce. 
While  official  endorsement  of  agricultural  cooperatives  can  be  dated  to  the  decree  of  16 
August  1921,  "'  it  was  the  so-called  "wager  on  the  kulak"  policy  in  the  mid-1920s  that 
signalled  the  beginning  of  the  development  of  the  agricultural  cooperatives  movement  in  a 
formal  way.  Cooperatives  were  then  viewed  as  "one  of  the  important  assets  for  raising  the 
level  of  the  agricultural  economy".  "'  Although  their  presence  was  clearly  a  victory  for  the 
well-to-do  peasant,  this  policy  was  justified  in  ideological  terms  by  characterising  the 
agricultural  cooperatives  as  "socialist"  and part  of  a  tradition  dating  to  Lenin,  572  as  well  as  a 
constituting  step  towards  the  development  of  collective  agriculture. 
Following  the  resolutions  of  14'  Party  Congress  of  April  1925  (the  "Congress  of 
Industrialisation")  and  the  call  for  "socialism  in  one  country",  "'  official  policy  gradually 
shifted  as  all  efforts,  including  the  place  of  the  agricultural  cooperatives,  became  concentrated 
upon  achieving  the  goal  of  rapid  industrialisation  of  all  sectors  of  the  economy.  The 
.......  ...  .....  .  .....  .....  .........  --  ---  ---------  --...  .....  . ...  .  .........  ...........  . .. 
569  1922  RSFSR  Land  Code,  article  8.  See  also  articles  55  and  77  on  the  application  of  "local  customs". 
570  Supra  n.  109,  p-  44. 
571  0  Sel'skokhozyaistvennoi  Kooperatsii,  supra  n.  111  (1967),  p.  439 
572  Lenin  in  his  article  "On  Cooperative  Societies"  wrote  that  "under  our  existing  regime,  cooperative 
enterprises,  as  collective  enterprises,  differ  from  private-capitalist  enterprises  but  do  not  differ  from 
socialist  enterprises  if  they  are  established  on  the  land  under  the  means  of  production  belonging  to  the 
state  and  hence  the  working  class"  (45  Lenin  375).  On  references  to  cooperatives  in  the  works  of  Lenin 
and  Stalin,  see  Bratus'  short  bibliography,  S.  N.  Bratus',  Sub'ekty  Grazhdanskogo  Prava 
(Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1950),  p.  358.  See  also  A.  S.  Tsipko,  Kak  Byli 
Predany  Zabveniyu  Idei  Lenina,  in  Kooperativy  Sogodnya  iv  Budushchem  (Yuridicheskaya 
Literatura:  1988),  p.  9. 
573  The  phrase  famously  coined  by  Stalin  first  in  his  article  on  "The  October  Revolution  and  the  Tactics  of 
the  Russian  Communists"  of  December  1924  (6  Stalin  358). 
-  172- agricultural  cooperatives  became  gradually  integrated  into  the  state  agricultural  supply 
network,  and  despite  some  rivalry  with  official  state  organs,  they  played  an  important  role  in 
the  collections  of  the  1926  harvest.  These  collections  showed  "that  peasants  were  more  ready 
to  surrender  their  grain  to  cooperative  rather  than  state  organs;  but  it  also  revealed  the 
cooperatives  as  becoming  more  and  more  assimilated  to  the  role  of  state  institutions  engaged 
in  the  execution  of  public  policy".  "'  They  were  formally  incorporated  into  the  state  sector  in 
1932. 
Collective  Farms  The  origin  of  the  collective  farm  can  also  be  traced  to  the  Tsarist  peasant 
commune,  and  early  Soviet  law  treated  them  as  cooperatives  operating  on  the  basis  of  one  of 
the  three  forms  set  out  in  article  105  of  the  1922  RSFSR  Land  Code.  "'  The  initial  decrees  and 
model  charters  suggested  that  the  collective  farm  would  be  built  on  the  commune  form.  The 
original  charter  of  February  1919  noted  that  the  "agricultural  commune  must  serve  as  a 
sample  of  brotherhoodly  equality  of  all  people...  "  and  this  form  was  retained  in  the  successive 
charters  of  1922  and  December  1929.  "' 
The  decree  of  16  March  1927  "On  the  Collective  Economy"  was  the  first  to  stress  specifically 
the  importance  of  the  collective  farm  and  contemplated  the  development  of  the  agrarian 
577 
economy  on  the  basis  of  more  complex  forms  of  cooperation.  An  independent  central  organ, 
Kolkhoztsentr,  was  set  up  in  April  1927  and  the  beginning  of  the  collectivisation  movement  is 
usually  dated  to  this  time. 
The  1928  harvest  was  a  disaster  and  significant  state  intervention  was  regarded  as  necessary  to 
avoid  the  situation  happening  again.  Active  state  involvement  in  the  creation  and activities  of 
collective  farms  more  generally  began  towards  the  end  of  1928  when  Kolkhoztentr  launched 
the  campaign  for  the  establishment  of  large  kolkhozy,  which  resulted  in  the  creation  of  farms 
like  the  famous  "Gigant"  covering  some  135,000  hectares.  The  subsequent  collectivisation 
drive  of  1929/1930  commenced  with  the  decree  of  21  June  1929  "On  Measures  to  Strengthen 
the  Kolkhoz  System".  "'  The  particularly  coercive  and  brutal  phase  lasted  between  October  to 
574  Supra  n.  183,  p.  16. 
575  Supra  n.  569.  The  resolution  of  December  30,1926  referred  explicitly  to  the  collective  farm  as  a  type  of 
cooperative  organisation  (Ob  Itogakh  Sovkoznogo  i  Kolkhoznogo  Stroitel'stva,  supra  n.  111  (1967), 
p.  561). 
576  Supra  n.  22  (1948),  pp.  699-700. 
577  0  Kollektivnykh  Khozyaistvakh,  supra  n.  111  (1967),  p.  590. 
578  0  Merakh  Ukrepleniya  Kolkhoznoi  Systemy,  supra  n.  51,  p.  76. 
-  173- March  1930,,  "9  and  the  resolution  of  5  January  1930  marked  the  first  formal  intervention  in 
the  collectivisation  movement  by  the  Communist  Party  which  offered  assistance  in  the  process 
of  establishing  collective  farms.  "O 
With  the  threat  of  a  total  peasant  revolt,  March  1930  saw  a  temporary  respite  following  the 
publication  of  Stalin's  article  entitled  "Dizzy  with  Success",  "'  in  which  he  noted  that  "the 
collective  farm  must  not  be  imposed  by  force.  That  would  be  stupid  and  reactionary.  The 
collective  farm  movement  must  operate  with  the  active  support  of  the  main  mass  of  the 
peasantry  . 
18'  At  about  the  same  time,  on  I  March  1930,  a  new  model  charter  for  the 
collective  farm  was  adopted.  This  contemplated  the  use  of  the  artel  form  and  stressed  both  the 
voluntary  principle  and  the  combination  of  the  personal  and  social  interests,  thereby 
evidencing  the  emerging  collective  farm  compromise.  This  was  reinforced  by  the  subsequent 
decree  of  14  March  1930.  "'  Despite  the  fact  that  the  collectivisation  effort  had  been  put  on 
hold,  the  harvest  of  1930  had  shown  the  importance  of  the  socialised  sector  of  agriculture  in 
the  production  and  collection  of  grain;  and  as  such  the  place  of  the  collective  farm  as  a  key 
feature  of  the  Stalin  agrarian  economy  was  ensured. 
Due  to,  and  during  the  course  of  the  tragic  history  of  the  collectivisation  effort,  it  seems  as  if 
the  peasants  had  managed  to  extract  a  number  of  "legal  concessions"  from  the  Soviet  state 
which  had  not  been  given  to  workers  during  the  process  of  nationalising  the  industrial 
economy.  These  included  the  establishment  of  the  collective  farm  in  the  artel  form  with  the 
independent  right  of  ownership;  the  right  to  participate  in  its  management  organs;  the  right  to 
have  a  share  contribution  returned  upon  withdrawal;  the  right  to  be  paid  in  proportion  to  the 
number  of  labour  days  worked;  the  right  to  farm  a  separate  personal  land  plot;  and  the  right  to 
114  own,  in  a  personal  capacity,  objects and  produce  associated  with  this  personal  farming.  The 
main  features  of  this  collective  farm  compromise  were  broadly  settled  by  1930,  although  the 
., -.  ---..  -  -I-..  -  .-..................  .  ...........  I ..............  ....  ...  . ...  ..............  .-......  . ......................... 
579  The  most  significant  measures  were  taken  in  January  and  February:  "In  the  period  of  the  two  months 
(January-February  1930)  the  stormy  growth  of  the  collective  farm  movement  took  place:  about  14  million 
or  about  60  %  of  all  peasant  economies  were  at  that  time  collectivised.  "  (supra  n.  120,  p.  43). 
580  0  Tempe  Kollektivizatsii  i  Merakh  Pomoshchi  Gosudarstva  Kolkhoznomu  Stroitel'stvu,  supra  n.  51, 
p.  153. 
581  12  Stalin  191. 
582  Ibid  p.  193.  As  the  XVI  Party  Congress  subsequently  noted:  "if  these  mistakes  had  not  been  corrected  in  a 
timely  manner  by  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Party 
...  this  would  have  threatened  a  disruption  of  the 
work  of  the  collectivisation  of  agriculture,  to  undermine  the  very  foundations  of  the  Soviet  state  -  the 
union  of  the  working  class  and  the  peasantry"  (supra  n.  62,  p.  54).  For  a  description  of  the  recriminations 
within  the  Communist  Party  from  March  to  June  1930,  see  supra  n.  123  (1980),  pp.  269-291,311-330. 
583  0  Bor'be  s  Iskrivleniyami  Partlinii  v  Kolkhoznom  Dvizhenii,  supra  n.  5  1.,  p.  194. 
584  Supra  Sections  2.4.1  and  2.4.3. 
-  174- model  charter  and  its  associated  legal  regime  was  reformed  several  times  thereafter  generally 
resulting  in  an  adjustment  of  that  compromise  in  favour  of  the  state. 
Industfial  Cooperafives  In  the  industrial  economy,  although  the  cooperative  movement  in 
Russia  can  be  dated  to  the  mid-1860s,  its  principal  initial  development  was  in  the  period 
following  the  1905  revolution.  Between  1906  and  1911,5,439  cooperatives  were 
established.  585  Industrial  cooperatives  were  set  up  in  the  form  of  consumer,  credit  and 
production  cooperatives.  The  consumer  cooperatives  were  essentially  elements  of  the  internal 
trade  and  distribution  network.  During  the  period  of  war  communism,  and  following  the 
decree  of  10  April  1918,  they  began  to  be  absorbed  in  to  the  Soviet  administration,  "'  and 
came  to  be  identifiable  as  instruments  of  state  policy.  "'  Following  the  decree  of  16  March 
1919,  the  consumer  cooperatives  were  "transformed"  into  consumer  communes.  Each 
commune  elected  representatives  to  unions  in  each region  that  would  then  be  represented  at 
Tsentrosoyuz,  the  "single  economic  centre  of  all  consumer  commune  unions".  "'  In  January 
1920,  the  credit  and  production  cooperatives  were  brought  within  this  system. 
Following  the  end  of  the  civil  war,  the  cooperative  movement  was  permitted  greater 
autonomy.  First  a  letter  from  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Communist  Party  was  sent  to  all 
organisations  of  the  party  noting  the  importance  of  the  cooperatives,  "'  then,  commencing  on 
17  May  1921'9'  and  continuing  throughout  1921,  a  number  of  decrees  were  enacted  expanding 
their  autonomy  and  role  in  the  production  and  distribution  systems.  `  Gradually  this  autonomy 
was  increased:  all  their  property  previously  nationalised  was  returned  and  the  right  to  engage 
in  trade  without  government  intervention  was  finally  recognised.  With  the  adoption  of  the 
1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code,  article  57  acknowledged  that  "legally  existing  cooperative 
585  V.  Batov,  Cooperatives  in  the  Soviet  Union  (Soviet  News:  1945),  p.  13. 
586  0  Potrebitel'skik  Kooperativnykh  Organizatsiyakh,  supra  n.  111  (1967),  p.  48. 
587  Their  role  was  developed  in  a  number  of  decrees  including,  the  so-called  "obligatory  exchange"  decree  of 
6  August  1918  which  placed  cooperatives  on  an  equal  status  to  official  Soviet  organs;  and  a  decree  of  21 
November  1918  which  nationalised  internal  trade  and  recognised  the  cooperative's  privileged  position. 
Others  followed  that  gave  Narkomprod  the  right  to  appoint  a  representative  with  full  powers  to  the 
presidium  of  Tsentrosoyuz:  "in  the  long  run  the  effect  ...  was  to  turn  the  cooperatives,  more  thoroughly 
and  more  openly  than  before,  into  accredited  agents  of  Soviet  policy"  (supra  n.  217  (1952),  p.  235-6). 
588  0  Potrebitel'skikh  Kommunakh,  supra  n.  111  (1967),  p.  129. 
589  Pis'mo  TsK  RKP(b)  9  Maya  192  1,0  Kooperatsii,  supra  n.  II1  (1967),  p.  226. 
590  0  Rukovodyashchikh  Ukazaniyakh  Organam  Vlasti  v  Otnoshenii  Melkoi  i  Kustarnoi  Promyshlennosti  i 
Kustarnoi  Sel'skokhozyaistvennoi  Kooperatsii,  ibid,  p.  232. 
591  Most  importantly  a  decree  of  7  April  1921  restored  a  large  degree  of  the  autonomy  that  they  had  ceded  to 
the  state  during  the  war  communism  years.  However,  Narkomprod  retained  the  right  to  require  them  to 
carry  out  "obligatory  state  tasks"  (supra  n.  217  (1952),  p-338). 
-  175- organisations  may  possess  all  types  of  property  on  a  level  with  private  persons"  [emphasis 
added].  A  decree  of  December  1923  finally  restored  the  voluntary  principle.  "" 
However,  following  the  emphasis  on  industrialisation  in  the  late  1920s,  the  industrial 
cooperatives  like  the  agricultural  cooperatives  were  again  viewed  as  a  network  that  could  be 
absorbed  wholesale  into  the  state  trade  and  distribution  network.  It  was  hoped  that  the 
cooperatives  would  enable  the  state  to  compete  more  effectively  with  the  private  sector. 
Industrial  cooperatives  after  1927  were  distinguished  into  "independent"  and  "official" 
cooperatives.  The  former  were  characterised  as  organisations  of  the  Nepmen,  whereas  the 
latter,  based  on  small  scale  and  artisan  production,  were  encouraged.  "'  From  1927  the  state 
(through  syndicates  and  torgi)  and  industrial  cooperatives  gradually  took  over  from  private 
trading.  By  the  early  1930s,  "legally  existing  cooperatives"  within  the  meaning  of  article  57  of 
the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  were  only  those  that  existed  within  the  official  state  cooperative 
network.  Thus  Gsovski  concluded  "co-operatives  are  in  fact  completely  controlled  by  the 
goverm-nent  but  differ  from  governmental  enterprises  in  that  those  who  work  in  them  have 
shares  but  are  paid  only  for  contribution  in  labor".  "'  The  importance  of  the  cooperative 
system  in  the  industrial  economy  increasingly  became  marginalised  with  the  development  of 
the  Soviet  economy  through  the  late  1950s.  Eventually  they  were  abolished  entirely  by 
Khruschev  in  his  early  attempts  to  reform  the  Stalin  economy.  "' 
The  cooperatives,  and  in  particular  collective  farms,  therefore  represented  a  traditional 
economic  organisation  within  the  national  Soviet  economy.  As  has  been  noted,  the  Brezhnev 
Constitution  referred  to  cooperatives  in  article  7  noting  that  they  were  a  type  of  "social 
organisation",  and  article  10  went  on  to  provide  for  "collective  farm-cooperative  ownership" 
as  a  form  of  socialist  ownership.  "'  In  view  of  the  fact  that  there  was  a  separate  form  of 
ownership  for  the  cooperatives,  the  list  of  juridical  persons  in  article  11  of  the  1961  FPCivL 
distinguished  specifically  "the  collective  farms,  intercollective  and  other  co-operative 
organisations  and  their  associations"  from  other  juridical  persons.  "' 
..........  .-.............  .........  .......  ...  . ...........  .  ....... 
592  0  Reorganizatsii  Potrebitel'skoi  Kooperatsii  na  Nachalakh  Dobrovol'nogo  CWenstva,  supra  n.  I  11 
(1967),  p.  385. 
593  0  Kustarno-Remeslennoi  Promyshlennosti  i  Promyslovoi  Kooperatsii,  supra  n.  111  (1967),  p.  639. 
594  Supra  n.  22  (1948),  p-413. 
595  Supra  n.  137,  p.  312. 
596  This  was  elaborated  both  in  the  1961  FPCivL  (article  23)  and  the  various  provisions  of  the  civil  codes. 
See  supra  Section  2.3.2  and  infra  Section  6.4.4.2. 
597  Supra  Section  2.5. 
-  176- In  the  early  1980s,  the  collective  farm  was  the  principal  form  of  cooperative.  "'  However,  the 
Soviet  legal  system  still  recognised  a  number  of  other  cooperative  forms  which  operated  in 
discrete  areas  of  the  economy.  "9  The  formal  resurrection  of  the  cooperative  form  in  the  Soviet 
industrial  economy  during  perestroika  began  gradually  with  the  adoption  of  a  number  of 
decrees  culminating  in  1988  with  the  enactment  of  Cooperatives  Law.  Following  the  decree  of 
9  January  1986  "On  Measures  for  the  Further  Development  of  Consumer  Cooperatives",  ' 
the  broadening  of  the  cooperative  sector  of  the  industrial  economy  developed  through  the 
lengthy  decree  of  July  "On  the  Perfecting  of  Planning,  Economic  Stimulation  and 
Management  in  State  Trade  and  Consumer  Cooperatives",  "  and  the  decree  on  the 
organisation  of  state  procurement  and  processing  of  secondary  raw  materials  on  a  cooperative 
basis  (attaching  a  model  charter).  " 
During  1987,  new  model  charters  were  adopted  for  cooperatives  for  public  catering;  for 
service  establishments  of  the  populace;  for  the  production  of  goods  of  national  needs  and  for 
603  the  manufacture  of  confectionery  and  pastries.  These  were  all  broadly  similar  in  detail.  The 
last  decree  of  1987  relating  to  cooperatives  introduced  a  set  of  general  measures  aimed  at 
improving  the  organisation  of  the  sale  of  goods  produced  by  cooperatives  and  citizens 
conducting  individual  labour  activity.  "  The  cooperative  movement  developed  throughout  the 
latter  half  of  1987  on  the  basis  of  these  decrees.  By  late  November  there  were  700  registered 
598  By  1982  there  were  25,800  collective  farms  in  the  Soviet  Union  composed  for  more  than  13.3  million 
people  (supra  n.  93,  p.  43). 
599  Seven  types  were  traditionally  distinguished  comprising:  the  collective  farm;  the  fishing  collective  farm 
and  their  unions;  the  artel  of  gold  prospectors;  consumer  cooperatives  and  their  unions;  intereconornic 
organisations  (intercollective  farm  and  other  intercollective  farm  organisations);  cooperatives  for  the 
construction  and  exploitation  of  objects  of  consumer  designation  (multi-apartment  housing  blocks,  dachas, 
garages  etc);  and  horticultural  partnerships  (supra  n.  41  (1986),  p.  149  et  seq). 
600  0  Merakh  po  Dal'neishemu  Razvitiyu  Potrebitel'skoi  Kooperatsii,  Postanoveleniya  (January  1986), 
no.  40,  p.  109. 
601  0  Sovershenstvovanii  Planirovaniya,  Ekonornicheskogo  Stimulirpvaniya  i  Upravleniya  v  Gosudarstvennoi 
Torgovle  i  Potrebitel'skoi  Kooperatsii,  Postanoveleniya  (July  1986),  no.  842,  p.  155. 
602  Ob  Organizatsii  Zagotovki  i  Pererabotki  Vtorichnogo  Syr'ya  na  Koopertivnoi  Osnove,  Postanoveleniya 
(August  1986),  no.  988,  p.  201. 
603  0  Sozdanii  Kooperativov  Obshchestvennogo  Pitaniya,  Postanoveleniya  (February  1987),  no.  160,  p.  89;  0 
Sozdanii  Kooperativov  po  Bytovomu  Obsluzhivaniyu  Naseleniya,  Postanoveleniya  (February  1987), 
no.  161,  p.  100;  0  Sozdanii  Kooperativov  po  Porizvodstvu  Tovarov  Narodnogo  Potreblerniya, 
Postanoveleniya  (February  1987),  no.  162,  p.  112;  and  0  Sozdanii  Kooperativov  po  Vyrabotke 
Konditerskikh  i  Khlebobulochnykh  Izdelii,  Postanoveleniya  (August  1987),  no.  1042,  p.  93. 
604  0  Merakh  po  Uluchsheniyu  Organizatsii  Prodazhi  Tovorov  Proizvodimykh  Koopertivarni  i  Grazhdanami, 
Zanimayushchimcya  Individual'noi  Trudovoi  Deyatel'nost'yu,  Postanovleniya  (September  1987), 
no.  1097,  p.  3  82. 
-  177- in  Moscow  alone  and  Leonid  Abalkin,  director  of  the  Institute  of  Economics,  predicted  that 
they  would  account  for  between  10-12%  of  the  national  income  within  the  next  10  years.  " 
An  unpublished  decree  of  March  1988  indicated  that  a  new  law  on  cooperatives  was  nearing 
completion,  and  directed  work  on  the  draft  to  be  finished  by  lst  May.  "  The  Cooperatives 
Law  was  finally  adopted  on  26  May  1988  and  was  amended  several  times,  principally  in  June 
1990  (the  "June  1990  Amendments") 
. 
60'  The  Cooperatives  Law  set  out  general  principles,  as 
well  as  specific  rules,  relating  to  collective  farms  and  agricultural  cooperatives,  production 
cooperatives,  and  consumer  cooperatives  and  societies  including  cooperative  banks.  "  It  had  a 
number  of  general  similarities  with  the  State  Enterprise  Law.  First,  like  the  State  Enterprise 
Law,  it  was  a  "law"  (and  not  a  decree  or  statute)  and  this  suggested  that  cooperatives  were  to 
be  a  central  plank  in  the  development  of  the  new  industrial  socialist  economy.  Furthermore, 
like  the  State  Enterprise  Law,  it  was  exceedingly  long  (running  to  some  54  articles,  each  with 
generally  at  least  4  sub-articles).  Finally,  in  the  same  way  that  the  State  Enterprise  Law  had 
unified  the  legal  regime  of  previously  two  distinct  organisations  (enterprises  and  associations), 
so  the  Cooperatives  Law  unified  what  previously  had  been  two  distinct  areas  of  law  (collective 
farm  law  and  the  law  on  industrial  cooperative  organisations)  thereby  providing  for  a  single 
609  legal  organisational  structure.  It  was  the  first  time  in  the  later  Soviet  period  that 
organisational  forms  from  the  industrial  and  agricultural  sphere  had  been  so  directly  married 
under  the  same  basic  legislation. 
The  use  of  the  cooperative  was  yet  another  attempt  to  reform  the  framework  and  function  of 
an  established  form  of  Soviet  organisation  (i.  e.  the  collective  farm)  with  the  aim  of  tackling 
the  structural  problems  at  the  heart  of  the  industrial  command  economy,  and  to  "further 
perfect"  the  operation  of  that  economy.  610  While  the  1987  state  enterprises  were  developed 
605  Supra  n.  547,  p.  59. 
606  0  Poryadke  Obobshcheniya  Zamechanii  i  Predlozhenii  Trudovykh  Kollektiviv  i  Grazhdan  po  Proekty 
Zakona  SSSR  "0  Kooperatsii  v  SSSR"  i  Dorabotke  ego  s  Uchetom  Vse-Narodnogo  Obsuzheniya, 
Postanoveleniya  (March  1988),  no.  300,  p.  14. 
607  0  Vnesenii  Izemenenii  i  Dopolnenii  v  Zakon  SSSR  "0  Kooperatsii  v  SSSR",  Vedomosti  SND  SSSR 
(1990),  no.  26,  item  489. 
608  These  distinctions  were  clearly  indebted  to  the  NEP  era  cooperatives  which  distinguished  agricultural 
cooperatives,  production  cooperatives,  credit  cooperatives  and  consumer  cooperatives. 
609  The  "cooperative"  governed  by  the  general  provisions  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  was  now  to  be  used  "in 
agriculture,  in  industry,  construction,  for  transport,  in  trade  and  public  catering,  in  the  sphere  of  paid 
services,  and  other  branches  of  production  and  socio-cultural  life.  "  (Cooperatives  Law,  preamble,  article 
3(l)). 
610  Article  l(l)  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  assumed  cooperatives  would  be  able  to  give  a  "new  impulse"  to  the 
development  of  various  spheres  of  economic  life,  including:  "to  uncover  the  great  potential  possibilities 
of  cooperative  societies  and  the  growth  of  their  role  in  the  acceleration  of  the  social-economic 
-  178- from  an  existing  organisational  form  within  the  industrial  economy  (the  state  enterprise),  the 
1988  cooperatives  by  contrast  were  developed  upon  an  organisational  form  that  until  then  had 
developed  primarily  from  within  the  agrarian  economy,  namely  the  collective  farm.  As  has 
been  shown,  the  characteristics  of  the  collective  farm,  and  the  agricultural  economic 
settlement  following  the  1930s  collectivisation  drive  were  very  different  from  those  of  state 
enterprises  and  the  industrial  economic  settlement.  The  Cooperatives  Law  seemed  to  be 
enacted  upon  the  premise  that  the  previously  agrarian  framework  of  the  collective  farm  could 
be  translated  into  the  industrial  sphere  with  slight  alteration  to  the  balance  between  social  and 
personal  interests,  and  without  prejudicing  the  socialist  foundations  of  the  industrial  economy 
thereby  preserving  the  state's  overall  control  of,  and  ability  to  plan,  the  national  economy. 
Like  the  state  enterprises,  "'  the  cooperatives  were  declared  to  be  "socialist",  "'  and  were 
expressed  to  be  founded  upon  "Leninist  ideas  on  cooperative  societies  as  applied  to  the 
modem  stage  of  the  construction  of  socialism  in  the  USSR".  "'  As  with  all  the  expressions  of 
the  participation  model,  the  Cooperatives  Law  was  not  intended  to  undermine  the  concept  of  a 
planned  economy  per  se  or  existing  forms  of  ownership,  but  instead  sought  to  "restructure" 
the  economy  by  incorporating  the  twin  pillars  of  incentivisation  and  limited  democracy.  "'  It  is 
perhaps  for  this  reason  that  the  1988  cooperatives  were  explicitly  referred  to  as  enterprises,  or 
strictly  speaking  as  "cooperative  enterprises  (organisations)".  "'  The  "enterprise"  was 
development  of  the  country,  to  strengthen  the  process  of  democratisation  of  economic  life 
...  and  create 
conditions  for  involving  the  broad  population  in  cooperatives"  (preamble);  the  "saturating  of  the  market 
with  high  quality  goods  and  services,  making  them  cheaper,  and  satisfying  more  fully  the  material  and 
spiritual  needs  of  the  Soviet  people"  (article  1(2));  satisfying  the  "economic  and  social  development  of 
society  [and],  the  rational  use  of  material  and  labour  resources"  (article  1(3));  "raising  the  efficiency  of 
economic  operations  ... 
[and  ensuring]  higher  labour  productivity  ...  to  facilitate  increased  efficiency  of 
economic  operations  in  every  way"  (article  1(5));  and  the  "satisfaction  of  the  needs  of  the  national 
economy  and  population  for  foodstuffs,  consumer  goods  [and]  housing  ...  enhanced  efficiency, 
improvement  of  the  quality  of  productions  ...  and  growth  of  labour  productivity  ...  and  wasteless  and 
resource-saving  technologies  shall  be  worked  out  and  introduced"  (article  4(l)). 
611  Supra  n.  566. 
612  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  l(l)  and  2(2)  actually  called  these  cooperatives  "the  socialist  cooperative 
society"  [emphasis  added].  See  for  other  references  to  "socialism"  in  the  Cooperatives  Law:  article  10(l) 
("socialist  legality"),  articles  6(l)  and  14(l)  ("socialist  self-management"),  and  article  17(l)  ("socialist 
economic  operations"). 
613  Cooperatives  Law,  preamble.  On  Lenin's  ideas  on  cooperatives  see  supra  n.  572. 
614  As  Batygin  noted  of  the  Cooperatives  Law,  "from  all  the  measures  of  the  social-economic  polity  adopted 
by  the  party  for  the  purpose  of  renewing  socialism,  the  law  on  cooperatives  has  the  most  important 
political  and  practical  significance"  (G.  S.  Batygin,  Pochemu  Kooperator  v  Nemilosti,  in  supra  n.  572 
(1988),  p.  50). 
615  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  l(l)  and  1(4)  [emphasis  added]. 
-  179- traditionally  the  Soviet  judicial  person  developed  on  the  basis  of  the  Stalin  forms  of  ownership 
regime  to  operate  within  the  planned  industrial  economy.  "' 
It  shall  be  argued  that  the  1988  cooperative  enterprises  fell  within  the  participation  model  and 
radicalised  the  steps  taken  by  the  1987  legislation  on  state  enterprises.  Most  importantly, 
unlike  state  enterprises,  the  state  was  not  the  legal  owner  of  the  cooperatives  in  any  necessary 
respect.  617  Furthermore,  unlike  state  enterprises,  the  cooperatives  had  the  independent  right 
(and  an  independent  form)  of  ownership  separate  from  that  of  the  state,  characterised  as 
"collective  farm-cooperative  ownership".  This  type  of  separation  from  the  state  was 
something  that  had  not  even  been  envisaged  in  the  contract-based  concession  model,  where  the 
state  generally  retained  in  part  the  role  of  creator  owner  (through  its  ownership  of  the  Soviet 
participant)  and  continued  to  act  as  direct  owner  of  the  property  contributed  to  the  joint 
enterprises  by  the  Soviet  participant.  618  This  cleaner  separation  from  the  state  in  the  second 
expression  of  the  participation  model  further  exacerbated  the  possibility  for  the  development 
of  "independent"  interests  in  the  Soviet  economy  that  may  not  have  been  coincident  with  those 
of  the  state.  619 
The  effect  was  therefore  to  deepen  the  fragmentation  of  the  unitary  all-people's  state  marked 
by  the  divisions  latent  in  the  1987  state  enterprises  legislation;  and  in  addition,  to  accelerate 
the  dismantling  of  the  core  of  the  governance  system  of  the  confirmation  model.  In  this 
second  expression  of  the  participation  model  the  state  was  no  longer  the  creator-owner,  nor 
the  property-owner,  and  hence  its  role  as  economic  sovereign  became  questioned.  However, 
despite  the  loss  of  direct  ownership  of  a  certain  portion  of  the  domestic  economy,  the  Soviet 
state  leveraged  upon  its  position  as  legal  sovereign  to  preserve  its  "administrative  rights" 
through  specific  mandatory  provisions  of  the  Cooperative  Law  relating  to  the  operation  of 
cooperatives  within  the  national  economy  (in  much  the  same  way  that  the  Soviet  state 
continued  to  control  the  collective  farms  and,  to  some  extent,  joint  enterprises).  "'  It  was  only 
in  the  final  expression  of  the  participation  model,  in  the  form  of  the  leased  enterprise,  that 
...........  -----.  -_..  1. _1-  . ..................  __  ...............  .........  .IIII  ---.  ------  ...........  .  .......  --  -  -1.1  -.  1 111  .....  . .....  . .....................................  ..  --.  -  .......  . ......  .......  . .. 
616  On  the  meaning  of  "the  enterprise",  supra  Section  5.5  and  infra  Sections  7.5  and  7.6. 
617  On  the  question  of  the  identity  of  the  owner  of  the  cooperative,  infra  Section  6.4.1. 
618  Supra  Section  5.4.2. 
619  This  had  always  been  somewhat  implicit  within  the  cooperative  form:  "Cooperative  organisations  differ 
from  other  social  organisations  in  that  they  are  created  for  the  effectuation  of  economic  activities  in  the 
interests  of  their  members"  (Sovetskoe  Grazhdanskoe  Pravo  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1983),  p.  67 
[emphasis  added]).  As  such,  the  state  specifically  governed  their  activities  by  characterising  them  as  part 
of  the  unified  planned  economic  network  (see  supra  Section  2.4.1). 
620  "The  Soviet  state,  effecutating  general  leadership  over  the  activities  of  the  cooperative,  coordinates  it  in 
the  procedure  as  set  out  in  the  plan.  (supra  n.  41  54,  p.  3  11).  See  infra  Section  6.4.4  and  supra  Section 
5.2. 
-  180- those  administrative  relationships  themselves  were  directly  undermined  by  an  organisational 
form  founded  explicitly  upon  the  civil  law  of  contract. 
6.1.4  1989  Leased  Enterptises 
References  to  the  concept  of  the  lease,  and  the  possibility  for  "transforming"  one  type  of 
enterprise  into  a  leased  enterprise,  appeared  not  only  in  the  State  Enterprise  Law  '62'  but  also 
622  in  the  Cooperatives  Law.  These  provided  the  first  hints  of  the  possibility  of  using  the  lease 
as  a  mechanism  by  which  a  collective  (namely  a  cooperative  or  other  form)  might  be 
permitted  to  lease  assets  from  an  enterprise  or  perhaps  even  an  entire  enterprise  itself  from  the 
state. 
While  the  first  two  expressions  of  the  participation  model  were  built  upon  existing 
organisations  within  the  Soviet  economy,  the  third  expression  looked  not  to  an  existing 
organisation,  but  to  an  existing  form  of  contract,  the  lease.  The  origins  of  this  contract  and  its 
use  in  the  context  of  the  law  on  industrial  organisations  once  again  can  be  traced  to  the  1920s. 
Unfortunately  the  Soviet  law  on  "lease"  was  plagued  with  a  plethora  of  terminology,  the 
precise  meaning  of  which  was  often  quite  difficult  to  identify.  Two  basic  terms  were  used:  the 
"lease"  ("arenda"),  and  the  "contract  for  property  hire"  ("imushchestvennyi  naem").  The  term 
"lease"  was  traditionally  used  in  the  context  of  land  law  and  was  specifically  mentioned  in  the 
1922  RSFSR  Land  Code.  Primary  civil  law  legislation  omitted  any  reference  to  the  term 
"lease"  and  only  referred  to  the  "contract  for  property  hire".  The  contract  for  property  hire 
had  been  a  feature  of  pre-revolutionary  Russian  law,  623  continued  to  be  referred  to  in  the  1922 
RSFSR  Civil  Code,  624  and  remained  as  a  distinct  form  of  contract  in  the  framework  of  the 
1961  FPCiVL62'  and  the  1960s  civil  codes. 
One  of  the  earliest  references  to  the  legal  mechanism  of  the  lease  was  to  the  lease  of 
enterprises  in  the  Decree  of  28  June  1918  on  nationalising  key  sectors  of  industry.  During  this 
time  of  civil  war,  while  it  was  always  possible  to  undertake  formal  "nationalisation"  through 
legislative  diktat,  implementation  in  practice  was  of  course  going  to  be  problematic  and 
gradual.  The  decree  of  June  1918  carefully  avoided  an  immediate  and  abrupt  alteration  of 
management  structures  by  providing  that  although  the  relevant  enterprises  were  to  be 
621  Infra  n.  710. 
622  For  example,  Cooperatives  Law  articles  5(l),  5(4),  8(3),  and  27(4).  Article  29(3)  of  the  Cooperatives 
Law  was  the  first  place  to  mention  all  three  participation  enterprises  in  the  same  article. 
623  Supra  n.  88,  p.  355. 
624  Article  152  et  seq. 
625  Article  53  et  seq. 
-  181  - nationalised  (ie  ownership  thereof  passing  to  the  state),  until  Vesenkha  adopted  specific 
decrees  for  specific  enterprises,  the  existing  management  would  continue  to  have  the  right  to 
operate  the  enterprise  which  "shall  be  deemed  to  be  in  rent  free  leased  use".  "'  As  such,  from 
the  very  early  days  of  Soviet  power,  the  lease  was  used  as  a  mechanism  by  which  the  Soviet 
legal  system  preserved  state  ownership  of  an  asset  while  at  the  same  time  providing  the  legal 
basis  for  continued  operational  control  by  others. 
The  NEP  period  saw  the  development  of  the  use  of  the  lease  in  the  context  of  the  "private" 
economy  in  two  principal  contexts:  the  lease  of  an  enterprise  and  the  lease  of  land.  The  basis 
for  the  lease  of  enterprises  generally  was  contained  in  a  dekret  of  Sovnarkom  of  5  July 
1921.627  This  dekret  was  considered  to  have  been  promulgated  pursuant  to  article  153  of  the 
1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code,  despite  the  fact  that  that  article  used  the  term  "hire"  rather  than 
"lease".  Article  1  of  the  dekret  stated  that  "the  right  to  lease  state  industrial  enterprises  with 
the  purpose  of  their  exploitation  shall  be  granted  to  cooperatives,  partnerships  and  other 
associations.  "  This  was  developed  in  1923  Trusts  Dekret  where  article  28(a)  contemplated  the 
leasing  of  a  part  of  a  trust  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code.  (Again, 
while  the  1923  Trusts  Dekret  used  the  term  "lease",  the  civil  code  only  used  the  word  "hire"). 
In  this  way  the  term  "lease"  gradually  came  to  be  used  in  subordinate  legislation 
interchangeably  with  the  term  "contract  for  property  hire".  628 
The  lease  of  land  developed  during  the  mid-1920s  as  the  state  put  its  "wager  on  the  kulak". 
Unlike  primary  civil  law  legislation,  the  1922  RSFSR  Land  Code  did  specifically  refer  to  the 
"lease  contract"  and  formally  contemplated  the  leasing  of  land  in  restricted  instances. 
Subordinate  legislation  of  this  period  also  referred  to  the  lease  as  a  mechanism  for  transferring 
property  rights,  in  particular  relating  to  land  plots  and  the  subsoil.  During  NEP,  article  28  of 
the  1922  RSFSR  Land  Code  was  amended  to  allow  households  the  right  to  lease  all  or  part  of 
their  land  if  they  had  been  "temporarily  weakened  as  a  consequence  of  some  natural  disaster 
(bad  harvest,  fire,  cattle  disease  etc)  or  [in  the  event  of]  an  insufficient  inventory  or  labour 
626  Supra  n.  111  (1967),  p.  95  (article  III). 
627  0  Poryadke  Sdachi  v  Arendu  Predpriyatii,  Podvedomstvennykh  Vyshemu  Sovetu  Narodnogo 
Khozyaistva,  SU  (1921),  no.  53,  item  313.  This  very  early  concept  of  leasing  "an  enterprise"  evidenced 
the  basic  assumption  under  Soviet  law  that  an  enterprise  could  be  viewed  as  an  indivisible  object  of  the 
law  on  ownership. 
628  See  use  of  the  term  "lease"  in  the  commentary  to  articles  152  and  153  of  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code  and 
in  the  subordinate  legislation  noted  supra  n.  182  (1928),  pp.  508-532.  A  legal  encyclopedia  of  that  period 
under  the  definition  of  property  hire  contract  stated  "see  Lease"  (Entsiklopediya  Gosudarstva  i  Prava, 
Vyp.  4  (Izdatel'stvo  Kommunisticheskoi  Akademii:  1926),  p.  1066). 
-  182- force  ".  629  This  amendment  therefore  provided  a  further  opportunity  to  lease  land  "under  the 
guise  of  a  concession  to  temporary  emergencies". 
630 
Leasing  in  the  private  economy  only  began  to  be  curtailed  following  the  failure  of  the  harvest 
of  1925  which  signalled  a  reversal  of  policy  as  the  emphasis  moved  from  agriculture  to 
industry.  Following  the  14'  Congress  of  Industrialisation  in  1925  and  the  increase  in  the  role 
of  central  planning,  the  lease  of  land  came  to  be  presented  as  a  feature  of  capitalist  societies,  "' 
and  the  lease  of  enterprises  became  less  attractive  in  light  of  state  policy  aimed  at  increasing 
direct  control  over  the  economy.  During  1927  a  number  of  measures  were  adopted  that 
restricted  the  periods  and  conditions  for  the  lease  of  land  ;  612  and  in  1928  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  RSFSR  even  decided  to  permit  applications  for  the  termination  of  leases  of  state 
enterprises  where  the  leased  enterprise  did  not  contribute  to  the  industrial  efforts  of  the  USSR 
or  where  its  productivity  had  been  reduced  . 
61'  An  explicit  prohibition  on  the  leasing  of 
agricultural  land  was  finally  introduced  in  1937,634  and  the  1968  FPLand  and  the  subsequent 
land  codes  removed  all  references  to  the  lease  as  a  method  of  landholding  (adopting  instead 
the  concept  of  "land  use"  as  the  mechanism  by  which  land  was  allocated  by  the  state).  635 
While  the  "lease"  of  land  and  enterprises  effectively  came  to  an  end  during  the  1930s,  the  use 
of  the  term  "lease",  as  distinct  from  "property  hire",  did  survive  in  subordinate  legislation  of 
the  later  Soviet  period  including  the  Enterprise  Statute,  "'  and  usually  was  applied  in  the 
629  Supra  n.  17,  p.  3  17. 
630  E.  H.  Carr,  Socialism  in  One  Country  1924-1926,  Volume  One  (1958,  reprinted  Macmillan:  1978),  p.  257. 
631  See,  for  example,  Zemel'noe  Pravo  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1958), 
pp.  291-297,  and  B.  V.  Erofeev,  Sovetskoe  Zemel'noe  Pravo  (Izdatel'stvo  Vyshaya  Shkola:  1965),  pp.  314- 
318. 
632  Supra  n.  183,  p.  134. 
633  Case  No  32471-1928,  Sudebnoya  Praktika  (1928),  no.  24,  p.  3. 
634  Supra  n.  22  (1948),  p-706- 
635  See,  generally,  Zemel'nye  Pravootnosheniya  v  SSSR  (Gosudarstvennoe  Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi 
Literatury:  1958),  p.  127  et  seq,  and  Sovetskoe  Zemel'noe  Pravo  (Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskaya 
Literatura:  198  1),  p.  145  et  seq. 
636  Article  16  of  the  Enterprise  Statute  provided  for  the  right  of  a  state  enterprise  to  lease  buildings  and 
equipment  that  it  was  not  using  to  other  enterprises  and  organisations  at  centrally  established  lease 
payments.  A  commentary  to  that  article  (again  noting  the  interchangeability  of  the  terminology)  explained 
that  "these  relationships  are  regulated  by  the  contract  of  property  hire  (lease)  in  the  procedure  and  on  the 
conditions  provided  by  articles  275-278  of  the  RSFSR  CC  and  corresponding  articles  of  the  civil  codes  of 
the  other  union  republics...  "  (supra  n.  245,  pp.  50-5  1).  For  other  examples  of  subordinate  legislation  of  the 
later  Soviet  period  using  the  concept  of  "lease",  see  supra  n.  244,  p.  321  and  p.  329. 
-  183- context  of  immoveables.  In  such  instances,  provisions  relating  to  lease  were  considered  to  be 
regulated  by  the  provisions  of  the  civil  codes  relating  to  "the  contract  for  property  hire  it 
. 
637 
The  FPLease  adopted  in  1989  can  therefore  be  seen  as  an  extension  of  the  existing  law  of 
property  hire  as  set  out  in  the  1961  FPCivL  and  civil  codes  and  other  subordinate  legislation 
on  lease.  By  explicitly  using  the  term  lease,  arenda,  it  placed  this  new  initiative  firmly  within 
the  NEP  era  legislation,  and  incorporated  the  lease  within  primary  civil  law  legislation  for  the 
first  time  in  Soviet  history.  The  "leased  enterprise"  itself,  like  the  other  participation 
enterprises,  was  formed  from  within  the  mainstream  of  Soviet  law,  but  was  indebted  to  the 
radical  form  of  lease  structure  as  applied  during  the  NEP  years. 
Similar  to  the  cooperatives  legislation  of  1986-1988,  the  introduction  of  the  legislation  on 
lease  was  gradual.  Although  the  use  and  importance  of  the  lease  was  hinted  at  in  the  State 
Enterprise  Law  and  the  Cooperatives  Law,  the  first  decree  of  this  period  to  contemplate 
explicitly  the  use  of  the  lease  in  relation  to  land  and  enterprises  was  the  USSR  Supreme  Soviet 
decree  "On  Lease  and  Lease  Relations  in  the  USSR"  passed  on  7  April  1989.638  The  FPLease 
was  then  adopted  on  25  November  1989,  and  shortly  afterwards  on  20  March  1990  a  decree 
"On  the  Procedure  for  Leasing  Enterprises  (Associations)  of  Union  Subordination  their 
Property"  was  passed.  This  decree  excluded  defence,  communications,  transport,  oil-energy 
and  other  specific  sectors  from  the  ambit  of  the  FPLease.  "9 
The  basic  elements  of  the  participation  model  were  identifiable  in  the  preamble  to  the  April 
1989  decree  which  predated  the  FPLease.  The  decree  aimed  at  "...  protecting  the  rights  of 
lessors,  strengthening  their  interestedness  and  responsibility  in  the  attainment  of  the  highest 
final  results  of  labour";  and  like  the  1987  state  enterprise  and  1988  cooperatives,  the  lease  was 
-......  ....  ....... 
637  In  common  with  past  practices,  primary  civil  law  legislation  (eg  the  1961  FPCivL  (article  56  et  seq)  and 
the  civil  codes  (eg  RSFSR  CC,  article  295  et  seq)  only  used  the  word  hire  ("naem"),  and  not  lease,  in  the 
context  of  (the  hire  of)  dwelling  premises.  A  textbook  written  in  1983  however  noted  their 
interchangeability  referring  to:  "The  contract  for  property  hire  (sometimes  called  by  the  terms  contract  of 
lease  or  rent  of  property)...  "  (supra  n.  619,  p.  237.  This  question  of  terminology  prevails  to  date:  one  civil 
law  textbook  of  the  current  post-Soviet  period  noted  "Today's  current  Civil  Code  considers  the  lease  and 
the  property  hire  as  interchangeable"  and  speculated  that  the  origin  of  the  distinction  might  be  traceable 
to  French  law  (which  distinguishes  the  hire  of  moveable  property  from  the  lease  of  immoveable  property) 
and  German  law  (which  makes  a  similar  distinction)  (Grazhdanskoe  Pravo,  Uchebnik  Chast'  2 
(Prospect:  1997),  p.  15  1,  footnote  1).  Other  terms  in  Russian  have  been  used  in  the  Soviet  legal  system  for 
contracts  granting  the  right  of  use  of  an  asset  (for  example,  "prokat"  (to  rent)),  but  these  are  not 
significant  for  present  purposes. 
638  Ob  Arende  i  Arendykh  Otnosheniyakh  v  SSSR,  Vedomosti  SSSR  (1989),  no.  15,  item  105. 
639  0  Poryadke  Sdachi  Predpriyatii  (Ob"edinenii)  Soyuznogo  Podchineniya  i  ikh  Imushchestva  v  Arendu, 
Postanovleniya  (March  1990),  no.  280,  p.  88. 
-  184- again  conceived  as  a  socialist  measure  that  was  to  be  used  in  order  to  make  the  economy  more 
responsive,  while  preserving  in  general  the  existing  Soviet  planned  economy.  The  preamble 
to  this  decree  described  the  lease  as  "a  new  progressive  form  of  socialist  economy"  to  be  used 
in  the  quest  for  "greater  effective  industrial  and  agricultural  production"  through  activating  the 
human  factor  and  creating  an  interest  of  the  participant  in  the  outcome  of  his  labours. 
The  FPLease,  adopted  following  the  April  decree,  was  the  briefest  of  all  the  legislation  within 
the  participation  model,  spanning  a  mere  33  articles,  with  only  12  devoted  specifically  to  the 
leased  enterprise.  This  was  probably  because  the  FPLease  (unlike  the  State  Enterprise  Law 
and  the  Cooperatives  Law)  was  adopted  in  the  form  of  "fundamental  principles",  and  as  such 
was  only  intended  to  set  out  a  basic  framework  upon  which  more  detailed  legislation  in  the 
form  of  republic  codes  on  lease  could  have  been  adopted  (no  such  codes  were  in  fact  ever 
adopted). 
As  was  illustrated  by  the  early  decree  of  28  June  1918,  "  the  innovation  of  the  lease  was  that 
it  presented  the  opportunity  of  preserving  formal  state  ownership  of  an  asset,  while 
transferring  to  another,  control  and  the  right  to  profits  for  a  negotiated  period  of  time.  It  was 
an  attempt  to  provide  the  economic  incidents  of  ownership  without  affecting  the  formal  legal 
position.  Like  the  NEP  era  legislation,  leasing  was  available  in  relation  to  a  specified  list  of 
objects  including  land,  6"  as  well  as  "enterprises  (associations),  organisations,  structural 
entities  of  associations,  production  entities,  shops,  other  subdivisions  of  enterprises"  ;  642  and  it 
was  the  lease  of  the  latter  which  gave  rise  to  the  so-called  "leased  enterprise"  ("arendhoe 
predpriyatie"). 
The  importance  of  the  1989  leased  enterprise  was  not  only  that  it  built  upon  the  concept  of 
separate  interests,  and  that  it  consolidated  the  dismantling  of  the  governance  regime  of  the 
confirmation  model  achieved  by  the  earlier  expressions  of  the  participation  model,  but  also 
that  it  firmly  (but  only  implicitly)  reorientated  the  juridical  person  back  into  the  world  of 
"contract"  from  the  world  of  "forms  of  ownership".  The  leased  enterprises  were  born  of  a 
tradition  that  can  be  traced  both  to  the  NEP  legislation  on  leasing,  and  to  the  existing  bridge, 
the  contract  for  joint  activity,  that  was  the  grandfather  of  all  contract-based  associations.  As 
relations  therefore  moved  back  to  the  realm  of  civil  law,  the  balance,  embodied  by  democratic 
centralism  and  the  collective  farm  compromise,  tilted  firmly  towards  the  arena  of  the  market 
640  Supra  n.  626. 
641  Indeed,  the  subsequent  1990  FPLand,  like  the  former  1922  RSFSR  Land  Code,  provided  again  for  the 
lease  as  one  of  the  three  methods  for  holding  land:  (in  addition  to  possession  and  use)  (articles  5,6,7). 
642  FPLease,  article  I 
-  185- where  participants'  interests  were  defined  autonomously,  where  organisations  were  "owned" 
by  participants,  and  where  the  state's  rights,  as  quasi-feudal  overlord,  to  "administer"  the 
economy  through  instruction  were  increasingly  curtailed. 
6.2  The  Three  Expressions  of  the  Participation  Model 
The  argument  that  the  1987  state  enterprises,  1988  cooperative  enterprises  and  1989  leased 
enterprises  formed  different  expressions  of  a  single  unifying  model  or  policy  is  one  that  may 
on  its  face  seem  unlikely.  Indeed  the  link  between  these  three  organisations  is  rarely,  if  ever, 
made  in  commentaries  and  textbooks.  In  addition,  the  connection  between  all  these  enterprises 
and  the  contract  for  joint  activity  and  collective  farm  legislation  has,  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
author,  never  been  characterised  or  understood  in  the  terms  presented  by  the  participation 
model,  despite  the  fact  that  most  evidently  the  Cooperatives  Law  directly  regulated  the 
operation  of  collective  farms  as  well  as  industrial  cooperatives.  In  the  literature  that  preceded 
the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  these  three  enterprises  were  typically  regarded  as  discrete 
separate  initiatives;  6"  and  in  the  literature  written  after  the  adoption  of  the  1990  Law  on 
Enterprises  and  1990  Ownership  Law,  although  state  enterprises,  cooperatives  and  leased 
enterprises  were  all  seen  as  "enterprises"  (almost  by  definition  in  accordance  with  the  new 
law),  no  attempt  was  made  to  analyse  their  similarities  with  a  view  to  developing  an 
overarching  theoretical  understanding  of  their  structures.  ' 
It  is  argued  in  this  Chapter  that  each  of  the  1987  state  enterprises,  1988  cooperative 
enterprises  and  1989  leased  enterprises  were  in  fact  different  expressions  of  a  single  model 
where  the  Soviet  state  in  slightly  different  ways  explored  the  possibility  of  creating 
organisations  based  on  the  notion  of  active  "participation".  It  was  therefore  no  coincidence 
that  they  all  were  called  "enterprises".  "  All  these  enterprises  adopted  slightly  different  levels 
of  the  right  to  participate  through  the  democratic  process  coupled  with  economic 
643  For  example,  the  Soviet  state  publisher  of  legal  books,  "Yuridicheskaya  Literatura",  published  in  a  single 
book  the  set  of  1987  decrees  relating  to  the  reform  of  the  state  enterprises  (supra  n.  552);  published 
another  separate  book  on  the  role  and  function  of  these  new  1987  state  enterprises  (Predpriyatiye  -  Zakon 
-  Upravlenie  (Yuridicheskaya  Literatura:  1989));  and  published  a  third  separate  book  on  the  role  and 
function  of  the  cooperatives,  including  relevant  legislation  (supra  n.  572  (1988)).  Finally  a  separate  book 
on  leasing  was  published  after  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  (S.  A.  Gerasimenko,  Arenda  Kak 
Organizatsionno-Pravovaya  Forma  Predprimatel'stva  (Izatelstvo  BEK:  1992)).  None  of  these  studies 
made  more  than  a  passing  reference  to  the  other  enterprises.  This  was  generally  reflected  in  the  treatment 
in  western  literature  (see  for  example  Philip  Hanson,  From  Stagnation  to  Catastroika  -  Commentaries  on 
the  Soviet  Economy,  1983-1991  (Praeger  Publishers:  1992),  chapter  10  (The  Enterprise  Law  and  the 
Reform  Process),  and  chapter  12  (The  Draft  Law  on  Cooperatives:  An  Assessment)). 
644  On  the  significance  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  in  the  development  of  the  industrial  organisations, 
see  infra  Section  7.5. 
645  See  supra  n.  616. 
-  186- incentivisation  and  the  legacy  of  coercive  law.  However,  although  they  all  provided  the 
opportunity  for  participation,  they  were  never  intended  to  be,  in  the  words  of  loffe  and 
Maggs,  "a  change  of  the  system  itself".  It  gradually  became  clear  that  a  system  based  on  an 
"all  people's  state"  with  unlimited  political  and  economic  state  power  could  not  co-exist  with 
the  recognition  of  interests  separate  from  that  state  -  and  the  development  of  such  interests 
was  started  by  the  logic  of  the  1987  reform  of  the  state  enterprise  and  continued  through  to  the 
1989  leased  enterprises. 
6.3  1987  State  Enterprises  -  Separating  the  Private  from  the  Public 
6.3.1  The  State  Enterprise  and  the  Labour  Collective 
The  1987  state  enterprises  were  the  first  expression  of  the  participation  model  within  the 
Soviet  economy.  As  has  already  been  noted,  reforming  the  state  enterprise  as  a  starting  point 
for  the  perestroika  of  industrial  organisations  was  perhaps  an  obvious  choice.  The  law 
governing  their  regulation  dated  to  the  1965  Enterprise  Statute,  and  there  had  been  a 
"tradition"  since  the  1920s  of  periodically  re-examining  the  legal  framework  of  the  state 
enterprise  in  line  with  changing  macro-economic  policies,  stressing  alternatively  centralisation 
and  then  decentralisation.  16 
In  a  market  economy,  the  operation  of  that  economy  coupled  with  mandatory  corporate  law 
rules  provide  certain  systemic  incentives  to  align  the  interests  of  the  shareholders,  directors 
and  workers.  Ownership  provides  the  necessary  incentive  to  ensure  effective  monitoring  of 
operations  and  the  activities  of  directors  generally,  as  ownership  carries  with  it  the  right  to 
vote  on  the  appointment  of  the  executive  organ  (ie  directors),  to  receive  profits  in  the  form  of 
dividends,  and  to  benefit  from  an  increase  in  the  value  of  ownership  interests  (eg  shares) 
through  the  equity  market.  Structural  constraints  of  corporate  law  are  devised  in  part  to  ensure 
that,  where  there  may  be  a  risk  of  abuse,  interests  of  the  owners  and  the  directors  are 
realigned,  and  interests  of  minorities  are  protected.  "  Finally,  Smithean  hidden  hand  theory 
suggests  that  the  cumulation  of  all  companies  and  interest  groups  working  in  their  narrow  self- 
interest  in  the  market  place  actually  has  the  net  effect  of  producing  the  most  efficiencies  for 
the  market  as  a  whole. 
646  See  supra  n.  221. 
647  The  corporate  law  theory  beneath  this  summary  can  be  traced  to  Adolf  A.  Berle  and  Gardiner  C.  Means, 
The  Modem  Corporation  and  Private  Propeny  (1968,  reprinted  Transaction  Publishers:  1991)  and 
Coarse's  article  on  The  Nature  of  the  Finn  in  1937  (see  R.  H.  Coarse, 
. 
77ze  Firm,  the  Market  and  the  Law 
(The  University  of  Chicago  Press:  1988). 
-  187- The  Soviet  system  as  characterised  by  the  confirmation  model  was  radically  different  and  was 
more  akin  to  a  feudal  settlement  than  a  market  economy.  The  state  had  the  right  of  absolute 
ownership  and  control  over  the  whole  economy  (through  its  roles  as  creator-owner,  property- 
owner,  appointer  of  the  one-man  manager,  and  economic  and  legal  sovereign).  In  practice, 
this  command  economy  did  not  systemically  incentivise  the  individual  worker  who  was 
deprived  by  the  ubiquitous  dictatorial  institutions  of  the  Communist  Party  and  state  of  the 
usual  means  of  representation  and  protest,  including  trade  unions  and  parties.  Therefore, 
bereft  of  collective  institutions  that  may  have  represented  the  workers'  interests  in  the  narrow 
sense,  workers  generally  exercised  the  only  avenue  for  dissent  that  the  system  allowed  -  the 
withdrawal  of  their  labour.  64'  An  open  admission  of  the  existence  of  an  "interest  of  the 
worker"  as  separate  from  that  of  the  state  would  have  been  problematic  in  the  context  of 
Soviet  ideology,  the  logic  of  the  planned  economy,  and  the  theory  of  the  all-people's  state. 
Yet,  without  some  mechanism  for  incentivisation,  it  seemed  that  the  worker  would  be 
systemically  encouraged  to  withhold  his  labour.  Bonus  payments  and  labour  discipline  were 
the  traditional  incentivisation  methods  used,  "  and  therefore  an  "interest"  of  the  worker 
separate  from  that  of  the  state  was  always  implicit  within  Soviet  wage  payment  and  labour 
law. 
This  systemic  incentivisation  problem  was  unmasked  and  explicitly  acknowledged  by 
Gorbachev.  Probably,  without  an  understanding  of  the  practical  and  ultimate  consequences  of 
such  an  acknowledgement,  650  it  a  new  organisation"  was  introduced  on  the  basis  of  stressing 
the  central  role  of  the  participant,  the  individual  worker,  and  elaborating  a  regime  for 
incentivising  his  interest.  In  short,  the  aim  was  to  develop  in  each  worker  "a  deep  personal 
interestedness  in  the  economic  use  of  all-people's  ownership,  [and]  his  organic  participation  in 
the  affairs  of  the  collective  and  the  state,  11651  thereby  realising  in  practice  the  view  of 
Venediktov  and  Bratus  who  had  conceived  of  the  labour  collective  as  the  "heartbeat"  of  the 
state  enterprise.  "' 
..........................  .......  ............  ............  --  .............  .  ........  ........  . .........  .  ................  ......  ........  .........  ...  .........  .  ................  .....................  --  ------  .  ............  .....  .  ... 
648  This  argument  is  developed  by  Filtzer  (see  Donald  Filtzer,  Soviet  Workers  and  the  Collapse  of 
Perestroika  -  The  Soviet  labour  process  and  Gorbachev's  reforms,  1985-1991  (Cambridge  University 
Press:  1994)). 
649  See  infra  Section  6.3.2. 
650  The  consequences  of  the  participation  model  for  the  theory  of  the  all-people's  state  and  state  control  of  a 
single  national  economic  complex  are  evaluated  throughout  this  Chapter.  They  resulted  in  the 
fundamental  reforms  of  spring  1990  which  are  outlined  and  assessed  in  the  next  Chapter. 
651  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  1(3). 
652  Supra  n.  57  (1948),  pp.  664-673;  and  supra  n.  572,  pp.  104-115.  Indeed  this  was  partly  reflected  in  the 
drafting  of  1965  Enterprise  Statute. 
-  188- Despite  agreement  on  the  general  incentivisation  function  of  this  new  organisation,  the  detail 
of  how  to  achieve  the  resurrection  of  the  interest  of  the  participant  in  practice,  without 
prejudicing  the  state's  overall  control  of  the  economy,  was  not  something  that  had  been 
previously  worked  out.  The  State  Enterprise  Law  was  the  first  attempt  to  do  so  in  the 
perestroika  period. 
Most  of  the  techniques  adopted  by  the  State  Enterprise  Law  can  be  traced  to  the  law  of 
collective  farms.  A  certain  amount  of  confusion  however  inevitably  resulted  when  the 
collective  farm  compromise  was  transported  and  translated  into  the  industrial  economy,  and 
applied  to  an  organisation  which,  in  contrast  to  the  collective  farms,  had  traditionally  been 
wholly  owned  by  the  state. 
The  collective  farm  represented  a  balance  between  the  interests  of  the  state  (ie  the  "social 
interest")  and  the  interests  of  the  collective  farmers  and  their  households  (ie  the  "personal 
interest");  653  and  in  1987  the  new  state  enterprise  was  also  "opened  up"  to  interests  other  than 
those  of  the  state,  seemingly  in  the  pursuit  of  a  similar  dynamic.  However,  unlike  the 
collective  farm,  there  had  not  previously  been  any  tradition  of  distinguishing  different 
interests  within  this  industrial  organisation  and  hence  the  confirmation  model  only  provided 
for  a  regime  of  one  owner  and  a  one-man  manager.  In  a  break  from  the  past,  the  State 
Enterprise  Law  formally  recognised  (among  others)  the  interests  of:  the  state  and  Soviet 
society  generally  (ie  the  formal  owners),  those  of  the  labour  collective  and  its  members  (ie  the 
participants/economic  owners),  and  those  of  the  enterprise  itself. 
The  State  Enterprise  Law  in  many  places  anthropornorphised  the  concept  of  "the  enterprise" 
by  providing  that  "the  enterprise"  had  certain  rights  and  obligations.  "'  In  the  context  of  a  new 
model  that  contemplated  competing  interests  within  the  organisational  forum,  it  was  not 
exactly  clear  in  whose  interests  "the  enterprise"  was  intended  to  act.  655 
In  some  places  the  State  Enterprise  Law  assumed  that  the  interests  of  the  labour  collective 
were  the  interests  of  the  enterprise  and  could  not  be  distinguished.  The  clearest  expression  of 
the  labour  collective  "as  the  enterprise"  was  in  article  2(3)  where  the  labour  collective  was 
653  On  the  collective  farm  compromise,  see  supra  Sections  2.4.1  and  6.1.3. 
654  See  generally  infra  Sections  6.3.4.1  and  6.3.4.3. 
655  In  the  confirmation  regime  this  was  less  problematic  as  the  rights  "of  the  enterprise"  could  only  have 
been  construed  as  rights  of  the  one-man  manager  acting  on  behalf  of  the  enterprise  in  ftirthering  the 
interests  of  the  all-people's  state. 
-  189- described  as  the  "fully  fledged  proprietor  ("khozyain  it  )656  of  the  enterprise  [which]  shall 
autonomously  decide  all  questions  of  production  and  social  development.,  '  This  was  reflected 
again  in  article  1(2)  which  referred  to  the  labour  collective  as  having  the  right  to  use  "all- 
people's  ownership"  (ie  the  enterprise)  as  "proprietor". 
At  other  places  however,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  assumed  that  the  interests  of  the  enterprise 
and  the  labour  collective  could  be  distinguished  although  for  present  purposes  were  co- 
incident.  "  At  other  times  still,  the  interests  were  distinguished  and  assumed  not  to  be  co- 
incident.  For  example,  articles  3(5)  and  4(4)  both  referred  to  the  right  of  the  "the 
enterprise  ...  with  the  consent  of  the  labour  collective  ...... 
Article  8(2)  went  even  further  and 
provided  that  "the  enterprise  shall  form  a  stable  labour  collective",  thereby  suggesting  that  it 
was  the  enterprise  that  was  the  proprietor  of  the  labour  collective  and  not  the  other  way 
around. 
Perhaps  the  best  understanding  of  the  concept  of  "the  rights  of  the  enterprise"  is  by  reference 
to  the  traditional  view  of  identifying  rights  "of  a  juridical  person"  with  the  rights  of  its 
executive  body.  In  the  case  of  the  1987  state  enterprise,  the  executive  body  was  the  one-man 
manager.  Indeed,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  directly  referred  to  the  one-man  manager  as  acting 
"on  behalf  of  the  enterprise"  . 
118  Unlike  the  one-man  manager  of  the  confirmation  model,  the 
one-man  manager  of  the  participation  model  should  be  understood  as  an  executive  body 
required  to  act  in  the  combined  interests  of  the  state  and  the  participant  (ie  the  labour 
collective)  and  not  just  in  the  interests  of  the  state  alone.  "' 
Therefore,  like  the  collective  farm  compromise  that  balanced  the  interests  of  the  state  with 
those  of  the  dvor  and  the  collective  farm  members,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  elevated  the  role 
of  the  labour  collective  to  that  of  a  "participant"  with  separately  identifiable  interests  and 
accordingly  referred  throughout  to  a  balance  or  combination  of  interests  with  those  of  the 
state.  "'  As  a  result,  the  1987  state  enterprise  fell  clearly  outside  the  traditional  confirmation 
656  The  Russian  word  "khozyain"  suggested  therefore  that  the  labour  collective  had  control  over  the 
economic  operations  of  the  state  enterprise  but  avoided  the  ideologically  sensitive  term  "sobstvennik" 
(owner). 
657  For  example,  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  2(3)  stated  "achievements  and  losses  in  the  work  of  the 
enterprise  [NB  not  the  work  of  the  labour  collective]  shall  directly  effect  the  level  of  khozraschet  revenue 
of  the  collective,  the  well-being  of  each  worker"  [emphasis  added]. 
658  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  6(4). 
659  This  analysis  is  further  developed  infra  Sections  6.3.3  and  6.3.4. 
660  The  State  Enterprise  Law  referred  explicitly  to  this  dynamic:  to  "the  combination  of  interests  of  society, 
the  collective  and  each  worker"  (article  1(2));  "the  combination  of  centralised  management  and  the 
autonomy  of  the  enterprise"  (article  1(2));  "the  combination  of  interests  of  society,  the  collective  and 
each  worker"  (article  2(l));  "democratic  centralism  and  the  combination  of  centralised  management  and 
-190- model  of  the  industrial  organisation.  By  recognising  formally  the  existence  and  role  of 
separate  interests,  the  state  enterprise  was  cut  loose  to  sail  upon  the  sea  of  the  perestroika 
reforms,  with  the  state  hoping  to  retain  control  as  it  was  blown  upon  uncharted  waters  by  the 
winds  of  the  participants  and  other  interest  groups. 
6.3.2  Incentivisation  -  the  First  Pillar  (Full  Khozraschet,  Self-financing  and  Wages  linked 
to  Perfonnance) 
In  contrast  with  recessions  in  market  economies,  generally  evidenced  by  a  reduction  in 
demand,  the  systemic  problem  in  the  Soviet  command  economy  was  traditionally  based  on  a 
lack  of  sufficient  supply  (both  in  the  amount  and  quality  of  production)  to  satisfy  demand. 
This  feature  seemed  to  be  ever  present  in  the  economy,  even  since  the  very  earliest  days  of 
Soviet  power.  While  the  civil  war  was  clearly  responsible  for  the  economic  hardships  of  1918- 
1919,  during  the  NEP  period  the  state  sector  continued  to  have  problems  in  "competing"  on 
equal  terms  with  the  market  both  in  terms  of  production  and  marketing,  despite  Lenin's 
declaration  that  "we  must  learn  to  trade".  Thereafter,  the  economy  went  through  frequent 
systemic  crises  as  Stalin  pushed  towards  industrialisation.  Rather  than  conceiving  this  issue  in 
macro  economic  terms  (ie  as  a  systemic  consequence  of  the  command  economy  and  state 
planning  as  a  whole),  it  was  generally  problematised  by  the  Soviet  polity  within  the  context  of 
specific  incentivisation  measures  and  the  need  to  provide  better  conditions  to  encourage  the 
workforce  to  work  harder  and  more  efficiently,  thereby  resulting  in  additional  output  and 
improved  quality.  The  two  traditional  strategies  were  differential  wages  and  labour  discipline. 
The  concept  of  paying  differential  wages  in  accordance  with  the  quality  and  quantity  of  work 
was  initially  considered  to  be  contrary  to  the  Marxist  principle  of  equalisation  (ie  distribution 
according  to  need).  However,  following  the  Brest  Litovsk  crisis,  the  state  recognised  specific 
incentivisation  measures  to  be  an  indispensable  part  of  Soviet  economic  policy,  together  with 
its  twin,  labour  discipline.  The  7'  Party  Congress  in  March  1918  acknowledged  the  need  for 
"the  most  energetic,  unsparingly  decisive  and  draconian  measures  to  raise  self-discipline  and 
discipline  of  workers  and  peasants".  "'  At  the  same  time,  piece-rates  and  other  forms  of 
discriminatory  payments  were  introduced. 
The  implementation  of  khozraschet  in  the  early  1920s  further  consolidated  the  policy  of 
differential  wages  because  if  an  enterprise  was  to  cover  its  costs,  including  wages,  by  its 
socialist  self-management"  (article  6(l));  "the  interests  of  the  state  and  the  labour  collective"  (article 
6(3));  and  "planned  management  and  observance  of  principles  of  full  khozraschet,  self-financing  and  self- 
management"  (article  9(l)). 
661  Supra  n.  11,  p.  404. 
-  191- revenues,  then  wages  "by  definition"  would  need  to  vary  depending  upon  the  level  of 
revenues  of  the  enterprise  at  which  the  workers  were  employed.  While  the  policy  of 
differential  wages  came  to  be  broadly  accepted,  state  control  over  wages  in  practice  only 
developed  in  the  late  1920s.  Before  the  budget  of  1925-26  there  was  no  real  control  by 
Narkomfin  over  the  allocation  of  salaries  between  staff.  In  its  resolution  of  2  January  1925, 
Sovnarkom  recognised  the  need  for  a  uniform  nomenclature  for  posts  and  corresponding  fixed 
salaries;  and  in  1925,  uniform  state  regulation  of  wages  of  employees  in  state  sector, 
including  those  on  khozraschet,  commenced  and  was  gradually  developed  and  extended 
662  throughout  the  following  years.  By  the  end  of  the  1920s  and  with  the  defeat  of  Tomsky,  the 
possibility  for  "collective  bargaining"  was  reduced  and  wages  became  firmly  integrated  into 
the  planned  economy.  In  his  famous  speech,  "The  New  Situation  -  New  Tasks  for  Economic 
Construction",  to  the  conference  of  business  managers  in  June  22-23  1931,  Stalin  called 
finally  to  be  "rid  of  this  evil,  equalisation  must  not  be  tolerated".  663  The  unstable  balance 
between  discipline,  incentivisation  and  central  control  remained,  and  throughout  the  1950s  and 
60s  various  wage  reform  initiatives  were  pursued  in  an  attempt  to  increase  incentivisation  and 
productivity  . 
6'  These  concerns  even  found  expression  in  the  Enterprise  Statute  and  Production 
Statute  of  the  confirmation  model  which  contemplated  the  establishment  of  a  material 
incentive  fund,  an  enterprise  fund  and  a  wage  ftind.  665 
This  traditional  method  of  using  wages  as  an  incentivising  strategy  was  also  adopted  during 
the  early  years  of  perestroika.  In  line  with  this  policy,  the  Workers  Wages  Decree  of 
September  1986  666  linked  wage  levels  and  bonus  payments  to  specialisation  and  quality  of 
output.  Article  2  provided  for  the  broadening  of  the  rights  of  enterprises  in  "the  stimulation  of 
effective  labour  in  new  conditions  of  economic  management,  the  perfection  of  management, 
the  deepening  of  khozraschet  and  the  transfer  to  new  principles  of  self-financing".  The 
autonomy  of  the  enterprise  in  applying  the  proceeds  of  the  labour  fund  was  increased  as  well 
as  "the  role  of  the  labour  collective  in  the  organisation  of  an  efficient  system  of  material  and 
662  Supra  n.  630,  p.  381-2. 
663  13  Stalin  51. 
664  As  Filtzer  commented:  "Since  the  early  five  year  plans  the  Soviet  regime  has  consistently  failed  to 
develop  a  coherent  and  workable  system  of  incentives"  (supra  n.  648,  p.  56). 
665  Enterprise  Statute,  articles  14  and  84;  Production  Association  Statute,  article  39. 
666  0  Sovershenstvovanii  Organizatsii  Zarabotnoi  Platy  i  Vvedenii  Novykh  Tarifhykh  Stavok  i 
Dolzhnostnykh  Okladov  Ravotnikov  Proizvodstvennykh  Otraslei  Narodonogo  Khozayistva, 
Postanovleniya  (September  1986),  no.  1115,  p.  120.  The  preamble  simply  noted  that  "the  current  system 
of  wages  in  many  branches  of  the  national  economy  does  not  satisfy  the  demands  of  acceleration  of 
scientific-technical  progess,  transfer  to  intensive  methods  of  economic  management,  increasing  the 
quality  of  goods  and  does  not  correspond  to  a  modern  day  level  of  organisation  of  production  and 
labour  ". 
-  192- moral  stimuli".  However,  while  the  concept  of  self-financing  was  indeed  broadened,  the 
enterprise  was  still  ultimately  run  by  the  state's  appointed  one-man  manager,  and  the  labour 
collective  was  merely  involved  in  an  ancillary  way  and  in  moral  incentivisation. 
The  State  Enterprise  Law  built  upon  these  principles  but  rather  than  looking  at  wages  in 
isolation,  it  constructed  an  organisation  around  the  separate  interests  of  the  participants  (the 
labour  collective)  more  generally  and  thus  wage  policy  became  linked  both  to  the  profitability 
of  the  enterprise  and  to  the  rights  of  workers  in  management. 
The  organisational  incentivisation  regime  of  the  1987  state  enterprises  was  founded  upon  three 
elements:  (i)  the  enterprise  was  run  on  the  basis  of  full  khozraschet  and  self-financing;  (ii)  the 
residual  income  of  the  enterprise  was  available  for  distribution  to  the  workers;  and  (iii)  this 
117  distribution  was  effected  on  the  principle  of  "distribution  in  accordance  with  work  done". 
The  expressed  intention  was  simple:  to  operate  the  enterprise  with  profit  or  revenue  as  "the 
solitary  index  of  economic  activity",  668  and  to  create  a  "deep  personal  interestedness  of  each 
worker  in  the  economic  use  of  all-people's  ownership  it 
. 
669 
Full  Khozraschet  and  Self-financing  "Full  khozraschet  and  self-fmancing"  was  a  touchstone 
of  the  early  perestroika  reforms.  It  was  contemplated  expressly  in  the  legislation  of  January 
1987  on  the  contract-based  concession  enterprises  as  well  as  in  the  State  Enterprise  Law.  670 
There  was  however  no  formal  definition  of  the  concept,  and  its  origins  and  development  can 
only  be  found  in  a  series  of  unpublished  decrees  of  1985  -  1987. 
The  deepening  role  of  khozraschet  can  initially  be  traced  to  the  unpublished  decrees  that 
transferred  enterprises  and  associations  on  a  Ministry-by-Ministry  basis  to  the  so-called  "new 
economic  conditions".  These  transfers  were  carried  out  following,  and  on  the  basis  of,  Decree 
669  of  July  1985  "On  Extending  the  Application  of  New  Methods  of  Economic  Mechanisms 
and  Strengthening  their  Influence  on  the  Acceleration  of  Scientific-Technical  Progress".  671 
Decree  669  was  made  by  joint  order  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Communist  Party  and 
the  Government  of  the  USSR  and  aimed  at  extending  the  rights  of  enterprises  and  associations 
in  planning  and  economic  activity,  and  increasing  "responsibility"  for  the  results  of  their 
work.  This  was  to  be  achieved  by  creating  "genuine  interestedness"  of  the  labour  collective  in 
667  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  1(3). 
668  lbid,  article  2(2). 
669  Ibid,  article  1(3). 
670  Supra  Section  5.3.2. 
671  Only  extracts  of  Decree  669  were  published  in  the  official  gazette  (SP  SSSR  (1985),  no.  23,  item  115). 
For  the  unpublished  version,  see  supra  n.  559. 
-  193- the  performance  of  the  enterprise.  Decree  669  can  therefore  be  regarded  as  setting  the  basic 
parameters  of  the  participation  model. 
Decree  669  was  implemented  in  practice  starting  in  October  1985  with  Decree  981  "On  the 
Transfer  to  New  Economic  Conditions  of  Production  Associations  and  Enterprises  of  the 
Minstry  of  Medical  Industry".  "'  This  decree  was  divided  into  three  sections.  The  first  section, 
"On  the  Perfecting  of  Planning",  increased  the  role  of  the  enterprise  in  the  drafting  of  relevant 
plans.  A  basic  index  of  items  to  be  included  in  a  five-year  plan  and  in  an  annual  plan  were 
listed  in  the  decree,  and  then  individual  enterprises  were  given  the  right  to  prepare  drafts  on 
the  basis  of  "controlling"  prices,  limits  and  norms  set  by  the  Ministry.  The  second  section  of 
the  decree  was  "On  the  Technical  Perfecting  of  Production,  [and  on]  Acceleration  of  Working 
out  and  Introducing  of  New  Techniques";  and  the  third  section  was  "On  Increasing  the 
Interestedness  of  the  Labour  Collective  in  the  Growth  of  Effective  Production  and  On  the 
Strengthening  of  Khozraschet".  It  was  in  this  third  section  that  the  positive  law  origins  of  full 
khozraschet  and  self-financing  can  be  found.  Increasing  the  interestedness  of  the  workforce 
was  to  be  achieved  through  a  number  of  funds,  including  a  wages  fund,  from  which  payments 
could  be  made  to  incentivise  workers.  The  decree  in  this  section  gave  further  control  over 
production  activities  and  budget  payments  to  the  enterprise. 
The  transfer  to  "new  economic  conditions"  was  implemented  broadly  on  the  same  basis  in 
relation  to  enterprises  in  most  other  Ministries  throughout  the  remainder  of  1985  and 
continued  into  1986.673 
Following  the  decisions  of  the  February  XXVII  Congress  of  the  Communist  Party,  1986 
however  was  also  to  witness  the  start  of  a  more  radical  policy  that  introduced  explicitly  the 
term  full  khozraschet  and  self-financing  into  Soviet  subordinate  legislation  and  prepared  the 
foundations  for  its  appearance  in  the  primary  and  secondary  legislation  of  1987  (ie  Decree  49 
and  the  State  Enterprise  Law).  In  his  speech  to  the  XXVII  Congress,  Gorbachev  called  for  the 
transition  to  "genuine  khozraschet,  self  sufficiency  and  self-financing",  674  and  on  the  basis  of 
the  decisions  of  this  Congress,  another  series  of  unpublished  decrees  were  enacted  towards  the 
672  0  Perevode  na  Novye  Usloviya  Kozyaisvovaniya  Proizvodstvennykh  Ob''edinenii  i  Predpriyatii 
Ministerstva  Meditsinskoi  Promyshlennosti,  Postanovleniya  (October  1985),  no.  981,  p.  247. 
673  See  Decrees  1073-1079  and  1094-1099  of  1985;  and  Decrees  1199-1209,1321  and  1322  of  1986.  Like 
Decree  981,  these  decrees  were  also  unpublished  in  the  official  gazette  and  could  only  be  found  in  the 
"PostanovIeniya"  books  that  were  "for  internal  use  only". 
674  Supra  n.  561,  p.  54. 
-194- end  of  1986  and  through  1987.  This  time  these  decrees  provided  for  the  transfer  of  enterprises 
and  associations  on  a  Ministry-by-Ministry  basis  to  "full  khozraschet"  . 
675 
The  first  of  these  decrees  was  Decree  962  "On  the  Transfer  of  Associations  and  Enterprises  of 
the  Ministry  of  Chemical  and  Oil  Machine  Building  of  the  USSR  to  Full  Khozraschet" 
. 
61,  The 
aim  was  to  achieve  "profitable"  activity  through  increased  accountability  of  the  enterprise  for 
the  results  of  its  production.  Profit  was  deemed  to  be  the  most  important  economic  indicator 
to  be  achieved  through  the  establishment  of  efficient  operations  and  autonomous  control  by 
enterprises  over  resources  and  revenues.  The  decree  went  on  to  include  sections  "On 
Expanding  the  Application  of  Economic  Methods  of  Management",  "On  Improving  the 
Organisation  of  Planning  and  Management",  "On  Expanding  the  Rights  of  Associations  and 
Enterprises  in  Technical  and  Social  Development",  and,  most  importantly,  "On  Increasing  the 
Interestedness  of  the  Labour  Collective  in  the  Growth  of  Efficient  Production  and  the  Quality 
of  Products"  (which  contained  similar  provisions  to  the  equivalent  section  in  the  1985/1986 
decrees  on  transferring  enterprises  to  new  economic  conditions). 
As  such,  while  the  provisions  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law  in  1987  relating  to  ftill  khozraschet 
and self-financing  seemed  like  a  radical  departure  from  the  regime  of  the  confirmation  model, 
in  fact  a  transition  had  gradually  been  taking  place  since  1985  through  the  two  sets  of 
unpublished  decrees,  first  on  the  transfer  to  new  economic  conditions  and  secondly  on  the 
transfer  to  full  khozraschet.  Therefore,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  should  be  regarded  as 
consolidating  in  primary  legislation  certain  existing  concepts  rather  than  as  introducing  an 
entirely  new  set  of  economic  norms. 
The  basic  aims  of  ftill  khozraschet  and  self-financing,  although  not  explicitly  stated  in  the 
State  Enterprise  Law,  were  therefore  relatively  clear:  expenses  were  to  be  paid  out  of 
revenues;  the  "enterprise"  was  to  determine  "autonomously"  the  distribution  of  residual 
profits;  and  the  enterprise  was  "obliged  to  work  without  showing  a  loss".  "'  Therefore,  within 
the  framework  of  this  adjusted  planned  economy,  access  to  state  subsidies  by  the  enterprise 
was  increasingly  limited,  but  this  was  coupled  with  the  gradual  curtailment  of  the  practice  by 
the  state  of  extracting  all  profits  by  administrative  means,  in  excess  of  taxes,  with  a  view  to 
cross-subsidising  other  enterprises  operating  with  the  planned  economy.  The  finer  points  of 
675  See  Decrees  962-965,1072  and  1282  of  1986  and  Decrees  665,874,906-911,916,937-944  and  others 
of  1987.  Again,  copies  of  these  decrees  can  only  be  found  in  the  "Postanovleniya"  books  for  internal  use 
only. 
676  0  Perevode  Ob''edinenii  i  Predpriyatii  Ministerstva  Khimicheskogo  i  Neftyanogo  Mashinostroeniya 
SSSR  na  Polniy  Kozyaistvennyi  Raschet,  Postanoveleniya  (August  1986),  no.  962,  p.  111. 
677  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  17(4). 
-  195- the  application  of  full  khozraschet  and  self-financing  in  practice  were  as  much  a  question  of 
politics  and  economics  as  of  law.  "' 
Under  the  new  concept  of  "full"  khozraschet,  a  guaranteed  minimum  wage  was  questioned 
with  the  introduction  of  a  system  under  which  wages  were  paid  only  from  the  revenues/profit 
of  the  enterprise  (following  statutory  deductions,  taxes  and  other  expenses);  and  where  the 
residual  profit  was  distributed  among  the  workers  depending  upon  their  individual  "labour 
contributions".  Like  the  basic  concept  of  identifying  "a  participant"  and  its  interests  as 
separate  from  that  of  the  state,  this  framework  for  the  payment  of  wages  was  also  indebted  to 
collective  farm  law,  and  in  particular,  payments  made  from  residual  revenues  distributed  on 
the  basis  of  labour  days  worked.  "' 
The  Nature  o  Residual  Income  The  State  Enterprise  Law  provided  two  alternatives  for 
calculating  the  residual  amount,  called  the  "khozraschet  revenue  of  the  collective"  (ie  the 
residual  profit  after  statutory  deductions,  taxes  and  expenses).  "'  Article  3  provided  that  "the 
khozraschet  revenue  of  the  collective,  the  source  of  the  production  and  social  development  of 
the  enterprise,  the  payment  of  labour,  shall  be  located  at  the  disposal  of  the  enterprise,  shall 
be  used  autonomously  and  shall  not  be  subject  to  seizure". 
This  concept  of  khozraschet  revenue  as  described  in  article  3  was  problematic  and  illustrated 
again  the  tensions  in  distinguishing  between  an  anthropomorphic  enterprise  and  the  labour 
collective.  "'  On  the  one  hand,  it  referred  explicitly  to  khozraschet  revenue  as  being  "of  the 
collective"  (and  not  of  the  state  (who  was  the  legal  owner  of  the  enterprise  and  its  property) 
678  Despite  these  basic  rules,  there  were  instances  where  state  assistance  continued  to  be  contemplated,  most 
particularly  in  the  area  of  credits.  An  enterprise  was  given  the  right  to  open  bank  accounts  and  use  bank 
credits  but,  in  accordance  with  article  18(l),  a  "systemic  failure"  to  repay  loans  resulted  in  the  loss  of  the 
right  to  receive  new  credits.  However,  article  14(4)  provided  that  if  an  enterprise  did  not  have  sufficient 
assets  to  pay  for  goods  ordered  and  could  not  receive  bank  credits,  the  state  superior  agency  was  obliged 
to  allocate  funds  from  central  resources  to  that  enterprise,  on  condition  that  they  were  repaid  at  some 
future  date  (ie  they  were  construed  in  strictly  legal  terms  as  a  loan  and  not  as  a  "subsidy").  Furthermore, 
article  18(l)  actually  contemplated  the  issue  of  a  state  superior  agency  guarantee  as  an  exception  to  the 
rule  that  systemic  failure  to  repay  loans  would  result  in  the  loss  of  the  right  to  receive  bank  credits. 
Finally,  although  there  was  the  possibility  to  liquidate  a  state  enterprise  in  financial  difficulties  (see  infra 
Section  6.3.4.2),  the  procedures  involved  would  have  made  this  difficult  to  achieve  in  practice. 
679  See  supra  Section  2.4.1  and  infra  Section  6.4.2.  Ultimately,  however,  this  concept  (like  the  notion  of 
participation  itself)  can  be  traced  to  the  Brezhnev  Constitution.  This  was  recognised  in  article  14(l)  of 
the  State  Enterprise  Law  which  provided:  "At  the  enterprise,  a  citizen  of  the  USSR  shall  realise  his 
constitutional  right  to  work  and  to  be  paid  in  accordance  with  the  results  of  their  labour,  its  quantity  and 
its  quality"). 
680  "On  the  basis  of  normative  distribution  of  profit"  and  "on  the  basis  of  normative  distribution  of  revenue 
received  after  compensation  from  receipts  of  material  expenses"  (article  3(1)). 
681  See  disussion  at  n.  654  and  associated  paragraphs. 
-  196- nor  of  the  enterprise  itself).  This  was  consistent  with  the  notion  of  the  labour  collective  as 
"proprietor",  because  the  entitlement  to  residual  profits  normally  rests  with  the  ultimate 
"proprietors"  (or  "economic  owners")  of  a  juridical  person.  On  the  other  hand,  while  the  state 
was  clearly  prevented  from  "seizing"  this  khozraschet  revenue,  its  disposal  was  to  be  decided 
by  the  enterprise  tv  autonomously"  (ie  not  by  the  labour  collective)  . 
6"  Finally  this  definition 
suggested  that  the  "khozraschet  revenue"  was  not  just  to  be  used  for  "the  payment  of  labour  ", 
but  also  for  the  "production"  and  "social  development"  of  the  enterprise.  683  It  may  be  that  this 
division  between  the  right  of  the  worker  to  the  khozraschet  revenue  and  the  right  of  the 
enterprise  to  distribute  it,  was  the  first  indication  under  Soviet  law  (although  somewhat 
imperfectly)  of  the  ownership-control  distinction  and  of  the  right  of  owners  (who  later  became 
stockholders)  to  dividends,  but  the  right  of  management  (who  later  became  directors)  to 
decide  on  whether  to  declare  any  dividends.  The  wider  use  of  the  khozraschet  revenue  for 
purposes  other  than  just  the  payment  of  labour  again  has  parallels  with  the  status  of  residual 
income  as  the  source  for  dividends.  The  decision  to  use  the  residual  income  for  making 
dividend  payments  to  participants,  or  alternatively  for  use  to  invest  "in  the  enterprise",  was 
made  at  the  discretion  of  the  management. 
D- 
&--.:  ]L  istribution  of  Residual  Income  From  the  residual  profit  (the  khozraschet  revenue  of  the 
labour  collective),  wages  were  to  be  "determined  by  the  final  results  of  work,  [and]  by  the 
worker's  personal  labour  contribution  ("vk1adom")".  "  Article  14(2)  gave  "the  enterprise"  the 
right,  "on  the  basis  of  openness"  and  "objective  evaluation",  to  determine  how  individual 
"contributions"  were  to  be  assessed  and  translated  into  a  wage  (ie  the  portion  of  this  residual 
profit  to  be  allocated  to  a  particular  worker).  It  was  noted  explicitly  in  the  State  Enterprise 
Law  that  there  was  to  be  no  maximum  cap  on  the  amount  that  could  be  earned.  Within  the 
context  of  "established  norms",  the  enterprise  was  given  wide  discretion  in  establishing  wage 
funds  for  specific  categories  of  worker,  new  base  salary  rates,  forms  and  systems  of  wages 
and  incentive  funds.  "'  However  as  a  procedural  "check",  and  by  way  of  ensuring  that  the 
enterprise  was  managed  by  taking  into  account  a  combination  of  interests,  the  council  of  the 
682  The  right  of  "the  enterprise"  to  distribute  the  khozraschet  revenue  was  also  provided  by  article  2(2). 
683  This  use  of  the  khozraschet  revenue  was  reinforced  by  article  3(l)  which  noted  "the  khozraschet  revenue 
of  the  collective  as  the  main  source  of  self-financing  of  its  [the  enterprise's]  production  and  social 
development  and  of  payment  for  work  [of  workers]  ". 
684  The  term  "vklad"  presumably  meant  the  worker's  physical  efforts  rather  than  any  contribution  in  the 
sense  of  a  payment  (in  cash  or  in  kind)  to  the  enterprise.  It  therefore  had  a  different  meaning  to  that  used 
in  the  context  of  the  contract-based  concession  model  (see  supra  Section  5.4.2.1).  The  term  "labour 
contribution"  was  also  used  in  connection  with  the  profit  distribution  rules  of  the  second  expression  of  the 
participation  model  (see  Cooperatives  Law,  article  13(l),  and  infra  Section  6.4.2). 
685  State  Enterprise  Law,  articles  14(4)  and  14(5). 
-  197- labour  collective  was  additionally  given  the  right  to  ensure  that  "payment  for  the  work  of  the 
workers  corresponds  to  their  personal  contribution  and  the  fair  distribution  of  social 
wealth  ". 
686 
Therefore  the  "enterprise"  had  the  power  to  decide  whether  to  apply  the  residual  income 
towards  the  payment  of  wages;  if  so,  what  portion  should  be  distributed  in  wages;  and  the 
division  of  that  portion  between  workers  on  the  basis  of  their  individual  labour  contributions. 
If,  as  has  been  argued,  the  "enterprise"  (ie  one  man  manager)  was  to  act  in  the  combined 
interests  of  the  state  and  the  "workers  (participants)",  the  State  Enterprise  Law  meant  that  the 
internal  economic  framework  of  the  industrial  organisation  had  been  radically  restructured. 
The  state's  unitary  monopoly  interest  of  the  confirmation  governance  model  had  been  diluted 
by  the  presence  of  a  new  separate  and  independent  interest,  and  the  State  Enterprise  Law 
expressly  acknowledged  that  interest  and  explicitly  aimed  at  passing  back  to  the  participant  an 
element  of  economic  and  managerial  control  in  the  pursuit  of  efficiency  and  profitability. 
6.3.3  Democracy  -  the  Second  Pillar  (The  Combination  of  Centralised  Management  and 
Socialist  Self-Management) 
The  democracy  principle  in  the  Soviet  economy  and  polity  had  been  gradually  extinguished 
during  the  1920s  as  Stalin  took  control  over  the  Communist  Party  and  extended  its  hegemony 
over  the  voices  of  opposition.  As  Trotsky  had  feared  in  his  speech  to  the  12'  Party  Congress, 
"party  democracy"  gave  way  to  the  "nomination  principle"  and  "secretarial  bureaucratism",  a 
movement  that  can  be  dated  to  the  appointment  of  Kaganovich  in  April  1922  to  head 
Uchraspred  (the  section  of  the  secretariat  in  charge  of  qualifications  of  party  personnel).  A 
classification  of  posts  was  established  by  Orgburo  in  October  1923,  and  Orgburo  and 
Uchraspred  worked  together  in  the  proliferation  of  the  nomination  system  until  their 
amalgamation  in  1924.  The  development  of  the  Communist  Party  as  a  mass  political  party 
based  on  the  principles  of  dictatorship  and  run  by  the  secretariat  and  politburo  under  the 
leadership  of  the  general  secretary  was  achieved  by  1930;  "'  and  the  16'  Party  Congress  of 
686  Ibid,  article  7(l). 
687  The  condemnation  of  fractionalism  began  at  the  10'  Party  Congress  of  March  1921.  During  Lenin's 
illness,  the  triumvirate  defeated  the  "platform  of  the  46"  by  December  1923  thereby  consolidating  control 
over  Pravda  and  the  party  in  Moscow  and  the  regions;  the  1924  USSR  Constitution  furthered  the  process 
of  centralisation;  local  administrations  were  established  in  the  context  of  the  campaign  of  the  mid-1920s 
to  revitalise  the  Soviets;  by  the  14'  Party  Congress,  control  had  been  taken  over  the  Leningrad  party,  and 
Komsomol  as  an  independent  party  organ  had  been  tamed  and  transformed  into  the  junior  branch  of  the 
Communist  Party;  the  defeat  of  the  united  opposition  was  achieved  by  1927  and  the  development  of  an 
independent  trade  union  movement  under  Tomsky's  leadership  was  quashed  by  mid-  1929. 
-  198- June-July  1930  was  the  first  in  Soviet  history  where  there  was  no  opposition  to  any  aspect  of 
official  policy. 
In  the  industrial  economy,  political  dictatorship  was  replicated  within  the  organisational  forum 
688  through  the  principle  of  "one-man  management".  While  there  had  been  much  ideological  lip 
service  paid  to  the  role  of  the  "collective"  as  the  heartbeat  of  the  state  enterprise,  most 
traditionally  built  upon  the  work  of  Venediktov  and  Bratus,  it  was  more  the  work  of  Tolstoy, 
and  his  concept  of  the  "theory  of  the  director"  as  the  essence  of  the  state  enterprise,  that 
reflected  reality  . 
68'  The  main  "formal"  exception  to  the  dictatorship  principle  in  the  wider 
Soviet  economy  was  to  be  found  in  the  agrarian  economy  where  the  legacy  of  collectivisation 
had  resulted  in  a  compromise  in  the  legal  structure  of  the  collective  farm.  The  artel  form  was 
61  therefore  expressed  to  be  based  on  "collective  farm  democracy". 
The  resurrection  of  the  "participant"  as  an  independent  "interest"  in  the  1987  State  Enterprise 
Law  required  that  the  participant  not  only  had  the  right  to  receive  a  part  of  residual  profits  in 
proportion  to  work  done,  but  also  that  the  participant  had  the  ability  to  determine  the  overall 
level  of  those  profits  both  through  his  labour  contribution  as  well  as  through  a  voice  in 
management  decisions.  The  State  Enterprise  Law  recognised  the  interaction  between  these 
first  two  pillars  of  the  participation  model  by  providing  that  "the  enterprise's  activities  on 
conditions  of  ftill  khozraschet  and  self-financing  shall  be  carried  out  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  of  socialist  self  management"  . 
691 
While  the  concept  of  self-management  encouraged  the  "interestedness"  of  the  participant  in 
decision  making,  the  regime  of  "socialist  self-management",  like  the  principle  of  "collective 
farm  democracy",  entailed  a  continued  involvement  of  the  Soviet  state.  Therefore  the  notion 
of  a  balance  was  expressed  in  article  6(1):  "the  management  of  the  enterprise  is  carried  out  on 
the  basis  of  the  principle  of  democratic  centralism  and  the  combination  of  centralised 
management  and  socialist  self-management  of  the  labour  collective". 
This  balance  gave  rise  to  three  formal  institutions  of  management:  the  one-man  manager;  the 
general  meeting  (conference)  of  the  labour  collective;  and  the  council  of  the  labour  collective. 
In  addition,  there  were  certain  limited  instances  where  other  "political"  and  "social" 
688  See  supra  Section  2.2. 
689  Yu.  K.  Tolstoi,  Soderzhanie  i  Grazhdansko-Pravovaya  Zashchita  Prava  Sobstvennosti  v  SSSR 
(Leningrad:  1955/6),  p.  60-92. 
690  See  supra  Section  2.4.1. 
691  State  Enterprise  Law,  aricle  2(3). 
-  199- organisations  were  involved  in  the  management  process,  including  the  Komsomol  and  the 
Communist  Party  (the  latter  described  as  "the  political  core  of  the  collective").  " 
Although  the  concept  of  "one-man  management"  remained,  and  with  it  the  logic  of  a  single 
point  for  interest-group  capture,  this  traditionally  "dictatorial"  feature  was  adjusted  to  take 
account  of  the  new  compromise.  As  has  been  argued,  no  longer  was  the  one-man  manager  to 
be  conceived  to  be  the  single  delegate  of  the  unitary  state;  instead  the  manager  was  directed  to 
"express  the  interests  of  the  state  and  the  collective"  and  was  to  be  "responsible  for  the  results 
of  the  enterprise's  work  to  the  state  and  the  labour  collective".  "' 
The  process  of  the  manager's  appointment  also  reflected  this  new  balance.  The  nomination 
principle  of  the  confirmation  model  gave  way  to  more  democratic  elements:  the  general 
meeting  of  the  labour  collective  voted  on  the  appointment  of  the  one-man  manager  and  this 
was  confirmed  by  the  state  superior  agency.  The  state  superior  agency  was  only  given 
negative  control.  If  the  state  superior  agency  rejected  an  elected  one-man  manager,  a  new 
election  was  held  and  the  state  superior  agency  had  to  give  reasons  for  its  rejection.  This 
therefore  introduced  an  element  of  accountability  and  transparency,  checking  the  possible 
capricious  use  of  the  state  superior  agency's  veto  right. 
Once  appointed,  the  balance  shifted  ftirther  in  favour  of  the  labour  collective:  the  one-man 
manager  could  only  be  dismissed  by  the  state  superior  agency  following  a  decision  of  the 
general  meeting  or  council  of  the  labour  collective. 
The  express  powers  of  the  one-man  manager,  and as  representative  of  "the  enterprise",  were 
pervasive.  These  included  the  power  to  represent  the  enterprise,  conclude  contracts,  sell 
property,  issue  binding  instructions  and  deal  with  the  enterprise's  personnel.  In  addition,  the 
State  Enterprise  Law  suggested  that  the  strict  civil  law  vires  regime  of  the  confirmation  model 
was  in  some  way  to  be  relaxed  because  the  enterprise  was  given  the  "right  at  its  own  initiative 
to  adopt  all  decisions,  if  they  are  not  contrary  to  prevailing  legislation".  694 
The  interests  of  the  labour  collective  were  expressed  not  only  through  this  new  understanding 
of  the  one-man  manager  (as  elected  by  the  labour  collective  and  as  a  representative  of  their 
interests  as  well  as  those  of  the  state),  but  also  specifically  through  the  general  meeting 
(conference)  of  the  labour  collective.  The  general  meeting  was  given  additional  powers 
692  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  6(l).  See  also  supra  n.  566. 
693  State  Enterprise  Law,  articles  6(3)  and  6(4). 
694  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  2(5).  This  seemed  to  hint  at  the  introduction  of  a  permissive  regime  in 
contrast  to  the  prevailing  authorisation  regime  of  rights  embodied  in  civil  law  doctrine  (see  Section  7.4.1 
and  infra  n.  922). 
-200- including  the  right  to  examine  and  confirm  enterprise  plans,  and  to  approve  the  collective 
contract  and  other  important  questions  of  the  enterprise's  activity 
The  final  management  organ,  the  council  of  the  labour  collective,  was  intended  to  be  the 
plenary  institution  of  the  general  meeting  (conference)  of  the  labour  collective,  convened  in 
the  periods  between  general  meetings.  In  the  same  way  that  the  concept  of  "balance"  was 
introduced  in  developing  the  "new"  concept  of  the  one-man  manager  (as  a  representative  of 
the  labour  collective's  interests  as  well  as  the  state's),  the  concept  of  "balance"  was  also 
introduced  in  a  "new"  concept  of  the  council  of  the  labour  collective:  this  time  the  council  was 
required  to  take  into  account  the  state's  interests,  as  well  as  those  of  the  labour  collective.  On 
this  basis,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  directly  contemplated  the  election  of  representatives  of 
management,  the  Communist  Party,  Komsomol  and  other  public  organisations  to  the  council; 
however  the  number  of  management  representatives  was  limited  to  a  quarter.  "'  The  role  of 
the  council  included  monitoring  the  fulfilment  of  decisions  of  the  general  meeting; 
implementing  any  comments  and  proposals  of  workers;  hearing  management  reports;  solving 
questions  of  improving  management  and  organisational  structure;  and  confirming  conditions 
of  socialist  competition  (together  with  Communist  Party,  Komsomol  and  trade  union 
organisations).  The  decisions  of  the  council,  within  its  competence,  were  expressed  to  be 
binding  on  the  management  and  members  of  the  collective. 
The  procedural  rules  governing  the  internal  governance  democratic  processes  were 
rudimentary.  The  election  of  the  one-man  manager  was  expressed  to  be  "as  a  rule  on  a 
competitive  basis"  (Soviet  "elections"  traditionally  involved  only  one  candidate),  by  a  secret 
or  open  ballot  of  the  general  meeting  of  the  labour  collective,  for  a5  year  term.  The  election 
of  the  council  of  the  labour  collective  was  also  to  be  by  a  secret  or  open  ballot  of  the  general 
meeting  of  the  labour  collective,  for  a2  or  3  year  term.  At  each  election,  at  least  a  third  of  the 
members  of  the  council  were  generally  required  to  be  newly  elected.  Council  sessions  were 
required  to  be  held  at  least  once  a  quarter. 
The  procedures  were  not  much  more  developed  than  as  summarised  in  the  previous 
paragraph.  696  However,  irrespective  of  the  brevity  of  these  provisions  in  the  1987  State 
Enterprise  Law,  they,  like  the  provisions  relating  to  full  khozraschet  and  self-financing,  were 
immensely  significant.  An  internal  management  structure  had  been  introduced  that  tempered 
695  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  7(3). 
696  The  lack  of  detail  may  have  been  due  to  the  legacy  of  the  confirmation  model.  In  the  context  of  that 
model  the  legislation  only  had  to  contemplate  one  interest  within  the  management  regime,  and  a  one 
dimensional  manager  which  expressed  that  single  interest.  There  was  thus  no  need  for  complex  and 
detailed  provisions  on  internal  management  or  governance. 
-201- centralised  management  with  socialist  self  management  by  the  labour  collective  and  which 
required  "the  participation  of  the  entire  collective  and  its  social  organisations  in  the  working 
out  of  very  important  decisions  and  control  over  their  fulfilment".  "'  The  State  Enterprise  Law 
represented  the  first  attempt  since  the  1930s  to  develop  democratic  procedures  within  the 
domestic  industrial  organisation  based  on  the  recognition  of  more  than  one  interest.  It  was  the 
introduction  of  "the  other"  into  the  industrial  organisation  upon  the  foundations  laid  by  the 
State  Enterprise  Law  that  became  the  catalyst  for  the  radical  restructuring  of  the  economy 
some  years  later  in  Spring  1990. 
6.3.4  Coercive  Law  and  Governance  in  a  Regime  of  Separate  Interests 
The  identification  of  separate  interests  within  the  organisational  forum  and  the  granting  to 
them  of  democratic  means  of  expression  resulted  not  just  in  a  compromise  in  terms  of  the 
operation  of  the  internal  management  organs,  but  also  in  terms  of  economic  theory.  The 
policy  of  encouraging  participants  to  pursue  their  "own"  interests  was  developed  in  the  hope 
that  this  would  result  in  overall  efficiency  gains  for  the  Soviet  national  economy  as  a  whole 
(on  a  Smithean  type  analysis).  However,  the  principles  underlying  such  an  approach  were 
mutually  exclusive  to  the  Stalin  form  of  socialist  planning  and  the  unity  of  interests  expressed 
in  the  concept  of  the  all-people's  state.  As  such,  this  policy  was  tempered,  not  just  by 
requiring  that  the  interests  of  the  labour  collective  (ie  the  participant)  be  combined  with  those 
of  the  state,  but  also  by  formally  constructing  the  enterprise  as  an  organisation  that  had 
responsibility  for  the  social  as  a  whole  (and  not  just  as  an  instrument  for  the  pursuit  of  the 
interests  of  the  participants). 
Article  1(3)  specified  "the  principal  task"  of  the  enterprise  as  "the  satisfaction  in  every  way  of 
the  social  requirements  of  the  national  economy  and  citizens  in  its  products  (works,  services) 
with  a  high  level  of  consumer  properties  and  quality  with  the  minimum  of  the  expenses, 
increasing  the  contribution  to  the  acceleration  of  social-economic  development  of  the  country 
and,  on  this  basis,  ensuring  the  growth  of  the  well-being  of  the  collective  and  its  members. 
The  requirements  of  consumers  shall  be  binding  upon  enterprises  and  their  full  and  timely 
satisfaction  -  this  is  the  highest  meaning  and  norm  of  the  activities  of  each  labour 
collective  ".  698 
Clearly  the  protection  of  these  wider  interests  could  not  have  been  achieved  through  the 
narrow  governance  regime  of  the  1987  state  enterprise  because  there  were  only  very  limited 
697  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  6(1). 
698  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  1(3)  [emphasis  added]. 
-202- possibilities  for  the  involvement  of  representatives  of  the  wider  social  in  the  three  management 
organs.  As  such,  protection  of  the  interests  of  the  "national  economy  and 
citizens  ...  and  ...  consumers"  was  sought  through  coercive  law,  binding  requirements,  and 
traditional  governance  strategies. 
6.3.4.1  Coercive  Law 
While  in  later  expressions  of  the  participation  model  the  logic  of  the  separation  of  interests 
resulted  in  the  erosion  of  the  basic  features  of  the  confirmation  governance  regime  itself,  the 
state's  position  as  legal  sovereign  always  remained.  As  such,  this  position  came  to  be 
exploited  through  the  proliferation  of  coercive  law.  Although  coercive  law  had  been  an 
element  of  the  confirmation  model,...  within  the  participation  model,  it  became  the  central 
governance  technique  of  the  state,  and  hence  can  be  viewed  in  its  own  right  as  the  third  pillar 
of  the  participation  model.  Therefore,  for  example,  aware  that  the  interests  of  the  wider  social 
could  not  have  had  a  specific  voice  in  the  management  organs  of  the  enterprise,  the  state,  by 
legislative  diktat,  simply  "defined"  the  "principle  task"  of  the  enterprise  in  the  State 
Enterprise  Law  in  terms  of  the  satisfaction  of  the  social  requirements  of  the  national  economy, 
and  hence  "obliged"  the  enterprise  (ie  its  management)  to  take  into  account  the  interests  of  the 
social  in  its  management  decisions. 
The  origins  of  coercive  law  can  perhaps  be  dated  back  to  the  labour  law  of  the  years  of  war 
communism  and  the  regulations  of  the  4hAll-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  which  introduced  a 
strict  regime  of  labour  discipline.  Rather  than  creating  structural  economic  incentives  to 
encourage  efficient  and  hard  work,  the  approach  taken  by  the  1918  RSFSR  Labour  Code  was 
to  conceive  of  "work"  as  a  general  obligation,  a  debt  owed  to  society  for  the  advancement  of 
the  socialist  state,  and  as  such  "required"  it  to  be  carried  out  by  way  of  legal  diktat.  The 
attendant  "state  militarisation  of  labour"  was  developed  through  the  state  labour  exchanges, 
labour  books,  and  forced  labour  camps  for  offenders  of  labour  discipline.  As  Carr  explained, 
"the  ultimate  result  of  war  communism  in  the  field  of  labour  policy  was  to  leave  no  other 
incentives  in  operation  except  revolutionary  enthusiasm  and  naked  compulsion".  700 
Naked  compulsion  was  used  by  the  early  Soviet  regime  throughout  its  industrialisation  effort 
and  beyond,  both  in  terms  of  labour  law,  grain  requisitioning  and  requirements  for  the  regime 
of  economy.  The  legacy  of  this  approach,  the  use  of  coercion  rather  than  systemic  incentives, 
survived  into  the  provisions  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law  where  enterprises  were  simply 
699  Supra  Section  3.4-3. 
700  Supra  n.  217  (1952),  p.  218. 
-203- "obliged"  ("obyazano")  or  "required"  (Volzhna")  to  operate  in  a  certain  manner,  or  to  take 
into  account  certain  wider  interest  groups  . 
70'  The  use  of  the  present  tense  in  the  Russian 
language  in  legislation  is  generally  translated  as  "shall",  implying  the  imposition  of  an 
obligation.  In  addition  to  the  use  of  the  terms  "oblige"  or  "require",  there  were  numerous 
examples  in  the  State  Enterprise  Law  of  the  use  of  a  verb  in  the  present  tense  where  the 
subject  was  "the  enterprise"  . 
7'  The  obligation  in  whatever  form  was  then  sometimes  even 
specifically  coupled  with  prescribed  penalties.  703 
In  addition  to  the  use  of  its  position  as  legal  sovereign  to  exploit  the  possibility  for  coercive 
law,  in  this  first  expression  of  the  participation  model,  the  state  also  retained  the  other 
elements  of  the  governance  regime  of  the  confirmation  model  through  its  positions  as  state- 
creator-owner,  property-owner,  and  economic  sovereign.  Not  only  did  the  State  Enterprise 
Law  broadly  leave  all  elements  of  the  confirmation  governance  regime  intact,  but  it  also 
explicitly  aimed  at  "strengthening  state  (all-people's)  ownership",  "  and  still  conceived  of  the 
economy  as  a  state-run  indivisible  complex.  'O'  It  was  only  the  "unintended"  consequences  of 
creating  a  regime  based  on  the  separation  of  the  interest  of  the  participant  from  that  of  the 
state  that  led  eventually  to  the  gradual  erosion  of  these  other  elements  of  the  traditional 
governance  regime  as  evidenced  in  the  later  expressions  of  this  model. 
701  As  in  the  confirmation  model,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  provided  for  coercive  micro  management  by 
legislative  diktat  of  essential  economic  operations  of  the  enterprise  which,  in  a  market  economy,  would 
have  been  regulated  by  civil  law  and  general  economic  structural  incentives.  For  example  the  State 
Enterprise  Law  provided  that:  "the  activities  of  the  enterprise  must  not  violate  normal  conditions  of 
work"  (article  2(5));  "the  enterprise  shall  be  obliged  to  permanently  ensure  the  reproduction  of  the 
material-technical  base  on  a  progressive  basis,  to  effectively  use  of  production  capabilities  and  basic 
funds"  (article  4(l));  "the  enterprise  shall  be  obliged  to  ensure  safe  keeping,  the  rational  use  and 
accelerated  turnover  of  circulating  assets"  (article  4(3));  "the  enterprise  shall  be  obliged  to  comply  strictly 
with  planning  discipline  and  fully  fulfill  plan  and  contractual  obligations"  (article  10(5));  "the  enterprise 
shall  be  obliged  to  ensure  the  strict  compliance  with  technological  discipline,  standards,  technical 
specifications  and  reliability,  trouble-free  and  safety  in  the  use  of  equipment  produced  by  it"  (article 
11(3));  "the  enterprise  shall  be  obliged  to  give  the  utmost  importance  to  activiating  the  human  factor, 
improving  work  conditions,  increasing  the  creative  content  of  work,  gradually  transforming  labour  into  a 
prime  necessity  for  life"  (article  13(2));  and  "the  enterprise  shall  be  obliged  to  settle  accounts  in  a  timely 
manner"  (article  18(2)). 
702  Almost  every  economic  activity  of  the  enterprise  was  provided  for.  For  example:  "the  enterprise  shall 
display  constant  concern  for  the  steady  growth  of  vocational  skills  ...  of  its  personnel"  (article  8(2));  and 
"the  enterprise  shall  carry  out  the  technical  re-equipment,  reconstruction  and  expansion  of  existing 
production  facilities  by  efficiently  combining  do-it-yourself  and  contract  methods"  (article  12(4)). 
703  See  infra  Section  6.3.4.3. 
704  State  Enterprise  Law,  preamble. 
705  The  State  Enterprise  Law  referred  to  the  economy  as  "a  single  whole"  (preamble),  a  "single  national- 
economic  complex"  (article  l(l)).  See  supra  n.  567. 
-204- 6.3.4.2  Creation  and  Termination 
Due  to  the  continued  existence  of  the  role  of  the  state  as  "creator-owner",  the  law  regarding 
the  creation  and  termination  of  the  1987  state  enterprises  differed  little  from  that  of  the  1965 
106 
state  enterprise.  There  was  only  one  sentence  in  the  entire  State  Enterprise  Law  that 
mentioned  the  procedure  for  their  creation  and  this  simply  stated:  "enterprises  shall  be  created 
in  accordance  with  the  procedure  established  by  the  USSR  Council  of  Ministers".  707  The  law 
also  provided  that  each  enterprise  should  have  a  charter  which  included  the  purpose  of  its 
activities  and  a  seal.  708 
As  regards  their  termination,  the  law  blurred  the  traditional  distinction  made  in  the  civil  codes 
between  liquidation  and  reorganisation  as  the  two  types  of  "termination".  "'  By  contrast,  it 
provided  for  reorganisation  (through  merger,  accession,  separation,  division,  transformation) 
and  termination  (or  liquidation).  "0 
The  categories  of  division  and  transformation  were  entirely  novel,  as  the  civil  codes  only 
contemplated  reorganisation  through  merger,  separation  or  accession.  "Transformation"  was 
particularly  important  as  this  implied  that  state  enterprises  had  the  capability  of  being 
"transformed"  into  a  different  type  of  juridical  person.  In  1987  it  would  have  been  difficult  to 
have  identified  the  form  of  such  transformed  entities  (other  than  cooperatives).  However,  the 
introduction  of  such  a  concept  provided  the  first  hint  of  the  subsequent  development  of  the  de- 
statisation  programme  and  the  ability  to  lease  a  "state  enterprise"  thereby  "transforming"  it 
into  a  "leased  enterprise  if 
. 
711 
In  contrast  with  the  confirmation  model,  which  was  silent  as  to  the  circumstances  and 
procedures  for  liquidation,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  focused  more  carefully  on  this  concept 
and  set  out  certain  specified  circumstances  when  termination  (or  liquidation)  was  possible. 
These  were  when:  (i)  there  was  no  further  need  for  the  enterprise's  operations  and  it  could  not 
be  reorganised;  or  (ii)  in  other  instances  specified  by  legislation;  or  (iii)  when  the  enterprise 
was  operating  at  a  loss  for  a  long  time  and  when  it  was  insolvent  and  when  there  was  an 
absence  of  demand  for  its  products  and  in  the  instances  when  measures  had  been  taken  by  the 
706  See  supra  Section  3.2. 
707  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  23(l). 
708  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  23(3).  The  importance  of  a  purpose  clause  for  the  law  on  vires  is  discussed 
supra  Section  3.4.1. 
709  See  supra  Section  3.2. 
710  The  State  Enterprise  Law  seemingly  used  the  words  termination  ("prekrashchenie")  and  liquidation 
("likvidatsiya")  interchangeably  (see  articles  23(l)  and  23(2)). 
711  On  the  leased  enterprise  generally,  see  infra  Section  6.5. 
-205- enterprise  and  its  state  superior  agency  to  improve  profitability  which  had  not  yielded 
results.  "'  Additionally,  if  an  enterprise  systematically  violated  "payment  discipline",  the  law 
provided  that  its  bank  had  the  right  to  declare  the  enterprise  insolvent  and  to  communicate  this 
to  its  basic  suppliers  and  the  state  superior  agency.  "' 
The  possibility  of  termination  was  therefore  expressed  for  the  first  time  in  a  law  of  the  later 
Soviet  period  to  be  available  upon  the  occurrence  of  financial  difficulties.  Although  the  State 
Enterprise  Law  provided  for  a  number  of  cumulative  conditions  precedent  to  be  satisfied 
(operation  at  a  loss,  insolvency,  no  demand  and  unsuccessful  remedial  measures  adopted)  as 
714 
well  as  the  obligation  to  find  new  jobs  for,  or  retrain,  employees  made  redundant,  these 
provisions  still  evidenced  an  initial  attempt  to  impose  some  financial  boundaries  upon  the 
continued  operation  of  state  enterprises  and  to  develop  in  practice  the  declaration  in  article 
2(2)  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law  that  "profit  or  revenue  shall  be  the  solitary  index  of  economic 
activity  of  the  enterprise". 
6.3.4.3  State  Ownership  of  the  Enterprise,  Juridical  Personality  and  Responsibility 
In  the  elaboration  of  the  new  framework  which  contemplated  a  "combination  of  interests", 
certain  aspects  of  the  drafting  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law  may  have  suggested  that  a  new 
regime  of  ownership  relations  was  being  developed.  However  it  is  unlikely  that  any  of  the 
"ambiguities"  in  the  drafting  actually  resulted  in,  or  were  intended  to  result  in,  a  new 
ownership  regime. 
It  seems  that  the  basic  problem  resulted  from  the  fact  that  the  regime  of  balancing  interests 
had  been  taken  from  collective  farm  law.  The  collective  farm,  in  contrast  to  the  state 
enterprise,  had  the  right  of  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership  independent  from  state 
ownership.  Therefore,  when  the  first  two  pillars  of  the  participation  model  were  incorporated 
from  collective  farm  law  into  the  confirmation  model,  this  put  pressure  on  the  coherence  of 
the  existing  ownership  regime  (or  lack  thereof)  of  the  industrial  organisation. 
The  argument  that  the  existing  state  ownership  regime  of  the  confirmation  model  may  have 
been  compromised  by  the  provisions  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law  is  based  on  the  status  given 
in  the  State  Enterprise  Law  to  the  labour  collective  as  the  "fully-fledged  proprietor 
712  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  23(l). 
713  The  basic  suppliers  then  had  the  right  to  stop  deliveries  and  the  state  superior  agency  was  obliged, 
together  with  the  enterprise,  to  adopt  measures  to  remedy  the  situation  and  restore  accounting  discipline. 
(State  Enterprise  Law,  article  18(3)). 
714  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  23(2). 
-206- ("khozyain")  of  the  enterprise",  "using,  as  proprietor,  all-people's  ownership".  "'  The  phrase 
"fully  fledged  proprietor"  was  particularly  significant  as  this  was  the  phase  used  in  the 
Cooperative  Law  to  describe  the  place  of  the  cooperative  which  clearly  did  have  the  right  to 
own  property.  716  It  is  probable  however  that  these  references  were  simply  ideological  lip 
service  to  the  acknowledgement  of  the  separate  interest  of  the  labour  collective  and  that  the 
existing  regime  of  the  confirmation  model  was  to  be  left  intact. 
The  other  provisions  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law  which  described  the  ownership  regime  of  the 
1987  state  enterprise  suggested  that,  irrespective  of  the  professed  role  of  the  labour  collective 
as  "proprietor",  the  state  was  intended  to  remain  the  legal  owner  of  the  enterprise  and  its 
property,  which  continued  to  be  allocated  to  the  enterprise  by  way  of  operative  management. 
Article  1(2)  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law  referred  to  the  enterprise  as  having  the  right  to 
"possess  [ie  not  own]  a  solitary  part  of  all-people's  ownership  and  have  a  separate  balance 
sheet".  This  was  then  expanded  in  article  4(l)  which  gave  the  enterprise  "the  right  to  possess, 
use  and  dispose  of  this  property".  717  Furthermore,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  retained 
references  to  property  "of  the  enterprise"  (rather  than  in  "the  ownership  of"  the  enterprise).  718 
All  of  this  terminology  was  broadly  drawn  from  the  current  regime  of  state  ownership- 
operative  management  and  the  reference  to  "proprietor"  should  be  understood  in  this  context. 
Furthermore,  there  were  no  explicit  references  to  the  right  of  ownership  of  the  enterprise,  or 
of  the  labour  collective  acting  as  legal  "owner"  (in  addition  to  proprietor).  Thus,  while  the 
logic  of  the  collective  farm  compromise  may  have  nudged  the  participation  model  towards 
contemplating  a  new  form  of  ownership  relations,  the  1987  State  Enterprise  Law  still  placed 
the  ownership  framework  firmly  within  the  former  regime  of  confirmation  model:  hence  the 
1987  state  enterprises  were  juridical  persons  without  the  independent  right  of  ownership  and 
were  still  considered  as  indivisible  objects  located  "in"  state  ownership  allocated  state 
property  by  way  of  operative  management. 
As  the  basic  juridical  characterisation  of  the  state  enterprise  remained  unchanged  in  the  1987 
law,  the  responsibility  regime  of  the  confirmation  model  was  also  seemingly  left  intact. 
Therefore,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  separated  responsibility  for  the 
715  State  Enterprise  Law,  articles  2(3)  and  1(2). 
716  Cooperatives  Law,  article  7(4).  See  infra  Section  6.4.4.2. 
717  The  concept  of  operative  management  encompassed  this  triad  of  rights;  however,  in  contrast  to  the  right 
of  ownership,  these  rights  in  the  case  of  operative  management  were  limited  by  additional  restrictions 
that  were  placed  by  the  owner.  See  supra  Section  2.3.1. 
718  This  formulation  using  the  genetive  case,  without  specifically  mentioning  "in  the  ownership  of',  was 
used  when  indicating  the  existence  of  solitary  or  separated  property,  without  the  right  of  ownership  in 
such  property. 
-207- debts  of  the  enterprise  from  responsibility  for  the  debts  of  the  state  and  vice  versa.  However, 
the  introduction  of  "financial  indicators"  in  the  determination  of  solvency  and  the  importance 
of  profitability  generally  may  have  further  evidenced  a  trend  in  the  law  from  a  regime  of 
autonomous  property  responsibility  to  one  based  on  "liability  ".  `  This  embryonic 
development  towards  a  liability  based  regime  developed  the  steps  already  taken  in  this 
direction  as  contemplated  in  the  contract-based  concession  model  where  full  khozraschet,  self- 
financing  and  non  subsidy  were  the  foundations  for  a  regime  where  "all"  assets  were  available 
for  execution  by  creditors. 
In  addition  to  suggesting  a  move  towards  a  liability  regime  through  the  introduction  of 
liquidation  in  the  case  of  financial  difficulties  (crucial  for  any  understanding  of  limited 
liability),  the  State  Enterprise  Law  hinted  more  generally  at  a  move  towards  a  "fuller"  concept 
of  responsibility.  Building  upon  the  role  of  the  enterprise  as  an  expression  of  wider  social 
interests,  the  ambit  of  the  concept  of  responsibility  was  broadened  beyond  the  narrow  liability 
context.  "'  Article  2(5)  provided  that  the  enterprise  was  to  bear  "full  responsibility"  ("polnaya 
metmennost"')  for  compliance  with  the  interests  of  the  state  and  rights  of  citizens,  for  the 
safekeeping  and  development  of  socialist  ownership,  for  the  fulfilment  of  obligations,  for  the 
ensuring  of  profitability  and of  full  khozraschet,  and  for  the  strengthening  of  state,  production 
and  labour  discipline. 
This  wider  concept  of  responsibility  was  given  specific  application  in  a  number  of  instances 
where  legislative  coercive  diktat  was  coupled  with  attendant  sanctions  so  that,  for  example, 
article  11(5)  obliged  ("obyazano")  research  organisations  to  ensure  that  their  work 
corresponded  "to  the  basic  indicators  of  the  highest  world  standards".  In  the  event  that  they 
did  not,  the  organisation  would  bear  "material  responsibility"  and  the  managers  and 
development  personnel  would  be  subject  to  "disciplinary  responsibility,  lose  wages  and 
material  incentives".  Thus  the  concept  of  "full"  responsibility  "required"  a  high  quality  of 
research,  and  failure  resulted  in  material  penalties.  Other  examples  included  the  obligation  to 
ftilfil  contractual  delivery  requirements,  or  else  bear  "economic  responsibility"  (article  15(2)); 
and  the  obligation  to  fulfil  contractual  terms  generally,  or  else  "bear  economic  responsibility" 
and  pay  compensation  for  damage  caused  (article  16(3)).  Apparently  legislators  were  not 
719  On  the  differences  between  "autonomous  property  responsibility"  and  "limited  liability",  see  supra 
Section  3.3. 
720  This  development  of  a  wider  concept  of  responsibility  was  further  developed  in  the  1988  Cooperatives 
Law  (which,  like  the  contract-based  concession  model,  included  basic  assets  in  the  assets  available  to 
creditors,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  civil  codes  isolated  them  from  execution)  and  in  the  1990  Law 
on  Enterprises  which  introduced  explicitly  the  concept  of  "full  property  responsibility"  (see  infra  Sections 
6.4.1  and  7.5.4.3). 
-208- comfortable  with  leaving  the  question  of  responsibility  and  the  assessment  of  the  level  of 
damages  to  the  general  civil  law  of  contract.  While  the  participants  were  encouraged  to  pursue 
their  own  narrow  interests,  it  perhaps  was  feared  that  these  may  not  have  been  coincident  with 
those  of  the  wider  national  economy.  As  such,  the  state  as  legal  sovereign  used  coercive  law 
to  compel  behaviour  and  introduce  "fuller"  social  responsibilities  where  structural  incentives 
may  have  been  absent. 
6.3.4.4  Economic  Sovereign 
The  role  of  the  state  as  economic  sovereign  (like  the  role  of  the  king  in  the  feudal  system)  was 
derived  from  its  monopoly  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  and  hence  its  ability  to 
"administer"  the  economy  as  a  whole  through  the  plan.  Even  collective  farms  fell  within  this 
single  national  economy,  and  the  ownership  structure  of  collective  farms  finessed  the  question 
of  the  identity  of  their  ultimate  owner,  thereby  posing  no  challenge  to  the  state's  economic 
hegemony.  "' 
Despite  the  fact  that  both  the  fragmentation  of  the  single  all-people's  state  through  the 
acknowledgement  of  the  separate  interests  of  the  participants,  and  the  development  of 
enterprise  autonomy,  attacked  and  undermined  the  basic  assumptions  on  which  the  state's 
economic  sovereignty  was  based,  there  was  no  intention  of  compromising  the  scope  of  the 
state's  basic  economic  sovereignty  through  the  adoption  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law.  On  the 
contrary,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  was  intended  to  "improve"  socialist  planning. 
The  preamble  to  the  State  Enterprise  Law  stated  that  the  law  was  to  determine  "the  economic 
and  legal  basis  of  the  economic  activity  of  the  socialist  state  enterprise"  [emphasis  added]  and 
for  this  reason  the  law  was  concerned  as  much  with  the  operation  of  the  state  enterprise  within 
the  national  economy  (including  the  developing  of  its  production  plans,  production  quality  and 
material  and  technical  supply)  as  with  its  legal  characteristics.  The  State  Enterprise  Law 
provided  a  regime  that  attempted  to  preserve  the  planned  economy  while  at  the  same  time 
promoting  increased  decentralised  autonomy  of  the  enterprise.  Gorbachev  explained  the  law  as 
"completing  the  construction  of  a  modem  model  of  socialist  economy  to  meet  the  challenge  of 
the  present  stage  of  national  development 
... 
[where]  the  advantages  of  planning  will  be 
increasingly  combined  with  stimulating  factors  of  the  socialist  market".  722 
The  State  Enterprise  Law  again  adopted  the  framework  of  "combining  interests"  in 
elaborating  the  place  of  the  enterprise  within  the  command  economy,  and  went  on  to  limit  the 
721  On  the  ownership  regime  of  the  collective  farm,  see  supra  Section  2.4.2  and  infra  Section  6.4.1. 
722  Supra  n.  533,  p.  87,90. 
-209- scope  of  "its"  autonomy.  The  basic  rule  was  set  out  in  article  2(l)  which  provided  that  "the 
activities  of  enterprises  are  built  on  the  basis  of  the  state  plan  of  economic  and  social 
development  as  an  important  instrument  in  the  realisation  of  the  economic  policy  of  the 
Communist  Party.  Directed  by  controlled  prices,  state  orders,  long  term  scientifically 
substantiated  economic  norms  and  limits,  as  well  as  the  orders  of  consumers,  the  enterprise 
shall  autonomously  work  out  and  confirm  its  plans  and  conclude  contracts". 
Therefore  the  relationship  between  the  superior  state  agency  and  the  enterprise  was  one  of 
relative  autonomy  in  the  Althusserian  sense.  The  state  would  set  the  broad  parameters  on  the 
basis  of  which  the  enterprise  would  develop  operations.  The  state  clearly  had  the  upper  hand 
in  this  balance  as  it  retained  the  ultimate  right  to  elaborate  general  plans  for  the  economy  on 
the  basis  of  which  the  specific  plans  of  the  enterprise  were  then  elaborated;  the  right  to 
establish  prices  centrally;  the  right  to  require  compliance  with  state  orders  promulgated  in 
accordance  with  the  plan;  and  the  right  to  establish  long  term  economic  norms.  However,  in 
certain  specific  areas,  the  law  also  recognised  the  interest  of  the  enterprise  and  generally 
provided  a  limited  balance.  For  example,  planning  was  expressed  to  be  based  on  democratic 
centralism  and  the  enterprise  had  the  right  to  develop  its  plans  autonomously.  Prices  that  were 
not  fixed  centrally  were  permitted  to  be  set  by  the  enterprise  alone  or  as  negotiated  with  the 
customer. 
6.3.5  The  State  as  Defendant  and  the  Significance  of  the  First  Expression  of  the 
Participation  Model 
The  first  expression  of  the  participation  model  did  not  develop  a  new  economic  system.  In  fact 
the  intention  was  quite  the  opposite.  It  was  directed  at  adjusting  the  framework  of  the 
industrial  organisation  in  order  to  perfect  further  the  existing  socialist  economy.  As  such,  the 
ownership  and  governance  regimes  of  the  confirmation  model  were  broadly  unchanged. 
However,  the  1987  State  Enterprise  Law  did  introduce  a  principle  that  was  to  lead  ultimately 
to  the  dismantling  of  the  very  system  it  was  intended  to  support.  In  attempting  to  incentivise 
the  participants  (the  labour  collective),  the  legislation  recognised  the  role,  goals  and  rights  of 
the  labour  collective  as  an  independent  interest,  separate  from  that  of  the  state.  The  State 
Enterprise  Law  embraced  the  collective  farm  compromise  and  thereby  admitted  the  separation 
of  the  private  from  the  public  into  the  industrial  economy  and  so  questioned  the  very 
foundation  of  the  concept  of  the  all-people's  state. 
If  the  restructuring  of  the  economy  was  to  be  meaningful,  as  Gorbachev  was  determined  it 
would  be,  the  rights  given  to  the  participants  would  be  required  to  be  more  than  simple 
-210- legislative  lip-service.  Workers  would  have  to  feel  their  "deep  personal 
interestedness 
...  and  ...  participation  "  723  in  a  real  way.  Hence  the  first  two  pillars  of  this  model, 
incentivisation  and  democracy,  would  need  to  be  policies  that  had  effect  in  practice.  To  this 
end,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  incorporated  the  possibility  for  legal  redress  for  participants 
where  a  state  superior  agency  had  abused  its  position  or  exceeded  its  competences.  In  the  past, 
legislation  contemplated  the  possibility  for  compensating  payments  but  there  was  no  means  of 
enforcing  these  rights.  "'  By  contrast,  the  State  Enterprise  Law  first  increased  transparency  by 
requiring  the  superior  state  agency  to  give  reasons  when  exercising  discretions  (eg  in  vetoing 
the  appointment  of  the  one-man  manager);  and  then  provided  that  if  a  ministry,  department  or 
other  state  superior  agency  issued  an  act  that  was  ultra  vires  or  breached  legislative 
requirements,  then  the  enterprise  had  the  right  to  appeal  to  an  arbitrazh  court  to  have  the  act 
declared  invalid  in  full  or  in  part.  Furthermore,  an  enterprise  had  the  right  to  be  compensated 
for  losses  caused  in  attempting  to  comply  with  such  acts,  or  with  acts  that  violated  the  rights 
of  the  enterprise.  "'  In  short,  state  agencies  bore  "responsibility"  for  their  failure  to  comply 
with  the  provisions  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law.  "'  In  this  way  the  1987  State  Enterprise  Law 
developed  the  very  embryonic  roots  of  the  framework  of  the  rule  of  law  state,  where  law  was 
not  just  the  tool  of  the  state  but  actually  bound  the  state  by  giving  others  legal  rights  against 
the  state. 
The  State  Enterprise  Law,  as  the  first  expression  of  the  participation  model,  presented  a  new 
foundation  for  a  new  organisational  form,  one  which  separated  the  private  from  the  public  and 
gave  the  former  legal  rights  against  the  latter.  Developed  on  the  basis  of  identifying  the 
participant  and  giving  him  the  right  to  receive  wages  linked  to  performance  and  the  right  to 
participate  in  management,  this  model  contained  the  seeds  of  the  destruction  of  the  planned 
economy  which  it  was  intended  to  support.  Further  expressions  radicalised  this  foundation  by 
first  excluding  the  state  from  the  ownership  regime,  thereby  undermining  the  foundations  of 
the  governance  system  of  the  confirmation  model,  and  then  by  reorientating  the  relations 
between  the  participant  and  state  from  the  realm  of  administrative/economic  law  to  one  based 
primarily  in  the  civil  law  of  contract. 
723  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  1(3). 
724  Supra  n.  21,  p.  257. 
725  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  9(3). 
726  State  Enterprise  Law,  article  24. 
-211- 6.4  1988  Cooperative  Enterprises  -  Towards  a  Non-State  Owned  Industrial 
Organisation 
Following  the  adoption  of  1987  State  Enterprise  Law  and  then  the  1988  Cooperatives  Law,  no 
amendment  was  made  to  the  implicit  classification  of  juridical  persons  in  article  11  of  the 
1961  FPCivL  which  continued  to  reflect  the  distinction  between  industrial  juridical  persons 
without  the  right  of  ownership  operating  on  the  basis  of  civil  law  (ie  state  enterprises)  on  the 
one  hand,  and  agricultural  juridical  persons  with  the  right  of  cooperative-collective  farm 
ownership  operating  on  the  basis  of  collective  farm  law  (ie  collective  farms)  on  the  other. 
Derived  from  the  logic  of  that  framework  of  analysis,  cooperatives  have  traditionally  been 
characterised  as  "different"  from  state  enterprises.  However,  conceptualising  the  1987  state 
enterprises  and  the  1988  cooperatives  from  within  the  participation  model  highlights  certain 
connections  and  implications  whose  significance  has  not  been  previously  recognised. 
First,  the  Cooperatives  Law  cut  across  the  existing  classification  of  juridical  persons  based  on 
the  industry  -  agriculture  distinction:  the  Cooperatives  Law  regulated  collective  farms  and 
other  agricultural  cooperatives  including  inter-collective  farm  organisations,  727  as  well  as 
cooperatives  in  the  industrial  economy  including  in  the  sphere  of  production  and  services,  and 
consumer  cooperatives  . 
72'  As  such,  the  Cooperatives  Law  was  the  first  time  in  Soviet  history 
that  a  single  law  regulated  juridical  persons  in  both  the  industrial  and  agrarian economy. 
Secondly,  the  Cooperatives  Law  was  the  first  time  that  juridical  persons  in  both  the  industrial 
and agrarian  economies  were  regulated  on  the  basis  of  a  unified  set  of  principles;  and  as  such 
it  cut  across  the  civil  law  -  collective  farm  law  distinction,  as  well  as  the  inherent  assumption 
that  industrial  organisations  did  not  have  the  right  of  ownership  but  agrarian  organisations  did. 
Principles  that  previously  had  only  been  applied  to  the  agrarian  economy  and  collective  farms 
directly  were  introduced  into  the  mainstream  of  the  industrial  economy.  729 
The  participation  model  also  most  readily  illustrates  that  the  1988  cooperatives,  although 
developed  from  the  legacy  of  collective  farm  law,  were  in  fact  based  on  a  new  form  of 
organisation  where  the  principal  place  was  reserved  for  the  participant.  The  members  of  the 
--------  .  ...........  ..........  . ........  .  ....  .....  .  ............  . .............................  . .........  . --.  - .  .......  .  ...  ...........  -  -----  ----  ...  ..................  ........  ..  --  ......  .  ...  ...................  .........  . ...  . 
727  The  list  of  possible  types  of  cooperative  activity  in  the  agricultural  sphere  were  set  out  in  article  33(5)  of 
the  Cooperatives  Law. 
728  The  list  of  possible  types  of  cooperative  activity  in  the  industrial  sphere  were  set  out  in  article  3(2)  of  the 
Cooperatives  Law. 
729  While  remnants  of  the  industrial  cooperatives  of  the  1920s  survived  on  a  discrete  scale  in  the  industrial 
economy  of  the  early  1980s,  mainly  to  effect  self-help  joint  activity  of  the  members,  they  were  never 
intended  to  be  anything  more  than  a  small  scale  adjunct  to  the  principal  status  of  the  state  enterprises  and 
associations.  On  the  existing  types  of  cooperative  in  1985,  see  supra  Section  6.1.3. 
-212- cooperatives  (the  participants)  were  at  the  same  time  the  notional  owners,  "'  the  managers  and 
the  workers.  Participation  again  embodied  the  three  basic  pillars  of  incentivisation  through 
self-financing;  democracy  in  the  taking  of  management  decisions;  and  the  importance  of 
coercive  law  for  the  protection  of  the  state's  interests 
The  underlying  structure  of  the  participation  model  therefore  enables  a  comparison  to  be 
drawn  with  1987  state  enterprises  and  highlights  the  theoretical  links  between  these 
organisations.  For  while  they  had  different  ownership  regimes,  the  participation  model  shows 
that  the  first  step  away  from  the  confirmation  model  came  in  1987  and  not  in  1988;  and  that 
the  core  structure  of  the  1987  state  enterprises  remained  as  the  basis  for  the  law  of  all  the 
"new"  industrial  Soviet  organisations  to  1990. 
The  1987  state  enterprises  were  the  first  and  hence  most  rudimentary  expression  of  this 
model.  The  State  Enterprise  Law  crucially  identified  an  interest  separate  from  the  state  (ie  the 
labour  collective  or  worker)  and  then  gave  expression  to  that  interest  via  the  twin  pillars  of 
incentivisation  and  democratisation.  The  interests  of  the  state  were  protected  by  coercive  law 
as  well  as  by  retaining  the  traditional  confirmation  governance  regime  intact. 
The  1988  cooperatives  radicalised  this  structure  principally  due  to  their  distinctive 
it  characteristics"  inherited  from  collective  farm  law.  As  a  result  of  these  new  characteristics, 
each  of  the  elements  of  the  governance  regime  of  the  confirmation  model  became 
compromised  in  this  second  expression  of  the  participation  model  and  were  reconstituted  into 
an  entirely  new  state  governance  regime  based  on  a  mixture  of  legal,  administrative  and 
procedural  obligations. 
The  first  distinguishing  characteristic  of  this  second  expression  of  the  participation  model  was 
that,  unlike  the  1987  state  enterprise,  the  cooperatives  were  not  created  by,  or  explicitly 
owned  by,  the  state.  As  such  the  state  lost  the  element  of  "creator-owner"  from  the 
confirmation  governance  regime.  The  state  could  therefore  no  longer  create  or  terminate  all 
industrial  organisations  by  diktat,  nor  could  it  just  draft  the  purpose  clause  in  the  charter 
(which  would  limit  the  scope  of  activities  due  to  the  law  of  vires).  Despite  the  fact  that  the 
state  had  lost  the  naked  power  to  control  creation,  it  readjusted  the  confirmation  governance 
regime  to  enable  it  to  retain  negative  control  over  the  creation  of  cooperatives  through  a 
concealed  power  cloaked  by  the  legitimation  of  legality.  The  Cooperatives  Law  provided  for  a 
"newil  state  registration  process  and  gave  to  the  registering  agency  both  the  right  to  refuse 
registration  (including  for  the  reason  that  the  charter  failed  to  conform  to  legislative 
730  On  the  question  of  who  owned  the  cooperatives,  see  infra  Section  6.4.1. 
-213- requirements);  and  in  addition,  the  right  to  terminate  the  activities  of  the  cooperative 
(including  for  flagrant  violation  of  legislation).  Therefore,  while  the  foundations  of  this 
element  of  the  confirmation  governance  regime  were  removed,  in  common  with  the  contract- 
based  concession  enterprises,  the  Soviet  state  still  managed  to  retain  certain  control  over  the 
creation  and  termination  processes  by  other  means. 
The  second  distinguishing  characteristic  of  this  second  expression  of  the  participation  model 
was  that,  unlike  the  1987  state  enterprise  (and  unlike  the  joint  enterprises),  the  cooperatives 
had  the  right  of  ownership  (collective  farm-cooperative  ownership)  and  therefore  were  capable 
of  owning  property  separately  from  the  state.  The  state  therefore  lost  the  element  of 
"property-owner"  from  the  confirmation  governance  regime,  and  hence  lost  the  right  to 
impose  direct  restrictions  on  property  through  "designation".  The  origins  of  collective  farm- 
cooperative  ownership  in  the  history  of  collective  farm  law  suggested  that  this  form  of 
ownership  was  never  intended  to  be  transferred  from  the  agrarian  economy  into  the 
711  mainstream  industrial  economy.  In  contrast  with  the  collectivisation  of  agriculture  and  its 
resulting  effect  on  the  legal  regime  of  agricultural  organisations,  the  nationalisation  of  the 
industrial  economy  had  never  contemplated  nor  necessitated  the  concession  of  recognising 
interests  other  than  the  state,  either  in  the  law  on  ownership,  or  in  the  law  on  industrial 
organisations. 
The  result  of  losing  the  elements  of  creator-owner  and  property-owner  meant  that  this  second 
expression  of  the  participation  model  contemplated  a  non-state  owned  organisation  with  the 
separate  right  to  own  and  accumulate  the  means  of  production  in  the  industrial  economy. 
Therefore,  the  development  of  the  cooperatives  network  necessarily  led  to  the  erosion  of  the 
ability  of  the  state  to  run  the  economy  as  a  single  unit  based  on  state  ownership  of  all  the 
means  of  production  through  administrative  instructions  implementing  a  general  national  plan. 
State  ownership  and  planning  were  simply  incompatible  with  the  growth  of  a  separate  non- 
state  sector  within  the  economy  owning  the  means  of  production  in  its  own  right.  As  such,  the 
logic  of  this  second  expression  of  the  participation  model  entailed  that  the  third  element  of  the 
confirmation  governance  regime,  "economic  sovereignty",  would  gradually  become 
compromised.  In  the  short  term,  only  by  leveraging  upon  its  continued  legal  sovereignty  and 
its  control  of  the  state  owned  sector  of  the  economy,  was  the  state  able,  by  legislative  diktat, 
to  ensure  its  continued  control  by  administrative  means  over  the  national  economy  as  a  whole 
and  the  preservation  of  central  planning  despite  the  growing  importance  of  the  cooperatives 
sector. 
-214- 6.4.1  Membership,  the  Nature  of  the  Ownership  Interest  of  a  Cooperative,  Juridical 
Personality  and  Responsibility 
As  the  presence  of  the  1988  cooperatives  became  more  visible  in  the  industrial  economy,  the 
question  of  who,  if  anyone,  owned  them  became  of  fundamental  importance.  This  issue  was 
central  not  just  to  the  development  of  the  law  on  industrial  organisations,  but  also  to  the 
development  of  the  law  of  juridical  persons  generally  and  ultimately  the  law  on  ownership 
itself. 
This  question  had  always  been  unresolved  within  the  context  of  the  mainstream  law  of 
collective  farms  from  which  the  1988  cooperatives  were  born 
. 
7"  As  already  discussed,  the 
issue  of  the  ownership  of  collective  farms  had  generally  been  ignored,  hidden  beneath  the 
framework  of  "membership"  and  the  legal  doctrine  which  still  considered  the  collective  farm 
as  falling  within  the  state  controlled  national  economy  and  the  state  procurement  network. 
This  approach  was  unfortunately  broadly  replicated  in  the  provisions  of  the  1988  Cooperatives 
Law. 
Once  again,  the  concept  of  "membership"  was  central.  As  one  contemporary  textbook 
explained,  "membership  was  the  fundamental  organisational  unity  of  the  cooperative 
133 
organisation".  Reasserting  again  the  voluntary  principle  that  was  at  the  heart  of  collective 
farm  law,  article  5  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  defined  the  "socialist  cooperative"  as  "a  social 
organisation  of  citizens  of  the  USSR  voluntarily  associating  on  the  basis  of  membership",  and 
article  10  affirmed  "the  principle  of  voluntariness  of  entry  into  the  cooperative  and  unhindered 
withdrawal  therefrom.  " 
There  were  general  rules  relating  to  eligibility  to  become  a  member,  including  for  citizens,  a 
minimum  age  of  16,  the  expression  of  a  desire  to  become  a  member,  and  the  capacity  to  carry 
out  the  purposes  and  tasks  of  the  cooperative. 
Although  the  Cooperatives  Law  generally  used  the  word  "citizens"  when  referring  to  the 
members, 
734 
article  12  provided  that  "in  instances  provided  for  by  the  present  law  or  charter 
731  On  the  origins  of  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership,  see  supra  Sections  2.3.2,2.4  and  infra  Section 
6.4.4.2. 
732  See  supra  Section  2.4.2. 
733  Supra  n.  41  (1986),  p.  149. 
734  For  example,  article  5  referred  to  an  "organisation  of  citizens  of  the  USSR";  article  11(l)  referred  to  a 
cooperative  "organised  at  the  wish  of  citizens"  with  a  minimum  of  three  "individuals"  ("chelovek")  (the 
word  "chlelovek"  means  a  natural  person/individual  and  can  be  contrasted  with  the  word  "litso"  meaning 
of  person"  which  includes  both  natural  persons  and  juridical  persons);  and  article  11(2)  referred  to  a 
it  general  meeting  of  citizens". 
-215- of  the  cooperative,  other  cooperatives,  state  and  social  enterprises  and  organisations  may  also 
be  collective  members".  Therefore,  despite  the  many  references  specifically  to  citizens  as 
members,  it  was  clear  that  juridical  persons  could  become  "collective  members"  of  a 
cooperative.  This  was  a  departure  from  collective  farm  law  which  only  permitted  citizens  to 
be  members  of  collective  farms,  a  measure  in  part  designed  to  break  up  the  cohesion  of  the 
pre-revolutionary  dvory. 
The  development  of  membership  based  on  natural  and  juridical  persons  was  yet  another  step 
towards  conceiving  of  the  Soviet  economy  as  based  upon  a  multiplicity  of  actors,  other  than 
the  state,  each  with  the  right  of  ownership.  However,  as  in  the  case  of  the  collective  farm,  it 
was  uncertain  whether  accession  to  a  cooperative  as  a  member  carried  with  it  the  right  to  own 
an  ownership  interest  of  the  cooperative  itself.  While  the  concept  of  ownership  by  the 
cooperative  itself  was  a  feature  of  mainstream  Soviet  civil  and  collective  farm  law,  "'  as 
mentioned  above,  the  question  of  who  owned  the  cooperative,  or  the  collective  farm,  was 
never  explicitly  posed  and  was  traditionally  finessed  within  the  legal  treatment  of  the  incidents 
of  "membership". 
Membership  in  a  cooperative  carried  with  it  the  right  to  receive  a  share  of  the  profits  and  the 
right  to  manage  its  operations  through  a  democratic  process,  736  and  therefore  might  have  been 
construed  as  carrying  with  it  the  additional  right  of  ownership  of  the  cooperative.  However,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  collective  farm,  this  conclusion  was  problematic  for  a  number  of  reasons: 
First  there  were  no  explicit  references  in  the  Cooperatives  Law  to  members  having  ownership 
interests  of  the  cooperative,  despite  the  fact  that  a  membership  fee  was  contemplated. 
Secondly,  the  Cooperatives  Law  included  the  concept  of  a  stockholder,  in  addition  to  that  of  a 
member,  and  this  further  precluded  the  possibility  of  a  straightforward  analysis  of  the  issue. 
Thirdly,  there  was  no  concept  of  different  sizes  of  ownership  interest  as  between  different 
members,  or  the  accumulation  of  rights  through  the  accumulation  of  ownership  interests: 
members  did  have  the  right  to  vote  and  sometimes  the  right  to  be  paid  a  liquidation  dividend 
but  not  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  the  membership  fee  paid  or  any  specific  interest  that 
was  acquired.  The  level  of  profit  distribution  was  more  complex  and  was,  in  part  only, 
dependent  upon  the  amount  of  the  fee  paid.  Finally,  a  member  could  be  expelled  from  the 
cooperative  by  a  decision  of  the  general  meeting  which  would  have  been  problematic  if  the 
member  had  an  ownership  interest,  as  this  would  have  entailed  a  deprivation  of  ownership. 
.  ....  ....... 
735  On  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership,  see  supra  Section  2.3.2  and  infra  Section  6.4.4.2. 
736  These  two  pillars  of  the  participation  model  in  the  context  of  cooperatives  are  considered  in  more  detail 
respectively  infra  Section  6.4.2  and  Section  6.4.3. 
-216- Fees,  Contributions,  Funds  and  Withdrawal  The  law  relating  to  entry  and  other  fees,  labour 
contributions  and  ftinds  arguably  went  to  the  heart  of  the  question  of  whether  members  had  an 
ownership  interest  of  the  cooperative.  Like  the  existence  of  the  share  fund  ("paevoi  fond")  in 
the  early  collective  farms,  the  terminology  and  the  fact  that  a  fee  was  paid,  or  property  passed 
over,  "suggested"  that  membership  resulted  in  the  "purchase"  of  an  ownership  interest. 
However,  upon  closer  analysis,  this  did  not  prove  to  be  the  case.  "'  Unfortunately  the  relevant 
terminology  was  not  precise,  and  perhaps  deliberately  so,  because  explicit  recognition  of 
ownership  of  a  cooperative  by  natural  and  juridical  persons  other  than  the  state  would  have 
compromised  the  principle  of  state  ownership  of  the  industrial  economy  still  further. 
The  Cooperatives  Law  referred  to  the  following  general  concepts  and  terms:  fees  ("vznosov") 
paid  by  members  in  cash  and  other  material  assets;  738  entry  and  share  fees  ("vstqpite1'nykh  i 
paevykh  vznosov");  739  cash  entry  and  share  fees  ;  740  fees  paid  by  way  of  property  passed  over 
("imushchestvennym  vznosom");  741  share  and  other  fees  of  individual  and  collective  members 
of  the  cooperative,  other  enterprises  and  organisations  and  persons  working  in  the  cooperative 
under  a  labour  contract;  as  well  as  cash  and  other  property  fees  of  its  members,  enterprises, 
742  organisations  and  citizens.  In  addition  to  the  concept  of  the  "fee",  the  Cooperatives  Law 
also  contemplated  the  "labour  contribution"  ("trudovoi  vk1ad").  Rather  than  being  a  payment 
in  cash  or  in  kind,  this  was  a  measure  of  the  amount  of  participatory  work  that  a  member 
undertook  in  the  activities  of  the  cooperative.  743 
The  Cooperatives  Law  also  provided  specific  rules  for  "agricultural  cooperatives"  and  specific 
rules  for  "consumer  cooperatives".  The  general  rule  was  that  the  cooperatives  had  the  right  to 
determine  autonomously  the  types,  amounts  and  procedures  for  formulating  and  using  funds 
and  reserves.  " 
In  relation  to  agricultural  cooperatives  specifically,  the  Cooperatives  Law  provided  for  the 
possibility  of  a  "participatory  share  fund  ("dolevoi  fond")  of  the  members  of  a  cooperative" 
737  Supra  n.  109,  p.  195.  See  generally  supra  Section  2.4.2  where  it  is  noted  that  the  right  to  a  portion  of  the 
share  fund  of  a  collective  farm  was  generally  regarded  only  as  contractual,  and  not  in  rem,  and  therefore 
conferred  neither  a  property  interest  in  the  fund  nor  in  the  collective  farm  itself. 
738  Cooperatives  Law,  article  7(2). 
739  Cooperatives  Law,  article  14(3). 
740  Cooperatives  Law,  article  48(l). 
741  Cooperatives  Law,  article  13(l)  and  14(2). 
742  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  7(2),  22(l)  and  36(l). 
743  This  was  adopted  directly  from  the  1987  State  Enterprise  Law,  supra  Section  6.3-2. 
744  Cooperatives  Law,  article  20(l).  This  was  amended  by  the  June  1990  Amendments  which  required  the 
creation  of  an  insurance  (reserve)  fund.  See  infra  6.4.4-3. 
-217- expressed  to  be  funded  from  a  portion  of  any  annual  increase  in  production  funds.  Assets 
were  then  distributed  from  this  fund  to  members'  "personal  accounts"  in  proportion  to  their 
specific  labour  contributions.  This  participatory  share  fund  therefore  had  nothing  to  do  with 
fees  paid  by  members  but,  as  noted  by  the  Cooperatives  Law  itself,  was  just  a  further  method 
to  incentivise  work  for  the  "improving  use  of  production  funds"  and  increasing  labour 
contributions.  "'  Although  this  fund  was  expressed  to  be  "of  the  members"  (and  not  of  other 
employees  of  the  cooperative)  and  may  have  been  an  incident  of  membership,  it  would  have 
been  difficult  to  have  viewed  it  as  evidence  of  ownership  by  members  of  an  ownership  interest 
of  the  cooperative  itself.  Indeed  the  waterfall  of  payments  on  the  termination  of  an  agricultural 
cooperative  treated  the  claims  of  members  in  respect  of  this  fund  like  other  creditors.  "' 
In  relation  to  consumer  cooperatives  specifically,  the  Cooperatives  Law  stated  expressly  that 
"members 
...  shall  make  cash  entry  and  share  fees",  and  that  when  a  member  withdrew,  he  was 
entitled  to  be  reimbursed  the  amount  of  his  share  fee  and  a  portion  of  distributable  profits,  but 
not  his  entry  fee.  "'  While  the  right  of  "unhindered  withdrawal"  was  included  for  all  members 
of  all  types  of  cooperative  generally,  "'  it  seemed  therefore  that  the  right  to  have  the  share  fee 
returned  on  withdrawal  only  applied  to  consumer  cooperatives. 
These  provisions  taken  as  a  whole  presented  a  very  confused  picture.  In  particular,  the  only 
"obligation"  in  the  Cooperatives  Law  actually  to  pay  an  entry  or  share  fee  was  set  out  in  the 
specific  rules  governing  consumer  cooperatives  (and  not  others  forms  of  cooperative)  although 
other  sections  of  the  law  clearly  did  contemplate  their  existence.  If  fees  were  due,  it  was 
unclear:  what  exactly  these  different  fees  were  for;  when  these  fees  were  payable  (the 
legislation  contemplated  entry  and  "other"  fees);  whether  they  were  to  be  paid  in  cash  or  in 
kind;  whether  they  were  returnable  (other  than  in  the  case  of  consumer  cooperatives);  and 
whether  they  were  paid  only  by  members  or  by  others  (the  legislation  contemplated  fees  "of 
members"  as  well  as  "of  other  enterprises  and  organisations  and  persons  working  in  the 
cooperative  under  a  labour  contract"). 
In  these  circumstances,  it  seems  that  the  "entry  and other  fees"  are  best  regarded  as  fees  paid 
in  connection  with  membership  but  not  as  consideration  for  the  purchase  of  an  ownership 
interest.  The  right  to  withdraw  further  suggested  that  the  membership  was  a  right  against  the 
745  Cooperatives  Law,  article  36(2). 
746  In  fact  these  claims  seem  to  have  been  preferred  to  those  of  other  creditors  (Cooperatives  Law,  article 
36(3)).  Infra  Section  6.4.4.1. 
747  Cooperatives  Law,  article  48(l). 
748  Cooperatives  Law,  article  10(l). 
-218- cooperative  and  the  other  members,  and  did  not  give  rise  to  an  ownership  interest  that  could 
have  been  sold  on  a  withdrawal  to  another. 
Although  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  membership  fees  as  consideration  for  the  purchase  of  an 
ownership  interest  of  a  judicial  person,  there  was,  on  the  other  hand,  no  hint  in  the 
Cooperatives  Law  that  the  law  on  common  ownership  applied  to  property  of  a  cooperative, 
and  therefore  no  suggestion  that  fees  or  property  paid  by  members  remained  in  their 
ownership.  There  was  no  mention  of  "contributions"  or  "participatory  shares".  Thus  the 
terminology  was  consistent  with  that  used  for  collective  farms,  and  can  be  distinguished  from 
the  language  of  the  contract  for  joint  activity  and  the  joint  enterprise.  The  latter  were 
developed  from  the  traditional  framework  for  industrial  associations  without  the  independent 
right  of  ownership  . 
149The  cooperatives,  by  contrast,  were  developed  from  the  legacy  of  the 
collective  farm  and  the  framework  of  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership. 
Ownership  Interests  and  Stocks  Although  cooperatives  were  clearly  to  be  juridical  persons, 
the  Cooperatives  Law  was  entirely  silent  on  the  question  of  the  existence  or  nature  of  an 
ownership  interest  of  the  cooperative  itself.  In  all  the  many  references  to  the  payment  of  fees, 
there  was  no  mention  that  these  resulted  in  anything  other  than  "membership"  (distinguishable 
from  "ownership").  Even  the  general  provisions  setting  out  the  rights  of  members  did  not 
include  a  right  of  members  to  own  the  cooperative  itself.  "'  It  is  therefore  suggested  that  the 
previous  analysis  presented  in  this  study  with  regard  to  the  ownership  of  collective  farms  still 
applied  in  relation  to  the  1988  cooperatives.  "' 
There  was,  however,  one  important  difference  between  the  prevailing  collective  farm  law  and 
the  Cooperatives  Law.  In  addition  to  the  concept  of  "membership" 
,  the  Cooperatives  Law  also 
contemplated  the  existence  of  "stocks" 
"As  a  further  source  of  financing",  the  Cooperatives  Law  expressly  permitted  the  issue  of 
stocks  ("aktsii")  for  sale  to  (i)  members;  (ii)  persons  working  at  the  cooperative  under  a 
labour  contract;  or  (iii)  enterprises  or  organisations.  "'  In  addition,  the  Cooperatives  Law 
contemplated  the  issue  of  "other  securities"  ("tsennye  bumagi").  "  While  the  term  for 
11securities"  in  the  Russian  language  includes  both  debt  and  equity  securities,  the  term  "stock" 
refers  only  to  equity  securities  -  ie  an  ownership  interest  of  a  juridical  person. 
749  Supra  Sections  4.6  and  5.4.2.2. 
750  Cooperatives  Law,  article  13(l). 
751  Supra  Section  2.4.2. 
752  Cooperatives  Law,  article  22(4). 
-219- In  light  of  this  basic  "definitional"  understanding  as  to  the  meaning  of  "stocks",  the  rules 
relating  to  the  issuance  of  stocks  by  cooperatives  made  little  sense:  They  provided  that  stocks 
could  only  be  issued  following  a  verification  of  solvency  from  a  bank;  stocks  were  expressed 
"to  be  secured"  ("obespechivaywya")  by  all  the  property  of  the  cooperative;  stocks  were 
available  to  be  purchased  by  members  on  a  preferential  basis;  as  a  rule,  the  total  value  of  the 
stocks  should  not  have  exceeded  the  gross  revenue  ("valovogo  dokhoda")  for  a  year.  The 
cooperative  was  to  establish  the  procedure  for  payment  of  the  annual  revenue  on  stocks  ("na 
aktsii  godovogo  dokhoda")  and  that  this  annual  revenue  could  not  be  changed  other  than  at  a 
general  meeting  of  members  "with  the  participation  of  stockholders".  "' 
It  is  tempting  to  understand  the  reference  to  "stocks"  as  an  example  of  inappropriate  drafting. 
Despite  the  reference  to  the  term  "stocks  and  other  securities"  [emphasis  added],  this  phrase 
was  only  intended  to  relate  to  debt  securities.  The  law  governing  the  right  to  vote,  to  receive  a 
share  of  profits  and  to  receive  a  portion  of  the  residual  property  on  the  termination  of 
activities  (considered  below)  also  suggested  that  the  "stock"  was  not  meant  to  be  understood 
as  an  equity  interest;  or  if  it  was,  it  was  more  like  preferred  stock  than  ordinary  stock.  The 
use  of  the  term  "annual  revenue"  (which  suggested  more  of  an  "interest"  type  quality  and 
avoided  the  use  of  the  term  "dividend")  further  bolstered  the  argument  that  "stocks"  were  not 
to  be  understood  as  equity. 
However  the  word  in  the  Russian  language  for  "stock"  does  mean  an  equity  interest,  and as 
part  of  the  June  1990  Amendments,  the  term  "dividends  on  stocks"  ("dividendov  po 
aktsiyam")  was  included  in  article  20(l)  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  which  suggested  that  despite 
the  reference  to  "annual  revenue",  the  term  "stock"  really  did  mean  an  equity  interest. 
Furthermore,  civil  law  textbooks  of  the  early  1990s,  written  after  the  development  of  joint- 
stock  societies  and  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  notion  of  the  stock  had  been  established, 
still,  on  the  basis  of  this  legislation,  confirmed  the  right  of  the  cooperative  to  issue  stocks 
(without  comment  as  to  the  implications  for  understanding  its  ownership  regime).  "'  The 
situation  was  only  fully  cleared  up  almost  eight  years  later  by  article  109(3)  of  the  1994 
Russian  Civil  Code  (Part  1)  which  expressly  provided  that  "cooperatives  shall  not  have  the 
right  to  issue  stocks". 
Right  to  Vote  and  Right  to  Receive  a  Poition  of  Revenues  (and  Stocks)  If  the  amount  of 
votes  a  member  cast  or  the  amount  of  revenues  a  member  received  had  been  proportionate  to 
753  Cooperatives  Law,  article  7(2). 
754  Cooperatives  Law,  article  22(4). 
755  Supra  n.  412,  p.  243:  "Authorisation  to  issue  stocks  is  given  to  a  cooperative". 
-220- the  amount  of  the  membership  or  other  fee  paid  by  that  member  then  this  may  have  been 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  an  ownership  interest.  However  this  was  not  the  case.  The 
Cooperatives  Law  provided  that  "each  member  ...  shall  have  one  vote  irrespective  of  the 
amount  of  its  fee  paid  in  property  ("razmer  ego  imushchestvennogo  vznosa")";  "'  and  that 
"members 
...  shall  have  the  right  to  ...  receive  a  share  of  the  revenue  (profit)  subject  to 
distribution  among  members  ... 
in  accordance  with  labour  contribution,  and  in  the  instances 
provided  for  in  the  charter,  also  in  accordance  with  the  fee  paid  in  property  to  the 
cooperative".  "'  Both  of  these  regimes  were  consistent  with  the  interpretation  of  the  member 
as  a  participant  in  the  activities  of  the  cooperative  contributing  with  personal  labour  efforts, 
but  did  not  suggest  that  they  were  the  owners  of  the  cooperative.  Furthermore,  stockholders 
(in  their  sole  capacity  as  stockholders)  were  not  generally  given  the  right  to  vote  or  the  right 
to  receive  a  portion  of  revenues  (in  addition  to  the  fixed  "annual  revenue")  which  further 
suggested  that  stocks  were  intended  to  have  the  character  of  debt  or  preferred  stock. 
Right  to  Receive  Residual  Property  on  Tennination  (and  Stocks)  The  initial  redaction  of  the 
Cooperatives  Law  provided  the  general  rule  that  "property,  remaining  after  the  liquidation  of 
a  cooperative,  shall  be  used  in  the  procedure  established  by  civil  legislation  if  not  otherwise 
provided  in  this  Law".  "'  This  merely  avoided  the  direct  issue  of  whether  a  member  had  a 
residual  right  in  the  liquidated  assets.  The  situation  was  clarified  following  the  June  1990 
Amendments  which  amended  this  general  provision  to  read  that:  "when  liquidating  a 
cooperative,  the  property  left  after  accounts  with  the  budget,  banks  and  other  creditors  shall 
be  distributed  between  members  of  the  cooperative".  However,  there  were  additional 
provisions  on  liquidation  relating  specifically  to  each  of  the  agricultural  cooperatives, 
production  cooperatives,  and  consumer  cooperatives. 
For  the  agricultural  cooperatives,  the  initial  redaction  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  provided  that 
after  settling  accounts  with  regard  to  the  payment  of  labour,  payments  of  personal  accounts  of 
members,  assets  from  the  participatory  share  fund,  and  fulfilment  of  obligations  to  the  budget, 
banks,  stockholders  and  other  creditors,  the  distribution  of  any  residual  amounts  shall  be 
determined  by  the  board  of  the  collective  farm  for  the  benefit  of  other  collective  farms  in 
agricultural  production.  "'  This  further  suggested  that  membership  did  not  entail  an  ownership 
interest  (at  least  in  the  context  of  agricultural  cooperatives),  as  members  of  agricultural 
756  Cooperatives  Law,  article  14(2)  [emphasis  added]. 
757  Cooperatives  Law,  article  13(l)  [emphasis  added].  The  procedure  was  decided  by  the  general  meeting 
(see  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  14(3)  and  20(l)  see  also  25(2)). 
758  Cooperatives  Law,  article  15(3). 
759  Cooperatives  Law,  article  36(3). 
-221- cooperatives  were  not  entit  ed  to  any  residual  property  upon  liquidation.  Furthermore,  it 
seemed  that  stockholders  were  treated  like  creditors  and  this  reinforced  the  interpretation  that 
the  reference  to  stock  was  intended  only  to  be  understood  as  a  debt  security.  These  provisions 
changed  following  the  June  1990  Amendments  which  provided  that  the  final  residual  property 
should  be  distributed  among  members  and  not  given  to  other  collective  farms. 
For  the  production  cooperatives,  the  initial  redaction  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  provided  that 
residual  property  after  the  payment  of  labour  wages,  and  fulfilling  obligations  to  the  budget, 
banks  and  other  creditors,  shall  be  distributed  among  members  "in  the  procedure  and  on  the 
conditions  provided  for  in  the  charter".  "  Although  stockholders  were  not  specifically 
mentioned,  the  rules  for  production  cooperatives  did  provide  members  clearly  with  a  potential 
right  to  residual  property.  The  June  1990  Amendments  merely  deleted  the  phrase  relating  to 
the  method  of  distribution  being  set  out  in  the  charter. 
For  the  consumer  cooperatives,  yet  another  rule  applied.  The  provisions  followed  a  similar 
description  of  deductions  as  for  the  production  cooperatives,  but  the  final  residual  property 
was  expressed  to  be  distributed,  not  to  the  members,  but  to  the  cooperatives  union  (or 
association)  of  which  the  consumer  society  was  a  member  . 
71'  This  was  unamended  by  the  June 
1990  Amendments. 
These  rules  were  therefore  different  for  different  types  of  cooperative  and  changed  over  time 
from  a  situation  where  members  did  not  have  an  explicit  right  to  a  share  in  the  residual  assets 
to  one  where  members  (other  than  in  consumer  cooperatives)  were  given  this  right.  Unless  the 
view  is  taken  that  different  types  of  cooperative  had  different  types  of  ownership  interest  (if  at 
all),  the  termination  regimes  were  by  no  means  conclusive  evidence  of  the  presence  of  "an 
ownership  interest"  of  members. 
Right  of  Expulsion  There  were  only  a  few  brief  references  to  the  right  of  expulsion  in  the 
Cooperatives  Law.  They  contemplated  the  right  of  the  general  meeting  to  "expel"  a  member 
from  the  cooperative  in  the  instances  provided  for  in  the  charter.  "'  While  the  right  to  expel  a 
member  did  address  the  question  of  the  ownership  interest  directly,  the  language  of 
it  expulsion"  is  more  suitable  to  the  status  of  membership  based  on  contract  than  upon 
ownership  of  an  ownership  interest  of  a  juridical  person.  The  right  to  deprive  a  member  of  an 
ownership  interest  would  have  been  subject  to  the  general  law  on  ownership  and  provisions 
relating  to  the  deprivation  of  the  right  of  ownership.  If  expulsion  amounted  to  the  deprivation 
760  Cooperatives  Law,  article  44. 
761  Cooperatives  Law,  article  45(5). 
762  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  11(2),  12(4)  and  14(3). 
-222- of  an  ownership  interest,  then  more  detailed  rules  on  expulsion  and  the  deprivation  of 
property  would  have  been  expected  to  have  been  included  in  the  Cooperatives  Law,  rather 
than  leaving  the  matter  to  be  regulated  by  the  provisions  of  the  charter  and  general  meeting.  "' 
Summary  and  Autonomous  Property  Responsibility  From  the  above  it  is  abundantly  clear  that 
there  was  no  clear  understanding  of  what  "an  ownership  interest  of  a  cooperative"  actually 
meant  as  a  legal  matter  or  whether  it  existed  at  all.  This  lack  of  clarity  on  such  a  central 
doctrinal  issue  was  probably  in  part  due  to  the  legacy  of  state  enterprises  (which  had  no 
ownership  interests  as  they  were  conceived  of  as  indivisible  objects  of  state  ownership  without 
the  separate  right  of  ownership)  and  the  law  of  collective  farms  (which  did  not  clearly  address 
the  question  and  finessed  the  point  beneath  discussions  on  the  doctrine  on  membership). 
On  the  basis  of  the  positive  law,  it  is  difficult  to  come  to  a  sensible  interpretation  on  the 
ownership  interest  question  in  the  context  of  the  1988  cooperatives.  It  seems  that  the  strict 
legal  position  was  that  although  the  state  and  members  had  various  rights  as  against  the 
cooperative,  neither  the  state  nor  the  members  "owned"  the  cooperatives  and  furthermore, 
stockholders  only  acquired  an  interest  as  a  creditor  against  the  cooperative.  The  cooperatives 
regime  therefore  operated  by  virtue  of  the  state's  position,  not  as  owner,  but  as  legal 
sovereign  and  through  statute  which  provided  a  legal  framework  for  circumstances  where  the 
nature  of  the  ownership  interest  (and  the  specific  rights  and  obligations  attached  to  it)  would 
otherwise  have  regulated  the  matter  (eg  on  termination,  distribution  of  profits,  responsibility 
etc). 
The  effect  of  the  uncertain  ownership  position  was  reflected  in  the  rules  relating  to  the 
autonomous  property  responsibility  of  the  cooperatives.  The  responsibility  rule  for  any 
juridical  person  is  usually  drafted  on  the  basis  of  separating  responsibility  of  the  legal  owner 
from  that  of  the  juridical  person.  While  the  labour  collective  had  a  significant  role  in  the 
activities  of  the  1987  state  enterprises,  they  were  clearly  not  the  legal  owners,  and  as  such, 
article  2(6)  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law  separated  the  responsibility  of  the  state  only  (ie  the 
legal  owner)  from  that  of  the  state  enterprise  (presumably  on  the  basis  that  there  could  be  no 
question  of  liability  falling  on  the  labour  collective  even  though  it  was  referred  to  as  the 
"proprietor").  "  By  contrast,  article  8(4)  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  provided  that  both  the  state 
and  the  members  shall  not  be  responsible  for  the  debts  of  the  cooperative.  This  further 
evidenced  the  fact  that  the  ownership  regime  of  the  cooperatives  was  unclear  (or  even  absent) 
763  The  importance  of  deprivation  of  property  rights  was  noted  in  Cooperatives  Law,  article  8(l)  which 
provided  that  property  of  a  cooperative  could  only  be  withdrawn  by  a  decision  of  a  court  or  arbitrazh. 
764  On  the  meaning  of  the  term  "proprietor"  in  this  context,  supra  Section  6.3-4.3. 
-223- and  that  in  these  circumstances  it  might  have  been  inferred  that  either  the  state  or  the  members 
could  have  been  responsible  for  the  debts  of  the  cooperatives,  and  consequentially  the 
Cooperatives  Law  referred  to  both  in  separating  responsibility. 
Article  8(4)  had  two  additional  features:  it  provided  that,  in  certain  specific  circumstances, 
members  could  have  been  made  to  be  responsible  for  debts  of  certain  cooperatives;  and  that 
the  "basic  assets"  of  the  cooperative  were  available  for  execution  by  creditors. 
In  the  case  of  production  cooperatives  only,  the  members  were  expressed  to  bear  subsidiary 
responsibility  for  debts  of  the  cooperative  "in  the  procedures,  amounts,  and  conditions 
provided  for  in  the  charter".  7"  The  June  1990  Amendments  introduced  a  minimum  level  of 
responsibility  to  be  no  less  than  the  annual  revenue  received  by  the  member;  and  amended 
article  11(4)  to  require  all  charters  of  production  cooperatives  to  include  provisions  for  the 
level  of  responsibility  of  members  for  debts  of  the  cooperative  (or  else  registration  would  be 
refused).  The  nature  of  the  liability  of  an  owner  of  an  ownership  interest  in  a  juridical  person 
would  generally  be  regulated  by  the  rights  and  obligations  attached  to  the  particular  ownership 
interest.  Thus,  for  example,  a  stockholder  in  an  English  "plc"  has  limited  liability  (a 
characteristic  of  being  an  owner  of  stock).  As  the  cooperatives  did  not  have  a  specific 
ownership  interest  (or  as  the  question  was  overlooked),  the  state  "had  to"  provide  through  the 
legal  system  a  default  regime  for  responsibility.  This  was  achieved  in  the  case  of  the 
production  cooperative  by  the  Cooperatives  Law  specifying  that  the  nature  and  level  of 
responsibility  was  a  matter  that  had  to  be  set  out  in  the  charter. 
The  inclusion  of  "basic  assets"  of  the  cooperative  within  its  property  responsibility  (and  hence 
the  assets  available  to  creditors)  was  significant  because  it  amended  the  underlying  civil  law 
position  which  applied  to  the  confirmation  enterprises  and  which  excluded  most  basic  assets  of 
an  industrial  judicial  person  from  the  property  available  to  creditors.  "'  This  expansion  in  the 
scope  of  responsibility  again  signalled  the  development  towards  a  concept  of  liability  (rather 
than  responsibility)  understood  in  terms  of  the  position  at  liquidation.  The  first  expression  of 
the  participation  model  had  introduced  financial  indicators  into  the  liquidation  procedure.  The 
second  expression,  the  Cooperatives  Law,  developed  this  ftirther,  767  suggesting  that  a  regime 
of  limited  liability  may  have  been  just  a  short  step  away. 
765  Cooperatives  Law,  article  43. 
766  Supra  n.  270.  This  change  was  pre-empted.  by  the  responsibility  rules  that  applied  to  the  contract-based 
concession  enterprises  (supra  Section  5.3.2). 
767  On  termination  rules,  infra  Section  6.4.4.1. 
-224- 6.4.2  Participation  and  Incentivisation  -  the  First  Pillar 
"Participation"  entailed  personal  involvement  and  interestedness  in  the  activities  of  the 
cooperative,  in  the  distribution  of  revenues  and  in  the  decision  making  process 
In  the  case  of  the  cooperatives,  participation  took  two  forms:  In  production  cooperatives, 
membership  was  conditioned  upon  obligatory  "personal  labour  participation"  in  the  production 
activities.  "'  In  consumer  cooperatives,  while  personal  labour  participation  was  not  prohibited 
and  while  members  had  preferential  rights  to  work  in  the  cooperative  system,  the  concept  of 
participation  emphasised  to  a  greater  extent  an  involvement  in  the  orientation  of  the  activities 
of  the  cooperative  to  ensure  that  production  satisfied  the  needs  of  its  members.  "' 
This  concept  of  the  participant  as  active  in  the  business  of  the  enterprise/cooperative  broadly 
precluded  the  development  of  the  concept  of  the  "silent  member"  acting  as  an  equity  investor, 
where  a  payment  or  fee  is  made,  not  with  a  view  to  participating  in  the  activities  of  the 
cooperative,  but  with  the  aim  of  acquiring  an  ownership  interest  of  the  cooperative  in  order  to 
realise  a  return  linked  to  profits  and  upon  a  sale  of  that  interest.  In  contrast  to  the  participant, 
a  stockholder  may  have  had  such  an  opportunity.  However,  as  discussed  above,  the  notion  of 
"stocks"  was  not  sufficiently  developed  in  the  legislation  to  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  stocks 
were  intended  to  represent  equity  capital.  The  participation  enterprises  thus  in  traditional 
terminology  were  conceived  broadly  as  an  association  of  persons  (rather  than  of  capital) 
where  members  had  the  right  and  obligation  to  "participate"  personally  in  its  activities.  For 
this  reason,  not  only  is  this  model  indebted  to  collective  farm  legislation,  but  also  to  the 
"bridge",  the  contract  for  joint  activity.  In  line  with  this  analysis,  while  the  legislation 
contemplated  the  hire  of  non-members  pursuant  to  a  labour  contract,  the  Cooperatives  Law 
provided  that  the  "state  shall  take  measures  to  prevent  instances  of  the  use  of  cooperatives  for 
private  entrepreneurial  activities  with  the  use  of  hired  labour  in  the  guise  of  creating 
768  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  3(2)  and  40(2).  This  is  more  akin  to  the  type  of  participation  in  the  first 
expression  of  this  model.  The  participants  of  the  first  expression  of  this  model  were  workers  and 
therefore  participated  in  the  activities  of  the  enterprise  almost  by  definition.  Yet  the  State  Enterprise 
Law,  adopting  the  technique  of  coercive  law,  still  provided  that  "it  is  the  debt  of  each  woker  to  labour 
honestly  and  conscientiously,  to  increase  labour  productivity,  to  improve  the  quality  of  products,  to  take 
care  of  and  augment  the  national  good  and  comply  with  labour  discipline"  (State  Enterprise  Law,  article 
14(l)). 
769  The  Cooperatives  Law  provided  that  "membership  in  a  consumer  society  shall  not  be  conditioned  by  the 
labour  participation  of  citizens  in  its  activity"  (article  48(l)).  However  the  principal  task  of  a  consumer 
cooperative  was  "to  guarantee  the  provision  of  goods,  services  and  work  to  its  members"  and  members 
had  the  "right  of  preferential  acquisition  of  goods  in  cooperative  stores  ...  and  also  a  preferential  right  to 
receive  work  in  the  consumer  cooperative  system"  (Cooperatives  Law,  articles  45(3)  and  (4)). 
-225- cooperatives. 
vt770  This  limitation  attempted  therefore  to  ensure  that  the  practice  of  hiring 
workers  did  not  compromise  the  personal  participation  principle  of  members. 
Like  the  first  expression  of  this  model,  the  obligation  to  participate  was  intended  to  be 
"incentivised"  through  "broad  opportunities"  for  "the  receipt  of  revenues  dependent  upon  the 
quantity  and  quality  of  [their]  labour".  111  It  was  hoped  that  production  efficiencies  would 
result  from  creating  a  "material  interest"  of  the  members  in  the  profitability  of  the 
cooperative.  772  In  short,  this  first  pillar  as  applied  in  the  second  expression  of  the  participation 
model  comprised  the  application  of  the  "new  economic  principles"  coupled  with  the  right  of  a 
member  to  share  in  the  profits  divided  prima  facie  in  accordance  with  labour  contributions. 
The  new  economic  principles  of  the  1987  state  enterprises  were  developed  further  in  the 
Cooperatives  Law.  While  providing  for  operation  on  the  basis  of  "self-financing".  773 
"nonsubsidy",  774  and  in  the  case  of  production  cooperatives,  full  khozraschet,  the  Cooperatives 
Law  also  required  that  their  activities  be  conducted  on  the  basis  of  "the  principles  of  socialist 
economic  operations  and  ...  the  extensive  use  of  goods-money  relations".  77'  The  incorporation 
of  "socialist  economic  principles"  provided  the  basis  for  state  mandatory  rules  governing  the 
operations  of  the  cooperatives,  and  the  use  of  "goods-money  relations"  indicated  the 
developing  use  of  civil  law  contractual  relations.  Both  of  these  aspects  are  considered  later  in 
this  Chapter.  776 
In  common  with  the  first  expression  of  this  model,  the  principles  of  self-financing  and 
nonsubsidy  were  aimed  at  ensuring  that  the  cooperative  operated  autonomously  and  was  not 
required  to  subsidise  other  cooperatives.  But  again  like  the  first  expression  of  this  model,  "' 
there  were  instances  where  the  Cooperatives  Law  contemplated  the  "rendering  of  financial 
118  support"  by  the  state  "including  on  conditions  of  the  assets  being  reimbursed". 
770  Cooperatives  Law,  article  40(2). 
771  Cooperatives  Law,  article  l(l). 
772  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  1(5)  and  5(l). 
773  Cooperatives  Law,  article  17(l). 
774  Cooperatives  Law,  article  20(l),  because  "loss-making  work  is  incompatible  with  the  essence  thereof". 
775  Cooperatives  Law,  article  17(l). 
776  Infra  Sections  6.4.4.3  and  6.5. 
777  Supra  n.  678. 
778  Cooperatives  Law,  article  22(2).  The  reference  to  "reimbursement"  ensured  as  a  legal  matter  that  any 
state  aid  was  characterised  as  a  loan,  and  not  as  a  subsidy  or  grant. 
-226- The  distribution  of  gross  revenue  was  "the  exclusive  right  of  the  general  meeting  of 
members",  779  and  was  to  be  based  "in  accordance  with  labour  contribution,  and  in  the 
instances  provided  for  in  the  charter,  also  in  accordance  with  the  fee  paid  in  property  to  the 
cooperative  ".  7"  This  aspect  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  was  inherited  from  one  of  the  key 
features  of  collective  farm  law  and  the  1987  state  enterprises  (ie  payment  in  proportion  to 
work).  The  right  to  provide  for  an  alternative  distribution  mechanism  in  accordance  with 
property  fees  paid  was  an  exception  to  the  general  participation  model  rule.  It  can  be 
understood  in  terms  of  the  way  in  which  this  expression  of  the  model,  while  rooted  in  the 
three  basic  pillars,  was  also  searching  forward  towards  an  organisational  form  based  on 
stocks,  equity  capital  and  dividends,  but  was  unable  to  reach  to  that  position,  in  part  due  to  a 
tension  between  such  a  position  and  the  participation  principle,  and  in  part  due  to  an 
incomplete  understanding  of  certain  of  the  basic  principles,  most  importantly  the  nature  of  the 
ownership  interest. 
6.4.3  Participation  and  Democracy  -  the  Second  Pillar 
While  the  first  expression  of  this  model  pioneered  the  departure  in  the  industrial  economy 
from  the  one-man  management/one  interest  framework,  the  cooperatives,  embracing  their 
collective  farm  heritage,  further  developed  the  principle  of  participant  democracy.  "'  The 
Cooperatives  Law  provided  generally  that  "the  administration  of  a  cooperative  shall  be  carried 
out  on  the  basis  of  socialist  self-management,  broad  democracy,  glasnost  and  active 
participation  of  its  members  in  deciding  all  questions  of  activity  of  the  cooperative.  ""' 
In  this  second  expression,  the  removal  of  the  state  from  its  role  as  creator-owner  and  hence 
from  the  internal  democracy  of  the  enterprise,  enabled  an  internal  management  democratic 
framework  to  be  developed  on  the  basis  of  the  voting  mechanism  between  members.  The 
Cooperatives  Law  called  this  "socialist  self-management".  While  the  state  was  indeed  no 
longer  an  owner,  the  reference  to  "socialist"  was  no  doubt  left  as  a  marker  that  there  were 
limits  to  the  choices  that  members  could  make  and  that  their  decisions  had  to  be  adopted 
779  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  14(3)  and  20(l). 
780  Cooperatives  Law,  article  13(l). 
781  The  traditional  division  between  the  confirmation  state  enterprise  and  the  collective  farm  was  noted  in  the 
"Handbook  for  the  Chairman  of  a  Collective  Farm"  which  stressed  that  "state  enterprises  [are]  where  all 
the  means  of  production  and  produced  products  belong  to  the  state  ... 
[and]  are  administered  on  the  basis 
of  one-man  management  by  the  director  having  a  power  of  attorney  to  administer  on  behalf  of  a  state 
agency.  In  collective  farms,  as  a  voluntary  production  cooperative  association,  where  social  ownership  of 
the  means  of  production  is  the  basis  thereof,  the  labour  collective  manages  directly  on  the  basis  of  a 
broad  democratic  foundation".  (Spravochnik  Predsedatelya  Kolkhoza  -  Kniga  Pervaya  (Gosudarstvennoe 
Izdatel'stvo  Sel'skokhozyaistvennoi  Literatury:  1956),  p.  172). 
782  Cooperatives  Law,  article  14(l). 
-227- taking  into  account  the  general  "interests"  of  socialism.  This  broad  implicit  restraint  on  the 
internal  decision  making  process  was  borrowed  from  the  concept  of  collective  farm 
democracy  where  the  state  was  also  excluded  from  direct  management.  "' 
As  the  participation  model  was  based  on  the  personal  participation  of  the  members  in 
management,  and  in  the  absence  of  a  formal  separation  of  ownership  from  control,  its 
governance  regime  was  centred  more  around  balancing  the  interests  of  members  inter  se 
rather  than  aligning  the  interests  of  the  member  (or  owners)  with  those  of  the  managers.  The 
Cooperatives  Law  explicitly  provided  that  "disputes  relating  to  cases  arising  from  membership 
relations"  shall  be  settled  by  the  organs  of  the  cooperative  as  set  out  in  the  charter,  and  in 
instances  provided  for  by  legislation,  a  court.  784 
The  principal  organ  and  forum  for  the  resolution  of  differences  between  members  and  for 
deciding  upon  policy  was  the  general  meeting.  Its  expressed  purpose  was  to  "direct  current 
affairs"  of  the  cooperative.  "'  Each  member  had  one  vote  irrespective  of  the  fee  paid,  and  the 
workers  who  were  not  members  had  a  consultative  vote.  The  general  meeting  had  exclusive 
competences  in  key  areas,  including  adopting  the  charter  and  changes  thereto;  electing  the 
chairman,  (in  the  case  of  large  cooperatives)  a  board,  and  an  audit  commission;  determining 
amounts  of  entry  and  share  fees;  establishing  a  procedure  for  the  distribution  of  revenues 
(profits)  and  for  the  creation  of  internal  funds;  deciding  questions  relating  to  withdrawal  and 
expulsion  of  members  and  the  termination  and  reorganisation  of  the  cooperative.  Other  areas 
of  competence  were  permitted  to  be  specified  additionally  in  the  charter. 
Residual  authority  and  general  "guidance  over  current  affairs"  was  relegated  to  the  chairman 
(or  the  board,  in  the  case  of  larger  cooperatives).  "'  Additionally  the  chairman  was  responsible 
for  ensuring  that  the  decisions  of  the  general  meeting,  and  if  applicable,  the  board,  were 
carried  out.  The  audit  commission  (or  single  auditor)  verified  financial  and  economic 
activities. 
The  most  noticeable  feature  of  the  provisions  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  relating  to  the  internal 
organs  and  procedures  was  their  brevity.  This  continued  the  tradition  set  out  both  in  the  State 
Enterprise  Law,  collective  farm  legislation  and  the  contract-based  concession  model.  Despite 
providing  for  three  internal  organs  and  a  chairman,  there  was  only  one  article  in  the 
783  See  supra  Section  2.4.1.  The  nature  of  the  state  control  over  the  management  process  by  external  and 
legislative  constraints  on  members  is  examined  infra  Section  6.4.4. 
784  Cooperatives  Law,  article  12(3). 
785  Cooperatives  Law,  article  14(2). 
786  Cooperatives  Law,  article  14(4). 
-228- Cooperatives  Law  related  specifically  to  their  operation  and  constitution.  No  default  rules 
were  provided  relating  to  the  calling  of  meetings,  information  requirements  to  be  circulated 
prior  to  meetings,  quorum  requirements,  majority  and  supra-majority  voting,  method  of 
voting  (secret  or  open),  and  the  procedures  in  the  event  of  deadlock  etc.  All  of  these  areas 
were  left  to  be  elaborated  in  the  charter,  or  to  be  decided  upon  by  the  general  meeting  itself. 
There  seemed  to  be  no  appreciation  of  the  fine  balance  to  be  struck  in  legislation  on 
enterprises  between  procedural,  mandatory  and  default  rules.  Although  the  cooperative 
enterprise  was  an  independent  industrial  organisation,  the  brevity  of  the  legislation  almost 
suggested  that  it  was  still  owned  by  a  single  owner  and  still  governed  by  a  one-man  manager, 
and  hence  there  was  no  need  to  provide  for  an  elaborate  internal  governance  framework. 
As  in  the  contract-based  concession  model,  now  that  the  state  had  been  excluded  from  the 
internal  management  organs  of  the  cooperative,  legislators  seemed  to  be  more  interested  in 
ensuring  that  the  state's  interests  were  protected  than  in  developing  rules  relating  to  internal 
organs.  Therefore,  by  contrast  with  the  provisions  relating  to  the  internal  organs,  the 
Cooperatives  Law  contained  12  articles  on  the  "Economic  Principles  of  Economic  Machinery 
in  System  of  Cooperatives"  (ie  economic  relations  with  the  state)  and  a  further  4  articles  on 
"The  State  and  the  Cooperative"  (ie  state  aid  and  political  relations).  Clearly  explicit  detailed 
legal  regulation  of  relations  with  the  state  was  critical  because  in  this  second  expression  of  the 
participation  model  each  of  the  distinctly  Soviet  elements  of  the  governance  regime  of  the 
confirmation  model  had  been  dismantled:  the  state  was  no  longer  the  creator  of  the 
cooperatives,  nor  the  owner  of  their  property,  nor  therefore  the  sole  owner  of  the  industrial 
economy.  A  new  governance  regime  therefore  had  to  be  constructed  to  ensure  that  the 
cooperative,  like  the  collective  farm,  operated  by  way  of  "combining"  personal  and  collective 
interests  with  those  of  the  State.  787 
6.4.4  Protection  of  the  Interests  of  the  State 
Both  of  the  first  two  pillars  of  the  participation  model  as  applied  to  cooperatives  had  a 
"socialist"  dimension  to  their  operation,  and  hence  the  Cooperatives  Law  referred  to  "the 
principles  of  socialist  economic  operations"  and  "socialist  self  management".  Like  the  state 
regulation  of  the  collective  farm,  there  was  no  intention  that  exclusion  of  the  state  from  the 
organisation  as  an  owner  would  entail  a  loss  of  control  by  the  state  over  its  activities.  In 
relation  to  each  element  of  the  confirmation  governance  regime  that  had  been  lost  in  this 
. ......  .  ........  ......  . .... 
787  Cooperatives  Law,  article  10(l).  This  was  also  (co-incidentally?  )  the  same  list  as  the  new  forms  of 
ownership  that  were  to  be  adopted  pursuant  to  the  1990  Ownership  Law,  see  infra  Section  7.3. 
-229- second  expression  of  the  participation  model,  the  state  therefore  adjusted  its  position  in  order 
to  ensure  that  its  interests  continued  to  be  protected. 
6.4.4.1  Loss  of  Role  as  Creator-owner 
As  distinct  from  the  first  expression  of  this  model,  cooperatives  were  created  by  the 
participants  and  not  by  the  state.  Article  11  provided  that  cooperatives  were  organised  at  the 
will  of  citizens  on  a  voluntary  basis.  The  charter  of  the  cooperative  was  adopted  by  the 
general  meeting  of  citizens  and  the  cooperative  was  deemed  to  be  formed  upon  registration  of 
the  charter.  There  had  to  be  at  least  three  individual  members. 
It  seemed  therefore  that  the  state  had  lost  its  right  to  protect  its  interests  through  the  first 
element  of  the  governance  regime  of  the  confirmation  model  -  acting  as  state-creator.  In  the 
confirmation  model,  the  state  used  its  position  as  creator  to  determine  when  to  create  all 
industrial  organisations,  to  specify  the  purpose  clause  of  the  charter  (and  hence  rely  on  the 
vires  rules  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  purpose)  and  to  terminate  its  activities.  "' 
Despite  the  loss  of  its  status  as  creator  in  this  second  expression  of  the  participation  model, 
the  state  developed  an  alternative  "indirect"  regime  for  retaining  negative  control  over  the 
creation  of  cooperatives  (hence  control  over  the  contents  of  the  purpose  clause  of  the  charter) 
through  the  right  to  refuse  registration;  and  positive  control  over  the  termination  of  activities, 
through  the  guise  of  ensuring  financial  stability  and  compliance  with  law. 
Article  11  (1)  in  the  initial  redaction  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  set  out  (rather  misleadingly)  the 
general  principle  that  "the  creation  of  a  cooperative  shall  not  be  conditional  upon  any  special 
authorisation  of  soviet,,  economic  or  other  agency".  Article  11(4)  however  seemed  to  provide 
an  exception:  "die  executive  committee  of  the  regional,  district,  city,  district  within  a  city 
soviet  of  people's  deputies  shall  have  the  right  to  refuse  to  register  the  charter  of  a  cooperative 
only  in  the  instances  of  it  being  contrary  to  prevailing  legislation".  Any  refusal  to  register  was 
appeallable  to  the  registering  agency. 
This  registration  regime  clearly  fell  short  of  an  "incorporation  model"  where  members  have 
the  right  to  incorporate  a  judicial  person  and  have  their  organisation  registered  provided  that 
all  "formal"  registration  documents  are  duly  presented  (irrespective  of  content).  By  contrast, 
under  the  article  11  procedure,  first,  the  registration  body  was  an  agency  of  the  state; 
secondly,  it  was  given  broad  discretion  to  refuse  to  register  charters  on  non-procedural 
grounds;  and  thirdly,  it  (rather  than  an  independent  tribunal)  had  the  right  to  hear  appeals. 
788  See  supra  Sections  3.2  and  3.4.1. 
-230- The  June  1990  Amendments  acknowledged  the  reality  of  this  situation  and  deleted  the 
reference  in  article  11(l)  to  the  fact  that  registration  was  not  conditional  upon  any 
authorisation.  It  also  introduced  references  to  a  licensing  regime  for  certain  activities  thereby 
extending  the  ambit  of  state  control.  "'  In  addition,  the  June  1990  Amendments  seemed  to 
expand  the  circumstances  where  registration  could  have  been  refused,  "'  but  did  however 
provide  for  judicial  determination  of  any  appeals  and  made  it  clear  that  registration  could  not 
have  been  refused  for  reasons  of  inadvisability. 
Each  charter  was  still  required  to  contain  a  purpose  clause  '79'  and  control  over  the  formulation 
of  this  clause  was  important  for  two  reasons:  first  the  civil  law  vires  rules  prohibited  any 
activities  contrary  to  this  purpose  ;  792  and  secondly,  the  law  on  collective  farm-cooperative 
ownership  only  permitted  the  ownership  of  property  necessary  to  carry  out  the  specified 
charter  tasks.  '9'  Although  formally  registration  agencies  were  not  permitted  to  refuse 
registration  for  reasons  of  inadvisability,  control  over  the  registration  process  meant  that  the 
charter  purposes  could  have  been  scrutinised  and  might  either  have  been  subject  generally  to  a 
licensing  requirement  or,  if  perceived  as  contrary  to  the  state's  interests,  the  registration  of  the 
charter  in  practice  could  have  been  delayed  or  refused. 
As  such,  while  the  state  was  no  longer  the  creator  of  these  industrial  organisations,  and  while 
until  June  1990  their  creation  was  expressed  to  be  without  the  need  for  authorisation,  the  state 
did  in  fact  retain  negative  control  over  the  registration  process:  ie  the  right  in  practice  to  delay 
or  veto  an  application.  The  state's  discretion  moved  from  a  "naked"  power  (such  as  in  the 
789  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  3(l)  and  17(2)  (as  amended). 
790  Registration  could  have  been  refused  where  there  was  "a  violation  of  the  established  procedure  for  the 
creation  of  a  cooperative,  when  its  charter  fails  to  conform  to  the  requirements  of  legislation,  and  also  if 
responsibility  of  members  of  the  cooperative  for  the  debts  of  the  cooperative  has  not  been  provided  for  in 
the  charter  [of  production  cooperatives]  ... 
A  refusal  to  register  a  cooperative  for  reasons  of  inadvisability 
shall  not  be  permitted"  (Cooperatives  Law,  article  11(4),  as  amended). 
791  Cooperatives  Law,  article  11(2). 
792  On  the  civil  law  of  vires,  see  supra  Section  3.4.1.  Article  3(l)  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  permitted  the 
inclusion  in  the  charter  of  any  type  of  activity  not  prohibited  by  legislative  acts  and  the  preamble  noted 
that  cooperatives  had  the  right  of  "a  free  choice  of  form  of  economic  activity".  Article  5(3)  then  provided 
that  the  cooperative  had  "the  right  to  adopt  any  decisions  if  this  is  not  contrary  to  prevailing  legislation 
and  the  charter".  Like  the  equivalent  provisions  of  the  first  expression  of  this  model  (supra  n.  694),  this 
formulation  indicated  that  the  special  legal  capacity  authorisation  regime  was  developing  into  a  more 
permissive  regime  (infra  n.  922). 
However  the  June  1990  Amendments  reasserted  again  the  more  authoritarian  regime  by  supplementing 
article  17(2)  to  specifying  that:  "a  cooperative  shall  not  have  the  right  to  carry  out  any  activity  which 
does  not  correspond  to  the  subject  and  purposes  provided  by  its  charter,  and  in  instances  established  by 
legislation,  -  and  by  issued  licences".  The  regime  of  special  legal  capacity  was  reinforced  by  the  practice 
of  listing  the  "rights"  of  the  cooperatives  in  the  Cooperatives  Law  (see  article  8(3)). 
793  See  infra  Section  6.4.4.2. 
-231  - confirmation  model,  and  in  the  contract-based  concession  model  where  creation  was  entirely 
at  the  behest  of  the  state)  to  a  power  cloaked  by  the  legitimation  of  law.  This  power  to  refuse 
to  register  charters  was  presented  both  in  terms  of  a  licensing  regime  and  a  right  to  monitor 
content  with  the  professed  aim  of  ensuring  that  all  charters  conformed  to  legislative 
requirements.  In  practice  this  system  was  clearly  open  to  abuse,  and  while  more  progressive 
than  the  concession  model,  it  did  not  even  nearly  resemble  a  right  to  incorporate. 
Despite  the  state's  lack  of  ownership  of  cooperatives  or  their  property,  the  technique  of 
maintaining  negative  control  over  the  creation  of  cooperatives,  through  characterising  the  role 
of  the  registering  agency  as  the  guardian  of  legality,  was  also  applied  in  the  context  of  the 
termination  procedures. 
In  common  with  the  regime  of  the  first  expression  of  this  model,  termination  was  expressed  to 
occur  by  way  of  reorganisation  (merger,  accession,  separation,  division  or  transformation)  or 
termination/liquidation.  "  This  again  included  the  possibility  for  a  transformation.  Liquidation 
could  occur  as  a  result  of  a  decision  of  the  general  meeting  or  of  the  executive  committee  of  a 
local  soviet  of  peoples  deputies  which  registered  the  cooperative. 
The  local  soviet  was  given  the  right  to  liquidate  the  cooperative  if  the  cooperative  was 
"trading  at  a  loss  ("ubytochnosti")  and  was  insolvent  ("neplatezhesposobnosfi")  and  in  the 
instances  when  the  cooperative,  irrespective  of  a  rendered  warning,  repeatedly  or  flagrantly 
violates  legislation".  "'  Members  had  the  right  to  appeal  a  decision  by  a  local  soviet  to 
liquidate  it.  Initially  this  appeal  was  to  the  local  soviet  itself,  but  after  the  June  1990 
Amendments,  appeals  were  considered  by  courts.  "'  In  addition,  following  a  similar  right  in 
the  first  expression  of  this  model,  the  initial  redaction  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  also  provided 
that  a  cooperative  that  had  systematically  breached  its  credit  obligations  may  be  declared  by 
its  bank  to  be  insolvent.  Thereafter,  if  the  cooperative  was  trading  at  a  loss,  the  bank  was 
given  the  right  to  request  the  relevant  local  soviet  to  commence  liquidation  proceedings 
against  the  cooperative  with  a  view  to  protecting  the  property  interests  of  creditors.  " 
794  Cooperatives  Law,  article  15.  See  supra  Section  6.3.4.2. 
795  Cooperatives  Law,  article  15(2).  The  June  1990  Amendments  provided  for  a  test  based  only  on 
insolvency  for  more  than  six months. 
796  Cooperatives  Law,  article  15(2). 
797  Cooperatives  Law,  article  23(3)  and  supra  n.  713.  Following  the  June  1990  Amendments,  insolvency 
could  only  have  been  declared  by  a  bank  if  a  cooperative  failed  to  fulfil  its  obligations  with  regard  to  its 
accounts;  and  if  it  was  insolvent  for  more  than  six  months,  a  bank  then  had  the  right  to  request 
liquidation  proceedings  by  the  local  soviet. 
-232- As  with  the  first  expression,  the  movement  to  termination  provisions  based  on  protection  of 
creditors  and  financial  stability  suggested  a  reconceptualisation  of  the  industrial  organisation 
as  a  creature  of  a  market  economy  and  hastened  the  development  of  a  regime  of  limited 
liability.  However,  by  making  the  registering  agency,  rather  than  actual  creditors,  the 
guardian  of  legality  and  solvency,  again  the  Soviet  state  retained  influence  in  a  process  which 
it  could  no  longer  control  by  direct  means  (having  lost  its  role  as  creator  of  all  industrial 
organisations). 
6.4.4.2  Loss  of  Role  as  Property-owner  (Cooperative  Ownership) 
As  distinct  from  the  first  expression  of  this  model,  the  cooperatives  had  the  right  to  own 
property  in  their  own  right,  by  way  of  "collective  farm-cooperative  ownership".  The  Stalin 
Constitution  had  originally  conceived  of  "socialist  ownership  of  the  USSR"  comprising  "state 
ownership"  and  "cooperative-collective  farm  ownership".  As  has  been  described  already,  the 
Cooperatives  Law  cut  across  the  traditional  distinctions  implicit  in  the  then  existing 
classification  of  Soviet  juridical  persons  between  juridical  persons  operating  in  the  industrial 
economy  without  the  right  of  ownership  on  the  basis  of  civil  law,  and  those  different  juridical 
persons  operating  in  the  agrarian  economy  with  the  right  of  ownership  on  the  basis  of 
collective  farm  law. 
The  radical  step  taken  by  the  Cooperatives  Law  was  to  introduce  the  collective 
farm/agricultural  economic  settlement  into  the  industrial  economy,  thereby  granting  to  the 
1988  industrial  cooperatives  the  right  of  ownership  which  had  been  won  by  collective  farmers 
in  the  context  of  the  collectivisation  settlement  of  the  1930s  and  which  applied  at  that  time 
primarily  only  to  agricultural  collective  farms.  "'  Unwilling  to  explore  the  consequences  of 
providing  for  a  single  framework  for  an  industrial  and  agrarian  juridical  person  with  the  right 
of  ownership,  the  Cooperatives  Law  continued  to  characterise  the  national  economy  as  based 
on  the  separate  forms  of  state  (all-people's)  ownership  and  collective  farm-cooperative 
ownership.  '99  However,  after  1988  this  distinction  simply  became  less  "relevant"  as  it  no 
longer  formed  the  basis  for  distinguishing  industrial  from  agrarian  juridical  persons,  and  civil 
law  from  collective  farm  law. 
798  On  the  historical  origins  of  the  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership,  supra  n.  41  (1982),  p.  258. 
799  "The  leading  role  of  state  (all-people's)  form  of  ownership  [and]  the  cooperative  form  is  developing 
everywhere"  and  that  "cooperative  enterprises  ...  together  with  state  enterprises  (associations)  shall  be  the 
basic  link  of  the  unified  national  economic  complex"  (Cooperatives  Law,  articles  1(2)  and  1(4);  see  also 
supra  n.  610).  Note  that  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  referred  to  "collective  farm-cooperative  ownership" 
(article  10)  rather  than  to  "cooperative-collective  farm  ownership"  as  set  out  in  the  Stalin  Constitution. 
-233- Under  the  general  law  of  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership,  cooperatives  had  the  right  to 
possess,  use  and  dispose  of  property  in  their  ownership  as  established  by  their  charters,  but 
only  to  the  extent  that  such  property  was  "necessary  for  the  carrying  out  of  charter  tasks".  " 
The  Cooperatives  Law  developed  this  position  by  providing  that  only  property  "necessary  for 
carrying  out  charter  tasks  ...  and  ... 
in  accordance  with  the  purposes  of  its  activities"  could  be  in 
their  ownership,  "'  and  affirmed  the  principle  that  the  right  of  disposition  only  belonged  to  the 
cooperative  itself.  "'  Using  the  same  term  that  the  State  Enterprise  Law  had  used  to  describe 
the  labour  collective,  the  Cooperatives  Law  described  the  cooperative  as  the  "fully  fledged 
proprietor"  of  the  property  belonging  to  it  by  right  of  ownership.  803  It  is  unclear  what  this 
terminology  added,  but  it  did  serve  to  illustrate  the  continuous  thread  through  the  first  two 
expressions  of  the  participation  model. 
The  significance  of  the  provisions  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  on  collective  farm-cooperative 
ownership  was  principally  threefold. 
First,  the  Cooperatives  Law  no  longer  referred  to  "collective  farm-cooperative  ownership"  but 
only  to  "cooperative  ownership".  "'  This  may  have  not  been  noticed  at  the  time,  however  this 
shift  in  expressions  evidenced  the  beginnings  of  the  reformulation  of  the  terminology  of  the 
Stalin  ownership  regime.  "  Secondly,  it  provided  that  cooperative  ownership  "as  a  form  of 
socialist  ownership  shall  be  inviolable  and  under  the  protection  of  the  State.  It  shall  be 
protected  by  law  equally  with  state  ownership".  "'  The  state  was  then  directed  "to  facilitate  in 
every  possible  way  the  development  of  cooperative  ownership".  'O'  This  therefore  gave  it  an 
equal  status  to  state ownership  and  evidenced  a  "coming  together"  of  two  distinct  forms  of 
ownership,  illustrating  a  possible  shift  towards  a  generic  concept  of  ownership  applied  to  all 
800  1961  FPCivL,  article  23.  The  rules  governing  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership  were  set  out  in  the 
Brezhnev  Constitution,  article  10,  the  1961  FPCivL,  articles  20  and  23;  and  civil  codes,  for  example, 
RSFSR  CC,  articles  99-101. 
801  Cooperatives  Law,  article  7(l).  This  article  also  included  a  list  of  property  that  could  be  owned  subject  to 
the  conditions  set  out  above.  Clearly,  property  designated  exclusively  within  the  ownership  of  the  state 
would  be  excluded  (1961  FPCivL,  article  21). 
802  Cooperatives  Law,  article  8(2).  On  the  then  prevailing  procedure  for  disposing  of  property  in  cooperative 
ownership,  supra  n.  244,  p.  131-132. 
803  Cooperatives  Law,  article  7(4). 
804  See  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  1(2),  8(l)  and  29(l). 
805  Supra  Section  2.3. 
806  Cooperatives  Law,  article  8(1). 
807  Cooperatives  Law,  article  29(l). 
-234- participants  in  the  economy.  808  Thirdly,  it  was  the  first  time  that  this  (or  any)  form  of 
ownership  was  applied  so  visibly  to  an  industrial  organisation. 
In  this  second  expression  of  the  participation  model,  the  state  lost  its  second  element  of  the 
confirmation  governance  regime,  its  status  as  "property-owner".  The  most  narrow  effect  of 
this  was  that  the  state  lost  its  right  to  limit  the  possession,  use  and  disposition  of  the  property 
of  cooperatives  through  "designation"  as  the  continuing  owner.  "'  However,  more  broadly,  the 
loss  of  ownership  of  the  cooperatives  themselves  and  of  their  property  meant  that  the 
monopoly  position  of  the  state  as  the  single  legal  owner  of  the  whole  industrial  economy 
became  capable  of  erosion  as  this  "independent"  cooperatives  sector  developed.  It  was 
therefore  critical  that  the  legislation  on  cooperatives  provided  some  other  means  by  which  the 
state  could  still  maintain  control  over  the  activities  of  the  cooperatives  in  particular,  and  more 
generally  over  the  underlying  economy  as  a  whole. 
6.4.4.3  Loss  of  Role  as  Economic  Sovereign  (The  Cooperatives  Sector,  Coercive  Law  and 
State  Aid) 
In  this  second  expression  of  the  participation  model,  the  implications  of  identifying  an  interest 
of  the  participant  as  "separate"  from  that  of  the  state,  became  more  radical,  visible  and 
significant:  the  state  neither  owned  this  industrial  organisation,  nor  its  property,  and  as  such 
the  state  was  excluded  from  participating  in  its  internal  management,  leaving  greater  formal 
discretions  in  the  hands  of  the  participants.  While  acknowledging  that  the  participants  had  a 
separate  interest,  the  state  did  not  want  the  cooperatives  simply  to  become  a  vehicle  for  the 
pursuit  of  their  narrow  interests.  The  Smithean  hidden  hand  was  still  mistrusted,  and  as  in 
previous  industrial  and  agricultural  forms,  the  state  needed  to  ensure  specifically  that  the 
cooperative  acted  in  the  wider  interests  of  the  social.  This  was  achieved  partly  through  the 
registration  and  termination  procedures.  However  these  mechanisms  only  really  gave  the  state 
the  right  to  halt  their  activities  and  were  not  a  way  to  control  management  on  an  on-going 
basis.  The  protection  of  the  interests  of  the  social  and  the  state  were  therefore  developed 
through  coercive  law  and  the  limitation  of  rights  through  legislative  diktat  in  an  attempt  to 
preserve  economic  sovereignty  over  the  industrial  and  national  economy. 
-  ------  ....  .  ....... 
808  This  concept  is  explored  in  greater  detail  infra  Chapter  7. 
809  See  supra  Section  3.4.2.  Where  the  state  did  retain  ownership  of  the  property  "of'  the  cooperative  (ie 
where  the  property  was  exclusively  in  state  ownership),  the  state  did  impose  traditional  designation 
restrictions.  Therefore  in  the  case  of  land,  which  was  only  granted  for  use,  the  state  "obliged"  the 
cooperative  "to  ensure  the  efficient  use  of  land,  manifest  constant  concern  for  increasing  its 
fertility 
...  and  ...  carry  out  ...  production  on  the  basis  of  low  waste  and  wasteless  technology"  (Cooperatives 
Law,  article  9(2)). 
-235- Once  again  an  approach  was  taken  that  was  rooted  in  collective  farm  law  and  that  had  been 
present  in  the  first  expression  of  this  model,  namely  the  "balancing"  or  "combining"  interests 
through  the  use  of  coercive  law.  "O  The  Cooperatives  Law  acknowledged  this  "balance",  "'  and 
by  diktat,  imposed  requirements  on  all  cooperatives  to  take  into  account  wider  social  or  state 
interests.  Article  4  set  out  the  "principal  tasks  of  the  cooperative"  in  the  following  order  "the 
satisfaction  of  the  requirements  of  the  national  economy  and  populace  ...  the  development  of 
labour  and  social  activeness  of  members";  then,  to  "increase  in  employment  of  the  populace  in 
socially  useful  labour";  and  finally,  ensuring  "from  its  own  revenues  an  increased  standard  of 
living  of  members  and  their  families"!  "  The  Cooperatives  Law  never  really  mentioned  the 
satisfaction  of  the  interests  of  the  participants  as  a  purpose  of  the  activities  of  the  cooperative 
without  combining  it  with  those  of  other  interest  groups  including  the  state,  consumers, 
workers,  and  society  generally.  Indeed  the  state's  concern  that  the  cooperative  may  become  a 
vehicle  for  the  expression  of  the  narrow  interests  of  the  participants  was  evidenced  by  the 
explicit  direction  that  "no  one  shall  have  the  right  to  use  cooperative  ownership  to  obtain 
illegal  revenues  and  for  other  mercenary  purposes".  813 
While  the  granting  of  the  right  of  ownership  to  an  industrial  juridical  person  (the  industrial 
cooperative)  blurred  the  traditional  distinction  between  the  "state  owned"  industrial  economy, 
comprising  state  enterprises,  and  the  "non-state  owned"  (but  state  controlled)  agrarian 
economy,  comprising  collective  farms  and  cooperatives,  it  did  not  undermine  the  fact  that  the 
Soviet  economy  continued  to  be  bifurcated  between  a  "state  owned"  and  a  "non-state  owned 
810  Supra  Section  6.3.4. 
811  References  to  balancing  interests  in  the  Cooperatives  Law  included:  article  5(l)  ("the  fullest  combination 
of  their  interests  with  the  interests  of  the  collective  and  society");  article  10(l)  ("the  combining  of 
personal,  collective  and  state  interests");  article  19(l)  ("the  mutual  interests  both  of  the  cooperatives  and 
consumers  and  the  national  economy  as  a  whole");  article  17(3)  ("mutual  relations  of  the  cooperative 
with  the  state,  cooperative  and  other  social  enterprises,  organisations,  and  citizens  who  are  consumers  of 
its  product");  and  article  29(2)  ("the  proper  combining  of  interests  of  cooperatives  with  all-people's"). 
812  Other  references  to  the  wider  role  of  the  cooperatives  in  the  Cooperatives  Law  included:  the  preamble 
("the  use  of  cooperative  forms  in  every  possible  way  for  the  satisfaction  of  the  growing  requirements  of 
the  national  economy  and  populace  for  foodstuffs,  consumer  goods,  housing  and  various  products  of 
production-technical  designation,  work  and  services");  article  1(2)  (role  in  "satisfying  more  fully  the 
material  and  spiritual  requirements  of  the  Soviet  people");  article  5(2)  ("the  cooperative  has  been  called 
upon  to  actively  participate  in  the  economic  and  social  development  of  the  country  ...  the  fullest 
satisfaction  of  the  growing  material  and  spiritual  requirements  of  people");  and  article  17(3)  ("the 
interests  of  consumers  shall  be  the  major  requirement  for  the  activity  of  a  cooperative  and  the  principal 
criterion  for  assessing  the  quality  and  efficiency  of  its  work").  Indeed  article  24(2)  required  the 
cooperative  to  use  its  own  assets  to  construct  housing,  preschool  institutions  and  other  objects  of  social 
designation  (it  was  unclear  whether  this  was  to  be  for  the  members,  workforce  or  simply  society  in 
general). 
813  Cooperatives  Law,  article  7(4). 
-236- sector";  it  was  just  that  the  state  owned  sector  was  no  longer  coincident  with  the  entire 
industrial  economy. 
The  state  sought  to  extend  its  control  over  the  non-state  owned  sector  (including  the  1988 
cooperatives  and  collective  farms)  in  the  traditional  way.  Thus  although  the  Cooperatives  Law 
recognised  these  two  sectors  and  sought  to  provide  equal  protection  for  both,  814  it  also 
contemplated  state  control  over  the  "cooperatives  sector".  This  was  done  by  continuing  to 
conceive  of  the  economy  as  a  "unified  national  economic  complex"  '81'  and  then  by  stressing 
the  "leading  role  of  state  (all-people's)  ownership"  8"  and  contemplating  an  "extensive 
interlaced  system"  of  cooperatives  as  "organically  connected  ("organicheski  svyazannuyu")  to 
the  state  sector  of  the  economy".  817 
As  with  collective  farms,  this  "organic"  connection  to  the  state  sector  proved  to  be  quite 
restricting.  Gsovski  noted  that  the  state  had  always  retained  control  in  practice  over  these 
"voluntary  democratic  organisations"  through  its  control  over  the  economy  as  a  single  national 
complex  and quoted  a  1939  textbook  on  collective  farm  law:  "[The  status  of  collective  farms] 
does  not  preclude  governmental  agencies  and  public  organisations  [i.  e.  the  Communist  Party] 
from  recommending  to  the  general  meeting  one  or  another  comrade  for  the  office  of 
chairman";  and concluded  "from  the  soviet  laws  and  decrees,  one  gets  the  impression  that  all 
the  rules  designed  to  safeguard  the  autonomy  and  self-government  of  collective  farms  are 
more  often  violated  than  obeyed.  ""' 
Therefore,  although  article  10(2)  set  out  the  principle  that  "interference  in  economic  or  other 
activities  of  the  cooperatives  on  the  part  of  state  and  cooperative  agencies  ...  shall  not  be 
permitted",  the  Cooperatives  Law  in  fact  provided  a  range  of  rights  of  the  state  to  monitor  the 
activities  of  the  cooperatives  and  control  the  economic  system  in  which  they  operated. 
Furthermore,  it  provided,  by  legislative  diktat,  certain  requirements  relating  to  their  specific 
operations  and  activities.  The  reality  of  the  underlying  position  was  acknowledged  in  the  June 
1990  Amendments  which  included  the  declaration  that  "the  present  provision  shall  not  affect 
814  The  premable  to  the  Cooperatives  Law  noted  "the  equal  interaction  of  state  and  collective  farm- 
cooperative  sectors  of  the  socialist  economy";  article  1(4)  recognised  both  state  enterprises  and 
cooperatives  as  "the  basic  link"  in  the  economy;  and  article  8(l)  provided  for  equal  protection  of  state 
and  cooperative  ownership. 
815  Cooperatives  Law,  article  1(4). 
816  Cooperatives  Law,  article  1(2).  Indeed  cooperative  ownership  was  even  described  as  "under  the 
protection  of  the  state"  (article  8(l)). 
817  Cooperatives  Law,  article  3(l). 
818  Supra.  n.  22  (1948),  pp.  755-756  (brackets  added  by  Gsovski). 
-237- the  rights  of  state  agencies  in  carrying  out  control  over  the  activities  of  cooperatives  as 
provided  for  by  legislation". 
Initial  control  over  the  verification  of  cooperatives'  financial  and  economic  activities  and  the 
conducting  of  audits  was  placed  with  the  audit  commission.  "'  Cooperatives  were  required  to 
compile  very  detailed  financial  and  operational  reports  and  as  a  general  matter  submit  them  to 
state  agencies  in  a  timely  manner  as  prescribed  by  legislation.  More  specifically,  the 
cooperative  was  obliged  to  notify  the  relevant  territorial  state  agency  of  all  of  its  contemplated 
and  actual  volumes  of  production,  "'  and  the  agencies  of  state  administration  were  given  the 
right  to  "verify"  the  work  of  cooperatives;  "'  as  well  as  the  right  to  carry  out  "control"  over 
compliance  with  prevailing  legislation.  These  provisions  therefore  provided  sufficient  grounds 
for  the  state  to  monitor  closely  the  activities  of  the  cooperatives  if  required. 
Despite  the  increased  role  of  contracting,  "'  and  despite  the  fact  that  the  cooperatives  had  the 
right  to  "autonomously  plan  production"  and  "voluntarily  accept  the  performance  of  state 
orders",  "'  the  state  nevertheless  retained  the  right  to  control  the  entire  economy  (and  hence 
the  cooperatives)  in  two  principal  ways  (albeit  that  the  balance  between  the  interests  of  the 
state  and  participant  shifted  from  the  first  expression  of  this  model  in  favour  of  the 
participant). 
First,  "long-term  economic  normative  standards"  of  the  state  as  developed  in  the  context  of 
the  state  plan  remained  binding  on  the  cooperatives.  Long-term  economic  normative  standards 
were  enacted  in  relation  to:  prices,  taxes,  interest  rates  on  loans,  payment  for  natural 
resources,  and  social  security  deductions.  "'  Secondly,  cooperatives  were  required  "to 
participate  in  economic  competition"  (on  terms  with  increased  quality  and  reduced  costs  of 
production)  with  state  and  other  enterprises  with  the  aim  of  obtaining  state orders  . 
82'  This 
requirement  implicitly  obliged  the  cooperatives  sector  to  become  involved  in  the  state  sector 
and  on  terms  that  were  most  advantageous  to  the  state.  Control  over  the  economy  was 
additionally  effected  by  way  of  the  tax  system  (which  was  to  be  orientated  explicitly  toward 
819  Cooperatives  Law,  article  14(4)  and  32(4). 
820  Cooperatives  Law,  article  18(4).  This  was  expressed  as  necessary  in  order  to  ensure  that  the 
cooperatives'  plans  were  coordinated  with  the  plans  of  the  region  as  a  whole. 
821  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  32(5)  and  30(4). 
822  Infra  Section  6.5. 
823  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  18(l)  and  18(2). 
824  Cooperatives  Law  articles  18(3)  and  20(2). 
825  Cooperatives  Law,  article  18(2). 
-238- incentivising  the  cooperatives  to  act  in  the  interests  of  the  state  and  the  national  economy  as  a 
whole).  826 
Of  these  various  mechanisms,  the  control  over  prices  was  perhaps  the  most  sensitive  and  most 
disabling,  for  true  economic  autonomy  could  never  have  been  achieved  if  prices  remained 
centrally  fixed.  In  fact  the  Cooperatives  Law  included  a  specific  article  on  prices  which, 
rather  than  suggesting  that  they  were  to  be  set  by  the  cooperative  in  order  to  maximise  its 
profit,  provided  that  they  "must  (Volzhny")  be  structured  by  taking  into  account  the  mutual 
121  interests  both  of  the  cooperatives  and  the  consumers  and  the  national  economy  as  a  whole". 
This  was  achieved  by  the  Soviet  of  People's  Deputies  specifying  maximum  levels  of  prices  for 
828  basic  consumer  goods  or  services.  Furthermore,  the  prices  of  any  contracts  for  a  state 
order,  or  for  any  production  using  raw  materials  supplied  pursuant  to  a  state  order,  were 
required  to  be  "determined  in  a  centralised  way"  . 
82'  Finally,  penalties  were  provided  in  the 
event  of  a  breach  of  these  provisions  by  a  cooperative  . 
810  In  this  manner  the  state's  remaining 
monopoly  over  the  majority  of  the  industrial  economy  was  leveraged  upon  thereby  enabling  it 
to  control  prices  and  activities  in  the  cooperative  sector. 
In  addition  to  maintaining  the  right  to  plan  the  economy  generally,  the  Cooperatives  Law 
again  adopted  coercive  legislation,  including  mandatory  legislative  "obligations"  (by  use  of  the 
words  "oblige",  "must"  and  the  present  tense),  with  a  view  to  controlling  and  limiting  the 
day-to-day  activities  of  the  cooperatives  and  maintaining  quality  and  efficiency.  "' 
Conceived  in  this  way,  the  cooperatives  network  (like  the  collective  farm  network  it 
superseded)  was  intended  to  be  an  integral  part  of  the  national  economy,  broadly  within  state 
826  Coopertives  Law,  article  21. 
827  Cooperatives  Law,  article  19(l). 
828  By  an  amending  decree  in  1989,  this  addition  was  made  to  article  19(2)  (0  Vnesenii  Izmenenii  i 
Dopolnenii  v  Zakon  SSSR  "0  Kooperatsii  v  SSSR,  Vedomosti  SAD  SSSR  (1989),  no.  19,  item  350  (the 
"October  1989  Amendments")). 
829  Cooperatives  Law,  article  19(3),  21(2)  and  34(3).  Almost  all  raw  materials  were  supplied  by  the  state  and 
so  their  pricing  generally  came  within  the  centrally  determined  regime. 
830  Cooperatives  Law,  article  19(4)  (as  amended  by  the  October  1989  Amendments  and  the  June  1990 
Amendments)  provided  that  revenue  "unjustifiably  received"  shall  be  confiscated  to  the  budget  and 
cooperatives  may  be  fined  an  amount  equal  to  the  "illegally  received  additional  revenue".  Furthermore,  a 
consumer  had  the  right  to  dissolve  any  contract  which  breached  the  rules  relating  to  price  fixing. 
831  For  example,  Cooperatives  Law,  article  4(l)  ("production  shall  be  developed  ... 
its  efficiency  enhanced, 
the  improvement  of  product  quality  ...  and  the  growth  of  labour  productivity  shall  be  ensured,  local  raw 
materials  and  materials  shall  be  involved  maximally  in  economic  turnover,  and  wasteless  and  resource- 
saving  technologies  shall  be  worked  out  and  introduced");  article  23  ("a  cooperative  shall  be  obliged  to 
strengthen  accounting  discipline");  and  article  26(4)  ("concern  for  the  reputation  of  its  mark  must  be  the 
subject  of  professional  pride  of  every  member"). 
-239- control  and  operating  by  taking  into  account  the  interests  of  the  state.  As  such,  the 
Cooperatives  Law  required  that  the  state  supported  the  cooperative  movement  "in  every 
possible  way,  promote  its  expansion,  and  guarantee  compliance  with  the  rights  and  legal 
interests  of  cooperatives  and  their  members"  - 
"'  Echoing  the  drafting  of  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil 
Code,...  the  reference  to  "legal  interests"  again  betrayed  the  fact  that  limits  that  were  intended 
to  be  imposed  (through  the  law  of  vires  and  otherwise)  on  the  freedom  of  participants  to 
pursue  their  narrow  interests.  Indeed  state  guidance  of  cooperatives'  activities  was  expressed 
to  be  carried  out  "in  all-people's  interests".  "' 
The  state  was  obliged  to  assist  in  the  development  of  cooperatives  generally;  83'  as  well  as 
more  specifically,  for  example,  to  assist  in  the  completion  of  necessary  documentation 
regarding  the  organisation  of  production  and  labour;  capital  construction  and  other  activities; 
financial  aid,  and  access  to  research  institutions.  836  In  addition  to  direct  aid,  the  Cooperatives 
Law  included  certain  "paternalist"  provisions  evidencing  the  state's  "concern"  that  members 
of  the  cooperatives  may  not  have  possessed  the  sufficient  experience  to  manage  them 
competently.  837 
While  the  role  of  the  state  as  economic  sovereign  was  therefore  preserved  by  leveraging  upon 
its  monopoly  position  in  the  broader  industrial  economy  and  by  legislative  diktat,  the 
Cooperatives  Law  continued  to  contemplate  the  possibility  of  a  state  agency  as  a  defendant,  a 
position  first  more  fully  developed  in  the  State  Enterprise  Law.  Cooperatives  were  given  the 
right  to  apply  to  a  court  or  arbitrazh  with  an  application  to  deem  any  act  of  a  state  agency  void 
832  Cooperatives  Law,  article  10(3)  [emphasis  added].  Reference  was  also  made  to  "legal  interests"  in 
articles  29(l)  and  33(7). 
833  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code,  article  57  (which  referred  to  "legally  existing  cooperatives"  (supra  p.  172-173)). 
834  Cooperatives  Law,  article  29(2). 
835  See  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  29,30  and  31. 
836  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  18(5);  22(2);  26(2). 
837  An  example  of  general  assistance  is  in  the  provisions  giving  the  cooperatives  the  right  to  develop  plans 
autonomously.  Paternalistic  drafting  in  the  law  itself  explains  (and  requires)  that  such  plans  should  be 
developed  on  the  basis  of  the  "demand"  for  products  and  the  "possibilities  of  receiving  revenue",  "the 
effective  use  of  ..  resources",  "the  use  of  progressive  technologies",  the  consideration  of  "economic 
expenditure  of  raw  materials",  "production  and  distribution  costs",  and  "labour  productivity" 
(Cooperatives  Law,  article  18(l)).  Another  example  is  article  27(3),  the  purpose  of  which  can  only  again 
be  paternalistic:  "in  order  to  produce  a  product  (work,  service)",  the  law  explained  "a  cooperative  shall 
organise  when  necessary  the  extraction  and  processing  of  local  raw  materials  and  materials  and,  in  the 
established  procedure,  minerals,  the  collection  and  precessing  of  secondary  resources  and  wastes, 
subsidiary  agricultural  production,  the  manufacture  and  repair  of  equipment,  tools  and  rigging  as  well  as 
firm  servicing  of  its  product".  There  were  many  other  examples  of  such  drafting.  A  more  specific 
example  was  the  introduction  of  the  requirement  to  create  an  "insurance  (reserve)  ftind"  which  not  less 
than  5%  of  net  annual  revenue  (see  June  1990  Amendments).  This  concept  was  incorporated  from  the 
contract-based  concession  model  (see  supra  Section  5.3-2). 
-240- in  full  or  part  where  such  act  exceeded  delegated  competences  or  did  not  conform  to 
legislation.  In  addition,  the  courts  and  arbitrazh  were  given  the  right  to  award  compensatory 
838  losses.  This  general  principle  was  developed  by  providing  the  right  of  judicial  review  of  a 
131  refusal  by  a  state  agency  to  register  a  charter  and  the  decision  to  terminate  its  activities. 
Although  article  10(2)  still  referred  to  Vyshinksy's  principle  of  "socialist  legality",  as  the 
participation  model  deepened,  so  a  new  concept  of  legality  seemed  to  emerge  where  the  state's 
competences  were  specified  and  ringfenced,  and  where  legal  rights  became  enforceable  not 
just  against  juridical  persons  but  also  against  the  state  and  its  agencies. 
6.4.5  The  Significance  of  the  Second  Expression  of  the  Pailicipation  Model 
The  first  expression  of  the  participation  model  had  introduced  the  notion  of  "the  separate 
interest"  into  the  industrial  organisation.  It  furthermore  developed  the  three  basic  pillars  of  the 
participation  model:  incentivisation,  democracy  and  coercive  law.  In  addition,  its  rationale 
reflected  the  policy  goal  of  "improving"  the  planned  economy,  and  it  broadly  left  the 
confirmation  governance  regime  untouched.  As  already  noted,  there  was  an  inherent  tension 
between  recognising  the  presence  of  different  interests  (in  addition  to  that  of  the  state's)  while 
at  the  same  time  trying  to  preserve  state  control  over  the  entire  economy  by  administrative 
means,  through  central  planning  and  control  over  prices.  This  tension  and  balance  was 
acknowledged  in  the  State  Enterprise  Law,  although  it  was  firn-fly  weighted  in  the  interests  of 
the  state. 
This  second  expression  contained  certain  structural  differences  that  enabled  the  logic  of  the 
participation  model  to  be  extended.  As  the  cooperatives  had  been  developed  from  the  law  on 
collective  farms,  the  state  neither  owned  them  nor  their  property.  This  enabled  the 
development  of  the  interests  of  the  participant  in  the  internal  management  organs  to  be 
unfettered  by  the  direct  involvement  of  the  state  in  the  decision-making  process.  In  addition, 
this  loss  of  ownership  undermined  the  three  distinctly  Soviet  elements  of  the  confirmation 
governance  regime:  the  state  could  no  longer  control  the  cooperatives  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that 
it  was  their  creator,  the  owner  of  their  property  or  an  economic  sovereign. 
The  introduction  of  non-state  owned  cooperatives  into  the  industrial  economy  led  to  a  blurring 
of  the  traditional  distinction  between  the  state  owned  industrial  economy  operated  entirely 
838  Cooperatives  Law,  article  10(2). 
839  As  mentioned  in  Section  4.4.4.1  above,  if  a  registering  agency  did  not  register  a  charter  within  30  days 
of  the  application  or  refused  registration  on  the  grounds  provided,  or  if  a  registering  agency  decided  to 
terminate  the  activities  of  the  cooperative,  the  members  of  the  cooperative  had  the  right  to  appeal  the 
decision  to  a  court  (Cooperatives  Law,  articles  11(4)  and  15(2)  as  amended  by  June  1990  Amendments). 
-241- through  state  enterprises  and  civil  law,  and  the  non-state  owned  agricultural  economy  operated 
predominantly  through  collective  farms  on  the  basis  of  collective  farm  law.  The  result  was 
that  the  non-state  cooperatives  sector  grew  within  the  industrial  economy  and  economic 
sovereignty  was  only  maintained  by  leveraging  upon  the  state  monopoly  of  the  means  of 
production  in  the  non  cooperative  sector  as  well  as  by  exploiting  the  state's  position  as  legal 
sovereign.  As  such,  legislation  provided  requirements  to  comply  with  state  long  term 
economic  normative  standards  and  to  take  into  account  wider  social  interests.  In  addition, 
legal  procedural  requirements  were  developed  to  retain  control  over  the  creation  and 
termination  of  cooperatives. 
This  second  expression  was  the  first  time  since  the  1930s  that  primary  legislation  had 
contemplated  the  possibility  of  an  industrial  juridical  person  with  the  right  of  ownership.  By 
excluding  the  state  from  the  internal  governance  regime  and  confining  the  state  therefore  to 
protecting  its  interests  through  "external  control  mechanisms",  the  role  of  law  and  statute 
became  increasingly  important. 
The  main  structural  significance  of  this  second  expression  was  at  the  same  time  its  main 
shortcoming.  The  legacy  of  the  Soviet  law  on  ownership  and  how  it  was  applied  in  the  context 
of  collective  farm  law  meant  that  industrial  organisations  acquired  the  right  of  ownership  and 
that  the  state  lost  its  role  as  owner  of  all  industrial  organisations.  Unfortunately  this  same  law 
on  ownership  provided  no  legal  regime  for  analysing  who  in  fact  did  own  them.  The  concept 
of  "an  ownership  interest"  in  a  juridical  person  was  absent  within  mainstream  Soviet 
ownership  law  and as  such  there  was  no  coherence  to  the  provisions  of  the  Cooperatives  Law 
on  stocks;  responsibility;  and  membership  fees  and  other  contributions.  Ultimately  there  was 
no  real  attempt  to  explain  fundamentally  the  basic  legal  structure  of  this  "new"  juridical 
person. 
In  Soviet  times  this  question  was  successfully  finessed  as  all  state  enterprises  were  wholly 
owned  by  the  state  (and  thus  could  be  treated  as  indivisible  objects  of  the  right  of  ownership) 
and  there  was  no  need  or  desire  to  develop  an  understanding  of  ownership  interests  in 
collective  farms  (as  this  was  a  politically  charged  issue  and  was  successfully  avoided  through 
the  regime  of  membership).  In  relation  to  the  1987  state  enterprises  and  1988  cooperatives, 
their  characterisation  of  associations  of  people  (and  not  capital)  with  an  emphasis  on  "personal 
participation"  also  meant  that  the  question  of  ownership  interests  could  continue  to  be  finessed 
without  any  resulting  significant  practical  difficulties.  However  the  Soviet  approach  to 
ownership  interests  of  juridical  persons  became  problematic  as  these  new  industrial 
organisations  came  increasingly  to  act  in  the  context  of  a  "socialist"  market  with  multiple 
-242- owners  and  investment  capital.  More  immediately,  the  lack  of  clarity  and  coherence  in  the 
legal  regime  of  ownership  interests  became  particularly  evident  as  legislators  sought  in  1989 
to  examine  directly  this  area  by  reintroducing  the  concept  of  contract  into  the  basic  framework 
of  the  industrial  organisation. 
6.5  1989  Leased  Enterprises  -  From  Administrative  Subordination  to  Contractual 
Parity 
The  first  expression  of  the  participation  model  was  based  on  the  formal  acknowledgement  of 
the  "interest  of  the  participant"  as  separate  from  that  of  the  state.  In  the  second  expression, 
this  "interest"  broke  free  and  captured  the  ownership  of  the  industrial  organisation  itself 
thereby  dismantling  the  confirmation  governance  regime.  Increasingly  the  state  came  to  rely 
upon  its  legislative  sovereignty,  exercised  by  way  of  coercive  law,  in  order  to  maintain  its 
economic  sovereignty,  and  hence  "administrative  control",  over  the  economy.  This  third 
expression  was  the  most  advanced  form  of  the  participation  model  as  the  state  retreated  from 
the  economic  incidents  of  its  ownership  of  the  state  enterprise,  retaining  only  a  reversionary 
interest.  In  addition,  the  legislation  on  lease  contemplated  the  creation  of  a  new  post-command 
economy  based  on  contract  and  a  permissive  regime. 
The  leased  enterprise  was  the  most  radical  attempt  yet  to  incentivise  the  workers  of  a  state 
enterprise  by  giving  them  the  ability  to  lease  an  enterprise  as  a  whole.  The  rights  of  the  labour 
collective  to  residual  profits  and  to  manage  the  operations  of  the  leased  enterprise  were 
significantly  greater  than  those  in  the  first  expression;  and  more  importantly  those  rights  were 
created  by  virtue  of  legal  contractual  relationships  with  the  state,  rather  than  on  the  basis  of 
administrative  ones. 
Analysing  industrial  organisations  and  group  structures  on  the  basis  of  contract  is  something 
that  is  relatively  established  within  market  economies..  Where  ownership  interests  are  in  turn 
owned  by  juridical  persons,  this  gives  rise  to  group  structures  (ie  the  holding  company  - 
subsidiary  relationship).  Within  this  framework,  the  lease  "of  an  enterprise"  would  be 
achieved  by  the  lease  or  lending  of  all  of  the  ownership  interests  of  that  enterprise  to  another. 
There  is  no  reason  at  all  for  this  to  affect  the  juridical  status  of  the  underlying  enterprise, 
because  a  lease  per  se  only  involves  ownership  interests  passing  to  another  for  a  fixed  period, 
and  not  a  change  in  the  nature  of  the  juridical  person  itself  or  the  nature  of  the  ownership 
interests  themselves. 
By  contrast,  since  at  least  the  1930s,  Soviet  law  had  rejected  a  "law  of  property"  and  instead 
constructed  a  "law  on  ownership"  founded  upon  the  forms  of  ownership  and  the  identity 
-243- principle.  840  The  forms  of  ownership  regime  took  an  entirely  different  approach  and  rejected 
the  generic  owner  by  distinguishing  between  the  identity  of  different  owners,  and  allocating  to 
each  identified  owner  a  different  form  of  ownership,  together  with  a  specific  type  of  juridical 
person.  Thus,  for  example,  the  law  on  ownership  distinguished  the  state,  created  the  form  of 
"state  ownership",  and  allocated  the  "state  enterprise"  to  that  form  (and  hence  only  the  state 
could  own  a  state  enterprise). 
Because  the  leasing  of  a  state enterprise  involved  the  passing  of  the  economic  incidents  of 
ownership  to  multiple  persons  that  previously  had  not  been  identified  by  the  forms  of 
ownership  regime  as  owners  of  that  specific  juridical  person,  the  legal  mechanism  of  the  lease 
by  definition  implicitly  challenged  the  very  basis  of  the  existing  Soviet  ownership  regime. 
Rather  than  taking-up  the  challenge  and  questioning  the  relevance  and  use  of  the  existing 
forms  of  ownership  doctrinal  framework  within  the  context  of  leased  enterprises  and  the  new 
post-command  economy,  the  FPLease  continued  to  regulate  the  leasing  of  state  enterprises 
from  within  the  logic  of  the  traditional  forms  of  ownership  regime.  In  trying  to  make  sense  of 
the  legislation  and  the  existence  of  the  leased  enterprise,  it  seems  as  if  the  underlying  rationale 
had  been  developed  as  follows: 
When  a  state  enterprise  was  leased  to  another  for  a  period  of  time,  the  identity  of  the  owner 
(or  strictly  speaking,  the  persons  having  the  economic  incidents  of  ownership)  of  the 
enterprise  changed.  The  "forms  of  ownership  regime"  was  predicated  upon  the  identity 
principle  that  provided  that  a  change  in  the  identity  of  the  owner  changed  the  nature  of  the 
juridical  person  itself.  Therefore  in  order  to  preserve  the  link  between  each  specific  category 
of  owner  and  a  single  specific  juridical  person,  the  logic  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime 
dictated  that  upon  the  signing  of  the  lease  contract,  the  state  enterprise  should  change  its 
character  because  the  identity  of  the  "owner"  had  changed.  Hence,  the  legislation  provided  for 
the  creation  of  a  new  juridical  person  in  its  own  right,  the  leased  enterprise.  "' 
This  understanding  illustrates  the  sharp  contrast  between  an  analysis  of  the  lease  mechanism 
under  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  and  under  market  economy  principles  based  on  the 
generic  owner  where  no  change  to  the  nature  of  the  juridical  person  is  occasioned  by  the 
leasing  of  all  of  its  ownership  interests  to  another.  8"  The  fact  that the  leased  enterprise  existed 
840  Supra.  Section  2.3.  This  is  examined  in  much  greater  detail  in  Chapter  7. 
841  The  detail  of  this  process  is  considered  infra  Section  6.5-2.2. 
842  In  fact,  with  the  adoption  of  the  1995  Russian  Civil  Code  (Part  2),  the  leased  enterprise  was 
reconceptualised  along  more  traditional  lines:  ie  as  a  contract  where  the  object  was  simply  an  existing 
enterprise  or  part  thereof  (article  656  et  seq)  "without  the  committing  to  it  any  type  of  autonomous 
organisational  form  of  juridical  person"  (Grazhdanskii  Kodeks  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  Chast'  Vtoraya, 
-244- at  all  as  a  juridical  person  in  its  own  right  was  therefore  a  result  of  extending  the  traditional 
Soviet  forms  of  ownership  regime  based  on  the  identity  principle  to  apply  to  a  situation  that 
had  never  before  been  contemplated  within  that  framework;  for  in  the  context  of  the  command 
economy  there  had  been  no  need  to  develop  understandings  of  juridical  persons  with  multiple 
owners  that  cut  across  the  forms  of  ownership  and  no  need  to  develop  a  law  on  group 
structures  based  on  ownership  relationship  s/ownership  interest. 
6.5.1  Group  Structures  in  the  Soviet  Command  Economy  -a  Summary 
It  is  necessary  to  summarise  the  Soviet  law  approach  to  group  structures  in  order  to 
understand  how  the  contractual  relationship  of  the  lease  was  straightJacketed  by  the  doctrinal 
imperatives  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  resulting  in  the  creation  of  a  new  type  of 
juridical  person,  the  leased  enterprise. 
Group  structures  in  the  traditional  Soviet  industrial  economy  were  based  primarily  on 
administrative  relationships.  Indeed  Soviet  primary  legislation  did  not  even  use  the  word 
"subsidiary"  ("dochernee  predpriyatie").  The  absence  of  group  structures  based  on  an 
ownership  relationship  (ie  "holding  company-subsidiary")  was  primarily  due  to  the  fact  that 
state  enterprises  simply  did  not  have  the  right  of  ownership.  Therefore,  as  a  matter  of  law, 
they  could  not  "own"  another  enterprise  (or  the  ownership  interests  in  another  enterprise,  had 
they  existed).  "'  All  enterprises  were  treated  as  an  indivisible  objects  of  the  law  on  ownership, 
and  all  enterprises  were  owned  by  the  state.  In  addition,  and  perhaps  as  a  consequence,  Soviet 
law  did  not  contain  the  concept  of  the  "ownership  interests"  of  a  state  enterprise,  and  as  such 
did  not  have  a  developed  mechanism  of  analysing  group  structures  in  terms  of  an  ownership 
relationship. 
Nevertheless  Soviet  law  did  contemplate  group  structures  between  juridical  persons. 
However,  they  were  developed  by  exploiting  the  possibilities  of  the  state-owned  planned 
economy.  In  a  planned  economy  where  all  enterprises  and  agencies  are  in  the  control  and 
ownership  of  the  state,  "administrative  instructions"  of  the  state,  or  of  a  state-owned 
enterprise  duly  empowered  by  the  state,  could  have  been  given  to  another  state-owned  person, 
irrespective  of  whether  the  instructing  enterprise  had  the  right  to  vote  within  the  management 
organs  of  the  other  by  virtue  of  an  ownership  (eg  shareholder)  relationship. 
___  --............. 
Tekst,  Kommentarii,  Aýfabitno-Predmetnyu  Ukazatel'  (Mezhdunarodnyi  Tsentr  Finansovo- 
Ekonomichesogo  Razvitiya),  p.  341).  As  one  commentary  noted:  "in  our  time  the  list  of  organisational- 
legal  forms  of  commercial  organisations  does  not  include  within  it  the  leased  enterprises...  "  (Kommentarii 
Chasti  Vtoroi  Grazhdanskogo  Kodeksa  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  (Firma  Gardarika:  1996),  p.  95 
-) 
843  Which  in  turn  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Soviet  state  was  to  be  the  monopoly  owner  of  all  of  the  means 
of  production  (supra.  Sections  2.3.1  and  3.4.2). 
-245- The  Soviet  group  structure  relationship  based  on  administrative  links  was  described  by  the 
legislation  as  a  juridical  person  (as  an  indivisible  whole)  being  "subordinated"  ("podchineno") 
to,  or  "within"  ("vkhodit"),  another.  In  the  same  way  that  a  ministry  had  control  over  (but  not 
ownership  of)  enterprises  subordinated  to  it  through  the  right  to  issue  administrative 
instructions  within  its  competence,  Soviet  law  extended  this  type  of  relationship  to  apply  as 
between  industrial  organisations.  '"  Where  a  group  of  enterprises  were  subordinated  to  another 
industrial  organisation,  this  latter  organisation  was  generally  called  an  "association".  " 
However  traditionally  Soviet  law  used  a  number  of  names  for  this  umbrella  group  concept.  846 
Soviet  civil  law  did  contemplate  a  non-administrative  relationships  between  an  industrial 
organisation  and  its  structural  subdivisions  ("podrazdeleniya")  or  "internal  links"  ("vnutrennye 
zvena")  that  did  not  have  juridical  personality.  The  two  principal  subdivisions  were  the  branch 
("filial"')  and  the  representation  ("predstavitel'stvo")  and  their  status  was  governed  by  the 
civil  codes  of  the  1960s  and  subordinate  legislation.  "' 
844  On  the  governance  regime,  see  Section  3.4.  More  specifically  see,  Effectivnost'  Zakonodatel'stva  0 
Proizvodstvennom  Ob  "edinend  v  Promyshlennosti  (Izdatel'stvo  Nauka:  198  1),  pp.  132-13  8. 
845  The  effect  of  the  association  was  simply  to  interpose  an  additional  administrative  relationship  between  a 
state  superior  agency  and  an  enterprise  thereby  creating  the  triple  link  structure  of  mini  stry-association- 
enterprise.  Under  the  Production  Association  Statute,  although  article  1  provided  that  "production  entities 
comprising  the  production  association  ...  shall  not  be  juridical  persons",  article  6  permitted  that  "when 
necessary,  by  decision  of  the  respective  ministry  ... 
individual  independent  enterprises  and  organisations 
enjoying  the  rights  provided  for  by  the  Statute  on  Socialist  State  Production  Enterprise  [ie  including  the 
right  of  juridical  personality]  may  be  subordinated  to  a  production  association".  The  subordination 
concept  was  also  elaborated  in  article  10  of  the  Enterprise  Statute. 
As  has  been  described  in  Chapter  3,  the  origin  of  the  "associations"  dated  to  the  syndicate  movement  of 
the  late  1920s  and  formally  to  the  decree  of  5  December  1929  "On  the  Reorganisation  of  the  Management  of 
Industry"  (0  Reorganizatsii  Upravleniya  Promyshlennost'yu,  supra  n.  51,  p.  136.  The  syndicate  movement 
enabled  the  production  of  all  enterprises  in  the  same  sector  of  the  economy  to  be  coordinated  and  sold 
through  a  single  institution  thereby  enabling  the  extraction  of  monopoly  profits  within  the  NEP  economy. 
This  single  institution,  or  syndicate,  developed  into  the  association.  The  relationship  between  the  syndicate 
and  the  enterprises  was  initially  based  on  civil  contract  law,  however  as  the  syndicates  grew  in  size  and 
importance  and  as  the  Soviet  economy  developed  along  the  lines  of  the  first  five  year  plan,  the  relationship 
became  confused.  Thus  the  "association"  of  the  1980s  was  still  legally  separate  from  the  enterprises  within 
its  structure,  but  given  the  right  by  the  state  to  control  certain  co-ordinated  activities  through  the  operation  of 
the  dynamics  of  the  planned  economy  and  the  issue  of  "administrative  instructions". 
846  These  include  the  trust,  combine,  firm,  consortium,  concern  and  union.  No  broadly  accepted  definitions 
of  these  concepts  appeared  in  the  legislation,  however  secondary  material  sometimes  attempted  to  draw 
distinctions. 
A  commentary  to  the  Enterprise  Statute  (complied  before  the  adoption  of  the  Production  Association  Statute) 
distinguished  between  trusts,  combines  and  firms  on  the  basis  that  the  trust  comprised  subdivisions  in  the 
same  branch  vertically  integrating  production;  the  combine  comprised  subdivisions  from  various  branches  of 
the  economy,  and  the  firm  has  no  special  management  apparatus,  only  a  factory  head  (supra  n.  245,  p.  28). 
847  There  were  no  specific  references  to  the  branch  and  the  representation  in  the  1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code; 
and  therefore  it  is  no  surprise  that  the  1929  "Encyclopedia  of  State  and  Law"  compiled  under  the  general 
editorship  of  Stuchka  also  did  not  contain  any  such  references  (Entsiklopeidiya  Gosudarstva  i  Prava  - 
-246- Following  the  adoption  of  Decree  49,  the  cracks  began  to  appear  in  this  traditional  Soviet 
understanding  of  the  group  structure.  Decree  49  required  a  sharper  focus  on  the  ownership 
relationship  (if  any)  because  this  was  the  first  time  that  the  law  was  forced  to  regulate  the 
creation  of  a  juridical  person  outside  the  planned  economy  by  juridical  persons  that  were  not 
all  state-owned.  As  such,  the  relationship  between  the  participants  (juridical  persons)  and  the 
joint  enterprise  could  not  have  been  based  purely  upon  administrative  mechanisms.  While  it 
was  uncertain  who  (if  anyone)  owned  the  joint  enterprise,  848  article  18  of  Decree  49  did  take 
the  first  tentative  steps  towards  recognising  the  concept  of  groups  based  on  ownership 
relationships  rather  than  administrative  links  by  referring  explicitly  (in  addition  to  the 
traditional  branches  and  representations  which  were  not  juridical  persons)  to 
"branches 
...  which  are  juridical  persons".  At  the  time,  that  formulation  (and  the  choice  of  the 
term  "filial"  in  that  context)  was  at  direct  variance  with  the  traditional  doctrinal 
understanding  of  the  branch  as  a  subdivision  without  juridical  personality.  It  did  hint  at  the 
development  of  group  structures  based  on  a  mechanism  other  than  "subordination",  and  the 
(Izdatel'stvo  Kommunisticheskoi  Akademii:  (3  volumes)  1929-1930)).  Their  formal  status  was  only 
acknowledged  by  subordinate  legislation  of  1935  (0  Poryadke  Otkrytiya  i  Registratsii  Filialov  i 
Predstavitel'stv  Kozyaistvennykh  Organizatsii  i  Predpreiyatii,  12  SDZ  SSSR  90)  which  equated  branches 
with  departments,  offices,  and  agencies.  Initially  the  separation  between  the  branch  and  the  represenation 
was  unclear.  For  example,  the  definition  of  "Branches  of  Juridical  Persons"  in  a  1953  Legal  Dictionary 
(compiled  before  the  adoption  of  the  1960s  civil  codes)  included  all  subdivisions  (offices,  departments, 
agencies  and  representations)  within  the  definition  of  branch  merely  distinguishing  between  them  on  the 
basis  of  whether  they  operate  on  internal  kozraschet  (supra  n.  65,  p.  740). 
However  following  the  1960s  civil  codes,  the  distinction  and  difference  between  the  branch  and  the 
representation  became  relatively  settled  and  the  procedures  of  the  1935  Decree  were  finally  updated  by  a 
statute  of  1982  (Polozhenie  o  Poryadke  Sozdaniya,  Reorganizatsh  i  Likvidatsii  Predpriyatii,  Ob"edinenii, 
Organizatsii  i  Uchrezhdenii,  SP  SSSR  (1982),  no.  25,  item  130).  As  such,  the  branch  carried  out 
transactions  and  other  business  in  the  name  of  that  juridical  person,  but  usually  in  another  location;  and  a 
representation  did  not  carry  out  business  but  merely  "represented"  and  furthered  the  interests  of  the 
juridical  person. 
Although  the  branch  and  representation  were  terms  of  art  specifically  mentioned  in  the  civil  codes  (see, 
for  example,  RSFSR  CC,  article  3  1),  as  in  the  case  of  group  structures  between  juridical  persons,  Soviet 
law  used  a  plethora  of  terminology  to  describe  the  subdivisions  within  a  juridical  person  in  addition  to  the 
"representation"  and  the  "branch".  Examples  included  "Welenie"  (department);  "agenstvo"  (agency); 
"punkt"  (post);  "kontor"  (office);  "baz"  (depot);  "byuro"  (bureau).  Article  93  of  the  Enterprise  Statute 
included  references  to  "shops,  sections,  sectors,  production  units,  economic  units,  farms  and  other 
structural  subdivisions  of  the  enterprise"  which  operated  in  accordance  with  statutes,  confirmed  by  the 
director  of  the  enterprise. 
Unlike  the  representation  and  the  branch,  these  other  terms  did  not  have  a  precise  meaning  and  were 
explained  differently  by  different  secondary  materials.  For  example  a  1965  commentary  to  the  Kaz  CC 
classified  departments  and  agencies  (as  well  as  offices,  depots)  as  essentially  the  same  as  branches  (supra 
n.  284,  p.  63);  whereas  a  1988  commentary  to  the  same  article  of  the  Kaz  CC  equated  departments  and 
agencies  with  representations  (supra  n.  250,  p.  69). 
848  Supra  Section  5.4.2.1. 
-247- development  of  a  new  term  of  art  for  the  "subordinated  entity"  that  was  later  to  become  the 
" 
subsidiary  ". 
In  the  context  of  the  development  of  group  structures  based  on  ownership  interests,  in  the 
period  to  1989  Soviet  law  came  to  recognise  expressly  the  existence  of  the  "stock".  The  stock 
can  be  dated  to  the  Petrine  period  and  was  treated  as  an  equity  ownership  interest  of  a 
juridical  person  (eg  of  a  joint-stock  society),  capable  of  being  traded  and  listed.  During  the 
perestroika  period,  the  term  "stock"  appeared  in  the  Cooperatives  Law,  however  its  use  was 
more  consistent  with  a  debt  security  than  that  of  an  equity  ownership  interest.  "'  This  may 
have  been  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  socialist  forms  of  ownership  regime  precluded  a 
coherent  understanding  of  the  ownership  interest  of  a  juridical  person  and  thus,  while  there 
was  a  clear  desire  to  enable  juridical  persons  to  raise  finance  through  the  issue  of  securities, 
there  was  not  a  sufficiently  developed  legal  framework  for  analysing  the  nature  of  those 
securities  in  terms  of  equity. 
The  right  to  issue  stock  was  fornialised  by  a  decree  of  the  government  of  October  1988.  "' 
This  decree  noted  the  right  of  cooperatives  to  issue  stocks,  and gave  the  right  to  issue  stocks 
to  state  enterprises  operating,  in  accordance  with  the  State  Enterprise  Law,  on  the  basis  of  full 
khozraschet  and  self-financing.  The  preamble  set  out  the  expressed  aim  of  issuing  stock:  to 
"further  deepen  the  democratic  principles  of  management  and  the  development  of  the  initiative 
of  the  labour  collective  and  every  worker,  permitting  them  to  show  themselves  as  full 
proprietors  as  well  as  to  create  the  necessary  economic  and  legal  conditions  for  the  attraction 
by  enterprises  and  organisations  of  free  resources  of  workers,  other  enterprises  and 
associations  for  the  financing  of  expenses  not  covered  by  their  own  financial  resources  ...... 
This  extract  of  the  preamble  seemed  to  suggest  that  the  issue  of  stock  had  an  effect  on 
management  structures  by  enabling  workers  to  show  themselves  as  "full  proprietors". 
However  the  use  of  the  term  "proprietor"  did  not  necessarily  entail  ownership,  851  and  the 
operative  aspects  of  the  decree  focussed  only  on  the  procedures  relating  to  the  issue  of  stock, 
rather  than  the  nature  of  the  stock  as  an  equity  or  other  interest.  The  penultimate  paragraph  of 
the  decree  then  provided  that  the  issue  of  stocks  shall  constitute  "a  form  of  mobilising  cash 
resources  and  shall  not  change  the  status  of  the  enterprise  (organisation)".  So,  the  legal 
analysis  of  the  "stock"  continued  to  be  ambiguous,  and  by  1989,  group  structures  based  on 
849  Supra  Section  6.4.1. 
850  0  Vypuske  Predpriyatiyami  i  Organizatsiyarni  Tsennykh  Bumag,  Postanovleniya  (October  1988), 
no.  1195,  p.  83. 
851  It  did  in  the  case  of  the  cooperatives  (supra  n.  803)  but  did  not  in  the  case  of  1987  state  enterprises  (supra 
n.  656  and  715). 
-248- administrative  links  still  persisted,  with  no  clear  alternative  mechanism  for  regulating  groups 
on  the  basis  of  an  ownership  relationship. 
6.5.2  Group  Structures  based  on  Contract  -  the  Leased  Enterprise 
The  lease  was  defined  as  "the  fixed-term  possession  and  use  for  remuneration 
of  ...  property  ... 
based  on  contract";  and  the  principal  elements  of  any  lease  arrangement, 
including  the  leased  enterprise,  involved  a  lessor,  a  lessee  and  the  leased  object. 
The  provisions  in  the  FPLease  relating  to  the  parties  to  lease  contract,  the  creation  of  the 
leased  enterprise,  and  its  legal  nature,  were  extremely  brief  and  in  places  simply  inadequate 
for  any  sensible  understanding  to  be  developed. 
The  brevity  in  part  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  FPLease  were  only  "fundamental  principles". 
"Fundamental  principles"  was  the  highest  form  of  all-union  Soviet  legislation  below  the 
constitution  and  were  intended  to  set  out  broad  all-union  principles  in  a  particular  area  of  law 
which  were  then  to  be  elaborated  in  more  detail  in  the  various  republic  codes.  "'  For  this 
reason,  and  in  contrast  to  the  legislation  that  formed  the  basis  for  the  other  expressions  of  the 
participation  model,  the  FPLease  only  set  out  very  "high  level"  provisions  or  principles.  No 
republic  codes  on  lease  were  in  fact  ever  subsequently  adopted  (either  during  Soviet  times  or 
thereafter),  and  as  such  any  analysis  of  this  final  expression  of  the  participation  model  must  be 
based  primarily  on  the  1989  FPLease  itself.  853 
The  mere  status  of  the  FPLease  as  "fundamental  principles"  did  not  however  account  for  the 
ambiguity  or  uncertainty  of  some  of  the  drafting.  This  seeming  lack  of  a  coherent  doctrinal 
framework  in  part  would  have  been  due  to  the  fact  that  the  orthodox  lease  structure  sat 
uncomfortably  within  the  Soviet  forms  of  ownership  regime,  and  lent  itself  to  an  analysis  in 
terms  of  ownership  interests  being  transferred  for  a  period  of  time  without  affecting  the 
underlying  nature  of  the  juridical  person  in  question. 
852  Supra  Section  2.1. 
853  Arguably  the  rules  relating  to  the  property  hire  ("imuchshestvennyi  naem")  in  the  1961  FPCivL  (articles 
53-55)  and  civil  codes  (eg  RSFSR  CC,  articles  275-294)  applied  to  the  leased  enterprise  due  to  the  past 
practice  of  using  these  words  "property  hire"  and  "lease"  interchangeably  (supra  Section  6.1.4).  It  seems 
however  that  on  this  occasion  the  "leased  enterprise"  and  "property  hire"  were  different  legal  constructs. 
First,  in  the  absence  of  a  contrary  indication,  it  is  assumed  that  different  words  (leased  enterprise  and 
property  hire)  gave  rise  to  different  forms  and  legal  regimes;  particularly  because  no  mention  was  made 
in  the  FPLease  of  property  hire  as  a  similar  relationship;  and  being  "funamental  principles",  they 
therefore  contemplated  the  subsequent  adoption  of  civil  codes  specifically  on  lease  (leaving  property  hire 
to  be  regulated  by  the  civil  codes).  Secondly,  the  provisions  of  the  legislation  on  property  hire  were  at 
times  at  variance  with  those  of  the  FPLease.  For  example  a  property  hire  contract  could  not  exceed  10 
-249- 6.5.2.1  Parties  to  the  Lease  Contract  -  the  State  as  Lessor  and  a  new  Juridical  Person  as 
Lessee 
In  the  context  of  the  lease  of  a  state  enterprise,  it  was  the  state  that  acted  as  lessor  through  a 
814  duly  empowered  agency.  The  lessee  of  the  state  enterprise  was  specified  in  the  FPLease  to 
be  a  new  juridical  person  called  the  "  organisation  of  lessees".  There  is  of  course  no  particular 
reason  why  a  new  juridical  person  needs  to  be  created  under  a  legal  system  for  the  specific 
purpose  of  leasing  an  enterprise  -  unless  the  lease  structure  is  to  be  developed  from  within  the 
existing  logic  of  the  Soviet  forms  of  ownership  regime 
The  leased  enterprise  was  conceived  as  a  more  radical  form  of  the  first  expression  of  the 
participation  model,  developed  in  an  attempt  to  incentivise  further  the  labour  collective.  As 
such,  the  same  participant,  the  labour  collective,  was  intended  to  be  the  lessee.  Unfortunately 
the  labour  collective  was  not  a  subject  of  civil  law;...  and  although  each  member  of  the  labour 
collective  (ie  each  worker)  could  have  signed  the  lease  contract  as  a  "lessee",  this  approach 
would  have  compromised  the  characterisation  of  the  state  enterprise  as  a  single  object  with  a 
single  owner  (or  holder  of  the  economic  incidents  of  ownership).  Moreover,  as  a  practical 
matter,  it  would  have  been  very  difficult  to  have  had  thousands  of  workers  signing  the  lease 
contract;  and  as  a  doctrinal  matter,  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  based  on  the  identity 
principle  had  no  precedent  or  straightforward  mechanism  for  analysing  the  ownership  of  a 
juridical  person  by  multiple  owners. 
In  order  to  avoid  these  issues  and  preserve  the  one  owner-one  object  analysis  for  state 
enterprises,  the  FPLease  had  to  create  a  "new"  juridical  person,  formed  by  the  labour 
collective/workers,  that  could  act  as  the  lessee  in  the  contract  for  the  lease  of  a  state 
enterprise.  This  "new"  juridical  person  was  the  "organisation  of  lessees".  856 
years,  whereas  contracts  for  the  lease  of  an  enterprise  under  the  FPLease  were  of  a  long  term  nature  and 
automatically  renewable  (infra  Section  6.5.4). 
854  The  FPLease  contemplated  the  creation  of  state  agencies  specifically  empowered  to  lease  state  enteprises 
(FPLease,  article  16(l)).  Where  the  relevant  property  was  in  the  ownership  of  the  USSR,  the  USSR- 
lessor  acted  through  the  State  Property  Fund  of  the  USSR  formed  pursuant  to  the  edict  of  the  President: 
Ob  Obrazovanii  Fonda  Gosudarstvennogo  Imushchestva  SSSR,  Vedomosti  SAD  SSSR  (1990),  no.  33,  item 
633.  The  fund  determined  the  value  of  property  to  be  leased  and  the  protection  of  the  interests  of  the 
state. 
855  The  1983  Law  on  Labour  Collectives  (supra  n.  558)  finessed  the  issue  and  avoided  specifying  explicitly 
the  nature  of  their  juridical  status. 
856  In  addition  to  the  "organisation  of  lessees",  the  FPLease  contemplated  an  "association  of  lessees" 
(FPLease,  article  6).  The  provisions  relating  to  the  association  of  lessees  were  as  brief  as  those  relating 
specifically  to  the  organisation  of  lessees.  Lessees  were  given  the  right  on  a  voluntary  basis  to  form 
("obrazovyvat"')  "combinations,  unions,  consortiums,  concerns  and  other  associations"  and  to  freely 
-250- While  the  organisation  of  lessees  was  explicitly  described  as  an  "autonomous  juridical  person" 
in  the  FPLease,  its  creation  and  function  were  only  regulated  by  one  sub-section  of  article  16 
of  the  FPLease,  and  as  such  many  fundamental  questions  as  to  its  nature  and  operation  were 
simply  left  unanswered.  In  fact,  only  three  aspects  of  the  organisation  of  lessees  were 
provided  for  in  the  FPLease:  first,  it  was  "formed"  ("obrazovat"')  by  the  labour  collective; 
secondly,  it  was  formed  pursuant  to  a  decision  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  the  members  of  the 
labour  collective;  and  thirdly,  such  decision  on  its  formation  could  also  specify  its 
management  organs. 
The  FPLease  therefore  left  almost  every  aspect  of  this  juridical  person  to  be  regulated  by  its 
charter  and  subordinate  legislation.  Although  the  presence  of  this  new  juridical  person  (the 
organisation.  of  lessees)  meant  that  there  could  be  a  "single"  lessee  of  the  state  enterprise,  the 
multiple  ownership  problem  was  as  a  result  simply  abstracted  to  the  level  of  the  organisation 
of  lessees  itself.  In  this  regard  the  FPLease  was  silent  on  the  principal  questions  of  who  (if 
anyone)  "owned"  the  organisation  of  lessees  and  by  what  legal  mechanism?  and  whether  the 
organisation  of  lessees  had  the  right  of  ownership  itself? 
On  the  issue  of  the  ownership  "of"  the  organisation.  of  lessees,  it  was  uncertain  as  to  whether 
Soviet  law  intended  there  to  be  a  definite  owner  (as  in  the  case  of  the  state  enterprise)  or 
intended  to  finesse  the  ownership  question  by  focussing  on  the  concept  of  membership  (as  in 
the  case  of  the  collective  farm  and  cooperative)  . 
8"  The  only  hint  that  the  organisation  of 
lessees  may  have  been  "owned"  by  each  of  the  members  of  the  labour  collective  was  the 
reference  in  article  21  of  the  FPLease  to  "contributions  of  members  of  its  labour  collective" 
("vkladov  chlenov")  in  cash  and  in  property.  These  "contributions"  could  have  been  viewed  as 
a  term  of  art  for  an  ownership  interest 
. 
85'  Alternatively,  the  organisation  of  lessees  could  have 
been  intended  to  have  been  understood  in  terms  of  membership  (rather  than  ownership) 
relations,  particularly  as  its  "participants"  were  even  called  the  members  (of  a  labour 
collective)  thereby  using  the  same  terminology  as  the  participants  of  a  collective  farm. 
withdraw  ("vykhodit"').  It  was  unclear  whether  or  not  the  "organisation  of  lessees"  was  just  an  example 
of  an  "association  of  lessees",  although  the  association  of  lessees  was  not  specifically  expressed  to  be  a 
juridical  person. 
857  The  analysis  of  the  "ownership  of"  collective  farms  and  cooperatives  seemed  to  constitute  a  distinct 
approach  where,  in  contrast  to  the  analysis  of  the  state  enterprise,  traditional  doctrine  overlooked 
ownership  relationships  of  the  juridical  person  in  favour  of  an  analysis  of  the  concept  of  membership  and 
ownership  by  that  juridical  person  (supra  Sections  2.4.2,6.4.1,6.4.4.2  and  infra  Section  7.4-2-2). 
858  On  the  possibility  of  contributions  giving  rise  to  ownership  interests,  see  the  analysis  in  relation  to  joint 
enterprises  (supra  Section  5.4.2.1)  and  cooperatives  (supra  Section  6.4.1). 
-251- Irrespective  of  whether  the  organisation  of  lessees  was  owned  or  based  on  a  membership  type 
relationship,  it  was  also  unclear  as  to  who  those  owners  or  members  ultimately  were.  Did  they 
include  members  of  the  labour  collective  who  did  not  vote  in  favour  of  the  decision  on  the 
formation  of  the  leased  enterprise?  Did  they  include  new  workers  and  exclude  former 
workers?  If  so,  what  was  the  mechanism  to  enable  changes  to  the  ownership/membership 
structure  as  a  result  of  changes  to  the  membership  of  the  labour  collective? 
While  the  issue  of  "ownership  of"  the  organisation  of  lessees  was  entirely  uncertain,  it  seemed 
relatively  clear  that  the  organisation  of  lessees  did  not  have  the  right  of  ownership  as  it,  like 
the  state  and  the  contract-based  concession  enterprises,  did  not  fall  within  one  of  the  existing 
forms  of  ownership  as  set  out  in  the  Brezhnev  Constitution.  However  the  provisions  of  the 
FPLease  hinted  at  possible  "new"  forms  of  ownership,  and  it  may  have  been  intended  that  the 
organisation  of  lessees  would  come  to  fall  within  one  of  those  new  forms.  "' 
The  gaps  in  the  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  "organisation  of  lessees"  was  not  of  primary 
importance  because  its  place  in  the  lease  process  was  only  as  a  transitional  vehicle:  While 
there  were  no  specific  provisions  relating  to  its  termination,  the  FPLease  provided  that  the 
organisation  of  lessees  acquired  the  status  ("priobretaet  status")  of  the  leased  enterprise  upon 
the  signature  of  the  lease  contract. 
6.5.2.2  Ae  Object  of  the  Lease  Contract  and  the  Creation  of  the  Leased  Enterprise 
While  the  characterisation  of  the  state  enterprise  as  a  single  indivisible  object  suited  the 
purposes  of  a  command  economy  based  on  the  forms  of  ownership  regime,  it  made  the  legal 
analysis  of  the  lease  of  a  state  enterprise  quite  strained. 
As  aforementioned,  in  a  market  economy  regime,  the  distinction  between  ownership  interests 
and  the  juridical  person  meant  that  the  leasing  "of  a  juridical  person"  could  be  achieved  by  the 
leasing  of  the  ownership  interests  to  another,  without  affecting  the  property,  rights  and 
obligations"  of  the  juridical  person  itself.  The  veil  of  juridical  personality  was  intact.  By 
contrast,  the  state  enterprise  did  not  have  any  ownership  interests  which  could  have  been 
analysed  as  being  "leased"  -  it  was  a  single  indivisible  object.  As  such,  Soviet  law  found  it 
difficult  to  make  the  distinction  between  the  two  following  approaches: 
(i)  leasing  (the  ownership  interests  of)  the  state  enterprise  as  a  whole,  and 
859  Infra  Section  6.5.3.2  and  n.  870. 
860  Adopting  the  Soviet  law  distinction  between  "rights"  ("chose")  and  "things"  or  "property"  ("res"),  supra 
n.  160  and  519  and  infra.  n.  912. 
-252- (ii)  leasing  all  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the  state  enterprise  as  well  as  the  property 
allocated  to  it  in  operative  management 
The  latter  approach  seemed  particularly  problematic  because  it  involved  the  transfer  of 
obligations,  which  as  a  strictly  legal  matter  would  have  required  the  consent  of  each 
beneficiary.  "'  However,  in  the  Soviet  context  this  was  less  of  a  problem  in  practice, 
particularly  because  the  owner  and  lessor  of  the  state  enterprise  itself  (ie  the  state)  was  also 
the  owner  of  all  of  the  property  allocated  to  it;  and  also  because  most  of  the  obligations  owed 
by  the  state  enterprise  would  have  been  in  favour  of  the  state  or  other  state-owned  enterprises. 
Finally,  the  transfer  of  entities  within  the  command  economy  had  been  achieved  historically 
by  way  of  administrative  orders  in  the  context  of  the  group  structures  regime  outlined  above, 
and  therefore,  in  this  regard,  less  attention  was  paid  to  narrow  legal  impediments. 
The  mechanism  of  leasing  an  enterprise  as  analysed  in  terms  of  the  first  approach  set  out 
above  was  the  cleanest  and  most  consistent  with  the  notion  of  the  state  enterprise  as  a  single 
indivisible  object.  However,  due  to  the  lack  of  the  distinction  between  ownership  interest  and 
the  juridical  person,  the  legislation  was  forced  to  develop  the  mechanics  of  the  creation  of  the 
leased  enterprise  partly  in  terms  of  the  second  approach. 
Article  3  of  the  FPLease  included  "enterprises"  ("predpriyatiya")  among  the  specified  objects 
that  could  have  been  leased,  as  well  as  property  of  enterprises  including  individual  buildings, 
installations,  equipment  and  other  material  valuables.  This  seemed  to  contemplate  the 
possibility  of  leasing  the  enterprise  as  a  whole  separately  from  leasing  its  property;  and  it  was 
the  lease  of  the  former  that  gave  rise  to  the  so-called  leased  enterprise.  Thus  the  FPLease 
referred  to  "in  the  event  of  a  lease  of  an  enterprise  ("pri  arende  predpriyatiya")";  "a  state 
enterprise  which  has  been  leased";  and  "the  lease  of  state  enterprises".  862 
The  procedure  for  leasing  an  enterprise  involved  the  following  steps:  the  organisation  of 
lessees  jointly  with  the  trade  union  committee  prepared  a  draft  lease  contract  and  presented  it 
to  the  relevant  state  agency.  The  agency  was  obliged  to  consider  the  draft  within  30  days  and 
any  disagreements  were  referred  to  state  arbitrazh.  The  contract  was  then  signed.  863 
The  legal  analysis  of  the  consequences  of  the  signature  of  the  lease  contract  was  steeped  in 
traditional  Soviet  understandings  rooted  in  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  based  on  the 
861  For  example,  RSFSR  CC,  article  215  ("The  transfer  by  a  debtor  of  its  debt  to  another  person  shall  be 
permitted  only  with  the  consent  of  the  creditor"). 
862  FPLease,  articles  9(2),  16(3)  and  16(6). 
863  FPLease,  article  16(l). 
-253- identity  principle.  Two  principal  concepts  applied:  First,  as  explained  at  the  beginning  of  this 
Section  6.5,  the  application  of  the  identity  principle  meant  that  following  the  signature  of  the 
lease  contract  and  a  change  in  the  identity  of  the  owner  (or  the  holder  of  the  economic 
incidents  of  ownership)  of  the  state  enterprise,  the  nature  of  the  juridical  person  was  treated  as 
having  changed.  Secondly,  as  the  state  enterprise  was  conceived  as  an  indivisible  object,  the 
application  of  an  analysis  of  the  lease  mechanism  in  terms  of  leasing  ownership  interests  was 
precluded.  The  picture  was  inevitably  going  to  be  very  confused: 
The  mechanism  for  the  creation  of  the  leased  enterprise  set  out  in  article  16(l)  seemingly  was 
based  on  the  traditional  Soviet  distinction  between  "property  ("imushchestvo")"  (allocated  by 
way  of  operative  management)  and  "property  rights  ("imushchestvennye  prava")  and 
obligations"  of  the  state  enterprise.  "  Therefore  it  provided  that  in  relation  to  property:  "after 
the  signature  of  the  contract,  the  organisation  of  lessees  shall  accept  the  propeny  of  the 
enterprise  in  the  established  procedure  and  shall  acquire  the  status  oa  leased  enterprise" 
[emphasis  added].  Article  16  elaborated  further  in  relation  to  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the 
state  enterprise:  "a  leased  enterprise  shall  become  the  legal  successor  of  the  property  rights 
and  obligations  of  the  state  enterprise  assumed  in  the  lease...  The  lessor  may  assume  fully  or 
partially  the  repayment  of  credit  indebtedness  of  the  enterprise...  The  obligations  of  a  state 
enterprise  ...  shall  be  performed  by  the  lessee...  To  the  lease  enterprise  shall  pass  the  rights 
and  obligations  of  the  leased  state  enterprise  with  regard  to  participation  in  socio-economic 
development  of  the  territory  on  which  it  is  located"  [emphasis  added]. 
Such  provisions  immediately  displayed  the  tefions  between  the  lease  process  and  its  analysis 
within  the  forms  of  ownership  regime.  It  was  uncertain  what  was  being  leased  (was  it  the  state 
enterprise  as  a  whole,  or  the  aggregate  of  its  property  and  its  property  rights  and 
obligations?  );  and  if  the  lease  contract  resulted  in  the  transfer  of  the  property,  property  rights 
and obligations  of  the  state  enterprise  to  the  lessee,  did  the  state  enterprise  remain  in  existence 
(as  a  sort  of  "shell  enterprise"),  available  to  accept  a  re-transfer  at  the  end  of  the  term  of  the 
lease?  In  addition  to  the  nature  of  the  leased  property,  the  nature  of  the  parties  seemed  to  be 
affected  by  the  signature  of  the  lease  contract.  The  legislation  attempted  to  preserve  the  logic 
of  the  identity  principle  by  providing  that  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  lease  contract  and  a 
change  in  economic  owner,  the  organisation  of  lessees  was  somehow  "transformed"  into  the 
leased  enterprise  by  "accepting"  the  property  of  the  enterprise  and  becoming  the  legal 
864  Supra  n.  860. 
-254- successor  of  the  property  rights  and  obligations  of  the  state  enterprise.  "'  Yet  the  process  of 
this  transformation  was  left  implicit  without  adequate  explanation. 
6.5.3  The  Ownership  Regime  of  the  Leased  Enterprise 
While  the  concept  of  "transformation"  of  the  organisation  of  lessees  into  the  leased  enterprise 
can  be  understood  as  a  function  of  the  logic  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime,  the  detail  of 
the  FPLease  left  many  consequential  issues  unanswered.  Most  importantly,  the  provisions  of 
the  FPLease  were  entirely  insufficient  even  to  hint  at  the  basics  of  the  nature  of  the  legal 
relationship  between  the  labour  collective  and  the  leased  enterprise  (following  the 
transformation  of  the  organisation  of  lessees).  As  in  the  case  of  all  the  previous  new  industrial 
organisations,  including  the  organisation  of  lessees  itself,  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  was 
found  lacking,  unable  to  offer  even  a  rudimentary  legal  analysis  of  group  structures  based  on 
ownership  relationships,  and  of  the  ownership  of  a  juridical  person  by  multiple  owners. 
Furthermore,  the  question  of  whether  the  leased  enterprise  itself  had  the  right  of  ownership 
should  have  been  relatively  clear  within  the  provisions  of  the  existing  form  of  ownership 
regime,  but  the  provisions  of  the  FPLease  again  were  obtuse  in  this  regard. 
6.5.3.1  Ownership  of  the  Leased  Enterprise 
The  members  of  the  labour  collective  clearly  remained  as  "workers"  at  the  leased  enterprise 
and  retained  a  contractual  relationship  with  the  leased  enterprise  in  this  capacity.  However,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  organisation  of  lessees  itself,  it  was  unclear  whether  the  labour  collective/its 
members  were  also  intended  to  be  the  owners  of  the  leased  enterprise  through  the  holding  of 
an  equity-like  interest  (like  that  of  the  state-state  enterprise  relationship),  or  whether  they  were 
just  to  be  "members"  of  the  leased  enterprise  where  their  holding  of  equity  interests  was 
uncertain  (like  that  of  the  members  of  the  collective  farm  or  cooperative). 
The  lack  of  Soviet  group  structures  based  on  ownership  interests/relationships  (rather  than 
administrative  links)  was  more  relevant  when  the  "transformation"  concept  was  applied  to  the 
lease  of  state  enterprises  by  juridical  persons  other  than  an  organisation  of  lessees.  For 
example,  the  FPLease  contemplated  the  lease  of  a  state  enterprise  by  a  cooperative  without 
mentioning  the  requirement  for  the  cooperative  to  first  form  an  organisation  of  lessees 
(presumably  on  the  basis  that,  in  contrast  to  the  labour  collective,  the  cooperative  was  a 
juridical  person  and  had  the  right  of  ownership).  In  those  circumstances,  the  analysis 
presented  similar  issues:  did  the  cooperative  itself  "accept"  the  property  of  the  state  enterprise 
.....  ...  .......... 
865  "Transformation"  was  first  contemplated  as  a  form  of  "reorganisation"  in  the  1987  State  Enterprise  Law 
and  then  included  in  the  1988  Cooperatives  Law,  see  supra  n.  622  and  710. 
-255- and  become  the  legal  successor  to  its  rights  and  obligations  resulting  in  a  transformation  from 
a  cooperative  into  a  leased  enterprise?  If  so,  what  then  was  the  legal  relationship  between  the 
members  of  the  former  cooperative  and  the  leased  enterprise?  Alternatively,  would  the  lease 
of  a  state  enterprise  by  a  cooperative  (an  existing  subject  of  civil  law  with  the  right  of 
ownership)  have  given  rise  to  an  ownership  based  group  structure:  cooperative  -  leased 
enterprise?  This  would  have  been  difficult  to  express  within  the  existing  Soviet  understanding 
of  group  structures  based  on  administrative  links.  However,  in  this  regard,  the  FPLease,  like 
the  1988  Cooperatives  Law,  contemplated  the  issue  of  "securities"  and  perhaps  they  were  to 
be  used  as  the  legal  mechanism  for  an  embryonic  ownership-based  group  structure. 
By  1989  the  concepts  of  "securities"  and  "stock"  had  been  applied  in  the  context  of 
cooperatives  and  state  enterprises  and  might  have  been  used  to  explain  the  legal  relationship 
between  the  members  of  the  labour  collective  (or  cooperative)  and  the  leased  enterprise. 
Articles  19  and  21  of  the  initial  redaction  of  the  FPLease  contemplated  the  issue  of  securities, 
but  did  not  specifically  mention  the  issue  of  stocks  . 
816  Adopting  a  similar  rationale  to  that  of 
the  1988  decree,  867  securities  were  expressed  to  be  issued  for  the  "mobilisation  of  additional 
financial  resources"  and  the  FPLease  gave  members  of  the  labour  collective  a  preferential 
right  to  acquire  them.  Securities  were  also  permitted  to  be  issued  to  a  member  of  the  labour 
collective  "for  the  value  of  the  contribution"  paid  by  that  member  to  "the  property  of  the 
leased  enterprise".  Dividends  were  paid  on  the  securities  in  an  amount  determined  by  the 
labour  collective  proceeding  from  the  results  of  production  and  tasks  for  the  development  of 
the  enterprise.  The  nominal  value  ("real'naya  stoimost"')  of  the  securities  was  to  be 
determined  by  the  charter  as  well  as  the  payment  of  dividends  to  a  member  who  was  no 
longer  employed  at  the  enterprise. 
The  references  to  "securities"  in  Russian  included  the  concept  of  stocks  (ie  equity)  as  well  as 
debt  instruments;  and  the  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  stock  in  1989  was  more 
developed  than  in  1988  when  the  Cooperatives  Law  was  passed.  The  reference  to  dividends, 
nominal  value  and  a  payment  after  the  termination  of  labour  relations  further  suggested  that 
the  reference  to  securities  was  intended  to  include  stock  as  an  equity  interest.  However,  only 
the  word  "securities",  and  not  "stocks",  was  used  in  the  FPLease;  and  there  was  no  mention 
of  whether  the  relationship  between  the  labour  collective  was  one  based  on  ownership  or 
membership.  As  such,  it  is  possible  that  the  FPLease  only  intended  that  debt  securities  would 
866  Article  21  was  amended  to  include  a  reference  to  stocks  of  a  member  of  the  labour  collective.  The 
amendment  was  made  in  March  1991  and  an  analysis  of  the  amended  position  falls  outside  the  scope  of 
this  study. 
867  Supra  n.  850. 
-256- be  issued  with  a  view  to  attracting  investment  from  the  labour  collective  in  order  to  further 
incentivise  their  participation.  Unfortunately,  because  the  FPLease  were  so  "short  form"  it  is 
not  possible  to  evaluate  any  interpretation  of  "securities"  in  light  of  detailed  provisions  on 
management  structures  or  in  the  context  of  a  wider  relationship  between  the  labour  collective 
and  the  leased  enterprise.  Tberefore,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Cooperatives  Law  and  under  the 
1988  decree,  the  position  remained  far  from  clear. 
6.5.3.2  Ownership  by  the  Leased  Enterprise 
The  forms  of  ownership  regime  also  provided  difficulties  for  the  analysis  of  whether  the 
leased  enterprise  itself  could  "own"  property.  Strictly  speaking,  like  the  organisation  of 
lessees,  it  neither  fell  within  state  ownership  nor  within  collective  farm-cooperative 
ownership.  Furthermore,  to  the  extent  the  leased  enterprise  "accepted"  property  of  the  state 
enterprise  under  the  lease  contract,  this  certainly  remained  in  the  ownership  of  the  state  (ie  the 
lessor).  868 
The  FPLease  did  however  cryptically  include  references  to  "ownership  by  the  leased 
enterprise",  "products  and  revenues  obtained  by  the  lessee 
... 
[being]  in  its  ownership"  and  to 
"its  [the  leased  enterprise's]  collective  ownership".  8"  Furthermore,  the  FPLease  used  the 
concept  of  "collective  ownership"  to  describe  the  ownership  regime  of  all  new  kinds  of 
enterprise  that  the  leased  enterprise  could  be  transformed  into  following  its  purchase  by  a 
lessee,  including  "collective  enterprise,  cooperative,  joint  stock  society  or  other  type  of 
enterprise  ".  870 
These  few  careful  references  to  "collective  ownership"  and  the  "collective  enterprise" 
illustrated  a  possible  fundamental  shift  in  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  and  suggested  that 
perhaps  the  leased  enterprise  did  have  the  right  of  ownership.  It  was  as  if  the  limits  of  the 
forms  of  ownership  regime  had  been  reached:  although  the  mechanism  for  leasing  an 
enterprise  was  compressed  within  the  logic  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime.  The  presence  of 
the  leased  enterprise,  and  the  new  open  economy  in  which  it  operated,  seemed  to  necessitate 
the  creation  of  a  "new"  form  of  ownership  (in  addition  to  the  existing  forms).  Yet  in  1989  this 
new  form  of  "collective  ownership"  was  still  an  anomaly.  "Collective  ownership"  had  not  at 
868  FPLease,  article  9(l)  ("the  leasing  of  property  shall  not  entail  the  transfer  of  the  right  of  ownership  to 
such  property"). 
869  FPLease,  articles  21(l),  9(l)  and  18(4). 
870  FPLease,  article  10(2).  The  application  of  "collective  ownership"  to  the  organisation  of  lessees  was  not 
specifically  mentioned.  In  1989  the  collective  enterprise  or  joint-stock  society  were  not  regulated  by 
specific  legislation  of  the  perestroika  era.  On  the  purchase  of  the  leased  enterprise,  see  infra  Section 
6.5.4. 
-257- the  time  been  referred  to  in  any  other  primary  legislation  and  its  existence  contradicted  the 
current  forms  of  ownership  framework  which  had  its  legal  basis  in  the  USSR  constitution 
itself. 
6.5.4  Participation,  Incentivisation  and  Democracy 
This  third  expression  included  all  the  traditional  pillars  of  the  participation  model:  "personal 
labour  participation"  of  the  participants  was  specifically  contemplated,  "'  and  the  leased 
enterprise  was  constructed  in  the  pursuit  of  greater  incentivisation  and  democracy.  The 
protection  of  the  interests  of  the  state  was  based  almost  entirely  on  coercive  law,  the 
traditional  technique  of  the  participation  model. 
The  contractual  basis  for  each  lease  enabled  much  scope  for  determining  incentivisation 
methods  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  However,  the  FPLease  included  certain  specific 
incentivisation  techniques  which  included:  the  right  to  lease  an  enterprise  on  a  long  term 
basis;  the  right  to  renew  a  lease;  the  right  to  buy  the  leased  object;  the  right  of  lease  akin  to  a 
right  in  rem;  a  grandfather  clause;  and  the  general  right  to  own  the  fruits  of  the  leased  object. 
The  principal  "de-incentivising"  element  of  the  lease  mechanism  was  its  principal  ideological 
imperative,  namely  that  ownership  was  not  transferred  to  the  lessee.  It  would  have  been 
politically  unacceptable  in  1989  simply  to  have  privatised  all  state  enterprises;  so  the 
mechanism  of  lease  was  adopted  to  enable  the  economic  incidents  of  ownership  to  be 
transferred  to  the  participants,  ie  the  labour  collective,  while  the  formal  right  of  ownership 
remained  with  the  state.  The  fact  that  the  state  enterprise  was  to  be  returned  at  some  later  date 
to  the  lessor  may  have  encouraged  short-termism  on  the  part  of  the  lessees,  the  labour 
collective.  Clearly  the  state  wanted  to  ensure  that  the  state  enterprise  was  run  on  a  "rational" 
basis  by  the  lessees  and  not  in  order  to  maximise  short  term  gains  before  returning  it  to  the 
state  at  the  end  of  the  term.  This  concern  was  initially  addressed  through  three  interlinked 
rights  that  ftirther  compromised  the  position  of  the  state  as  formal  owner  of  the  reversionary 
interest  in  the  leased  property.  These  rights  were  the  right  to  lease  on  a  long  term  basis,  the 
right  to  renew  the  lease,  and  the  right  to  buy  the  leased  object. 
Although  not  specifically  stated,  the  FPLease  seemed  to  contain  the  implicit  "right  to  lease". 
A  labour  collective  at  an  enterprise  was  expressed  to  have  the  right  to  form  ("vprave 
obrazovat"')  an  organisation  of  lessees  in  order  to  create  a  leased  enterprise;  "'  and  if  the 
organisation  of  lessees  submitted  a  proposal  to  the  relevant  state  agency  to  lease  the 
871  FPLease,  article  21(2). 
872  FPLease,  article  16(l). 
-258- enterprise,  the  agency  "was  obliged"  ("obyazan")  to  consider  the  draft  within  thirty  days  and 
could  be  sued  at  the  state  arbitrazh  for  any  "unfounded"  ("neobosnovannyW)  refusal  to  lease 
the  enterprise  or  delay  in  considering  the  proposal.  The  transition  of  state  enterprises  to  leased 
enterprises  was  explicitly  required  to  be  encouraged  and  facilitated  by  the  state.  "' 
A  lease  contract  for  a  state  enterprise  was  "as  a  rule"  to  be  "of  a  long  term  character  -  five 
years  and  longer".  "'  This  was  the  first  step  towards  encouraging  the  lessee  to  take  a  "longer 
term"  view  of  its  operations.  Once  entered  into,  the  lease  contract  could  only  have  been 
terminated  in  accordance  with  its  terms  or  by  a  decision  of  the  state  arbitrazh  or  court  for 
violation  of  its  conditions.  "'  Once  the  term  of  the  lease  came  to  an  end,  the  FPLease  provided 
that  not  only  did  the  lessee  have  the  right  to  renew  the  contract,  but  that  as  a  default  rule,  in 
the  absence  of  an  application  by  one  of  the  parties,  the  lease  contract  was  automatically 
renewed  on  the  same  terms  for  the  same  period.  "' 
In  addition  to  automatic  renewal,  the  FPLease  also  included  the  right  to  buy  the  leased 
enterprise.  While  the  conditions  were  the  subject  of  negotiation,  and  restrictions  or 
prohibitions  were  permitted  to  be  imposed  by  subsequent  legislation,  it  was  provided  that  any 
lessee  "may"  ("mozhet")  buy  in  whole  or  in  part  the  leased  property  or  any  assets  available  at 
a  leased  enterprise.  "'  This  right  to  buy  was  less  clear  than  the  right  to  lease  or  the  right  to 
renew  as  the  drafting  used  the  Russian  word  "mozhet"  (may)  rather  than  "imet  pravo"  (shall 
have  the  right).  This  is  not  surprising  as  the  right  to  buy  challenged  the  heart  of  the  command 
economy  and  the  role  of  the  state  as  economic  sovereign.  Financing  the  purchase  of  a  leased 
enterprise  was  permitted  to  be  achieved  by  financial  assistance  from  the  leased  enterprise: 
subject  to  implementing  legislation,  the  FPLease  contemplated  the  use  of  assets  of  the  leased 
enterprise  itself  as  sources  for  the  purchase  of  the  enterprise. 
Incentivising  the  lessee  to  act  with  a  long  term  view  in  managing  enterprises  was  therefore 
initially  developed  by  attempting  to  reduce  the  significance  of  the  state's  reversionary  interest 
through  the  right  to  lease,  renew  and  buy.  Long  term  planning  going  forward  was  then 
encouraged  by  ensuring  that  any  benefits  of  personal  participation  could  be  passed  on  by 
873  FPLease,  article  16(6)  provided  that  "the  state  shall  facilitate  in  every  possible  way  the  development  of 
lease  relations  and  the  transition  to  the  lease  of  state  enterprises".  This  is  reminiscent  of  the  drafting  of 
the  Cooperatives  Law  in  this  respect  but  without  any  reference  to  that  assistance  being  limited  to  legal 
interests  or  activities  (supra  n.  832). 
874  FPLease,  article  12. 
875  FPLease,  article  13(l). 
876  FPLease,  article  13(3)  and  13(4). 
877  FPLease,  articles  10(l)  and  (2). 
-259- inheritance,  and  by  ensuring  the  stability  of  the  legal  regime  relating  to  leasing.  These  aims 
were  achieved  by  conceiving  rights  under  a  lease  contract  akin  to  in  rem  rights,  and  by  the 
operation  of  a  grandfather  clause. 
Soviet  law  had  traditionally  treated  the  lease/property  hire  as  part  of  the  law  of  obligations  and 
not  as  part  of  the  law  on  ownership.  Moreover,  the  Soviet  law  on  ownership  focussed  on  the 
identity  of  owners,  and  not  in  the  abstract  on  the  nature  of  rights  in  relation  to  an  object  or 
property.  As  such,  the  FPLease  was  not  able  to  achieve  the  treatment  of  lease  rights  as 
"property  rights  in  rem"  by  virtue  of  an  underlying  principle  or  framework  (as  would  have 
been  the  case  within  the  context  of  a  law  of  property).  Therefore  the  FPLease  dealt  with  this 
point  by  ad  hoc  explicit  statutory  provisions  (rather  than  reasoning  from  a  basis  of  principle), 
and so  the  description  in  this  study  as  lease  rights  "akin  to  in  rem  rights"  is  only  shorthand.  It 
provided  that  a  reorganisation  of  the  lessor  or  a  change  in  the  owner  of  the  leased  property 
shall  not  be  a  basis  for  changing  the  conditions  of  or  terminating  the  lease  contract;  "'  and  that 
rights  of  a  citizen  lessee  under  a  lease  contract  could  be  inherited  and  the  lessor  was  bound  to 
accept  the  beneficiary  for  the  remainder  of  the  term  (unless  the  lease  was  conditioned  on  the 
personal  qualities  of  the  lessee).  "' 
Going  forward,  the  legal  risk  associated  with  long  term  planning  was  reduced  further  by  a 
grandfather  clause  in  the  FPLease  which  provided  that  the  conditions  of  the  contract  of  lease 
would  retain  their  force  even  when,  after  the  conclusion  thereof,  "rules  worsening  the  position 
of  the  lessee  have  been  established  by  legislation".  880  This  was  clearly  an  important  protection 
provision  in  the  context  of  the  perestroika  economy  of  the  late  1980s  where  policy  initiatives 
changed  from  month  to  month. 
Once  the  FPLease  had  significantly  neutralised  the  effect  of  the  state's  reversionary  interest 
and  attempted  to  provide  the  preconditions  for  long  term  leasing  and  long  term  economic 
decision  making,  it  then  developed  the  traditional  incentive  process  of  ensuring  that 
participation  was  rewarded.  In  the  context  of  this  third  expression,  the  incentivisation  of 
personal  participation  was  almost  a  consequence  of  the  lease  framework  itself  for  it  was  a 
basic  part  of  the  lease  model  that  the  economic  incidents  of  ownership  and  economic  activity 
accrued  to  the  lessees.  Therefore,  all  products  and  revenues  received  as  a  result  of  the  use  of 
the  leased  property,  and  all  separable  improvements  to  the  leased  property  were  expressed  to 
878  FPLease,  article  13(2). 
879  FPLease,  article  14(5). 
880  FPLease,  article  15(4).  The  use  of  a  grandfather  clause  was  not  without  precedent  (supra  n.  492). 
-260- be  in  the  ownership  of  the  lessee.  "'  Furthermore,  at  the  end  of  the  lease  term,  the  lessor  was 
obliged  to  pay  compensation  to  the  lessee  for  all  inseparable  improvements  made  to  the  leased 
enterprise.  In  short,  subject  to  certain  restrictions,  "'  the  lessee  had  the  right  to  sell,  convert, 
exchange,  sublease  and  generally  manage  the  leased  property  and  any  residual  profit  was  "at 
the  full  disposition"  of  the  leased  enterprise  which  had  the  right  to  determine  "autonomously" 
the  application  of  such  profit.  "' 
These  provisions  taken  together  attempted  to  ensure  that  the  labour  collective  was  sufficiently 
incentivised  both  to  enter  into  leases  of  enterprises,  and  then  to  manage  them  in  a  "rational" 
manner.  The  detail  of  the  management  organs  was  set  out  in  the  charter  approved  by  the 
general  meeting  of  the  labour  collective,  as  well  as  in  subordinate  legislation  and  the  lease 
contract  itself.  The  FPLease  only  contained  one  article  in  this  respect  which  stated  that 
"management 
...  shall  be  carried  out  in  accordance  with  its  charter,  on  the  basis  of  socialist 
self-management,  broad  democracy,  glasnost,  and  the  participation  of  every  member  of  the 
labour  collective  in  deciding  all  questions  of  its  activities".  "'  Despite  the  references  to 
democracy  and glasnost,  this  characterisation  still  used  the  term  "socialist  self-management" 
which  indicated  the  shadow  of  coercive  law  cast  over  the  governance  regime  of  the  leased 
enterprise,  and  the  placing  of  the  leased  enterprise  generally  within  the  socialist  (post- 
command?  )  economy. 
6.5.5  Coercive  Law  and  Responsibility  of  the  Lessee 
811 
Like  the  other  participation  enterprises,  the  leased  enterprise  was  ultimately  conceived 
within  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  and  hence  was  characterised  as  a  "socialist  goods- 
producer".  During  the  period  of  the  lease,  the  state  was  no  longer  the  economic  owner  of  the 
state  enterprise,  nor  was  it  the  owner  of  the  leased  enterprise  itself.  Like  the  second 
expression  of  the  participation  model,  due  to  the  state's  changing  roles,  the  basic  elements  of 
the  confirmation  governance  regime  were  no  longer  applicable.  The  state  was  again  left 
principally  with  its  role  as  "legal  sovereign"  to  ensure  that  the  activities  of  the  leased 
881  FPLease,  article  9. 
882  See  infra  Section  6.5.5. 
883  FPLease,  article  19(2). 
884  FPLease,  article  17. 
885  The  1987  state  enterprise  was  still  clearly  a  creature  of  the  command  economy  with  a  confirmation 
governance  regime;  and  the  1988  cooperative  enterprise  was  not  only  expressed  in  article  I  of  the 
Cooperatives  Law  to  be  a  "socialist  ...  society"  but  was  also  born  of  "Leninist  ideas  on  cooperative 
societies",  as  noted  in  the  preamble.  For  examples  of  the  socialist  orientation  of  the  State  Enterprise  Law 
and  the  Cooperatives  Law,  see  supra  n.  565  and  566;  and  n.  572  and  612. 
-261- enterprise  did  not  undermine  the  state's  core  interests;  and  this  was  achieved  through  coercive 
law  (ie  legislative  diktat)  in  the  FPLease  itself 
The  FPLease  protected  the  interests  of  the  state  in  three  principal  ways:  firstly,  it  attempted  to 
ensure  that  the  state  shared  directly  in  any  economic  success  of  the  lease  project;  secondly,  it 
attempted  to  control  the  activities  of  the  leased  enterprise  negatively,  by  placing  restrictions  on 
discretions  so  as  to  ensure  that  the  value  of  the  leased  property  was  preserved;  and  thirdly,  it 
attempted  to  control  such  activities  positively,  by  imposing  obligations  on  the  management  of 
operations. 
The  lease  payment  was  required  to  be  structured  so  as  to  ensure  that  the  state  would  share  in 
any  of  the  economic  benefits  gained  by  changing  the  structure  of  the  state  enterprise  to  one 
where  the  management  of  the  business  was  delegated  to  the  labour  collective.  As  such, 
although  the  amount  of  the  lease  payment  was  a  matter  for  negotiation  as  part  of  concluding 
the  lease  contract,  the  FPLease  provided  that  the  lease  payment  must  "include  part  of  the 
profit  (revenue)"  generated  from  the  use  of  the  leased  property,  and  as  a  rule  was  not  to  be 
less  than  bank  interest.  "'  It  seemed  as  if  this  element  of  the  leased  payment  (called  lease 
interest)  was  therefore  intended  to  fluctuate  depending  upon  the  economic  fortunes  of  the 
enterprise. 
In  addition  to  ensuring  that  the  state's  interests  were  protected  by  sharing  in  the  upside  of  any 
gains,  the  state  needed  to  risk-manage  the  downside  scenario  associated  with  the  passing  of  its 
assets  into  the  management  of  others.  Ultimately  this  could  only  have  been  achieved  by 
placing  restrictions  and  obligations  on  the  management  of  the  leased  enterprise  in  relation  to 
certain  activities. 
Unlike  the  first  expression  of  the  participation  model,  the  labour  collective  was  actually 
paying  the  lease  payment  for  the  right  to  manage  the  enterprise  and  the  right  to  receive  the 
fruits  of  their  management  decisions  (subject  to  a  state  "skim"  depending  on  the  structure  of 
the  lease  payment  itself).  As  such,  any  substantive  restrictions  on  the  discretions  of  the 
management  would  have  both  undermined  the  incentivisation  structure;  as  well  as  discouraged 
labour  collectives  to  enter  into  the  lease  of  enterprises  in  the  first  place. 
And  yet  the  regulation  of  the  risks  associated  with  a  down-side  scenario  seemingly  resulted  in 
two  principles  for  the  operation  of  activities  that  were  crude,  and  hence  pervasive,  in  their 
scope:  The  FPLease  gave  the  lessee  the  right  to  sell,  exchange  and  generally  manage  the 
leased  property  (ie  the  state  enterprise)  "autonomously"  but  only  if  it  increased  the  "value"  of 
886  FPLease,  article  8. 
-262- the  leased  enterprise  (unless  otherwise  provided  for  by  the  lease  contract);  ...  and  it  did  "not 
entail  a  reduction  of  the  production-economic  potential  (value)  of  the  enterprise".  888 
There  were  no  specific  details  as  to  how  these  principles  were  to  be  applied  in  practice, 
however  the  FPLease  included  a  number  of  sanctions.  If  the  leased  property  was  returned  at 
the  end  of  the  contract  in  a  "worse"  condition  than  provided  for,  the  lessee  was  required  to 
pay  compensation;  a  violation  of  the  lease  contract  could  have  resulted  in  its  dissolution  by  a 
decision  of  the  state  arbitrazh  or  court.  Finally,  the  FPLease  imposed  on  the  parties 
"responsibility  established  by  legislation  of  the  USSR  and  union  republics"  for  failure  to 
perform  or  improper  performance  of  obligations.  "' 
The  effect  of  these  provisions,  coupled  with  those  relating  to  improvements,  '90  meant  that  the 
state  participated  in  any  economic  gains  through  a  profit  skim,  and  the  lessee  retained  the 
benefit  of  any  separable  or  inseparable  improvements,  but  that  the  lessee  was  both  liable  for 
any  worsening  of  the  condition  of  the  enterprise  than  that  provided  for,  and  was  restricted 
from  taking  actions  that  resulted  in  a  decrease  of  its  economic  potential  or  value. 
These  tests  were  of  course  truly  evaluative  in  their  operation.  It  was  therefore  uncertain:  what 
was  the  start  date  for  measuring  a  worsening  of  the  condition  or  economic  potential  of  the 
enterprise?  were  transactions  to  be  evaluated  on  an  individual  basis,  or  in  the  context  of  a 
number  of  related  transactions,  or  in  the  context  of  an  entire  plan  or  policy?  was  a  transaction 
on  arms'  length  terms  necessarily  one  that  would  not  reduce  the  economic  potential  of  the 
enterprise?  was  a  transaction  in  accordance  with  a  state order,  or  on  state  prices,  one  that 
necessarily  increased  the  value  of  the  enterprise?  In  short,  these  provisions  gave  the  state  an 
enormous  discretion  in  intervening  and  restricting  the  exercise  of  discretions  by  management 
if  required. 
In  addition  to  imposing  negative  restrictions,  the  FPLease  imposed  certain  positive  obligations 
on  the  management  of  a  leased  enterprise.  These  took  the  form  of  a  series  of  legislative 
coercive  diktats,  including  the  obligation:  "'  to  ensure  the  effective  use  and  regeneration  of 
natural  resources;  to  protect  the  enviromnent;  to  accept  state  orders  with  regard  to  economic 
links  already  formed  (for  amounts  not  exceeding  those  accepted  during  the  year  that  the  lease 
took  effect);  and  to  purchase  and  sell  goods  at  the  same  contractual  prices  as  those  fixed  for 
887  FPLease,  article  18(l). 
888  Ibid. 
889  FPLease,  articles  9(4),  13(l)  and  7(6). 
890  Supra  Section  6.5.4. 
891  FPLease,  article  18(2),  18(4),  18(5)  and  18(7). 
-263- state  enterprises.  Furthermore  the  state  had  the  right  to  carry  out  "control"  over  the  activities 
of  the  leased  enterprises  "in  the  same  procedure  as  for  cooperatives" 
Evaluated  in  these  terms,  the  "socialist"  leased  enterprise  was  just  another  participation 
enterprise.  It  separated  an  interest  out  from  the  all-people's  state  (ie  the  labour  collective).  It 
contemplated  personal  participation  by  that  interest,  incentivised  that  interest  and  gave  it  a 
certain  amount  of  management  autonomy.  It  also  represented  an  end  to  the  confirmation 
governance  regime  of  the  former  state  enterprises  as  the  state  concentrated  on  legal 
mechanisms  to  protect  its  interests.  Not  only  was  its  structure  compressed  and  distorted  to  fit 
within  the  existing  framework  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime,  but  also  the  state  restricted 
discretions  and  required  the  leased  enterprise  to  act  within  the  state  pricing  system  and  accept 
certain  state  orders  thereby  anchoring  the  leased  enterprise  to  a  role  in  a  state-run  economy. 
The  participant,  while  benefiting  directly  from  any  production  efficiencies,  gains  and 
improvements,  was  required  to  pay  a  lease  payment  and  bore  an  open  ended  liability  for 
failure. 
The  significance  of  the  leased  enterprise  however  went  beyond  its  role  as  the  third  expression 
of  the  participation  model.  By  contemplating  a  juridical  person  with  multiple  owners  and  with 
a  contract-based  group  structure,  the  1989  leased  enterprises  exposed  the  underlying 
limitations  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  itself.  In  this  context,  the  FPLease  hinted  at  an 
entirely  new  model  of  economic  relations  that  went  beyond  the  narrow  doctrinal  problems  of 
multiple  owners  and  ownership  interests.  The  FPLease  presented,  albeit  implicitly  and 
obtusely  in  places,  an  economy  based  on  contract  instead  of  administrative  commands;  an 
economy  based  on  a  permissive  regime;  and  an  economy  based  on  a  generic  owner. 
6.5.6  Contract  and  the  Post-Command  Economy 
While  the  state  in  the  capacity  of  legislative  sovereign  imposed  certain  restrictions  on  the 
activities  of  the  leased  enterprise  by  coercive  law,  the  FPLease  contemplated  a  role  for  the 
state  in  another  capacity  -  as  lessor. 
The  state  in  its  role  as  "lessor"  or  "contracting  party"  was  entirely  new  within  the  Soviet 
framework  and  moved  the  relationship  with  the  state  from  one  based  on  administrative 
subordination  to  one  based  on  contractual  parity.  The  lessee  had  the  opportunity  to  negotiate 
the  deal  in  the  context  of  the  leased  contract;  and  should  those  terms  not  be  acceptable,  the 
lessee  could  simply  walk  away.  The  contract,  as  the  basis  for  constructing  the  juridical  person 
and  for  structuring  economic  relations,  had  its  origins  in  earlier  models  considered  in  this 
study. 
-264- It  was  argued  in  Chapter  4  that  the  grandfather  of  all  contract-based  juridical  persons  was  the 
contract  for  joint  activity,  which  linked  pre-revolutionary  associations  to  the  simple 
partnership  and  through  to  contemporary  Soviet  law.  The  first  "new"  industrial  organisation 
of  the  perestroika  period  was  also  based  on  contract,  the  contract-based  concession  enterprise 
(ie  joint  enterprises).  This  was  however  conceived  as  part  of  foreign  relations  law.  The  first 
time that  an  industrial  organisation  had  been  developed  explicitly  upon  the  domestic  civil  law 
of  contract  since  the  early  1960s  (when  the  1964  RSFSR  Civil  Code  partnerships  were 
formally  abolished)  was  the  leased  enterprise.  "Contractual  principles"  however  were  already 
evident  in  the  second  expression  of  the  participation  model. 
The  principles  of  economic  activity  as  set  out  in  article  17(l)  of  the  Cooperatives  Law 
contemplated  "socialist  economic  operations"  existing  side-by-side  "the  extensive  use  of 
goods-money  relations".  "Goods-money  relations"  was  a  reference  to  the  arena  of  civil  law 
which  had  been  so  visible  in  the  private  economy  of  the  NEP  era.  On  this  basis,  the 
Cooperatives  Law  actually  referred  to  the  existence  of  a  "market",  "'  and  "all  economic 
operations"  were  expressed  to  be  carried  out  "only  on  contractual  principles"  with  the  choice 
of  whether  to  contract,  and  who  to  contract  with,  being  left  in  the  decision  of  the  contracting 
193  parties.  The  principle  was  that  "the  contract  shall  be  the  sole  legal  and  economic  document 
regulating  all  the  said  economic-production  mutual  relations  of  the  cooperative  ".  '9'  The 
importance  of  contracting  was  such  that  the  Cooperatives  Law  reminded  cooperatives  that 
breaches  of  contract  would  result  in  property  responsibility  in  the  established  procedure 
including  the  obligation  to  compensate  for  losses  caused.  Contracting  was  specifically 
contemplated  in  the  areas  of:  the  sale  of  goods;  the  hire  of  labour;  transfers  of  cash  and  other 
resources;  the  use  of  property  granted  by  state,  cooperative  and  other  social  enterprises; 
relations  between  the  cooperative  and  its  collective  members;  obtaining  bank  credits;  the  use 
of  state  research  institutions;  the  training  of  personnel;  the  interaction  between  the  socialised 
and  state  sectors  of  agriculture;  relations  between  a  collective  farm  and  its  labour  collective 
for  use  of  its  products;  and  preferential  acquisition  of  products  in  consumer  cooperative 
stores.  895 
892  Cooperatives  Law,  article  1(5)  referred  to  a  "market  for  goods  ... 
both  between  cooperatives  and  between 
cooperatives  and  state  enterprises  and  organisations".  Other  references  to  the  market  in  the  Cooperatives 
Law  included:  article  1(2)  ("market  with  high  quality  goods");  article  26(l)  ("market  competitiveness"). 
893  Cooperatives  Law,  article  17(3).  In  Soviet  law  "economic  contracts",  the  choice  of  contract  parties  and 
basic  terms  were  provided  by  the  state  (supra  n.  344). 
894  Cooperatives  Law,  article  17(3). 
895  Cooperatives  Law,  articles  17(3)  and  42(l);  4(2)  and  6(l);  8(3);  9(3);  12(l)  and  48(2);  23(2);  26(2); 
31(4),  33(2);  33(4)  and  45(4). 
-265- The  leased  enterprise  formalised  this  drift  towards  contractual  relationships  by  actually  giving 
rise  to  a  "new  type"  of  juridical  person  created  on  the  basis  of  contract.  In  that  sense  it 
radicalised  the  contract  for  joint  activity  by  recognising  the  state-lessor  and  lessee  as 
contractual  parties  and  then  by  providing  for  a  juridical  person  to  arise  as  a  result  thereof.  The 
lease  contract  was  "the  principal  document. 
--concluded  on  the  basis  of  voluntariness";  "'  and 
the  FPLease  contained  broad  topics  that  were  required  to  be  addressed  in  the  lease  contract 
(including  a  description  of  the  property  leased,  the  term,  the  value  of  the  leased  property  and 
the  amount  of  the  lease  payment)  as  well  as  a  number  of  topics  whose  regulation  was  intended 
to  be  regulated  by  the  lease  contract  (including  the  right  to  sub-lease,  the  right  to  buy  and 
certain  limits  on  economic  activity).  "' 
Notwithstanding  the  existence  of  certain  restrictions  on  the  activities  of  the  lessee  in  the 
FPLease,  "'  the  FPLease  still  stated  the  broad  principle  that  it  was  the  lease  contract  that  was 
to  determine  any  limitations  on  the  performance  of  obligations,  and  hence  provided  explicitly 
that  "Beyond  the  limits  of  the  performance  of  obligations  under  the  contract  of  lease,  the 
lessee  is  entirely  free  in  its  economic  activities".  "'  In  this  manner,  the  FPLease  built  upon 
some  of  the  principles  of  earlier  expressions  of  the  participation  model  and  implicitly  hinted  at 
the  existence  of  an  entirely  new  economy  based  on  a  permissive  regime  where  everything  was 
permitted  unless  prohibited.  '  In  addition  to  the  permissive  regime  for  economic  activity,  the 
FPLease  moved  towards  recognising  all  actors  within  that  economy  as  equal  with  identical 
rights  of  ownership  and  hence  identical  legal  status:  The  FPLease  suggested  that  any  person 
could  act  as  a  lessor  and  as  a  lessee  and  that  the  significance  of  the  different  forms  of 
ownership  based  on  the  identity  principle  was  something  that  was  to  be  of  reduced 
significance  in  the  context  of  this  new  economic  settlement. 
The  definition  of  "lessor"  in  article  4  encompassed  every  actor  within  the  industrial  economy, 
whether  or  not  it  had  the  right  of  ownership;  whether  or  not  it  was  the  state,  a  natural  person 
or  a  juridical  person;  and  whether  or  not  it  was  Soviet  or  foreign.  The  "lessor"  was  a  broad 
church  including  even  state  enterprises  and  indeed  introduced  a  new  term,  "full  economic 
jurisdiction"  ("polnoe  khozyaistvennoe  vedenie"),  to  describe  a  new  method  by  which  they 
896  FPLease,  article  7(1). 
897  FPLease,  articles  7(2),  7(5),  10  and  11. 
898  Supra  Section  6.5.6. 
899  FPLease,  article  11. 
900  A  move  that  was  contemplated  in  State  Enterprise  Law  and  the  Cooperatives  Law  (supra  n.  792) 
-266- were  allocated  state  property;  a  term  that  was  born  from  the  new  permissive  regime.  "  The 
definition  of  "lessee"  in  article  5  likewise  encompassed  all  actors. 
Not  only  did  the  FPLease  contemplate  the  "generic  actor  in  the  economy"  encompassing  all 
persons,  it  also  hinted  at  a  new  era  of  ownership  relationships  that  had  moved  beyond  the 
narrow,  identity  based,  Soviet  forms.  The  FPLease  set  out  in  article  9(l)  the  general  rule  that 
all  "products  and  revenues  obtained  by  the  lessee  as  a  result  of  the  use  of  the  lease  property 
shall  be  in  its  ownership".  This  was  truly  dramatic:  for  if  any  person  could  act  as  a  lessee, 
then  surely  the  implication  was  that  any  person  in  the  lease  context  had  the  right  of 
ownership?  The  FPLease  then  moved  on  to  recognise  explicitly  the  limitations  of  the  existing 
forms  of  ownership  by  expressly  referring  to  a  new  form  of  ownership  called  "collective 
ownership".  90'  Finally,  the  FPLease  envisaged  the  lease  mechanism  as  operating  in  "all 
branches  of  the  national  economy  and  ...  with  respect  to  property  of  all  forms  of  ownership",  " 
contemplating  associations  with  multiple  owners  "irrespective  of  the  forms  of  ownership".  ' 
Building  upon  earlier  expressions  of  the  participation  model,  it  now  was  as  if  the  old  Soviet 
distinctions  between  industry  and  agriculture;  state  and  non-state  juridical  persons;  civil  law, 
economic  law  and  collective  farm  law,  were  simply  no  longer  directly  relevant. 
The  participation  model  had  bent  the  existing  spine  of  the  Stalin  economic  settlement  to  almost 
breaking  point.  In  1989  legislators  still  refused  to  tackle  any  fundamental  shortcomings  of  the 
forms  of  ownership  regime,  opting  instead  to  develop  the  lease  as  best  they  could  from  within 
it.  However,  implicit  within  the  provisions  of  the  FPLease  were  the  footprints  of  an  entirely 
new  economic  order;  and  by  March  1990  the  inconsistencies  between  economic  reality  and 
legal  regulation  were  so  great  that  a  revaluation  of  the  entire  basic  framework  of  ownership 
relations  could  no  longer  be  avoided. 
901  "Operative  management"  was  a  product  of  the  traditional  authorisation  regime  and  state  property 
allocated  to  a  state  enterprise  on  this  basis  could  only  be  used  for  the  purposes  specified  by  the  state 
(through  the  concept  of  designation).  "Full  economic  jurisdiction"  by  contrast  was  a  product  of  the 
permissive  regime  and  state  property  allocated  on  this  basis  could  be  used  for  any  activity  unless 
specifically  prohibited  by  the  terms  of  its  allocation. 
902  Supra  Section  6.5.5. 
903  FPLease,  article  3. 
904  FPLease,  article  6. 
-267- 7.  NOVOSTROIKA  OR  PERESTROIKA?  -  THE  TRIUMPH  OF  THE 
ENTERPRISE  (1990  OWNERSHIP  LAW  AND  THE  1990  LAW  ON 
ENTERPRISES) 
"But  strangest  of  all  are  the  things  which 
happen  on  Nevsky  Prospect.  Oh  have  no 
faith  in  this  Nevsky  Prospect! 
... 
It  is  all 
deception,  a  dream,  nothing  is  what  it 
seems...  ff 
N.  Gogol 
7.1  The  Confirmation  Enterprises  and  the  Economic  Constitution  of  the  Stalin  State 
Until  1987,  the  most  basic  principles  of  the  Soviet  industrial  economic  legal  framework  had 
never  seriously  been  questioned  since  their  elaboration  during  the  1930s.  The  spine  of  this 
system  comprised  state  ownership  and  state  control  of  the  means  of  production  supporting  a 
network  of  confirmation  enterprises  that  were  the  addressees  of  planning  instructions.  As  the 
English  feudal  crown  delegated  its  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  (ie  land)  to  tenants- 
in-chief  through  the  concept  of  tenure  without  ownership,  so  too  did  the  Soviet  state  "allocate" 
the  means  of  production  to  state  enterprises  without  ownership  to  hold  by  way  of  "operative 
management".  Such  was  the  economic  constitution  of  the  Stalin  state. 
The  foundations  of  that  system  were  so  fundamental  that  they  were  contained  in  the  USSR 
Constitution,  the  1961  FPCivL  and  civil  codes: 
The  Brezhnev  Constitution  set  out  the  "forms  of  ownership",  a  concept  that  distinguished 
different  ownership  regimes  on  the  basis  of  the  identity  of  the  owner.  Thus  the  Brezhnev 
Constitution  contemplated  a  form  of  ownership  for  the  state,  69state  (all-people's)  ownership"; 
a  form  of  ownership  for  non-state  owned  collective  farms  and  cooperatives,  "collective  farm- 
cooperative  ownership";  and  a  form  of  ownership  for  natural  persons,  "personal  ownership". 
State  ownership  was  expressed  to  be  the  "principal  form"  of  socialist  ownership,  905  and 
"enterprises  organised  by  the  state"  fell  within  this  form. 
906 
Section  II  of  the  1961  FPCivL  set  out  additional  principles  relating  to  the  law  on  ownership 
and  articles  11-13  contained  the  main  provisions  on  juridical  persons.  The  term  "juridical 
person"  was  used  to  define  "organisations"  which  "possess  separate  property;  may  acquire  in 
905  Brezhnev  Constitution,  article  10. 
906  Ibid,  article  11. 
-268- their  own  names  property,  and  personal  non-property,  rights;  and  bear  duties;  and  be 
plaintiffs  or  defendants  in  court...  ".  "' 
While  there  was  no  formal  classification  of  juridical  persons,  article  11  did  contain  a  list  of 
juridical  persons.  From  this  list  can  be  implied  the  importance  of  state  enterprises  (listed  first) 
as  well  as  the  theoretical  link  between  "types"  of  juridical  person  and  the  forms  of  ownership. 
Thus  article  11  listed  separately,  and  therefore  implicitly  distinguished,  "state  enterprises  and 
other  state  organisations"  from  "collective  farms 
...  and  other  cooperative  and  social 
organisations"  presumably  on  the  basis  of  the  distinction  between  state  ownership  and 
collective  farm-cooperative  ownership.  "  This  classification  illustrated  the  rigid  structure  of 
the  forms  of  ownership  regime  which  provided  for  each  relevant  identified  owner  an  attendant 
specific  form  of  ownership  and  an  attendant  specific  juridical  person.  Under  this 
methodology,  there  was  no  juridical  person  that  could  be  owned  by  more  than  one  identity  of 
owner  (ie  state  enterprises  could  only  be  owned  by  the  state,  and  collective  farms  could  never 
be  owned  by  the  state). 
In  addition  to  the  specific  listed  juridical  persons  in  article  11,  there  was  a  catch-all  category 
which  was  last  on  the  list  providing  for  "other  organisations  in  the  instances  provided  for  by 
legislation  of  the  USSR".  This  catch-all  category  included  existing  juridical  persons  that  were 
not  listed  specifically  (eg  foreign  trade  organisations)  and  contemplated  the  possible 
introduction  of  new  juridical  persons  in  the  future. 
Therefore,  the  1961  FPCivL  distinguished  the  "organisation"  (ie  the  generic  term  used  for  any 
juridical  person)  from  the  "state  enterprise"  (ie  a  specific  type  of  juridical  person  which 
formed  the  basic  or  primary  link"  in  the  socialist  industrial  spine).  It  was  argued  in  Chapter  3 
that  these  "state  enterprises"  are  best  understood  within  the  confirmation  model.  For  the 
purposes  however  of  evaluating  the  reforms  of  1990  and  the  choices  that  the  legislators  faced 
that  spring,  a  number  of  key  elements  of  that  model  and  the  relationship  between  the  state  and 
its  state  enterprises  need  to  be  revisited;  elements  that  arose  primarily  due  to  the  fact  that  all 
enterprises  in  the  Soviet  industrial  economy  were  owed  by  one  owner,  the  state. 
(a)  Creation:  The  Stalin  state  was  an  economic  sovereign,  the  owner  of  all  of  the  means 
of  production,  and  as  such  it  could  decide  when  and  whether  to  create  any  enterprise 
907  1961  FPCivL,  article  11. 
908  At  the  time  of  the  enactment  of  the  1961  FPCivL  this  classification  also  embodied  the  distinction  between 
the  industrial  economy  and  the  agrarian  economy;  and  between  civil  law  and  collective  farm  law  (supra 
Section  6.4.4.2). 
909  Adopting  the  terminology  of  article  1  of  the  Enterprise  Statute  and  Production  Association  Statute. 
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for  a  detailed  procedural  law  relating  to  their  creation. 
(b)  Ownership  of  the  enterprise  and  the  nature  of  its  ownership  interes  :  Again,  as  the 
state  was  an  economic  sovereign,  the  single  owner  of  all  enterprises,  there  was  no 
need  to  develop  a  precise  legal  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  ownership  interest 
of  these  enterprises.  While  Russian  legal  terminology  contained  various  concepts  that 
might  have  been  used  to  have  described  and  analysed  the  nature  of  the  state's 
ownership  interest  of  state  enterprises  (including  "pai"  (share);  "dolya"  (participatory 
share);  "aktsiya"  (stocks);  Volya  uchastiya"  (participatory  share  participation);  and 
"vklad"  (contribution)),  none  of  these  appeared  in  the  legislation  relating  to  the 
confirmation  enterprises.  Rather  than  adopting  any  of  these  or  other  precise  terms,  the 
legislation  simply  stated  that  all  state  enterprises  were  "located  in  ("nakhodyatsya") 
the  exclusive  ownership  of  the  state".  "' 
(C)  Ownership  by/property  of  the  enterprise  and  the  nature  of  its  rights:  In  order  to  ensure 
that  the  state  remained  at  all  times  the  owner  of  the  means  of  production,  the  law  on 
ownership  explicitly  provided  that  confirmation  enterprises  did  not  have  the  right  of 
ownership  of  property  but  merely  were  "allocated"  property  by  way  of  operative 
management. 
Although  state  enterprises  did  not  have  the  legal  capacity  "to  own  property",  they 
were  juridical  persons  and  as  such  had  the  capacity  to  "acquire"  rights.  "'  Consistent 
with  this  approach,  Soviet  law  used  a  variety  of  expressions  relating  to  rights  but  none 
provided  explicitly  for  the  "ownership"  of  a  right.  "'  Soviet  law  was  forced  into 
making  this  distinction  between  "property"  ("res")  and  "rights"  ("chose")  because,  on 
the  one  hand,  the  right  of  ownership  of  "the  means  of  production"  (ie  property)  as  a 
matter  of  Marxist-Leninist  theory  "had  to"  be  denied  to  juridical  persons  (because  the 
state  was  to  own  all  the  means  of  production);  but  on  the  other  hand,  to  deny  juridical 
persons  the  capacity  to  acquire  "rights"  per  se  would  have  been  inconsistent  with  their 
ability  "to  contract"  and  to  bear  separate  property  responsibility  from  the  state.  In 
practice,  little  turned  on  whether  rights  were  "owned"  or  only  "acquired"  by  their 
holder  because  this  distinction  was  broadly  a  consequence  of  doctrinal  imperative 
910  Brezhnev  Constitution,  article  11  [emphasis  added]. 
911  1961  FPCivL,  article  11. 
912  Traditional  formulations  in  the  constitution  and  civil  legislation  referred  to  rights  "belonging"  and  being 
"extended"  to  a  person;  or  of  persons  "having"  or  "acquiring"  rights. 
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command  economy  where  the  unitary  Soviet  state  was  to  be  the  legal  absolute  owner. 
(d)  Managemen  :  The  presence  of  a  single  owner,  the  state,  removed  the  need  for  an 
internal  governance  regime  or  procedure  for  the  balancing  of  the  interests  of  different 
owners.  The  principle  of  one-man  management  further  simplified  the  management 
structure:  one  owner  appointed  one  manager  who  was  responsible  for  all  operations 
and  could  act  on  behalf  of  the  enterprise.  Official  ideology  reinforced  the 
representative  nature  of  this  economic  dictatorship  by  explaining  that  the  state,  as  a 
socialist  all-people's  state,  represented  the  interests  of  all-people.  From  a  theoretical 
perspective,  the  state's  monopoly  ownership  of  the  enterprises  with  one-man 
management  was  expressed  to  result  in  management  being  in  the  interests  of  all 
workers  of  that  enterprise  and  of  Soviet  society  as  a  whole.  "' 
(e)  Sovereignty,  responsibility  and  the  macro  economy:  In  addition  to  the  state's  role  as 
owner  of  the  enterprises  and  of  their  property,  the  state,  as  "legal  sovereign",  had  the 
right  to  oblige  the  enterprise  to  carry  out  activities  by  virtue  of  legal  diktat;  and  the 
state,  as  "economic  sovereign",  had  the  right  to  oblige  the  enterprise,  together  with 
the  other  enterprises  within  the  national  economy,  to  comply  with  administrative 
(planning)  instructions.  "'  Despite  the  fact  that  the  state  exercised  considerable  control 
over  the  activities  of  the  enterprises,  the  1961  FPCivL  provided  that  the  state  was  not 
legally  responsible  for  their  debts  and  vice  versa.  However,  while  the  state  had  no 
formal  legal  responsibility  for  the  debts  of  its  enterprises,  its  de  facto  responsibility 
emerged  as  a  result  of  the  nature  of  the  command  economy:  The  state  as  owner  of  all 
enterprises  ran  the  macro  economy  on  the  basis  of  a  single  plan  and  hence  state 
subsidies  were  granted  as  a  matter  of  course  to  enterprises  who  were,  by  virtue  of 
their  balance  sheets,  "unprofitable"  where  their  place  within  the  plan  as  a  whole  was 
considered  necessary  or  justified  (from  a  political  or  economic  perspective).  "' 
State  and  Communist  Party  control:  Due  to  the  blurring  of  the  roles  of  state  and 
Party,  the  exact  method  by  which  in  practice  the  Party  and  the  state  controlled  the 
913  See  quotation  at  the  beginning  of  Chapter  6. 
914  Supra  Section  3.4  and  6.5.1. 
915  State  subsidisation  of  industry  was  a  legacy  of  the  financing  of  the  first  five  year  plan.  Although  it  was 
intended  that  industrialisation  would  be  financed  through  increased  profits,  this  proved  unrealistic  and  in 
the  absence  of  foreign  credits  and  a  market  for  capital,  it  was  ultimately  the  state  budget  that  funded  the 
capital  investment  industry.  A  practice  that  proved  difficult  to  curtail  within  the  logic  of  the  planned 
economy  (supra  n.  104,  pp.  740-746). 
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as  "guiding  and  directing  force"  in  Soviet  society,  and  the  state  qua  founder 
(operating  through  the  voting  system),  the  state  qua  property  owner  (imposing  limited 
designation  on  the  use  of  property),  the  state  qua  legal  sovereign  (adopting  legislation) 
and  the  state  qua  economic  sovereign  (adopting  planning  instructions  and  state 
orders),  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  have  drawn  such  distinctions  in  practice.  There 
were  so  many  overlapping  ways  that  the  Party  and  state  could  have  ensured 
compliance  with  their  instructions  that  there  was  no  necessity  to  identify  the  specific 
mechanism  that  was  being  adopted  in  any  individual  case. 
These  above  elements  summarise  what  has  been  argued  to  be  the  hallmarks  of  the  "industrial 
enterprise"  -  an  integrated  devolved  cog  in  a  single  administrative  and  economic  complex 
expressing  the  interests  of  the  state  and  hence  "all-people".  In  this  manner,  the  enterprise 
could  perhaps  be  viewed  as  the  socialist  equivalent  of  the  English  eleventh  century  feudal 
tenant,  representing  the  most  basic  element  of  the  economy,  the  vassal  or  puppet  of  the 
socialist  state. 
7.2  The  Challenge  to  Stalin  Economic  Constitution  -  1987-1990 
Despite  the  principal  place  of  the  confirmation  enterprise  within  the  traditional  Stalin 
industrial  economy,  as  aforementioned,  article  11  of  the  1961  FPCivL  contemplated  a  number 
of  other  juridical  persons  (operating  mainly  in  the  agricultural  sector)  as  well  as  the  possibility 
for  the  elaboration  of  new  juridical  persons  through  the  catch-all  category.  It  was  to  these 
"other  juridical  persons"  that  the  regime  turned  in  1987  in  order  to  develop  from  within  Soviet 
law  potential  alternative  forms  that  could  be  used  in  the  industrial  sector.  These  have  been 
described  in  terms  of  the  contract-based  concession  and  participation  models.  Their 
introduction  into  the  economy  began  to  question,  press  and  bend  the  rigid  spine  of  the 
command  system. 
Perhaps  most  importantly  these  models  contemplated  the  existence  of  new  juridical  persons 
with  more  than  one  founder.  Sometimes,  as  in  the  case  of  joint  enterprises,  the  state  (through, 
for  example,  a  state  enterprise  as  a  participant)  acted  as  one  of  the  founders,  and  sometimes 
(for  example  as  in  the  case  of  leased  enterprises),  it  did  not.  As  a  result  of  the  presence  of 
these  new  juridical  persons,  the  basic  assumptions  underpinning  the  confirmation  model  and 
the  Stalin  economic  constitution  gradually  became  compromised:  the  state  no  longer  was  the 
owner  of  all  enterprises  and  was  no  longer  the  sole  owner  of  any  given  enterprise.  The 
introduction  of  more  than  one  founder  and  the  possibility  of  a  founder  not  ultimately  owned 
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above: 
first  a  procedure  was  required  by  which  the  state  could  grant  juridical  personality 
upon  a  specific  organisation  following  the  petition  of  others; 
secondly,  as  the  state  was  no  longer  the  single  owner,  as  more  than  one  type  of 
industrial  juridical  person  was  now  contemplated,  and  as  each  identified  owner  could 
own  more  than  one  type  of  industrial  juridical  person  (sometimes  even  jointly  with 
other  identified  owners),  an  understanding  of  the  legal  nature  of  the  ownership 
interests  of  the  founders  seemed  to  be  required; 
thirdly,  as  the  state  no  longer  owned  (or  entirely  owned)  all  organisations,  the 
ownership  regime  of  these  organisations  could  not  fall  within  the  state  ownership- 
operative  management  analysis; 
(iv):  fourthly,  the  presence  of  more  than  one  owner  meant  that  the  law  setting  out  the 
procedure  for  the  management  of  the  organisation  would  need  to  be  more  elaborate, 
regulating  the  relationship  between  the  founders  and  their  representatives  at  the 
management  level; 
(v)  and  (vi):  fifthly  and  finally,  these  new  models  presided  over  the  erosion  of  the  power  of 
the  Party,  and  over  the  erosion  of  the  roles  of  the  state  as  owner  of  all  enterprises  and 
their  property,  and  as  economic  sovereign.  Consequently  the  state  lost  the  ability  to 
manage  the  economy  as  a  single  administrative  matrix  and  enterprises  were  "freed"  to 
operate  on  a  basis  where  their  own  balance  sheets  became  the  sole  indicator  of  their 
"utility".  As  the  roles  of  the  state  came  to  be  confined  to  its  position  as  legal 
sovereign,  it  had  to  reorientate  and  clarify  its  strategy  for  controlling  the  economy  and 
the  "new"  industrial  organisations  therein  by  developing  "legal  mechanisms", 
principally  through  the  authorisation  process  and  statutory  diktat,  that  would  ensure  its 
interests  were  protected. 
The  new  models  had  fissured,  split  and  cracked,  in  both  theory  and  practice,  the  notion  of  the 
"all-people's"  state  and  the  unity  of  interests  in  the  Soviet  industrial  economy  as  the  public 
and  private  spheres  of  the  Soviet  state  were  most  "publicly"  torn  apart.  The  principles  of  a 
new  open  economy  and  a  new  rudimentary  law  on  juridical  persons  were  already  latent  in  the 
legislation  on  which  these  models  were  based,  contemplating  an  atomised  legal  entity 
participating  as  an  independent  actor  in  a  market  orientated  economy  with  multiple  founders 
who  were  persons  other  than  the  state. 
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principal  steps  to  be  climbed  before  the  "general  corporation"  could  be  born  from  the  ashes  of 
the  socialist  industrial  enterprise: 
The  Concept  of  "the  Generic  Owner"  and  the  Nature  of  the  Ownership  Interest:  most 
importantly,  the  Soviet  ownership  regime  had  to  be  reconstituted  by  rejecting  the 
socialist  notion  of  "forms  of  ownership"  and  by  embracing  the  concept  of  "the  generic 
owner"  thereby  giving  all  subjects  of  civil  law  the  identical  (not  just  the  equal  or 
equivalent)  "right  to  own  property".  This  would  have  the  effect  of  moving  the  doctrinal 
emphasis  away  in  any  given  case  from  the  "identity"  of  the  owner  towards  the  "nature 
of  the  right"  owned;  and  move  the  law  on  ownership  towards  a  law  on  property.  In  this 
way,  the  nature  and  scope  of  rights  of  an  owner  would  come  to  depend  upon  the  nature 
of  the  property  owned  and  the  rights  in  relation  to  that  property,  rather  than  upon  the 
identity  of  the  owner. 
In  the  context  of  the  juridical  person,  such  a  regime  would  constitute  a  juridical 
person  as  a  sub  ect  of  civil  law  (and  not  as  an  object)  which  issued  ownership  interests  j 
(that  were  objects);  and  where  the  rights  associated  with  each  ownership  interest 
would  in  part  define  the  nature  of  the  juridical  person  and  would  determine  the  rights 
of  the  owner  of  that  ownership  interest  vis  a  vis  the  juridical  person.  In  this  way 
juridical  persons  would  come  to  be  classified  by  reference  to  their  specific 
peculiarities  rather  than  by  reference  to  the  identity  of  their  owner. 
An  ownership  regime  based  on  forms  of  ownership  derived  from  the  identity  principle 
was  broadly  necessary  and  unproblematic,  in  both  theory  and  practice,  in  an  economy 
where  the  Soviet  state  owned  all  the  means  of  production.  However,  in  an  economy 
with  multiple  owners  where  each  identified  owner  has  the  right  to  own  more  than  one 
type  of  juridical  person,  a  classification  based  on  the  identity  of  the  owner  and  forms 
of  ownership  would  almost  certainly  prove  to  be  comprehensively  and  structurally 
flawed.  Its  continued  application  in  such  an  open  economy  would  prevent,  from  a 
legal  point  of  view,  a  sensible  understanding  of  the  nature  of  ownership  interests  and 
hence  preclude  the  elaboration  of  a  logical  and  coherent  framework  for  characterising 
and  classifying  the  general  corporation  and  other  juridical  persons. 
(b)  Equity  Capital:  if  there  was  a  shift  in  the  focus  of  the  law  on  ownership  from  the 
identity  of  the  owner  to  the  nature  of  the  ownership  interest,  the  general  corporation 
would  only  be  possible  where  the  law  also  contemplated  an  ownership  interest  of  a 
juridical  person  that  was  constituted  in  terms  of  an  investment  (ie  equity  capital)  and 
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enterprises).  The  introduction  of  equity  capital,  and  the  consequential  separation  of 
ownership  from  control,  would  entail  a  more  detailed  governance  regime  providing  a 
procedure  both  for  regulating  the  interests  of  the  participants  inter  se,  and  the  managers 
inter  se,  as  well  as  for  regulating  the  interests  of  the  participants  on  the  one  hand  with 
those  of  the  managers  on  the  other. 
Right  to  Incorporate:  an  opening  up  of  ownership  rights  would  need  to  be  coupled  with 
a  reorientation  of  the  status  of  the  industrial  organisation  from  that  of  a  concession  to 
that  of  an  "accepted"  actor  in  a  new  economy.  This  would  be  evidenced  by  a  move 
from  an  authorisation  system  of  creation  to  one  where  founders  had  the  prima  facie 
right  to  incorporate,  without  any  state  approval  of  purposes,  provided  that  certain 
registration/notification  formalities  were  completed. 
(d)  Capacity  and  State  Control:  if  the  law  were  to  develop  an  ownership  regime  based  on 
the  concept  of  "the  generic  owner"  coupled  with  the  right  to  incorporate,  techniques 
such  as  the  "forms  of  ownership  regime"  or  an  "authorisation"  procedure  would  no 
longer  be  available  to  prevent  the  creation  of  a  juridical  person  by  its  founders.  There 
are  of  course  "legitimate"  reasons  for  a  state  to  regulate  the  "classes"  of  person 
permitted  to  found  a  juridical  person  (for  example,  those  without  civil  law  capacity 
(such  as  minors  or  the  insane)  or  particular  foreign  investors).  The  regulation  of  the 
scope  of  the  rights  of  those  persons  would  have  to  be  achieved,  not  through  contorting 
the  general  law  on  industrial  organisations  or  the  law  on  ownership,  but  through  stand- 
alone  legislation  by  developing  the  civil  law  concept  of  legal  capacity  or  by  specific 
legislation  on  (for  example)  foreign  investment  (without  creating  a  "new  type"  of 
juridical  person  for  this  purpose). 
In  1990  the  law  on  industrial  organisations  was  at  a  crossroads.  The  contract-based  concession 
and  participation  models,  coupled  with  the  other  perestroika  reforms,  had  bent  the  existing 
spine  of  the  command  economy  to  almost  breaking  point:  either  the  spine  could  be  broken  and 
a  new  framework  elaborated  by  extending  the  momentum  and  logic  of  these  models; 
alternatively,  the  existing  regime  could  be  bolstered  and  restructured  by  bringing  the  new 
models  from  the  fringes  of  the  law  into  the  mainstream  but  without  altering  fundamentally  the 
foundations  and  basic  principles  of  the  then  prevailing  framework  of  the  juridical  person  and 
the  law  on  ownership.  This  can  ultimately  be  characterised  as  a  choice  between  "novostroika" 
(the  building  afresh)  and  "perestroika"  (restructuring),  between  the  market  economy  general 
-275- corporation  and  the  socialist  enterprise  - 
The  constitutional  amendments  of  March  1990,  the 
1990  Ownership  Law  and  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  evidenced  the  choice  that  was  made. 
7.3  March  1990  Constitutional  Amendments  -  Towards  a  New  Economic  Constitution 
On  14  March  1990  the  Brezhnev  Constitution  was  amended  (the  "March  Constitutional 
Amendments  ")  again.  916  Certain  of  the  amendments  relating  to  the  law  on  ownership,  and 
hence  to  the  administration  of  the  economy  as  a  whole,  were  then  elaborated  in  more  detail  in 
the  1990  Ownership  Law  and  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises.  These  constitutional  amendments 
and  the  two  new  laws  should  not  be  understood  discretely  as  three  separate  enactments.  Taken 
together,  it  shall  be  argued  that  they  set  out  the  basis  for  a  new  "economic"  constitution  for 
the  Soviet  Union,  a  consolidation  and  restatement  of  the  previous  reforms  of  the  perestroika 
era  and  a  manifesto  for  the  post-Stalin  economy  and  for  the  "new"  industrial  juridical  person. 
The  1990  Ownership  Law  more  specifically  set  out  the  basic  features  of  this  underlying 
economic  constitution  and  its  theoretical  framework,  and on  the  basis  thereof,  the  1990  Law 
on  Enterprises  then  set  out  the  principles  upon  which  all  the  actors  in  the  industrial  economy 
would  operate. 
The  March  Constitutional  Amendments  comprised  three  principal  changes:  the  contemplation 
of  a  multi-party  system  with  the  amendment  of  the  infamous  article  6;  the  creation  of  the  post 
of  President  of  the  USSR;  and  changes  to  the  law  on  ownership.  As  a  consequence  of  the 
latter,  articles  10,1L  12  and  13  of  the  Brezhnev  Constitution,  which  set  out  the  fundamentals 
of  the  Economic  System  and  forms  of  ownership,  were  replaced  in  their  entirety. 
The  designation  "socialist  ownership"  and  the  old  forms  of  ownership  were  removed  and  in 
their  stead  article  10  provided  for  three  "new"  forms  of  ownership:  state  ownership,  collective 
ownership  and  ownership  of  Soviet  citizens.  "'  It  further  provided  that  all  of  these  "diverse 
forms  of  ownership"  were  subject  to  "equal  protection". 
The  March  Constitutional  Amendments  evidenced  the  demise  of  the  unitary  Stalin  political 
centralised  state  that  had  comprised  republics  which,  although  legally  autonomous,  were  by  no 
means  truly  independent.  The  participation  model  had  begun  the  process  of  identifying 
separate  interests  from  those  of  the  state;  and  now  those  initial  steps  were  taken  to  their 
logical  conclusion.  The  previously  homogenising  concept  of  "state  (all-people's)  ownership" 
became  splintered  in  recognition  of  the  independent  aspirations  of  the  nations  and  republics 
916  Ob  Uchrezhdenii  Posta  Prezidenta  SSSR  i  Vnesenii  Izmenenii  Dopolnenii  Konstitutsiyu  (Osnovnoi 
Zakon)  SSSR,  Vedomosti  SAD  SSSR  (1990),  no.  12,  item  189. 
917  In  fact  the  March  Constitutional  Amendments  listed  these  forms  with  "ownership  of  Soviet  citizens"  first, 
and  "state  ownership"  last. 
-276- within  the  Soviet  Union.  Article  13  now  provided  for  "state  ownership",  not  as  the  unitary 
"all-people's"  ownership  of  a  single  state,  but  as  allocated  separately  and  divided  between 
property  in  the  respective  jurisdictions  of  all-union  ownership,  ownership  of  the  union 
republics,  and  ownership  of  the  autonomous  republics,  autonomous  regions,  autonomous 
national  areas,  territories,  regions  and  other  administrative-territorial  entities.  At  a  single 
stroke,  article  13  almost  by  definition  gave  way  to  the  notion  of  the  fragmented  state  with 
more  than  one  owner,  at  least  at  the  level  of  the  polity.  "' 
As  the  political  unity  of  all-people's  state  ownership  was  shattered  and  relocated  among  the 
constituent  administrative  parts  of  the  USSR,  the  economic  unity  of  state  ownership  of  the 
means  of  production  was  eroded  with  the  recognition  of  the  right  of  ownership  of  others, 
including  juridical  persons.  "Collective  ownership",  in  accordance  with  article  12,  expanded 
the  form  of  ownership  that  had  previously  encompassed  non-state  owned  juridical  persons  (ie 
collective  farm-cooperative  ownership)  to  embrace  more  widely  ownership  by  leased 
enterprises,  collective  enterprises,  cooperatives,  joint  stock  societies,  economic  organisations 
and other  associations.  This  form  of  ownership  was  an  entirely  "new  form"  without  precedent 
in  Soviet  law,  `9  and  brought  the  ownership  regimes  of  the  new  juridical  persons  from  the 
ambiguous  (as  in  the  case  of  the  joint  enterprises  and  the  leased  enterprise)  or  from  the  fringes 
(as  in  the  case  of  the  cooperatives)  into  the  mainstream.  Additionally,  similar  to  the  references 
921  the  in  the  FPLease,  this  definition  of  collective  ownership  directly  contemplated 
introduction  of  a  number  of  further  new  juridical  persons,  including  the  joint-stock  society  and 
other  economic  organisations,  for  which  specific  legislation  had  not  yet  been  adopted. 
Finally  the  concept  of  "ownership  of  Soviet  citizens",  as  detailed  in  article  11,  radicalised  the 
concept  of  personal  ownership  by  permitting  the  citizen  to  use  his  personal  property  "to 
satisfy  material  and  spiritual  requirements  and  independently  carry  on  economic  and  other 
activities  not  prohibited  by  law".  This  was  to  open  the  door  to  the  possibility  of  offering 
labour  for  pay  and  hence  of  turning  the  Stalin  concept  of  individual  labour  activity  into  a 
broader  right  to  conduct  entrepreneurial  activity. 
In  short,  the  March  Constitutional  Amendments  took  the  step  of  recognising  the  right  of 
ownership  of  the  means  of  production  by  entities  other  than  the  state,  including  by  the  new 
918  This  was  explicitly  acknowledged  in  the  1990  Ownership  Law  which  referred  to  "owners  of  state 
property"  (article  19(l)). 
919  There  were  references  to  "collective  ownership"  and  "collective  enterprises"  prior  to  the  March 
Constitutional  Amendments"  but  their  significance  and  meaning  was  uncertain  (see,  for  example, 
FPLease,  article  10(2);  supra  Section  6.5.3.2). 
920  Supra.  n.  870. 
-277- industrial  organisations.  But  it  still  remained  to  be  seen  whether  these  amendments  were  to  be 
the  stepping  stone  to  the  novostroika  of  an  entirely  new  framework  or  whether  they  were 
merely  a  concession,  a  reorientation,  a  perestroika,  with  the  aim  of  supporting  the  tenets  of 
the  ancien  socialist  regime. 
7.4  1990  Ownership  Law  -  The  Principles  and  Doctrinal  Structure  of  the  New 
Economy 
The  new  forms  of  ownership  as  set  out  in  the  March  Constitutional  Amendments  were 
developed  in  a  specific  "Ownership  Law"  enacted  on  6  March  1990.  This  was  the  first  time  in 
Soviet  history  that  a  "law  ("zakon")"  had  been  adopted  detailing  the  specifics  of  the  Soviet 
ownership  regime  which  previously  had  been  regulated  only  by  broad  framework  principles 
set  out  in  the  constitution,  1961  FPCivL  and  the  civil  codes.  Much  has  been  written  about  the 
1990  Ownership  Law  mainly  highlighting  the  changes  made  in  the  positive  law.  Looking  back 
at  the  laws  on  ownership  of  1990,  Professor  Alekseev  commented  that  they  "clearly  led  to  a 
new  democratic,  market  aspect  to  the  whole  system  of  property  relationships.  ""  Indeed,  from 
the  perspective  of  positive  norms  and  the  operation  of  the  economy,  the  1990  Ownership  Law 
introduced  a  fundamentally  different  set  of  rules  for  the  law  on  ownership  and  provided  for 
the  development  of  a  market  orientated  economy  based  on  profit.  However,  this  Section  will 
try  to  search  behind  the  positive  law  rules  in  order  to  analyse  the  effect  that  the  1990 
Ownership  Law  had  at  the  level  of  doctrine  and  attempt  to  understand  not  just  how  this 
doctrinal  structure  affected  the  economic  framework,  but  also  how  it  determined  the  basic 
orientation  and  law  of  the  "new  industrial  organisations". 
It  shall  be  argued  that  the  1990  Ownership  Law,  building  on  the  fragmentation  of  the  single 
economic  state  in  the  March  Constitutional  Amendments,  seemingly  embraced  the  concept  of 
"the  generic  owner"  and  formalised  three  "new"  key  principles,  all  of  which  were  latent  in 
the  previous  legislation  and  the  March  Constitutional  Amendments.  These  comprised  the 
principles  of  equivalence  between  owners,  the  permissive  regime  and  the  rule  of  law  state. 
The  formal  adoption  of  these  principles  into  the  Soviet  ownership  regime  was  necessary  in 
order  to  create  a  legal  framework  that  reflected  the  development  of  the  post-plan  "open 
economy"  based  on  profit  indicators  and  with  multiple  owners.  In  addition  they  enabled  the 
basic  law  on  ownership  to  be  readjusted  in  order  to  take  into  account  and  provide  for  the  new 
models  and  the  new  legislation  introduced  since  1987  which  had  gradually,  and  then  more 
visibly,  undermined  the  coherence  of  the  previous  norms. 
921  S.  Alekseev-M.  Rogozhin,  Chastnaya  Sobstvennost'  -  Osnova  Nezavisimost,  Zakon  (1993),  no.  2,  p.  89. 
-278- The  three  new  key  principles  and  the  development  of  a  new  open  economy  could  have 
signalled  a  move  in  the  direction  of  novostroika  by  facilitating  the  completion  of  the  four 
outstanding  principal  steps  to  the  general  corporation  noted  in  Section  7.2:  the  concept  of  "the 
generic  owner"  would  have  formalised  the  fragmentation  of  the  previous  unitary  Soviet  state 
and  the  rejection  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime;  the  principle  of  equivalence  of  rights  of 
all  owners  and  equality  between  actors  in  the  marketplace  could  have  indicated  the  beginnings 
of  the  development  of  a  regime  where  the  nature  of  the  ownership  interest  rather  than  the 
identity  of  the  owner  was  the  keystone  concept;  equity  capital  and  the  right  of  incorporation 
could  be  seen  as  logically  flowing  from  the  framework  of  the  permissive  regime;  and  the 
regulation  of  capacity  through  vires  and  stand  alone  foreign  investment  legislation  would  seem 
to  sit  comfortably  within  the  principle  of  a  rule  of  law  state.  However  it  shall  be  argued  that 
while  these  three  principles  clearly  enabled  the  possibility  for  novostroika  and  the  development 
of  ownership  relations  based  on  the  "generic  owner",  a  closer  analysis  of  the  underlying 
structure  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  in  fact  the  Soviet  polity  had 
opted  for  the  more  conservative  choice  -  perestroika.  In  particular,  although  the  1990 
Ownership  Law  changed  each  individual  form  of  ownership,  it  continued  to  embrace  the 
uniquely  socialist  doctrinal  concept  of  the  "forms  of  ownership  regime"  itself  based  on  the 
identity  principle.  This  "underlying  doctrinal  socialist  structure"  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law 
will  be  shown  to  have  had  profound  consequences  for  the  development  of  the  law  on  industrial 
organisations,  and  it  shall  be  argued  that  as  a  result,  the  1990  reforms  evidenced  the  triumph 
of  the  "  socialist  industrial  enterprise  "  over  the  market  economy  "  general  corporation  "- 
7.4.1  New  Pyinciples  -  Equivalence,  the  Permissive  Regime  and  the  Rule  of  Law  State 
The  March  Constitutional  Amendments  shattered  the  Stalin  concept  of  the  Soviet  state  as  the 
unitary  and  exclusive  owner  of  all  the  means  of  production  and  thereby  introduced  the 
possibility  for  a  variety  of  juridical  persons  and  owners  of  the  means  of  production.  The  1990 
Ownership  Law  acknowledged  this  proliferation  of  the  "right  to  own",  and  initially  seemed  to 
build  its  regime  around  the  concept  of  "the  owner".  Article  1  did  not  differentiate  between  the 
identity  of  any  owner,  and  instead  provided  generally  that  "an  owner  shall,  at  his  discretion, 
possess,  use  and  dispose  of  property  which  belongs  to  him".  This  initial  declaration  seemed  to 
suggest  a  departure  from  the  concept  of  different  ownership  regimes  applying  to  different 
types  of  owner  and  a  step  towards  the  evolution  of  a  single  ownership  regime  applying  equally 
to  all  owners,  including  the  state  - 
Developing  from  this  definition  of  "the  article  1  owner",  the  three  key  and  somewhat 
interlinked  principles  mentioned  above  can  be  derived  from  the  provisions  of  the  1990 
-279- Ownership  Law.  They  comprised  the  principles  of  equivalence  between  owners,  the 
pernussive  regime  an  the  rule  of  law  state. 
The  principle  of  "equal  protection"  of  all  forms  of  ownership  provided  in  article  10  of  the 
Brezhnev  Constitution  as  amended  by  the  March  Constitutional  Amendments  underlined  the 
fact  that  the  concept  of  "the  article  1  owner"  entailed  not  only  that  non-state  entities  had  the 
capacity  to  act  as  an  owner,  but  also  that  all  owners  were  prima  facie  to  be  treated  equally. 
Unfortunately  the  corresponding  provision  of  1990  Ownership  Law,  article  4(5),  omitted  the 
word  "equal"  and  only  directed  the  state  to  "ensure  the  protection"  of  the  forms  of  ownership. 
Article  31(3)  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law  did  however  use  the  word  "equal"  in  providing  that 
the  state  should  ensure  "equal  conditions  for  protection  of  the  right  of  ownership  for  citizens, 
organisations  and  other  owners".  The  significance  of  the  omission  of  the  word  "equal"  in 
article  4(5)  can  perhaps  therefore  be  overstated,  and  in  any  event,  it  is  clear  that  by  the 
apparent  introduction  of  the  concept  of  "the  owner"  and  the  move  towards  protection  of  all 
forms  on  a  similar  (even  if  not  entirely  equal)  footing  evidenced  the  fact  that  the  confirmation 
enterprise  was  no  longer  to  have  a  monopoly  on  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  in  the 
industrial  sphere  and  that  the  economy  going  forward  was  to  be  opened  to  a  range  of  other 
actors,  including  citizens  and  juridical  persons  (whether  state  owned  or  not). 
Orthodox  Soviet  law  had  traditionally  been  based  on  an  authorisation  regime  (ie  everything 
was  prohibited  unless  specifically  permitted  or  authorised).  This  authorisation  regime  had 
been  gradually  compromised  by  much  of  the  legislation  of  the  perestroika  period  including 
enactments  relating  to  the  contract  based  concession  and  participation  modelS.  922  The  March 
Constitutional  Amendments  and  the  1990  Ownership  Law,  a  manifesto  for  the  new  economy, 
reinforced  and  underlined  this  change  in  approach  by  providing  explicitly  for  the  alternative 
permissive  regime.  92'  This  was  formally  set  out  in  article  1  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law 
which,  in  addition  to  setting  out  the  concept  of  "the  owner",  permitted  an  owner  to  carry  out 
all  activities  that  were  "not  contrary  to"  or  "not  prohibited  by"  law.  The  permissive  regime 
was  then  developed  throughout  the  law,  as  appropriate.  924 
The  move  towards  creating  an  even  playing  field  for  owners  in  the  market  place  and  the 
removal  of  the  monopolistic  position  of  the  state  accelerated  the  drift  towards  law.  As  the 
participation  model  illustrated,  the  new  Soviet  state,  shorn  of  its  role  as  sole  creator  of  all 
.............  I .............  --  ..........  . .....  . ........  . ........  --  . ............................  ..  --  ---  1--  -1-  .........  .-...........  --  ..................  . --  ---  111  1...  .  .................  ....  .... 
922  The  introduction  of  a  permissive  regime  seemed  to  be  anticipated  by  references  in  the  State  Enterprise 
Law  (supra  n.  694),  the  Cooperatives  Law  (supra  n.  792);  and  the  FPLease  (supra  Section  6.5.6). 
923  Brezhnev  Constitution,  article  11  as  amended  by  the  March  Constitutional  Amendments. 
924  See  1990  Ownership  Law,  articles  14(3),  15(2),  24(l). 
-280- enterprises,  of  its  role  as  owner  of  all  the  means  of  production  and  hence  of  its  role  as 
economic  sovereign,  was  forced  to  use  its  last  remaining  role  as  "legal  sovereign"  to  protect 
its  interests.  Previously  "extra-legal"  mechanisms,  such  as  control  by  the  Communist  Party 
and  use  of  the  state's  role  as  owner  of  all  enterprises,  were  used  to  supplement  gaps  in  the 
scope  of  its  legal  rights.  By  contrast,  in  this  new  world  where  law  was  the  central  mechanism 
for  ensuring  compliance  with  state  policy,  the  scope  and  content  of  the  legal  system  had  to  be 
sufficiently  detailed,  clear  and  coherent  to  stand  alone.  Such  an  elevation  in  the  role  of  law 
resulted  in  the  creation  of  rights  not  just  between  subjects  of  civil  law  but  also  as  against  the 
state  itself,  and  this  was  the  essence  of  the  principle  of  "the  rule  of  law  state".  925 
While  the  permissive  principle  was  stated  explicitly,  there  was  no  specific  declaration  of  the 
principle  of  the  rule  of  law  state  in  the  1990  Ownership  Law.  Again  the  principle  of  the  rule 
of  law  state  was  latent  in  previous  legislation,  but  in  terms  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law,  it  can 
be  understood  almost  as  an  inevitable  consequence  of  the  two  principles  of  equivalence  and 
the  permissive  regime:  as  the  state  was  relegated  to  just  one  type  of  owner,  sitting  within  a 
regime  that  applied  to  all  owners,  so  it  sat  within  the  restrictions  of  law  itself  and  ultimately 
the  USSR  Constitution.  Further  evidence  of  the  rule  of  law  state  in  the  1990  Ownership  Law 
could  be  seen  in  the  substantive  protections  provided  to  the  owner  of  property  in  the  case  of 
infringements  of  his  rights  by  the  actions  of  state  agencies.  The  1990  Ownership  Law  directly 
contemplated  the  challenge  of  state  acts  that  exceeded  specified  competences  and  the 
declaration  by  the  courts  and  state  arbitrazh  of  such  acts  as  void  together  with  the  possibility 
for  granting  compensation  for  losses.  " 
7.4.2  The  Underlying  Doctrinal  Socialist  Structure  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law 
Developing  the  detail  of  the  categories  set  out  in  the  March  Constitutional  Amendments, 
article  4  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law  provided  for  the  new  "forms  of  ownership"  (ownership 
of  Soviet  citizens,  collective  ownership  and  state  ownership),  "mixed  forms  of  ownership"; 
and  left  open  the  possibility  for  future  legislation  to  provide  for  "other  forms  of  ownership  not 
provided  for  by  the  present  law".  In  addition  it  contemplated  "common  (share  or  joint) 
ownership".  The  structure  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law  reflected  these  categories  containing, 
among  others,  sections  on  the  forms  of  ownership  (ie  Section  11:  Ownership  by  citizens  of  the 
USSR;  Section  III:  Collective  Ownership;  and  Section  IV:  State  Ownership);  and  a  section  on 
925  See,  generally,  Sotsialisticheskoe  Pravovoe  Gosudarstvo:  Kontseptsiya  i  Puti  Realizatsii  (Yuridicheskaya 
Literatura:  1990). 
926  1990  Ownership  Law,  articles  32-34. 
-281- certain  mixed  forms  and  ownership  by  "foreign"  persons  (ie  Section  V:  Ownership  of  Joint 
Enterprises  and  Foreign  Citizens,  Organisations  and  States). 
This  structure  was  based  on  the  underlying  socialist  doctrinal  regime  of  "forms  of  ownership" 
derived  from  the  identity  principle.  While  the  concept  of  tenures  in  English  land  law  survived 
the  feudal  period  to  the  present  day,  the  continued  status  of  the  English  crown  as  fisc  is  almost 
irrelevant  in  the  practical  day-to-day  operation  of  the  land  law  system  (other  than  in  the  rare 
instances  such  as  escheat).  The  legacy  of  the  forms  of  ownership  and  the  other  elements  of  the 
"socialist  structure"  surviving  into  the  1990  Ownership  Law  was  however  quite  different  and 
ensured  that  the  possibility  of  novostroika  was  passed  over.  It  shall  be  argued  that  the  very 
retention  of  this  framework,  irrespective  of  the  clearly  radical  change  in  positive  law,  was  not 
just  lip-service  to  a  vestigial  part  of  an  anachronistic  regime,  but  rather  served  crucially  to 
underpin,  distort  and  obscure  the  coherence  of  the  new  law  on  ownership  itself  as  well  as  the 
development  of  the  law  on  industrial  organisations  as  consolidated  in  the  1990  Law  on 
Enterprises. 
The  retention  of  this  socialist  framework  in  the  1990  Ownership  Law  meant  that  the  "new" 
law  on  ownership  continued  to  be  structured  by  reference  to  the  identity  principle  without  a 
clear  understanding  of  the  mechanism  for  owning  a  juridical  person,  of  the  nature  of  the 
ownership  interest  of  a  juridical  person  and  of  group  structures  based  thereon.  As  such,  the 
ownership  regime  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law  had  the  effect  of  drawing  artificial  links 
between  different  organisations,  and  artificial  distinctions  between  similar  organisations,  and 
ultimately  meant  that  the  concept  of  the  generic  owner  and  the  principles  of  equivalence, 
permissive  regime  and  rule  of  law  state,  were  hijacked  and  overthrown  by  the  historical 
socialist  tradition  of  providing  different  ownership  rights  for  owners  with  different 
"identities". 
So  while  the  economic  constitution  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law  contemplated  the  restructuring 
and  opening  up  of  the  economy  on  the  basis  of  profit,  its  legal  doctrinal  structure 
straightjacketed  the  development  of  the  juridical  person,  the  subject  of  this  new  economy,  and 
condemned  its  general  form  to  one  inherited  from  the  previous  Stalin  settlement.  The  juridical 
person  remained  tied  to  the  mast  of  the  command  system  and  its  theoretical  framework, 
despite  the  fact  that  the  fundamentals  of  this  economy,  based  on  state  ownership  and  state 
control  of  the  means  of  production,  had  been  eroded  and  replaced  by  the  same  law.  While  the 
new  forms  of  ownership  ensured  that  the  contorted  Soviet  spine  was  restructured,  the  socialist 
dimension  of  the  underlying  doctrinal  structure  meant  that  the  possibility  for  the  subsequent 
introduction  of  the  general  corporation  was  lost.  Furthermore,  the  law  on  industrial 
-282- organisations  in  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  context  of  the  new  regulated  market  economy  became 
927  crazed,  unprincipled  and  unsure  of  a  rationale  foundation. 
7.4.2.1  The  Forms  of  Ownership  Regime  -  Rationale 
The  regime  of  "forms  of  ownership"  was  born  from  the  Soviet  economy  of  the  late  1920s  and 
early  1930s  shaped  by  Venediktov's  theory  of  socialist  state  ownership.  "  It  stressed  the 
identity  of  the  owner  as  the  overriding  determinant  of  the  nature  and  rights  of  the  juridical 
person  and  was  formalised  in  the  provisions  of  the  1936  Stalin  Constitution  and  then  in  the 
1961  FPCivL.  Under  this  legislation,  private  ownership  was  abolished,  and  a  "form  of 
ownership"  was  allocated  to  certain  identified  persons  and  then  was  used  as  the  basis  for  the 
classification  of  all  juridical  persons. 
While  the  significance  of  each  particular  form  of  ownership  both  in  the  1961  FPCivL  and  in 
the  1990  Ownership  Law  was  considered  extensively  in  Soviet  legal  literature,  the  overall 
concept  of  the  "forms  of  ownership  regime"  as  a  whole  (as  an  alternative  to  the  "generic 
owner"  and  a  regime  for  characterising  juridical  persons  by  reference  to  contract  and  the 
nature  of  their  ownership  interests)  was  simply  accepted  at  face  value.  There  was  broad 
silence  in  the  literature  in  Russian  as  to  the  rationale  for  the  very  framework  itself.  In  western 
literature  sometimes  it  was  noted  that  the  "forms  of  ownership",  set  out  in  the  1936  Stalin 
Constitution,  were  imposed  by  diktat  with  little  theoretical  consideration  of  the  distinctions 
drawn,  9'9  and  at  other  times,  a  speculative  explanation  was  offered.  930 
The  previous  three  principal  forms  of  ownership  of  the  1936  Stalin  Constitution  (state 
ownership,  cooperative-collective  farm  ownership  and  personal  ownership)  reflected  the  three 
basic  areas  of  the  economic  world  at  that  time,  namely  industry;  agriculture;  and  the  rights  of 
the  individual  or  the  collective  farm  household  Ckolkhoznyi  dvor").  Throughout  the  early  part 
of  Soviet  history,  Trotsky's  scissors  opened  and  closed  to  the  tune  of  the  different  policy 
927  The  implications  of  the  framework  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law  for  the  new  constitution  of  the  industrial 
juridical  person  is  examined  infra  Section  7.5. 
928  Supra  n.  57  (1948),  Part  2,  chapter  9. 
929  For  example,  Gsovski  commented  on  the  1936  forms  that:  "Nowhere  was  a  principle  stated  governing  the 
differences  in  the  status  of  these  categories  of  ownership.  Several  overlapping  enumerations  were  given 
instead.  "  (supra  n.  22  (1948),  p.  555). 
930  For  example  Braginskii,  Butler  and  Rubanov  noted  of  the  forms  in  the  1990  Ownership  Law  that  "the 
concept  of  a  form  of  ownership  had  no  precisely  determined  significance  nor  precisely  established  legal 
consequences.  Nor  does  an  analysis  of  previous  legislation  offer  categorical  conclusions".  They  went  on 
to  argue  that  the  status  of  a  form  of  ownership  was  given  "only  [to]  that  property  which  ... 
is  essential  to 
exist  under  the  conditions  in  which  the  Soviet  Union  lives"  (M.  I.  Braginskii,  W.  E.  Butler,  A.  A. 
Rubanov,  The  Law  on  Ownership  in  the  USSR  (Interlist:  199  1),  p.  59,60). 
-283- initiatives,  first  in  terms  of  NEP,  the  policy  of  "facing  the  countryside"  and  the  wager  on  the 
kulak;  and  then  in  terms  of  industrialisation.  and  the  planned  economy,  the  policy  of 
"favouring"  the  proletariat  coupled  with  the  socialist  offensive  and  collectivisation  of 
agriculture.  The  legacy  of  the  Tsarist  state  and  the  "peasant  question"  resolved  during  the 
struggles  for  the  establishment  of  a  "socialist"  economy  during  the  1920s  and  1930s  gave  rise 
to  a  different  economic  settlement  for  industry  and  agriculture.  Within  agriculture  the 
adoption  of  the  artel  form  of  collective  farm  gave  rise  to  a  different  economic  settlement  as 
between  the  collective  farm  and  the  old  Tsarist  household.  It  has  been  suggested  in  this  study 
that  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  developed  out  of  (and  hence  corresponded  to)  each  of  the 
three  key  battlegrounds  of  the  emerging  Stalin  economy  of  the  1930s;  and  that  they 
represented  an  attempt  to  establish  "state  ownership"  as  the  general  rule  and  confine  the 
"exceptions"  accordingly.  931 
7.4.2.2  The  Forms  of  Ownership  Regime  and  Basic  Doctrinal  Shortcomings  -  1985  to  1990 
As  has  been  argued  throughout  this  study,  under  traditional  Soviet  law,  the  question  of  the 
"ownership  of"  a  juridical  person  (or  indeed  in  relation  to  any  association)  was  never 
"satisfactorily"  analysed;  the  distinction  between  ownership  "of"  and  ownership  "by"  a 
juridical  person  was  often  never  explicitly  acknowledged  or  examined.  932  Indeed,  the  forms  of 
ownership  regime  itself  sometimes  defined  the  relationship  of  ownership  "of"  a  juridical 
person,  and  sometimes  defined  the  relationship  of  ownership  "by"  a  juridical  person.  In  short 
the  "success"  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  relied  on  an  economy  where  there  were  a 
discrete  number  of  owners  (defined  by  reference  to  the  state)  and  where  a  specific  juridical 
person  could  be  allocated  to  each  owner  on  a  sole  basis;  or  where  the  question  of  "ownership 
of"  a  juridical  person  could  simply  be  overlooked  in  favour  of  the  concept  of  "membership". 
Therefore  with  regard  to  the  "traditional  Soviet  juridical  persons"  (ie  state enterprises  and 
collective  farms)  and  the  "new  juridical  persons"  (ie  joint  enterprise  and  leased  enterprises); 
and  the  contract-based  associations  (ie  contract  for  joint  activity)  the  following  interpretations 
can  be  derived: 
931  Supra  Section  2.3. 
932  This  distinction  between  "ownership  of"  a  juridical  person  (by  another),  and  "ownership  by"  a  juridical 
person  of  property  is  sometimes  further  finessed  in  English  language  translations  of  Soviet  laws  in  this 
area.  This  is  because  the  genetive  case  in  the  Russian  language  is  used  when  describing  "ownership  by"  a 
juridical  person.  For  example,  the  phrase  "sobstvennost'kolkhozov"  means  "ownership  [of  property]  by  a 
collective  farm",  although  in  Russian  "the  collective  farm"  is  in  the  genetive  case  (and  hence  is 
sometimes  transalated  literally  as  "ownership  of  a  collective  farm"  which  in  this  context  may  be 
misleading  and  suggest  that  the  meaning  of  this  phase  was  "ownership  of  a  collective  farm  [by 
another]  "). 
-284- (a)  In  the  case  of  the  state  enterprises  (pre  and  post  1987  State  Enterprise  Law):  933 
(i)  Ownership  "of"  a  state  enterprise  was  specified  but  without  careful  analysis: 
the  state  enterprise  was  treated  as  an  indivisible  entity  located  entirely  in  state 
ownership. 
(ii)  Ownership  "by"  a  state  enterprise  (or,  strictly  speaking,  its  possibility)  was  of 
utmost  concern  to  Soviet  legal  doctrine.  State  enterprises  were  conceived  as 
civil  law  persons  separate  from  the  state.  Therefore  it  was  considered 
imperative  that  they  did  not  have  the  independent  right  of  ownership  as  this 
would  otherwise  have  been  considered  to  have  prejudiced  the  state's 
monopoly  status.  The  concept  of  operative  management  provided  an 
alternative  framework.  On  this  basis: 
(1)  it  made  sense  to  talk  of  "property  of  a  state  enterprise"  (ie  allocated  to 
its  balance  sheet);  but  that 
(11)  the  state  enterprise  did  not  have  ownership  of  that  property;  and  hence 
(111)  Soviet  law  was  forced  to  distinguish  between  rights  (which  were  not 
characterised  as  ob  ects,  of  the  right  of  ownership  and  hence  were  j 
capable  of  being  acquired  by  any  juridical  person)  and  property 
(which  was  the  object  of  the  right  of  ownership  and  hence  could  only 
be  owned  by  juridical  persons  with  the  right  of  ownership). 
(b)  In  the  case  of  the  collective  farms  and  the  1988  cooperative  enterprises: 
Ownership  "of"  a  collective  farm/cooperative  enterprise  was  not  even 
considered  directly  by  the  legislation  and  instead  legislation  and  commentaries 
focussed  on  the  concept  of  membership. 
(ii)  Ownership  "by"  a  collective  farm/cooperative  enterprise  was  simply  governed 
by  the  form  of  collective  farm-cooperative  ownership. 
(c)  In  the  case  of  the  contract  for  joint  activity:  (on  the  basis  that  it  did  not  give  rise  to 
juridical  person) 
: 
935 
933  Supra  Sections  2.3.1,2.5,3.4.2,  and  6.3.4.3. 
934  Supra  Sections  2.4.2  and  6.4.1. 
935  Supra  Section  4.6.  The  juridical  status  of  the  contract  for  joint  activity  was  a  matter  of  some  debate 
(ibid.  ) 
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definition  as  it  was  not  a  juridical  person. 
Ownership  "by"  the  contract  for  joint  activity  was  rejected  as  it  was  not  a 
juridical  person  and  hence  the  participants  maintained  their  rights  of 
ownership  to  property  contributed  through  the  concept  of  common  ownership 
(d)  In  the  case  of  the  joint  enterprises:  the  following  analysis  has  been  suggested 
(although  Decree  49  was  not  very  specific  on  these  points):  "' 
Ownership  "of"  a  joint  enterprise  as  "a  juridical  person"  was  rejected  in 
favour  of  "looking  through"  the  veil  of  juridical  personality,  and  maintaining 
the  continuing  rights  of  ownership  of  the  participants  to  property;  and  as  such 
Ownership  "by"  a  joint  enterprise  was  rejected  and  hence  its  status  was 
similar  to  that  of  a  state  enterprise  (ie  a  juridical  person  without  the  right  of 
ownership  itself). 
(e)  In  the  case  of  the  leased  enterprises:  "' 
Ownership  "of"  a  leased  enterprise  by  the  labour  collective  (or  another 
person)  was  entirely  unclear  as  there  were  no  provisions  of  the  FPLease 
relating  directly  to  this  point. 
Ownership  "by"  a  leased  enterprise  seemed  to  be  rejected  as  it  did  not  fall 
within  any  of  the  existing  forms  of  ownership.  However  the  situation  was  left 
unclear  due  to  references  to  an  apparently  new  form  of  ownership,  collective 
ownership,  that  only  formally  became  part  of  Soviet  law  following  the  March 
Constitutional  Amendments. 
For  each  of  the  above  enterprises,  the  situation  was  confused  following  1988  as  Soviet  law 
gradually  came  to  acknowledge  the  right  of  each  to  issue  "stocks".  "' 
In  the  Soviet  law  context,  the  doctrinal  significance  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  was  that 
it  provided  the  building  blocks  for  a  legal  system  which  underpinned  the  command  economy 
and  which  distinguished  between,  and  stressed  the  important  differences  of,  the  position  of  the 
state  in  industry  (ie  direct  and  monopoly  owner  of  the  means  of  production)  and  the  formal 
936  Supra  Section  5.4.2. 
937  Supra  Section  6.5.3. 
938  Supra  Sections  6.4.1,6.5.1  and  6.5.3.1. 
-286- legal  autonomy  of  the  "peasantry"  in  agriculture  (where  collective  farms  were  permitted  to 
own  property  in  their  own  right).  "  '  It  was  perhaps  a  consequence  of  these  doctrinal 
imperatives  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  based  on  the  identity  principle  that  resulted  in 
the  following: 
(although  often  overlooked  and  as  noted  above)  the  forms  of  ownership  meant  different 
things  in  the  context  of  different  juridical  persons:  in  the  case  of  the  state  enterprise,  the 
forms  of  ownership  regime  regulated  ownership  of  the  state  enterprise;  whereas  in  the 
case  of  the  collective  farm/cooperative,  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  regulated  the 
ownership  by  the  collective  farm/cooperative; 
e  the  question  of  "ownership  of"  a  juridical  person  was  generally  overlooked.  The  only 
clear  example  of  an  attempt  to  analyse  this  question  was  in  the  context  of  the  state 
enterprise  which  was  treated  as  a  single  object  of  the  law  on  ownership  with  one  owner; 
0  the  question  of  "ownership  by"  a  juridical  person  gave  rise  to  different  regimes  for 
different  juridical  persons:  some  had  the  right  of  ownership,  some  did  not,  and  some  had 
an  uncertain  ownership  regime  (ie  falling  within  the  catch-all  category  of  article  11  of  the 
1961  FPCivL); 
0  the  presence  of  juridical  persons  without  the  right  of  ownership  gave  rise  to  the  distinction 
between  rights  and  property; 
939  The  main  practical  consequence  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  was  to  provide  the  basis  for  limiting 
the  types  of  assets  that  each  identified  "owner"  could,  or  could  not,  own.  However,  the  limitation  of  the 
right  of  certain  persons  to  own  particular  assets  does  not  necessiate  the  doctrinal  edifice  of  the  socialist 
forms  of  ownership  which  (as  noted  above)  was  more  a  product  of  doctrine  and  history  than  of  practical 
necessity. 
In  addition  to  providing  limits  on  the  types  of  assets  a  particular  person  could  own,  they  also  had  certain 
implications  in  the  field  of  criminal  law.  Soviet  criminal  law  distinguished  "Crimes  against  Socialist 
Ownership"  from  "Crimes  against  Personal  Ownership  of  Citizens"  and  based.  on  this  different  severity 
of  punishment  (cf  1960  RSFSR  CrimC,  Osobennaya  Chast',  chapters  2  and  5).  Although  this  distinction 
was  not  made  in  the  original  1926  RSFSR  Criminal  Code  (adopted  before  the  concept  of  "forms  of 
ownership"  had  been  introduced  into  Soviet  law),  the  classification  and  understanding  of  crimes  in  terms 
of  forms  of  ownership  was  developed  in  legal  doctrine  even  before  the  adoption  of  the  new  1960s  codes. 
See,  for  example,  Kurs  Sovetskogo  Ugolovnogo  Prava,  Osobennaya  Chast',  Tom  1  (Gosudarstvennoe 
Izdatel'stvo  Yuridicheskoi  Literatury:  1955),  parts  4  and  5.  The  use  of  criminal  law  to  protect  "state 
property"  predated  its  restatement  in  civil  law  in  terms  of  the  "forms  of  ownership"  regime.  A  most 
extreme  example  of  the  application  of  criminal  law  to  protect  state  property  was  the  decree  of  "On  the 
Defence  of  the  Property  of  State  Enterprises,  Kolkhozy  and  Cooperatives  and  on  Strengthening  of  Social 
(Socialist)  Property"  of  7  August  1932  which  prescribed  the  death  penalty  for  theft  of  kolkhoz  property 
and  was  interpreted  to  include  grain  standing  in  fields  (R.  W.  Davies,  Crisis  and  Progress  in  the  Soviet 
Economy,  1931-1933  (Macmillan:  1996),  p.  242). 
-287- 0  the  presence  of  one  type  of  juridical  person  for  each  identified  owner  on  a  sole  basis 
enabled  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  to  avoid  the  need  to  regulate  multiple  ownership 
structures  and  enabled  the  development  of  a  classification  of  juridical  persons  by  reference 
to  forms  of  ownership  based  on  the  identity  principle;  and 
0a  logical  consequence  of  monopoly  ownership  by  the  state  and  the  identity  principle  was 
that  joint  enterprises  could  not  have  had  the  right  of  ownership  (at  least  in  relation  to  part 
of  its  property)  because  (reasoning  from  the  operative  management  regime)  property 
contributed  to  them  by  the  Soviet  participant  would  have  had  to  have  remained  in  state 
ownership  and  could  not  have  passed  to  the  ownership  of  the  joint  enterprise. 
7.4.2.3  Legacy  of  the  Forms  of  Ownership  Regime  in  the  1990  Ownership  Law 
The  perestroika  economy  of  the  late  1980s  was  very  different  from  the  economy  of  the  1930s. 
The  Stalin  settlement  had  been  fatally  undermined  by  the  Gorbachev  economic  reforms, 
including  most  importantly  the  introduction  of  owners  of  the  means  of  production  other  than 
the  state.  Once  again  a  new  legal  framework  was  needed  and  the  1990  Ownership  Law 
defined  the  new  constitution  for  that  new  economy. 
The  possibility  of  novostroika  of  that  economy  and  the  legal  characterisation  of  its  actors  as 
suggested  in  Section  7.2  would  have  meant  an  end  to  the  "forms  of  ownership  regime"  and  an 
introduction  of  the  concept  of  the  generic  owner  coupled  with  a  revival  of  the  importance  of 
the  nature  of  the  ownership  interest.  Unfortunately  the  legislators  opted  to  retain  the  concept 
of  "forms  of  ownership"  almost  on  the  basis  of  inertia;  and  the  legal  literature  of  the  time,  like 
the  legislators,  rarely  questioned  its  appropriateness  or  appreciated  its  significance  when 
applied  in  the  context  of  the  post-plan  economy. 
By  retaining  the  importance  of  the  identity  principle  in  the  context  of  this  new  open  economy, 
the  forms  of  ownership  regime  by  definition  precluded  a  coherent  analysis  of  the  juridical 
person  itself  (as  a  generic  owner  and  subject  of  civil  law)  and  of  the  ownership  interest  of  that 
juridical  person  (as  an  object  of  the  law  on  ownership).  It  neither  highlighted,  nor  adequately 
regulated,  the  separate  questions  of  "ownership  of"  and  "ownership  by";  and  without  a  clear 
understanding  of  the  answers  to  those  questions  in  the  context  of  a  law  of  property  based  on 
the  generic  owner,  it  is  impossible  to  develop  a  law  of  juridical  persons  for  a  market 
economy,  with  equity  capital  and  group  structures  based  on  ownership  (rather  than 
administrative)  relationships. 
In  practice,  the  retention  of  forms  of  ownership  regime  based  on  the  identity  principle  made 
little  sense,  particularly  as  the  open  economy  now  broke  the  link  between  an  owner  and  its 
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being  owned  by  more  than  one  category  of  identified  owner.  Curious  distinctions,  without  any 
discernible  meaning,  were  therefore  created  by  its  continuing  application.  For  example,  under 
the  1990  Ownership  Law,  ownership  of  stocks  of  a  joint-stock  society  by  the  state  was 
characterised  as  state  ownership;  but  ownership  of  those  same  stocks  by  a  joint-stock  society 
was  characterised  as  collective  ownership;  and  ownership  of  those  same  stocks  by  a  citizen 
was  characterised  as  personal  ownership! 
By  analysing  carefully  the  identification  or  selection  of  the  "new"  persons  to  be  the  basis  for 
the  "new"  forms  of  ownership  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law,  the  rationale  for  their  selection 
can  be  discerned  relatively  clearly,  as  can  the  ways  in  which  the  forms  of  ownership  regime 
itself  inevitably  produced  a  distorted  and  incoherent  framework  for  the  regulation  of 
ownership  relations  in  the  open  economy: 
(a)  State  ownership: 
D-  * 
Rationale  State  ownership  seemed  to  be  based  on  the  principles  of  preserving  state 
ownership  as  a  separate  category  in  its  own  right  and  the  preservation  of  the  state's 
direct  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  to  the  extent  operated  through  the  state 
enterprises. 
Regulation  As  such,  Section  IV  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law  regulated  state 
ownership  separately  from  other  forms;  and  in  order  to  ensure  that  state  enterprises 
did  not  compromise  the  state  ownership  principle,  the  status  of  state  enterprises 
without  the  right  of  ownership  was  retained  together  with  the  concept  of  operative 
management  (coupled  with  a  similar  and  more  devolved  framework  of  "full  economic 
jurisdiction").  State  enterprises  were  therefore  also  regulated  in  Section  IV  as  well. 
RelevancelConsequences  The  above  rationale  had  little  relevance  in  an  open 
economy,  where  ownership  by  the  state  of  a  juridical  person  should  have  been  in 
principle  no  different  from  ownership  of  that  juridical  person  by  any  other;  and  where 
control  over  state  enterprises  should  have  been  no  different  from  control  over  other 
juridical  persons  by  their  owners  (ie  through  the  voting  mechanics  and  other 
provisions  of  their  charter).  The  socialist  rationale  for  the  existence  of  a  category  like 
"state  ownership",  and  with  it  the  concept  of  state  enterprises  (as  a  subject  of  civil  law 
but)  without  the  right  of  ownership,  rooted  the  state  industrial  organisation  firmly 
within  the  confirmation  governance  regime.  The  possibility  of  the  generic  ownership 
-289- for  all  subjects  of  civil  law  was  therefore  precluded  due  to  the  fact  that  there 
continued  to  exist  a  juridical  person  without  the  right  of  ownership. 
The  presence  of  a  juridical  person  without  the  right  of  ownership  further  perpetuated 
the  need  to  distinguish  rights  (as  capable  of  being  acquired  by  all  juridical  persons) 
from  property  (capable  of  being  owned  only  by  those  with  the  right  of  ownership). 
The  practical  consequences  of  such  a  distinction  were  even  uncertain  before  the 
perestroika  reforms:  if  rights  were  not  "owned",  what  was  the  relationship  between 
the  holder  and  the  right?  9"  It  is  after  all  almost  impossible  to  distinguish  for  these 
practical  purposes  between  rights  and  things,  between  a  chose  and  res.  However  in 
the  context  of  the  law  of  juridical  persons  in  an  open  economy,  it  was  perhaps  even 
more  important  for  this  "meaningless"  distinction  to  be  collapsed  because  the  owning 
of  an  ownership  interest  can  be  based  on  both  the  ownership  of  rights  (ie  stocks  as  a 
bundle  of  rights)  and  in  some  cases  on  the  ownership  of  property  (eg  bearer  stock)  in 
the  Romanist  sense. 
(b)  Collective  Ownership  /  Ownership  by  citizens: 
Rationale  In  order  to  provide  a  form  of  ownership  for  the  new  juridical  persons  and 
others,  and  in  light  of  the  fact  that  the  old  forms  of  ownership  were  no  longer 
applicable  in  the  post-Stalin  economy,  "new"  forms  of  ownership  were  created. 
Regulation  These  seemed  to  be  based  on  the  distinction  between  the  juridical  person 
and  the  natural  person  -  hence  collective  ownership  and  ownership  by  citizens. 
RelevancelConsequences  While  the  distinction  between  natural  and  legal  persons 
makes  sense  in  the  context  of  distinguishing  subjects  of  civil  law,  it  makes  little  sense 
in  terms  of  the  law  on  ownership  -  it  was  wholly  unclear  what  in  practice  was  to  be 
understood  by  the  distinction  between  ownership  by  a  juridical  person  and  ownership 
by  a  natural  person.  It  was  almost  as  if  because  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  were 
to  be  retained,  then,  by  necessity,  different  forms  "had"  to  be  identified,  and  the 
distinction  between  the  juridical  person  and  natural  person  seemed  as  convenient  as 
any  other.  In  fact  under  the  very  terms  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law  itself,  there  was 
no  conceptual  difference  between  ownership  by  citizens  and  ownership  by  juridical 
persons  (although  of  course  there  is  a  legal  difference  between  citizens  and  juridical 
persons). 
-290- In  relation  to  collective  ownership,  the  1990  Ownership  Law  provided  ftirther  separate 
sub-categories  of  ownership  for  different  named  juridical  persons;  "'  and  there  may 
have  been  even  greater  differences  between  two  sub-categories  of  collective 
ownership,  than  between  the  forms  of  ownership  of  citizens  and  collective  ownership. 
As  regards  the  law  of  juridical  persons,  the  distinction  between  collective  ownership 
and  ownership  by  citizens  would  have  been  largely  an  irrelevance  if,  as  set  out  in  the 
1990  Ownership  Law,  collective  ownership  in  Section  III  indeed  encompassed 
"ownership  by 
...  associations  which  are  juridical  persons".  "'  Unfortunately  not  all 
juridical  persons  were  included  within  collective  ownership  -  most  importantly  state 
enterprises  fell  outside  this  form  (presumably  on  the  basis  that  they  did  not  have  the 
right  of  ownership)  and  so  did  joint  enterprises  (see  paragraph  (c)  below).  The  fact 
that  certain  juridical  persons  fell  outside  the  scope  of  collective  ownership  meant  that 
the  1990  Ownership  Law  (and  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises)  could  still  continue  the 
tradition  of  article  11  of  the  1961  FPCivL  of  classifying  and  analysing  juridical 
persons  by  reference  to  their  form  of  ownership,  and  by  identifying  different  juridical 
persons  by  reference  to  different  owners.  Even  more  so  in  an  open  economy,  this  just 
resulted  in  drawing  distinctions  between  juridical  persons  which  in  practice  were 
largely  irrelevant,  and  which  in  doctrinal  terms  obscured  more  important  issues. 
Only  if  all  juridical  persons  fell  within  the  same  category  of  ownership  (whether  based 
on  the  generic  owner  or  on  collective  ownership)  could  Soviet  law  have  been  released 
from  the  fetters  of  the  forms  of  ownership  structure,  and  begin  to  analyse  and  examine 
the  nature  of  the  juridical  person  by  reference  to  its  "own"  characteristics  (including 
its  ownership  interest)  instead  of  by  reference  to  the  identity  of  its  owner. 
(C)  Ownership  by  Foreign  Persons: 
Rationale  The  basis  for  treating  ownership  by  "foreign"  persons  separately  from 
ownership  by  domestic  persons  seemed  to  be  derived  from  the  traditional  Soviet  law 
distinction  between  foreign  trade  law  and  civil  law. 
940  Phases  such  as  "belonging  to"  suggested  that  it  was  "possession"  (see  supra  n.  912),  but  alternatively  the 
nature  of  the  relationship  may  just  have  varied  depending  upon  the  identity  of  the  right-holder  and  hence 
its  form  of  ownership. 
941  Within  Section  III  on  collective  ownership,  there  were  separate  articles  respectively  on  ownership  by  the 
leased  enterprise,  by  the  collective  enterprise,  by  the  cooperative,  by  the  economic  society  and 
partnership,  by  the  joint-stock  society  and  by  the  economic  association. 
942  1990  Ownership  Law,  article  10(l). 
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States"  was  regulated  in  Section  V  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law.  This  section  (separate 
from  the  sections  on  each  form  of  ownership)  clearly  gave  the  right  of  ownership  to 
joint  enterprise,  foreign  citizens,  organisations  and  states.  However,  this  right  of 
ownership  existed  outside  of,  and  was  not  given  the  status  of,  a  form  of  ownership. 
RelevancelConsequences  Once  again,  it  was  unclear  what  in  practice  was  the 
significance  of  distinguishing  between  the  ownership  by  foreign  persons  and  the 
ownership  by  domestic  persons.  Once  again  the  presence  of  joint  enterprises  in 
Section  V  further  undermined  the  coherence  of  collective  ownership  as  the  category 
for  regulating  the  ownership  regimes  of  all  juridical  persons;  and  further  enabled  the 
continued  possibility  of  classifying  juridical  persons  on  the  basis  of  the  socialist  forms 
of  ownership  regime. 
It  seems  that  the  only  sensible  rationale  for  distinguishing  the  ownership  by  foreign 
persons  from  the  ownership  by  domestic  persons  was  on  the  basis  that  the  Soviet  state 
wanted  to  regulate  foreign  investment  specifically.  While  this  is  clearly  a  "legitimate" 
concern  of  any  state,  the  regulation  of  foreign  investment  could  simply  have  been 
achieved  through  stand-alone  legislation,  without  the  need  to  create  a  new  type  of 
juridical  person  (the  joint  enterprise).  The  creation  of  the  joint  enterprise  as  a  separate 
type  of  juridical  person,  to  be  assigned  to  foreign  owners  in  the  pursuit  of  regulating 
foreign  investment,  was  simply  an  extrapolation  of  the  existing  logic  of  the  forms  of 
ownership  regime  based  on  the  identity  principle  (in  the  same  way  that  a  specific  type 
of  juridical  person  had  been  assigned  to  the  state  as  owner  (ie  state  enterprises)  and  to 
the  peasantry  (ie  collective  farms)). 
As  a  result  of  regulating  ownership  by  foreign  persons  (or  domestic  Soviet  persons 
with  foreign  participants)  separately  from  ownership  by  Soviet  persons,  the 
classification  of  juridical  persons  became  bifurcated  between  specific  types  of  juridical 
person  that  had  foreign  owners  and  specific  types  of  juridical  person  that  had  domestic 
owners. 
7.4.2.4  The  Problem  of  Mixed  Ownership 
Certain  fundamental  practical  consequences  for  the  law  on  industrial  organisations  generally, 
and  in  particular  for  the  analysis  of  a  juridical  person  with  multiple  owners,  resulted  ftom  the 
"historical  difficulties"  associated  with  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  (as  noted  in  Section 
7.4.2.2)  and  from  the  inconsistencies  in  the  application  of  that  regime  in  the  context  of  the 
-292- new  forms  of  ownership  (as  noted  in  Section  7.4.2.3).  As  aforementioned,  in  the  context  of 
traditional  Soviet  law,  there  was  no  need  to  analyse  the  ownership  of  juridical  persons  by 
multiple  persons:  state  enterprises  were  wholly  owned  by  the  state;  the  ownership  of  collective 
farms/cooperatives  was  overlooked  in  favour  of  the  concept  of  membership;  group  structures 
were  based  on  administrative  links  and  not  an  ownership  relationship;  and  the  relationship 
between  participants  without  the  formation  of  a  juridical  person  was  analysed  through  the 
concept  of  common  ownership. 
Yet,  starting  with  the  joint  enterprises  and  moving  through  the  later  expressions  of  the 
participation  enterprises  and  beyond,  it  became  clear  that  the  "new"  industrial  organisations 
"demanded"  a  regime  for  multiple  owners  where  one  identified  owner  may  own  more  than 
one  type  of  juridical  person.  In  the  case  of  novostroika  this  would  have  been  developed  on  the 
basis  of  the  generic  owner  and  the  holding  of  ownership  interests  of  a  juridical  person  without 
affecting  the  nature  of  that  juridical  person  or  its  underlying  ownership  regime  (due  to  the 
distinction  between  the  juridical  person  and  its  ownership  interest).  Unfortunately  such  an 
analysis  was  not  possible  in  the  context  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime;  and  under  that 
regime  the  only  precedent  for  analysing  "ownership  of"  a  juridical  person  was  the  case  of  the 
state  enterprise:  the  state  enterprise  was  treated  as  an  indivisible  object  of  the  law  on 
ownership,  with  a  single  owner,  and  with  an  ownership  regime  characterised  by  reference  to 
that  single  owner  based  on  operative  management. 
The  multiple  owners  problem  most  specifically  questioned  the  basic  principles  of  conceiving 
of  the  juridical  person  as  an  indivisible  object  and  of  defining  the  regime  of  ownership  by  a 
juridical  person  in  terms  of  the  identity  of  the  owner  of  that  juridical  person.  Put  in  general 
terms: 
if  a  juridical  person  was  to  have  the  right  of  ownership,  would  this  right  of  ownership  be 
affected  if  the  identity  of  the  owner  of  that  juridical  person  changed?  and 
e  how  would  this  ownership  regime  be  analysed  in  the  context  of  multiple  owners? 
Or  to  pose  this  issue  in  terms  of  an  example:  under  the  1990  Ownership  Law,  the  joint-stock 
society  by  definition  issued  ownership  interests  (stocks)  and  was  given  the  right  of  collective 
ownership;  however: 
what  would  the  legal  analysis  be  if  (all  its  stocks)  became  wholly  owned  by  the  state? 
would  that  mean  that  the  joint-stock  society  lost  its  right  of  ownership  (like  the  state 
enterprise)  and  be  analysed  as  an  indivisible  object  of  state  ownership? 
-293- 0  what  would  be  the  legal  analysis  if  its  stocks  were  partly  owned  by  the  state  and  partly 
owned  by  a  Soviet  domestic  cooperative? 
0  what  would  be  the  legal  analysis  if  part  of  its  stocks  were  owned  by  a  foreign  person? 
Such  questions  would  have  been  almost  trivial  in  the  context  of  novostroika  and  a  law  of 
property  based  on  the  generic  owner.  However  in  the  context  of  a  regime  based  on  forms  of 
ownership,  these  questions  posed  critical  problems  which  the  forms  of  ownership  regime 
simply  did  not  have  the  legal  tools  to  solve  -  for  no  solution  could  have  been  found  without  a 
full  understanding  of  the  distinction  between  ownership  of  and  ownership  by,  and  of  the  nature 
of  the  ownership  interest. 
In  struggling  to  find  a  solution  to  the  question  of  analysing  the  issue  of  "ownership  of"  a 
juridical  person  with  multiple  owners,  the  1990  Ownership  Law  provided  for  the  concept  of 
"mixed  ownership"  (as  separate  from  "common  ownership").  Article  4(2)  of  the  1990 
Ownership  Law  provided  that  "the  combining  of  property  owned  by  citizens,  juridical  persons 
and  the  state,  and  the  formation  of  mixed  ownership  on  this  basis,  including  the  ownership  of 
joint  enterprises  with  Soviet  juridical  persons  and  foreign  juridical  persons  and  citizens,  shall 
be  permitted". 
It  is  important  to  note  that  "property  owned  by 
... 
juridical  persons"  as  mentioned  in  article  4(2) 
was  not  synonymous  with  collective  ownership  due  to  the  fact  that  collective  ownership  did 
not  regulate  the  ownership  by  all  juridical  persons  (most  notably  the  ownership  regimes  of 
state  enterprises  and  joint  enterprises  did  not  fall  within  collective  ownership).  Therefore, 
article  4(2)  implicitly  abandoned  the  forms  of  ownership  distinctions  (ownership  of  citizens, 
collective  ownership  and  state  ownership)  for  more  generic  civil  law  categories  based  on  the 
property  of  the  citizens,  juridical  persons  and  the  state,  without  an  explicit  distinction  between 
domestic  and  foreign  persons. 
As  regards  the  application  of  "mixed  ownership"  to  ownership  between  domestic  owners 
falling  within  different  categories  of  ownership  (eg  the  ownership  of  stocks  in  a  joint  stock 
society  by  the  state  and  by  a  cooperative),  article  4(2)  did  not  provide  any  details  of  the 
mechanism  by  which  this  multiple  ownership  structure  would  be  achieved  or  the  doctrinal 
effect  that  this  would  have.  Presumably  the  object  of  this  multiple  ownership  structure  would 
depend  upon  the  relevant  ownership  interests  (if  any)  of  the  particular  juridical  person  in 
question.  However  the  juridical  effect  of  this  mixing  of  forms  of  ownership  was  not  specified; 
and  as  such  there  was  no  indication  as  to  how  the  questions  posed  above  would  be  analysed. 
To  adopt  a  Dworkinian  expression,  it  seems  as  if  at  this  point  the  rules  based  on  the  forms  of 
-294- ownership  regime  simply  "ran  out".  However,  in  relation  to  mixed  ownership  between  a 
Soviet  and  a  foreign  person,  the  1990  Ownership  Law  did  provide  further  guidance 
The  mixing  of  ownership  between  Soviet  and  foreign  juridical  persons  was  analysed  by 
reference  to  the  concept  of  the  joint  enterprise  in  the  1990  Ownership  Law.  Article  27  adopted 
a  "new"  definition  of  the  joint  enterprise  as  follows:  "joint  enterprises  with  the  participation  of 
Soviet  juridical  persons  and  foreign  juridical  persons  and  citizens  ...  [are]  created  on  the 
territory  of  the  USSR  in  the  form  of  joint  stock  societies,  economic  societies  and 
partnerships".  Previously  a  "joint  enterprise"  had  been  simply  a  juridical  person  established 
pursuant  to  Decree  49.  Article  27  by  contrast  contemplated  a  wider  definition  of  the  "joint 
enterprise",  encompassing  for  example  joint  stock  societies  with  foreign  participation.  Again 
by  contrast  to  Decree  49  joint  enterprises,  the  article  27  joint  enterprise,  as  mentioned  above, 
was  given  a  right  of  ownership  (regulated  by  Section  V  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law),  separate 
from  collective  ownership  (regulated  by  Section  III  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law). 
Therefore,  while  it  was  unclear  in  the  domestic  context  whether,  for  example,  mixed 
ownership  between  the  state  and  a  domestic  juridical  person  of  a  joint  stock  society  would 
effect  the  juridical  status  of  the  joint  stock  society,  it  seemed  that  the  mixing  of  ownership 
between  domestic  and  foreign  juridical  persons  of  a  joint  stock  society,  would  "transform" 
that  joint  stock  society  into  an  article  27  "joint  enterprise"  with  a  different  ownership  regime. 
This  approach  had  a  precedent  in  the  transformation  of  the  organisation  of  lessees  into  the 
leased  enterprise  following  the  execution  of  the  lease  contract;  and  was  based  on  a  similar 
rationale.  "' 
However  even  in  the  context  of  mixed  ownership  between  domestic  and  foreign  persons,  the 
new  article  27  definition  of  the  joint  enterprise  presented  a  number  of  further  issues  because 
the  definition: 
0  did  not  include  foreign  participation  in  all  Soviet  juridical  persons,  but  only  in  "joint  stock 
societies,  economic  societies  and  partnerships".  In  particular,  participation  in  Decree  49 
joint  enterprises  was  not  specifically  mentioned  (though  clearly  inteiýded  to  be  covered  by 
Section  V)  and  notably  absent  were  cooperatives  and  social  organisations; 
did  not  permit  participants  to  be  Soviet  citizens;  and 
did  not  contemplate  enterprises  wholly  owned  by  foreign  participants. 
943  Supra  Section  6.5-2-2. 
-295- The  regulation  of  each  of  these  situations  was  simply  left  unanswered  thereby  rendering  moot 
the  questions  posed  at  the  beginning  of  this  Section  in  this  regard. 
In  summary,  in  the  pursuit  of  the  seemingly  simple  task  of  providing  for  the  legal  regulation 
of  multiple  ownership  and  foreign  investment,  the  logic  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime 
resulted  in  an  initial  framework  that  (i)  set  out  "forms  of  ownership";  and  (ii)  then  elaborated 
the  types  of  juridical  person  by  reference  to  the  identity  of  their  owners  (based  "broadly"  on 
civil  law  subjects),  and  (iii)  therefore  implied  that  where  the  owners  of  a  juridical  person 
changed  or  became  mixed,  the  form  of  ownership  of  that  juridical  person  changed  as  did  the 
nature  of  the  juridical  person  itself.  While  the  rationale  for  mixed  ownership  concept  as  a 
product  of  the  doctrinal  imperatives  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  is  relatively  clear,  its 
exposition  in  the  1990  Ownership  Law  was  thoroughly  incomplete,  and  its  legal  consequences 
in  practice  were  simply  unintelligible. 
7.4.3  Summary  and  Outstanding  Issues 
There  were  certain  references  in  the  1990  Ownership  Law  which  were  clearly  derived  from 
the  previous  socialist  regime.  The  best  example  was  the  statement  in  article  1(6)  that  the  "use 
of  any  form  of  ownership  must  preclude  the  alienation  of  the  worker  from  the  means  of 
production  and  the  exploitation  of  man  by  man".  These  references  were  generally  understood 
at  the  time  to  be  discrete  examples  of  lip-service  to  an  ancien  regime.  Overall  the  1990 
Ownership  Law  presented  a  coherent  and  radical  structure  for  the  development  of  market 
economic  relations.  In  this  Section  it  has  been  argued  that  in  fact,  far  from  being  isolated 
examples,  articles  such  as  article  1(6)  were  a  reflection  of  a  deeper  underlying  doctrinal 
structure  based  on  socialist  principles  and  most  importantly  on  the  retention  of  the  "forms  of 
ownership  regime"  based  on  the  identity  principle. 
The  concept  of  forms  of  ownership  rendered  the  generic  definition  of  "the  owner"  in  article  1 
as  hollow.  The  "new"  ownership  regime  continued  to  be  structured  by  reference  to  the 
identity  principle  despite  the  fact  that  the  Stalin  economic  settlement,  which  had  given  rise  to 
that  principle,  had  firmly  been  overthrown  by  the  Gorbachev  reforms.  In  the  context  of  a 
market  orientated  economy,  there  was  no  way  to  distinguish  meaningftilly  different 
"identities"  to  be  used  as  the  basis  for  the  new  forms  of  ownership,  and,  "broadly"  the 
selection  of  the  categories  of  the  natural  person,  the  juridical  person  and  the  state  was 
inevitably  going  to  be  problematic,  particularly  because  not  all  Soviet  juridical  persons  were 
regulated  by  "collective  ownership". 
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the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  developed  that  framework  in  elaborating  the  new  constitution  for 
the  "new"  industrial  juridical  person.  The  basic  precondition  for  the  development  of  the 
general  corporation  as  set  out  in  Section  7.2  (ie  the  development  of  the  generic  owner)  had 
been  overlooked  in  favour  of  the  continued  application  of  forms  of  ownership  regime  and  the 
identity  principle.  It  was  from  within  that  framework  that  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  tackled 
the  other  preconditions:  namely  the  separation  of  ownership  from  control  and  the  concept  of 
equity  capital,  a  complex  management  regime,  an  understanding  of  the  property  rights  of  the 
participants  and  the  right  to  incorporate. 
7.5  1990  Law  on  Enterprises 
The  then  current  definition  of  the  juridical  person  appeared  in  article  II  of  the  1961  FPCivL 
which  used  the  term  "organisation".  The  industrial  "enterprise"  was  referred  to  in  article  11 
as  one  type  of  juridical  person  or  organisation  which  was  state  owned  and  operated  on  the 
basis  of  khozraschet  within  the  industrial  economy.  It  has  been  argued  that  it  is  best 
understood  within  the  confirmation  model.  The  legislation  relating  to  the  contract-based 
concession  enterprise  and  each  of  the  participation  enterprises  also  adopted  the  term 
"enterprise"  to  describe  the  relevant  juridical  person,  "  but  it  was  uncertain  at  that  time 
whether  anything  turned  on  this  use  of  terminology. 
Although  it  was  never  explicitly  stated  as  a  purpose  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  in  the 
preamble  (nor  explicitly  recognised  in  most  of  textbooks  and  commentaries),  the  Law  on 
Enterprises  contained  an  implicit  categorisation  because  this  law  did  not  regulate  all  juridical 
persons.  The  "choice"  of  juridical  persons  falling  within  its  scope  (and  hence  within  the 
definition  of  "enterprise")  was  not  made  on  the  basis  of  "forms  of  ownership"  because  the 
Law  on  Enterprises  was  expressed  to  apply  to  "enterprises  under  diverse  forms  of 
ownership".  From  its  scope,  it  seems  as  if  the  Law  on  Enterprises  was  developed  in  order  to 
regulate  all  juridical  persons  operating  within  the  industrial  economy  both  commercial  and 
non-commercial.  It  therefore  did  not  regulate  juridical  persons  of  the  administrative  state  nor 
did  it  cover  state  farms  or  collective  farms.  As  such,  it  shall  be  argued  that  the  Law  on 
Enterprises  primarily  provided  a  new  constitution  for  the  industrial  organisation. 
Although  "  organisation  "  was  used  in  article  11  for  the  generic  juridical  person,  the  law  was 
expressed  to  be  "on  Enterprises"  and  not  "on  industrial  organisations"  or  "on  industrial 
juridical  persons"  generally;  and  it  shall  be  argued  that  this  was  quite  deliberate,  significant 
944  Namely  the  joint  enterprise,  the  1987  state  enterprise,  the  cooperative  enterprise  and  leased  enterprise. 
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underlying  socialist  framework  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law,  and  ultimately  on  the  previous 
socialist  state  enterprise.  As  such,  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  failed  to  introduce  any  of  the 
remaining  preconditions  to  the  introduction  of  the  general  corporation  as  contemplated  in 
Section  7.2  above;  and  indeed  constructed  a  regime  that  was  deeply  indebted  to  the 
confirmation  model.  For  this  reason,  the  title  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  was  well 
chosen.  As  the  1990  Ownership  Law  maintained  an  underlying  socialist  framework  in  the 
"new"  economic  constitution,  it  shall  be  argued  that  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  truly 
represented  the  triumph  of  the  socialist  "enterprise"  over  the  general  corporate  form. 
7.5.1  The  Concept  of  the  Genetic  Enterptise  and  Classification  of  Enterptises 
The  "enterprise"  was  defined  in  article  I  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  as  "an  autonomous 
economic  subject  with  the  rights  of  a  juridical  person  which  on  the  basis  of  the  use  of  property 
by  the  labour  collective  produces  and  realises  a  product,  fulfils  work  and  renders  services.  An 
enterprise,  shall  not  have  other  juridical  persons  as  a  part  thereof  ... 
[and],  irrespective  of  the 
form  of  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  and  other  property,  shall  operate  on  the 
principles  of  khozraschet".  This  definition  therefore  set  out  the  general  description  of  the 
industrial  organisation  and  appeared  to  be  broadly  uncontroversial.  It  was  clearly  intended  to 
it  945  embrace  all  "enterprises  under  the  diverse  forms  of  ownership  . 
Thus  the  state  was  directed 
to  "ensure  an  enterprise,  irrespective  of  the  forms  of  ownership,  equal  legal  and  economic 
conditions  for  economic  activity".  946 
Unfortunately  this  definition,  like  that  of  the  generic  owner,  was  then  distorted  by  imposing  a 
classification  on  these  enterprises  that  was  indebted  to  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  adopted 
by  the  1990  Ownership  Law.  Hence  article  2  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  classified 
ltenterprises"  as  follows: 
(a)  Those  based  on  ownership  by  Soviet  citizens:  individual  and  family  enterprises; 
(b)  Those  based  on  collective  ownership:  collective  enterprise,  production  cooperative; 
enterprise  belonging  to  a  cooperative;  enterprise  created  in  the  form  of  joint-stock 
societies  or  other  economic  societies  or  partnerships;  enterprise  of  a  social 
organisation  or  religious  organisation;  and 
945  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  preamble;  see  also  article  4(l)  ("state  enterprises  ...  and  enterprises  of  other 
forms  of  ownership  shall  be  guided  by  the  present  Law...  "). 
946  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  article  31  (1). 
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enterprises  of  other  administrative  sub-divisions  of  the  Soviet  state. 
To  this  classification  were  added  three  additional  provisions:  (a)  joint  enterprises  could  be 
created  by  Soviet  juridical  persons  and  foreign  juridical  persons  or  foreign  citizens;  (b)  any 
enterprise,  depending  upon  its  size,  could  be  designated  a  "small"  enterprise  (and  hence 
subject  to  a  special  regime);  and  (c)  other  enterprises  could  also  operate,  including  leased, 
provided  that  their  creation  was  not  contrary  to  legislative  acts  of  the  USSR. 
The  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  built  upon  the  doctrinal  socialist  structure  of  the  1990 
Ownership  Law  and  retained  the  method  of  classification  that  had  been  inherent  in  article  11 
of  the  1961  FPCivL,  namely  by  reference  to  forms  of  ownership.  The  shortcomings  of  a 
classification  based  on  forms  of  ownership  has  been  discussed  in  some  length  in  Section  7.4.2. 
As  has  been  argued,  the  retention  of  the  framework  of  forms  of  ownership  itself  made  little 
sense  within  the  context  of  an  open  economy,  and  furthermore  there  was  no  reason  for 
distinguishing  different  ownership  regimes  on  the  basis  of  subjects  of  civil  law.  Most 
importantly  it  obscured  a  proper  understanding  of  the  juridical  person  as  a  subject  of  civil  law 
and  of  its  "ownership  interests"  as  an  object  of  civil  law;  and  in  particular  the  socialist 
framework  resulted  in  distinguishing  of  state  enterprises  and  foreign  owned  juridical  persons 
as  distinct  from  other  juridical  persons  and  did  not  provide  a  satisfactory  legal  regime  for 
regulating  multiple  owners. 
The  classification  in  article  2  was  problematic  for  two  particular  reasons: 
First,  it  did  not  consistently  apply  the  distinction  between  ownership  of  and  ownership  by  a 
juridical  person,  and  hence  perpetuated  the  lack  of  clarity  concerning  these  two  critical  and 
basic  concepts.  This  lack  of  consistency  was  surely  the  result  of  an  incomplete  understanding 
of  the  basic  framework  of  ownership  interests  and  juridical  persons  obscured  by  the  shadows 
of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime.  The  nature  of  the  inconsistency  can  be  traced  to  the  basic 
doctrinal  shortcomings  of  the  traditional  forms  of  ownership  regime.  Therefore  the  first  and 
the  last  categories  (ownership  by  citizens  and  state  ownership)  in  this  classification  listed 
juridical  persons  by  reference  to  the  identity  of  their  owners.  Obviously  it  was  unclear  even 
then  whether  only  citizens  could  have  owned  individual  or  family  enterprises,  but  it  must  be 
assumed  that  this  was  the  case.  However  the  second  category  (collective  ownership)  in  this 
classification  seemed  to  be  based  on  the  ownership  regime  governing  the  ownership  by  the 
juridical  person,  without  reference  to  the  identity  of  its  owners.  Once  again,  by  incorporating 
the  inconsistencies  at  the  heart  of  the  forms  of  ownership  regime,  it  seemed  that  the  new 
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industrial  organisations,  that  of  regulating  multiple  ownership  structures. 
Secondly  and  more  discretely,  in  contrast  to  the  position  under  the  1989  FPLease  and  1990 
Ownership  Law  which  applied  the  collective  ownership  regime,  the  leased  enterprise  was 
placed  in  the  "catch-all  category"  of  the  classification  regime  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises 
(and  not  within  collective  ownership). 
The  retention  of  the  socialist  framework  for  the  basic  classification  of  "enterprises"  and  the 
rejection  of  the  nature  of  the  ownership  interest  as  a  keystone  concept  informed  the  detail  of 
the  law  in  each  of  its  most  important  areas: 
0  The  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  took  a  broader  concept  of  the  role  of  the  enterprise  as  a 
vehicle  for  fulfilling  the  interests  of  the  state,  employees  and  owners  (thereby  eschewing  a 
narrower  understanding  of  the  enterprise  as  a  vehicle  for  the  elaboration  in  the  first 
instance  of  the  interests  of  the  owners  of  its  ownership  interests); 
0  This  meant  that  the  governance  regime  was  constructed  to  align  the  interests  of  the  state, 
workers  and  owners  (and  not  on  the  basis  of  the  separation  of  ownership  from  control, 
and  the  alignment  of  the  interests  of  managers  with  those  of  the  owners  that  had  appointed 
them); 
*  The  orientation  on  wider  interests  and  the  doctrinal  position  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law 
meant  that  the  law  failed  to  regulate  adequately  the  ownership  of,  and  the  ownership  by, 
an  enterprise  and  hence  to  distinguish  properly  between  the  property  of  the  owners  of  the 
enterprise  and  the  property  of  the  enterprise  itself;  and 
0  Finally,  while  expressing  the  principles  of  equivalence,  the  permissive  regime  and  the  rule 
of  law,  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  continued  to  contemplate  a  developed  role  for  the 
state,  in  what  the  law  called,  a  "regulated"  market  which  ultimately  precluded  the 
permissive  regime  giving  rise  to  a  permissive  procedure  for  "incorporation" 
This  law  applied  to  all  enterprises  already  existing  under  Soviet  law  including  the  contract- 
based  concession  and  participation  enterprises  as  well  as  to  the  new  juridical  persons  whose 
introduction  was  clearly  imminent  (such  as  the  joint  stock  society  and  partnership).  Each  of 
the  above  elements  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  therefore  ensured  that  these  "enterprises", 
irrespective  of  their  type,  were  distinctly  socialist  in  their  doctrinal  structure;  and  although  the 
law  included  cooperatives  and  joint-stock  societies  specifically  within  its  ambit,  it  meant  that 
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economy. 
7.5.2  The  Role  of  the  Enterptise 
Article  1(2)  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  set  out  the  "principal  tasks  of  the  enterprise". 
They  were  listed  in  the  following  order:  (a)  "the  satisfaction  of  social  needs";  (b)  "the 
realisation  of  social  and  economic  interests  of  the  members  of  the  labour  collective"  and  (c) 
"the  interests  of  the  owner".  The  traditional  "general  corporation"  is  conceived  more 
narrowly,  first  in  terms  of  a  vehicle  for  the  expression  of  the  interests  of  its  owners,  and 
hence  the  principal  governance  question  relates  to  the  balancing  of  the  interests  of  different 
owners  and  then  how  to  ensure  that  their  appointed  managers  act  in  those  interests.  By 
classifying  the  enterprise  by  reference  to  forms  of  ownership  and  by  expressing  its  role  first  in 
terms  of  satisfying  "social  needs",  then  in  terms  of  protecting  the  interests  of  the  labour 
collective  and  finally  in  terms  of  expressing  the  interests  of  the  owners,  the  1990  enterprises, 
irrespective  of  type,  were  firmly  wedded  to  a  social  (or  socialist)  orientation. 
This  orientation  was  given  expression  through  legislative  diktat  and  informed  not  only  the 
detail  of  the  management  structure  and  the  socialist  structure  of  the  ownership  regime,  but 
also  the  direction  of  their  required  planning  activities,  "  the  choice  of  their  activities,  "'  and 
their  role  in  wider  social  services  including  the  support  of  "medical,  children's,  cultural- 
enlightenment,  instructional  and  sport  institutions 
...  public  dining 
...  and  organisations  servicing 
the  labour  collective".  949 
The  expanded  role  of  the  enterprise  had  its  roots  in  the  logic  of  the  planned  economy  and  the 
early  days  of  Soviet  industrialisation.  "Trusts"  and  "enterprises"  in  the  planned  economy  were 
not  run  on  the  basis  of  profit  but  on  the  basis  of  the  plan  and  during  the  late  1920s  were 
conceived  as  institutions  that  were  responsible  for  feeding,  housing  and  clothing  its 
workforce.  "'  In  this  spirit  of  the  late  1920s,  the  Soviet  "enterprise"  was  bom,  developed 
947  "An  enterprise  shall  independently  plan  its  activities  ...  to  ensure  the  production  and  social  development  of 
the  enterprise  and  raise  the  personal  incomes  of  its  workers  ... 
[and]  shall  [take  into  account]  when 
preparing  plans  ...  ecological,  social,  demographic  and  other  consequences  affecting  the  interests  of  the 
population  of  the  territory"  (1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  article  23). 
948  "In  its  activities  an  enterprise  shall  take  into  account  the  interests  of  the  consumer  and  his  requirements 
for  quality  of  the  product,  work  or  service"  (1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  article  24(3)). 
949  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  article  29(6). 
950  Indeed  the  1927  Trusts  Statute  specifically  contemplated  a  "fund  for  the  improving  of  the  living 
conditions  of  workers  and  employees"  to  which  10%  of  the  net  profit  was  required  to  be  allocated  (article 
43  and  46(a)).  In  addition  the  so-called  "director's  fund"  was  created  pursuant  to  the  STO  decree  of  14 
June  1928  which  provided  that  following  a  saving  in  production  costs,  25-50%  of  the  saving  could  be 
-301- through  the  confirmation  model,  and  persisted  through  into  this  new  constitution  for  the 
generic  industrial  enterprise  of  the  1990s. 
In  certain  respects  the  "enterprise"  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  clearly  moved  beyond  that 
of  the  "confirmation"  Soviet  enterprises.  For  example  the  state  was  no  longer  the  sole  owner 
and  profit  was  to  be  the  indicator  of  its  efficacy.  However,  like  the  legal  framework  of  the 
"new"  ownership  regime  which  overlooked  new  economic  realities  in  the  embrace  of  the 
socialist  forms  of  ownership,  the  1990  enterprises  still  were  conceived  within  the  confirmation 
model  more  generally.  Faced  with  the  option  of  novostroika  in  March  1990,  the  Soviet  state 
found  it  impossible  finally  to  cut  the  enterprise  loose  to  sail  upon  the  seas  of  the  market. 
There  was  no  faith  in  the  "hidden  hand"  to  ensure  a  wider  social  or  ethical  dimension. 
Instead,  the  Soviet  state,  clinging  to  the  traditional  methods,  required,  by  legislative  diktat  in 
the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  that  all  enterprises  should  continue  to  maintain  an  express  and 
explicit  wider  role  in  the  fulfilment  of  social  needs  and  those  of  the  labour  collective,  even  in 
precedence  to  those  of  its  owners. 
7.5.3  Management  and  Governance 
Section  IV  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  was  entitled  "Management  of  the  Enterprise  and 
Self-Management".  It  contemplated  various  interest  groups,  management  organs  and 
positions.  The  internal  structure  broadly  comprised: 
*  the  owner, 
the  director  of  the  enterprise  and  the  deputy  directors  of  the  enterprise  and  directors  of  its 
structural  subdivisions, 
0  the  council  (board)  of  the  enterprise,  and 
the  labour  collective  of  enterprise  and  the  general  meeting  (or  conference)  of  the  labour 
collective  of  the  enterprise. 
Developing  the  role  of  the  enterprise  as  set  out  in  article  1(2),  the  management  structure  was 
crafted  with  the  aim  of  "combining  the  principles  of  self-management  of  the  labour  collective 
and  the  rights  of  an  owner".  "'  The  overriding  importance  of  the  labour  collective  was 
suggested  by  the  fact  that  the  articles  relating  to  its  role  in  the  management  structure  were  set 
out  in  Section  IV  before  those  articles  dealing  with  the  role  of  the  board  and  the  director.  This 
credited  to  a  director's  fund  to  be  used  again  for  improving  the  living  conditions  of  workers  and 
employees. 
951  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  article  14(l). 
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the  participation  model.  However,  the  substance  of  Section  IV  as  a  whole  proved  that, 
notwithstanding  this  ordering  of  articles,  the  basic  management  structure  of  the  1990 
enterprises  followed  closely  that  of  the  traditional  state  confirmation  enterprise. 
An  acknowledgement  of  the  existence  of  multiple  owners  with  different  separate  interests  was 
broadly  absent  from  the  provisions  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises.  It  was  almost  assumed  in 
the  drafting  that  every  enterprise  had  only  one  owner.  There  was  no  treatment  of  how  the 
interests  of  different  owners  might  be  reconciled  and  there  was  no  contemplation  of  a  general 
meeting  of  owners  or  other  such  organ  which  had  exclusive  competences  to  make  decisions  at 
this  level.  952  Indeed,  with  the  exception  of  article  5(l)  which  referred  to  a  "decision  of  the 
owner  (owners)",  in  all  places  in  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  the  singular  form,  "owner" 
Csobstvennik")  was  used. 
The  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  went  on  to  provide  that  "the  owner  shall  effectuate  his  rights 
with  regard  to  the  management  directly  or  through  organs  empowered  by  him".  953  Two 
possibilities  were  therefore  presented:  the  owner  could  act  as  the  executive  organ  (such  as  in 
the  case  of  enterprises  based  on  personal  participation)  or  could  appoint  representatives  to  the 
board  (such  as  in  the  case  of  the  state  enterprise  where  the  owner  was  the  state). 
Article  14(2)  provided  that  "the  hiring 
...  of  the  director  of  an  enterprise  shall  be  the  right  of 
the  owner".  The  director  was  the  delegate  of  the  owner  and  was  expressed  to  have  the  power 
to  decide  independently  all  questions  not  delegated  to  the  general  meeting  of  the  labour 
collective  or  the  board.  His  powers  generally  included  the  right  to  act  without  a  power  of 
attorney  in  the  name  of  the  enterprise,  sell  assets  of  the  enterprise,  issue  orders  and  give 
binding  instructions  on  the  workers  of  the  enterprise.  954  Deputy  directors  (appointed  by  the 
director)  and  single  directors  for  each  structural  subdivision  were  also  contemplated.  This 
replicated  the  framework  of  one-man  management. 
In  addition  to  the  director,  the  owner  had  the  right  to  appoint  representatives  to  the  board 
headed  by  a  chairman  elected  from  its  members.  The  law  set  out  various  matters  that  were 
within  the  competence  of  the  board  (although  it  failed  to  specify  whether  this  competence  was 
exclusive  or  could  not  be  altered  by  the  provisions  of  the  charter).  These  included  deciding  the 
general  orientation  of  economic  and  social  activities  of  the  enterprise,  the  procedure  for 
952  Article  14(2)  mentioned  the  election  of  the  director  thereby  implying  that  a  collegial  organ  at  the  level  of 
the  owner  must  have  been  considered. 
953  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  article  14(l). 
954  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  article  19. 
-303- distribution  of  net  profit  and,  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  director,  the  issuance  of 
securities  of  the  enterprise.  The  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  provided  that  the  board  should 
consist  of  equal  numbers  of  representatives  "appointed  by  the  owner  ...  and  elected  by  its 
labour  collective,  unless  provided  otherwise  by  the  charter  of  the  enterprise".  955  The  proviso 
clearly  enabled  the  possibility  of  disenfranchising  the  rights  of  the  labour  collective. 
The  labour  collective  comprised  all  workers  of  the  enterprise  and  they  participated  in  the 
general  meeting  or  conference  of  the  labour  collective  which  appointed  the  board 
representatives  of  the  labour  collective  and  dealt  with  matters  relating  to  the  collective 
contract.  Various  other  rights  were  given  to  the  labour  collective  or  its  conference  including: 
the  right  to  purchase  or  lease  the  enterprise,  "'  the  right  to  be  allocated  stocks  and  other 
securities  of  the  enterprise,  "'  and  the  right  to  participate  in  social  and  economic  questions,  " 
The  reference  to  a  single  owner  and  a  single  director  was  clearly  indebted  to  the  confirmation 
model.  The  management  structure  only  hinted  at  the  possibility  of  multiple  owners  and  the 
possibility  of  a  collegial  management  organ  which  did  not  sit  comfortably  with  the  notion  of  a 
single  director/manager.  In  short,  the  provisions  applied  most  readily  to  the  "state  enterprise" 
and  were  no  doubt  born  of  the  socialist  orientation  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law.  The  notion 
that  all  enterprises  regulated  by  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  should  have  adopted  such  a 
management  regime  not  only  contradicted  the  existing  legislation  for  the  contract-based 
concession  and  participation  enterprises  (as  well  as  future  legislation)  but  also  betrayed  the 
extent  to  which  legislators  wished  to  construct  the  new  enterprises  of  the  perestroika  era  upon 
traditional  socialist  doctrinal  principles.  There  was  also  deep  reluctance  to  construct  a 
generally  applicable  governance  regime  upon  the  notion  of  multiple  owners  and  an  enterprise 
as  a  vehicle  primarily  for  the  pursuit  of  the  owners'  interests.  Furthermore,  quite  apart  from 
any  question  of  principle,  the  detail  of  the  law  relating  to  the  composition,  competences  and 
procedures  of  each  internal  organ  or  position  was  entirely  inadequate.  These  new  enterprises 
were  entirely  novel  for  a  whole  generation  of  Soviet  citizens  and  in  such  an  economy,  clear, 
detailed  and  precise  legislation  was  critical.  Its  absence  merely  further  indicated  a  further 
955  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  article  18(l)  [emphasis  added]. 
956  The  possibility  of  purchasing  the  enterprise  set  out  in  article  5  and  also  provided  for  by  article  12  of  the 
1990  Ownership  Law  was  again  an  indication  of  the  possibility  for  privatisation. 
957  This  is  considered  in  more  detail  infra  Section  7.5.4.1. 
958  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  articles  14(3)  and  29. 
-304- desire  on  the  part  of  the  state  to  continue  to  use  the  ambiguities  of  law  to  exploit  control 
through  non-legal  mechanisms. 
7.5.4  The  Ownership  Regime  and  Responsibility 
Taking  into  account  the  role  of  the  enterprise  as  set  out  in  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  and 
the  problematic  framework  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law,  it  is  perhaps  unsurprising  that  the 
law  failed  to  provide  a  clear  and  coherent  footing  for  the  most  critical  element  of  the  new 
juridical  person  -  the  ownership  regime.  The  provisions  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprise  in  this 
respect  were  not  only  based  on  the  socialist  forms  of  ownership  as  set  out  in  the  1990 
Ownership  Law  but  they  continued  to  finesse  the  understanding  of  the  ownership  interest  of  a 
juridical  person  as  an  object  of  the  right  of  ownership,  and  the  juridical  person  itself  as  the 
subject  of  the  right  of  ownership/civil  law.  Hence  the  law  maintained  the  general  confusion 
between  the  concepts  of  "ownership  of  a  juridical  person  by  its  owners"  and  "ownership  by 
that  juridical  person". 
7.5.4.1  The  Property  of  the  Owners  and  the  Property  of  the  Enterprise 
As  has  been  discussed,  the  concept  of  "the  nature  of  an  ownership  interest"  was  absent  from 
orthodox  Soviet  law.  As  the  Soviet  state  was  the  sole  owner  of  all  enterprises,  the  legislation 
simply  provided  that  state  enterprises  belonged  to  the  state,  located  within  state  ownership. 
With  the  development  of  the  contract-based  concession  and  participation  models,  the  relevant 
legislation  was  forced  to  consider  at  some  level  of  detail  the  nature  of  the  ownership  interests 
of  the  participants.  Any  interpretation  or  analysis  of  any  enterprise  with  multiple  owners  in 
the  post-command  economy  should  have  acknowledged  the  distinction  between  the  ownership 
of  the  enterprise  (through  an  understanding  of  ownership  interests  of  the  enterprise,  and  the 
rights  that  the  owners  acquired  by  virtue  of  their  ownership  of  such  interests)  and  the 
ownership  by  that  enterprise  of  property. 
The  1990  Ownership  Law  failed  to  take  up  the  challenge  to  develop  a  new  law  on  ownership 
based  on  the  generic  owner  and  by  reference  to  the  nature  of  different  ownership  interests  in 
different  juridical  persons  and  the  different  rights  that  therefore  accrued  to  the  owners  thereof. 
Instead,  the  1990  Ownership  Law  constructed  its  "new"  framework  based  on  the  traditional 
socialist  concept  of  "forms  of  ownership"  and  the  importance  of  the  identity  of  the  owner, 
retaining  the  possibility  for  the  continued  application  of  operative  management.  Predictably 
therefore  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprise  did  not  contain  any  provisions  setting  out  an 
understanding  of  the  place  and  nature  of  the  ownership  interest  of  any  owner,  despite  being 
required  to  take  into  account  certain  ownership  interests  by  virtue  of  their  clear  presence,  such 
-305- as  the  stock.  It  will  be  argued  that  the  terminology  used  was  hopelessly  confused  and  the 
concepts  so  rudimentary  that  any  meaningful  understanding  was  lost. 
First,  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  used  the  term  "owner"  and  "founder"  almost 
interchangeably.  "' 
Secondly,  as  already  noted,  there  was  no  clear  acknowledgement  of  multiple  owners.  With 
few  exceptions,  the  law  invariably  referred  simply  to  "the  owner"  (singular). 
Thirdly,  the  law  always  referred  not  to  the  owner  "of  the  relevant  ownership  interest  of  the 
enterprise"  (eg  the  owner  of  the  stocks  of  the  enterprise)  but  instead  to  the  "owner  of  the 
property  of  the  enterprise".  "  This  evidenced  again  the  profound  misunderstanding  of  the 
nature  of  the  owner-enterprise  relationship  in  an  open  economy  and  suggested  a  failure  to 
move  beyond  the  confirmation  /  operative  management  regime  where  the  owner  of  the 
enterprise  (ie  the  state)  was  also  the  owner  of  its  property. 
In  fact  under  the  existing  1990  Ownership  Law,  the  only  way  that  the  owner  of  a  juridical 
person  could  have  been  "the  owner  of  the  property  of  the  enterprise"  was  within  the  regimes 
of  "operative  management"  and  "full  economic  jurisdiction"  and  these  only  applied  in  the  case 
of  state enterprises.  As  such,  for  all  other  enterprises,  the  use  of  the  phrase  "owner  of  the 
property  of  the  enterprise"  simply  was  wrong.  Indeed  both  the  1990  Ownership  Law  and  the 
1990  Law  on  Enterprises  explicitly  contemplated  that  "property  of  an  enterprise  may  ... 
belong 
to  it  by  right  of  ownership...  ".  "  This  inevitably  meant  that  there  must  have  been  occasions 
where  the  owner  of  the  enterprise  was  not  the  "owner  of  the  property  of  the  enterprise". 
In  any  event,  the  phrase  "owner  of  the  property  of  the  enterprise"  was  used  constantly 
throughout  the  law  and  it  simply  betrayed  a  fundamental  misunderstanding  of  the  concepts  of 
the  ownership  of  the  enterprise  and  the  nature  of  equity  capital,  each  of  which  were 
fundamental  for  the  emergence  of  a  general  corporate  law  from  the  shadows  and  opacity  of 
the  socialist  enterprise  law. 
This  confused  understanding  and  drafting  was  then  applied  in  the  context  of  what  few 
references  there  were  to  the  concept  of  ownership  interests.  The  1990  Law  on  Enterprises 
959  Article  5(l)  referred  to  the  enterprise  created  by  decision  "of  the  owner",  where  the  word  founder  would 
have  been  more  appropriate;  and  article  10(3)  mentioned  property  of  the  enterprise  to  include  "cash  and 
material  contributions  of  the  founders",  whereas  the  term  owner  may  have  been  more  appropriate  and 
thereby  contemplated  the  possible  issue  of  further  ownership  interests  (eg  stocks)  after  the  creation  of  the 
enterprise. 
960  For  example,  articles  1(2),  5(2),  14(2)  and  18(l). 
961  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  article  10(2). 
-306- only  mentioned  the  concept  of  ownership  interests  almost  by  default  in  its  treatment  of  the 
"fees"  ("vznos")  of  the  founder;  the  issue  of  securities  ("tsennye  bumagy"),  and  the 
"contributions"  ("vklad")  and  fees  ("vznos")  of  the  labour  collective. 
Article  10(3)  included  "cash  and  material  fees  ("vznos")  of  the  founders"  as  one  of  the 
"sources  for  the  formation  of  property  of  the  enterprise".  This  phrase  was  ambiguous  as  it  is 
unclear  what  the  word  "fee"  was  intended  to  mean  -  either  it  could  have  been  interpreted  as 
consideration  for  the  purchase  by  the  founder  of  ownership  interests  issued  by  the  enterprise; 
or  alternatively  it  could  have  been  interpreted  as  property  "contributed"  to  the  enterprise  but 
remaining  in  the  ownership  of  the  founders  (which  would  have  been  consistent  with  the  phrase 
"owner  of  the  property  of  the  enterprise").  The  use  of  the  word  "founder"  (rather  than 
"owner")  in  this  context  was  also  perhaps  misleading  because  it  suggested  that  "fees"  were 
only  contributed  on  creation  of  the  enterprise  and  not  at  any  other  time. 
Ownership  interests  were  next  mentioned  in  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprise  in  the  context  of 
securities".  As  already  mentioned,  the  Russian  term  used  for  securities,  "tsennye  bunwgy' 
, 
includes  both  debt  and  equity  securities  (ie  stocks).  Article  12  of  the  law  provided  the  general 
rule  that  "in  order  to  attract  additional  cash  assets  ...  an  enterprise  shall  have  the  right  to  issue 
and  realise  securities"  and  article  18  gave  the  right  to  issue  securities  to  the  board  of  the 
enterprise  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  director. 
The  reference  to  "securities"  was  either  an  example  of  inappropriate  drafting  intended  to  be 
used  only  to  refer  to  debt  securities;  or  alternatively,  it  might  have  been  assumed  at  the  time 
that  any  enterprise  could  have  issued  stocks  and  it  was  not  understood  that  in  contrast  to  debt 
securities,  stocks  conferred  an  equity  interest.  In  view  of  the  general  socialist  orientation  of 
the  legislation  and  the  clear  existing  confusion  over  the  precise  nature  of  ownership  interests 
and  equity  capital,  and  in  light  of  the  explicit  reference  to  stocks  in  article  21(3)  (discussed 
below),  the  reference  to  "securities"  in  article  12  was  probably  more  likely  to  have  been  on 
the  basis  of  the  latter  interpretation  and  evidenced  a  total  misunderstanding  of  the  concept  of 
the  equity  interest. 
An  understanding  of  the  nature  of  "fees"  and  of  "securities"  was  confused  further  by  the 
provisions  relating  to  the  distribution  of  profit  and  the  rights  of  the  labour  collective  in  article 
21(3).  Article  21(3)  provided  that  in  specified  instances  "part  of  the  net  profit  shall  be 
transferred  to  the  ownership  of  members  of  the  labour  collective  ... 
The  amount  of  profit 
belonging  to  a  member  of  the  labour  collective  shall  form  his  contribution  ("vklad").  Stocks 
may  be  issued  in  the  amount  of  the  contribution  to  the  member  of  the  labour  collective.  An 
enterprise  annually  shall  pay  interest  (or  dividends)  to  the  member  of  the  labour  collective  ...... 
-307- Article  39  provided  further,  that  in  the  case  of  liquidation,  this  contribution  would  be  returned 
to  the  member  in  advance  of  payments  made  to  owners.  These  provisions  reproduced  almost 
verbatim  the  provisions  of  article  25  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law.  This  terminology  was 
further  confused  by  the  drafting  of  article  27(l)  which  referred  to  "the  sale  of  securities,  share 
("paeyye")  and  other  fees  ("vznosy")  of  members  of  the  labour  collective". 
The  drafting  of  article  21(3)  illustrated  most  readily  the  confusion  in  the  approach  of  the 
legislators  and  the  inadequacy  of  basic  understandings  in  relation  to  the  fundamental  question 
of  equity  and  the  nature  of  the  ownership  interest.  First  article  21(3)  used  the  word  "stocks" 
(not  "securities"  (which  may  have  been  debt  or  equity))  and  then  contemplated  a  payment  of 
"interest"  on  them.  112  Secondly,  it  again  assumed  that  any  enterprise  could  issue  stocks. 
Thirdly,  it  was  unclear  whether  there  was  any  difference  between  the  terms  "contribution" 
used  in  articles  21(3)  and  39  and  "fee"  and  "share"  used  in  article  27(l).  Finally,  it  was 
unclear  whether  the  rationale  of  article  21(3)  was  only  to  provide  a  financial  incentive  for 
workers.  If  so,  the  use  of  the  term  "stocks"  (as  opposed  to  "bonds"  or  other  securities)  was 
obviously  erroneous  as  stocks  generally  carried  with  them  additional  rights  to  be  involved  in 
management. 
The  use  of  various  terms  to  describe  ownership  interests  throughout  the  legislation  of  the 
perestroika  period  was  simply  nonsensical.  This  dated  to  the  early  attempts  to  use  this 
terminology  in  the  context  of  the  contract-based  concession  model,  "'  and  then  the  treatment  of 
the  right  to  issue  stocks  and  other  securities  in  the  context  of  the  second  expression  of  the 
participation  model.  "  The  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  simply  continued  what  had  always  been 
a  vain  attempt  to  create  coherence  from  within  a  framework  inadequate  to  deal  with  such  post- 
socialist  concepts. 
In  summary,  the  use  of  the  terms  "owners  of  the  property  of  the  enterprise"  and  the  confused 
use  of  the  terms  "fees",  "securities",  "stocks",  "contributions"  and  "shares"  betrayed  the  fact 
that  the  forms  of  ownership  regime  and  the  legacy  confirmation  model  had  successfully 
obscured  a  proper  understanding  of  the  ownership  regime  of  the  enterprise  and  in  particular 
the  rights  of  the  owners  and  the  nature  of  the  ownership  interests.  In  this  context  the 
emergence  of  a  general  corporate  model  was  not  likely  or  even  possible. 
%2  Curiously  article  25(2)  of  the  1990  Ownership  Law  were  clearer  on  this  point  as  it  referred  to  the 
payment  of  "interest  (or  dividends)  on  the  contribution  (or  stock)",  suggesting  two  different  forms  of 
"investing"  the  profit  share  of  the  labour  collective  member  by  debt  or  equity. 
963  Supra  Section  5.4.2.1. 
964  Supra  Section  6.4.1,6.5.1  and  6.5.2.1. 
-308- 7.5.4.2  Associations  and  Subsidiaries 
The  emphasis  on  forms  of  ownership  and  the  lack  of  clear  drafting  on  the  crucial  point  of  the 
nature  of  the  ownership  interest  almost  inevitably  meant  that  the  provisions  dealing  with  group 
structures  in  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  continued  to  be  steeped  in  socialist  understandings. 
As  has  been  outlined,  traditionally  the  concept  of  the  "association"  under  Soviet  law  was 
based  on  administrative  governance  techniques  . 
96'  The  association  was  an  abstraction, 
coordinating  the  activities  of  the  enterprises  that  had  acceded  to  it.  However  in  legal  terms, 
the  association  and  the  enterprises  were  separate  juridical  persons  (both  owned  by  the  state 
and  not  by  each  other)  and  therefore  control  by  the  former  over  the  latter  was  effected  by  way 
of  administrative  instruction  and  not  by  way  of  an  ownership  relationship  (such  as  voting 
rights).  Such  a  curious  structure  from  a  legal  point  of  view  was  only  possible  in  an  economy 
where  the  state  owned  exclusively  all  the  enterprises  and all  the  associations,  where  there  was 
no  practical  necessity  to  distinguish  between  ownership  relationships  and  administrative 
governance  mechanisms.  However  in  the  new  Soviet  economy  where  the  state  had  ceded  its 
monopoly  position  over  the  means  of  production  to  other  actors,  a  more  "ownership"  based 
law  of  group  structures  should  have  evolved  where  one  juridical  person  controlled  another 
only  by  virtue  of  the  rights  that  it  received  as  a  result  of  the  ownership  of  the  relevant 
ownership  interests  of  the  other  (eg  as  a  result  of  its  stockholding).  The  regulation  of  groups 
in  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  was  founded  broadly  upon  this  traditional  Soviet  framework. 
However  there  was  evidence  in  specific  areas  of  a  drift  towards  a  more  market  economy 
understanding  of  group  structures. 
The  law  retained  the  concept  of  the  "association"  but  attempted  to  put  it  on  a  more  permissive 
footing.  966  The  association  was  defined  as  an  independent  juridical  person  with  its  own  balance 
sheet  created  for  the  purpose  of  co-ordinating  activities  and  representing  the  common  interests 
of  its  enterprises.  The  law  then  stressed  the  fact  that  the  association  could  only  be  created  on  a 
voluntary  basis,  with  a  charter  confirmed  by  its  founders,  and  that  the  constituent  enterprises 
had  the  right  to  withdraw.  Although  this  new  regime  remodelled  the  association  on  a 
voluntary  basis,  the  essence  of  its  structure  was  still  that  of  the  Soviet  model.  The  association 
was  not  (and  was  traditionally  not  intended  to  be  conceived  of  as)  a  holding  company  to  which 
the  ownership  interests  of  its  constituent  enterprises  were  transferred.  Indeed  such  a 
characterisation  would  have  legally  precluded  the  right  of  a  constituent  enterprise  to  withdraw 
from  the  association.  The  governance  regimes  of  these  associations  could  still  only  be  based 
965  Supra  Section  6.5.1. 
966  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  article  3. 
-309- on  administrative  relationships  (akin  to  planning  instructions  issued  by  the  state).  It  was 
unclear  how  the  association  would  operate  where  its  constituent  enterprises  were  not 
exclusively  state  enterprises  and  more  precisely  what  was  to  be  the  ownership  or  legal 
relationship  between  the  association  and  such  enterprises.  This  might  have  developed  on  the 
basis  of  contract. 
In  addition  to  the  "association",  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  also  referred  to  "unions, 
economic  combinations,  concerns  and  other  associations%  as  well  as  to  "branches, 
representations,  divisions  and  other  solitary  subdivisions"  and  further  to  "structural 
subdivisions  (entities,  shops,  sections,  divisions,  sectors,  farms,  and  other  analogous 
subdivisions  of  an  enterprise  or  structural  entity  of  an  association)".  "'  Traditionally,  as 
discussed  in  Section  6.5.1,  the  three  principal  terms  used  within  the  Soviet  law  on  groups 
were  the  association,  the  branch  and  the  representation;  however  it  was  not  uncommon  for 
various  other  terms  such  as  those  used  in  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  also  to  be  used  in  the 
legislation  without  a  precise  legal  meaning.  The  plethora  of  terminology  in  this  area,  without 
clear  distinctions  between  any  terms,  seemed  similar  to  the  use  of  terminology  to  describe  the 
various  references  to  ownership  interests  in  the  legislation. 
Despite  the  varied  terminology  used  in  relation  to  the  law  of  groups  both  in  the  1990  Law  on 
Enterprises  and  in  Soviet  legislation  generally,  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  did  however  use 
a  particular  new  legal  term  that  did  have  a  broadly  accepted  meaning.  Article  7(l)  referred  to 
the  right  of  an  enterprise  "to  create  a  subsidiaries  ("dochemie  predreiyatiya")  with  the  right  of 
a  juridical  person".  This  was  very  significant  as  the  term  "subsidiary"  had  been  entirely 
absent  from  mainstream  Soviet  law  as  the  concept  was  not  directly  relevant  to  a  law  on  groups 
developed  upon  administrative  rather  than  ownership  relationships.  This  one  reference  to 
"subsidiary"  hinted  at  the  possibility  of  a  change  in  the  nature  of  the  way  the  law  on  groups 
was  to  be  conceived  and  expressly  permitted  a  relationship  between  juridical  persons  based  on 
the  ownership  of  ownership  interests  of  one  by  the  other.  A  more  developed  understanding 
awaited  a  clearer  elaboration  of  the  nature  of  ownership  interest  and  its  significance  in  the 
analysis  and  classification  of  the  juridical  person. 
967  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  articles  3(l),  7(l),  20(l).  These  were  not  terms  of  art  with  any  precise  meaning 
under  Soviet  law.  One  of  the  few  attempts  to  distinguish  the  "concern"  ("Kontsem"),  "consortium" 
("konsortsium")  and  "economic  association"  ("khozyaistvennaya  assotsiatsiya")  was  the  Kirgiz  collection  of 
laws  entitled  Sbondk  Zakonodatel'nykh  Aktov  i  Metodicheskikh  Rekomendatsii  d1ya  Predprininwelei,  I 
((Mirmeks:  1992),  pp.  298-330)  which  included  a  model  charter  for  each  type.  Although  written  after  the 
perestroika  legislation,  these  terms  were  products  of  the  Soviet  era  legislation. 
-310- 7.5.4.3  Property  Responsibility 
The  provisions  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  relating  to  liability  were  always  going  to  be 
"transitional".  The  1990  Ownership  Law  and  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  presented  a  regime 
that  lacked  sufficient  clarity  as  to  the  nature  of  the  ownership  interest  of  an  enterprise,  as  to 
the  difference  between  ownership  of  and  ownership  by  the  enterprise,  and  as  to  the 
relationship  between  an  association  and  its  constituent  enterprises.  In  such  circumstances,  the 
provisions  relating  the  respective  liabilities  of  the  owners  and  the  enterprise  would  necessarily 
be  vague.  In  addition,  if  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  was  to  be  a  broad  constitution  for  all 
industrial  juridical  persons,  one  would  expect  that  the  rules  relating  to  liability  would  be 
contained  in  subordinate  legislation  on  each  specific  juridical  person. 
The  corporate  law  model  provides  for  a  "veil"  between  the  owners  and  the  enterprise  and 
hence  generally  for  limited  liability  of  the  owners  in  the  context  of  an  insolvency  of  the 
enterprise.  The  alternative  concept  of  "independent  property  responsibility"  was  outlined  in 
Section  3.3.  A  shift  to  "limited  liability"  for  certain  juridical  persons  would  have  been 
expected  to  have  resulted  from  any  move  to  an  economy  based  on  profit. 
The  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  introduced  a  new  term,  "full  property  responsibility",  to 
describe  the  nature  of  the  responsibility  of  enterprises.  "'  It  was  unclear  what  the  use  of  the 
word  "full  property"  ("polhaya  imushchestvennaya")  added.  The  1990  Ownership  Law 
provided  generally  that  an  owner  shall  not  be  responsible  for  the  obligations  of  a  juridical 
person  "created  by  him"  but  that  exceptions  could  be  established  by  legislation.  "' 
Full  property  responsibility  should  be  understood  as  the  culmination  of  the  development  of  the 
concept  of  "full  responsibility"  in  the  first  expression  of  the  participation  model  '970  and  the 
development  of  self-financing  and  recourse  to  all  assets  as  in  the  contract-based  concession 
model  and  the  second  expression  of  the  participation  model.  "'  The  move  to  ftill  property 
responsibility  can  probably  be  regarded  as  a  move  towards  the  possibility  of  limited  liability, 
and  elements  of  the  new  economy  as  described  in  Section  7.5.5  below  supported  this  view. 
..........  .. 
968  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  article  340).  Full  property  responsibility  was  the  basic  position,  although 
certain  additional  responsibilities  were  included  for  specific  situations  in  particular  relating  to  the  use  of 
natural  resources  and  dealings  with  consumers  (article  34). 
969  1990  Ownership  Law,  article  5(l).  The  use  of  the  term  "created  by  him"  was  unfortunate,  because  this 
rule  was  intended  to  cover  not  just  owner-founders  of  juridical  persons  but  also  subsequent  owners. 
970  Supra  Section  6.3.4.3. 
971  Supra  Section  5.3.2  and  6.4.1. 
-311  - However  within  the  continued  socialist  framework,  the  interventionist  role  of  the  state  in 
particular  hindered  the  introduction  of  a  liability  regime  understood  primarily  in  terms  of  the 
insolvency  situation.  This  was  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  although  the  1990  Ownership  Law 
contemplated  a  regime  of  limited  responsibility,  it  also  contemplated  the  creation  of 
exceptions,  and  such  exceptions  were  also  included  in  the  law.  9" 
7.5.5  The  New  Economy  and  the  Role  of  the  State 
The  1990  Ownership  Law  and  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  consolidated  the  previous  steps 
taken  during  the  perestroika  period  by  setting  out  the  basic  legal  principles  upon  which  the 
new  economy  was  to  be  based.  The  preamble  to  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  used  the  phrase 
"the  development  of  goods-money  relations  and  a  regulated  market". 
The  concept  of  "goods-money  relations"  and  "a  regulated  market"  evidenced  a  retreat  by  the 
state  from  its  monopoly  position  as  owner  of  the  means  of  production  and  from  its 
paternalistic  role  as  subsidiser  of  enterprises  that  had been  subject  to  the  state  plan.  The  1990 
Law  on  Enterprises  emphasised  self-sufficiency  and referred  explicitly  to  "profit"  to  be  used 
both  in  incentivising  effective  production  as  well  as  in  measuring  "efficiency".  The  implicit 
assumption  was  that  in  the  absence  of  profit,  an  enterprise  should  be  considered  for 
liquidation. 
From  an  economic  perspective  this  was  a  radical  shift  in  the  nature  of  macro-economic 
management.  However  from  a  legal  perspective,  it  has  been  argued  that  both  the  1990 
Ownership  Law  and  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  provided  for  this  new  economy  to  be 
structured  upon,  and  regulated  by,  traditionally  Soviet  legal  understandings  and  theory.  For 
this  reason  the  new  framework  of  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  conceived  of  the  enterprises, 
not  in  terms  of  the  market  economy  "general  corporation",  but  as  a  vehicle  both  in 
terminology  and  function  tied  to  the  confirmation  model.  It  was  therefore  no  surprise  that the 
state  retained  the  right  under  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  to  control  the  activities  of  the 
enterprise  by  a  mixture  of  purely  legal  and  "traditionally  Soviet"  techniques. 
The  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  contained  provisions  where  the  state  had  the  right  to  control  the 
activities  of  the  enterprises;  and  where  the  state  had  the  right  to  demand  information  about  the 
enterprises'  activities  in  order  to  ensure  compliance  with  legislation.  The  law  also  explicitly 
left  open  the  possibility  of  further  rights  of  the  state  in  discrete  areas. 
972  See,  for  example,  1990  Ownership  Law,  article  26(3):  if  a  state  organisation  on  the  budget  had 
insufficient  assets  to  cover  claims  of  creditors,  responsibility  was  borne  by  the  owner. 
-312- The  law  contemplated  the  right  of  state  agencies  and  officials  "to  give  instructions"  in 
accordance  with  competences  set  out  in  the  legislation.  The  word  "instruction"  Cukazaniya") 
was  associated  with  the  language  of  administrative  control  and  planning;  and  it  was  unclear 
the  extent  to  which  the  state  was  intending  to  reserve  the  right  to  give  such  instructions  to 
enterprises  that  were  not  wholly-owned  by  the  state  in  order  to  preserve  its  former  role  as 
economic  sovereign.  In  addition  to  the  right  to  give  instructions,  the  law  seemed  implicitly  to 
give  the  state  in  certain  circumstances  the  right  of  "interference  in  the  economic  and  other 
activities  of  an  enterprise".  "'  This  was  defined  negatively  -  the  law  stated  merely  that  the  state 
could  not  interfere  in  the  activities  of  an  enterprise  if  such  activities  did  "not  affect  the  rights 
of  State  agencies  with  regard  to  carrying  out  supervision  over  the  activities  of  enterprises". 
Tax  and  state  agencies  were  given  the  right  to  demand  information  from  the  enterprise  to  the 
extent  that  they  had  the  right  to  carry  out  "control"  or  "verification"  over  individual  aspects  of 
the  activities  of  the  enterprise;  including  its  keeping  of  accounts  in  accordance  with  legislative 
requirements;  its  disclosure  of  commercial  secrets  capable  of  harming  society;  and  its 
payment  of  tax.  "'  This  clearly  opened  up  the  possibility  for  significant  information  gathering 
exercises  and  specifically  contemplated  the  existence  of  state  agencies  appointed  to  the  task  of 
monitoring  these  activities. 
The  law  included  other  provisions  that  also  alluded  to  the  further  possibility  of  state 
intervention  through  subordinate  legislation.  In  the  area  of  property,  article  10  provided  that 
the  enterprise  had  the  right  to  sell  and  transfer  property,  "unless  otherwise  provided  by 
legislative  acts  of  the  USSR  and  the  union  and  autonomous  republics".  In  the  area  of  profit, 
article  21  provided  that  while  the  enterprise  had  the  right  to  determine  the  orientation  of  the 
use  of  net  profit,  "state  influence  on  the  choice  of  orientations  ...  shall  be  effectuated  through 
taxes,  tax  privileges,  as  well  as  economic  sanctions"  [emphasis  added].  In  the  area  of 
planning,  article  23  provided  that  while  the  enterprise  had  the  right  to  plan  independently  its 
activities,  "the  enterprise  shall  fulfil  work  and  deliveries  for  state  needs  on  a  contractual 
basis"  and  must  take  into  account  "ecological,  social,  demographic  and  other  consequences 
affecting  the  interests  of  the  populace  on  the  territory".  In  the  area  of  economic  activities, 
article  24  provided  that  while  the  enterprise  had  the  right  to  carry  out  all  activities  that  were 
not  prohibited,  it  expressly  noted  that  "a  list  of  types  of  products,  work  and services  the  free 
realisation  of  which  is  prohibited  or  limited  shall  be  established  by  legislation  of  the  USSR" 
providing  further  that  "the  interests  and  rights  of  the  consumer  shall  be  protected  by 
973  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  article  30. 
974  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  articles  32(2),  33(2)  and  35(2). 
-313  - legislation".  This  principle  was  expanded  in  article  31(l)  that  additionally  provided  that  the 
state  should  "ensure  the  social  protection  of  all  working  people"  when  regulating  the  activities 
of  enterprises.  In  the  area  of  prices,  article  26  provided  that  while  the  enterprise  had  the  right 
to  establish  prices  independently  or  on  a  contractual  basis,  "state  regulation  of  prices  shall  be 
permitted  for 
...  resources  which  determine  the  scale  of  prices  for  the  economy  and  the  social 
protection  for  citizens".  Finally,  article  34(2)  gave  the  state  the  possibility  to  suspend  the 
activities  of  an  enterprise  for  violations  of  "the  regime  of  nature  use". 
The  practice  of  expressing  the  rights  of  the  enterprise  and  then  tempering  their  exercise  by  the 
use  of  provisos  or  by  alluding  to  the  possibility  of  state  intervention  was  not  an  uncommon 
practice  in  the  style  of  Soviet  drafting.  Indeed  article  30(l))  only  provided  state  guarantees  for 
the  "rights  and  legal  interests"  [emphasis  added]  of  an  enterprise,  suggesting  that  the  Soviet 
notion  of  contingent  rights  and  "legitimate"  interests  may  still  have  been  retained.  What  this 
meant  was  that  the  true  "independence"  of  the  enterprise  from  the  state  would  be  ultimately 
determined  by  the  extent  to  which  the  state  in  practice  exploited  the  wide  possibility  in  the 
drafting  for  intervention. 
7.5.6  Creation  and  Liquidation  of  Enterprises 
The  existence  of  non-state  owned  juridical  persons  did  not  necessarily  entail  the  introduction 
of  a  permissive  regime  with  regard  to  their  creation.  As  has  been  illustrated  in  the  previous 
models,  the  state  had  adopted  broadly  a  concession  approach  in  the  case  of  foreign  investors 
and  an  authorisation  regime  in  the  case  of  the  second  expression  of  the  participation 
enterprises. 
The  general  rules  relating  to  the  creation  of  enterprises  were  set  out  in  Section  11  of  the  1990 
Law  on  Enterprises  and  initially  evidenced  a  move  towards  a  permissive  regime,  although 
again  this  was  tempered  by  provisos  whereby  the  state  retained  the  possibility  for  intervention. 
The  creation  of  an  enterprise,  subject  to  the  details  of  any  subordinate  legislation,  was 
permitted  by  decision  of  the  founder  through  the  filing  of  the  relevant  documents,  including 
the  charter,  with  the  competent  state  body  and  informing  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  Registration 
was  required  to  be  made  within  30  days. 
This  seemingly  permissive  regime  then  contained  a  number  of  further  elements  which  gave 
the  state  the  possible  right  to  intervene  and  hence  meant  that  the  process  for  creating 
enterprises  fell  short  of  the  right  to  incorporate  which  is  a  prerequisite  for  characterising  an 
enterprise  as  a  corporate  body. 
-314- Although  the  refusal  to  register  an  application  "for  reasons  of  inadvisability"  was  prohibited, 
registration  was  permitted  to  be  refused  "for  reasons  of  violating  the  procedure  for  the 
creation  of  an  enterprise  established  by  legislative  acts  ...  as  well  as  the  failure  of  the 
constitutive  acts  (or  documents)  to  conform  to  the  requirements  of  legislation".  In  addition  to 
this  procedure,  the  law  provided  for  further  authorisations  and  procedures  to  be  followed  with 
respect  to  the  use  of  a  land  plot  or  natural  resources  (article  5(4)  and  11)  and  for  licences  to 
be  obtained  for  certain  specific  activities  (article  8). 
The  liquidation  of  an  enterprise  was  permitted  by  decision  of  the  owner  or  by  decision  of  a 
court  or  arbitration  tribunal  on  the  grounds  of  bankruptcy,  failure  to  fulfil  legislative 
requirements  and  other  grounds  specified.  "  Thus  in  a  similar  way  to  the  creation  regime,  the 
liquidation  regime  was  also  sufficiently  flexible  to  enable  the  possibility  of  state  intervention. 
The  regulation  of  the  liquidation  of  an  enterprise  under  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  was 
however  one  of  the  few  areas  where  the  law  reflected  the  new  underlying  economic  realities 
of  the  market  economy  and  the  importance  of  profit.  This  was  developed  through  the 
provisions  relating  to  the  liquidation  procedure  which  included  rudimentary  drafting  to  take 
into  account  the  concept  of  external  creditors  and  a  waterfall  of  payment  rights  upon  a 
winding-up. 
7.6  Whither  the  General  Corporation 
From  a  doctrinal  perspective,  the  consolidating  legislation  of  mid-1990  provided  the  most 
crucial  elements  of  the  legal  regulation  of  industrial  organisations  in  the  Soviet  legal  system 
during  the  perestroika  era.  The  possibility  for  the  introduction  of  the  general  corporate  form 
was  a  real  one.  Following  the  path  laid  by  the  contract-based  concession  and  participation 
models,  only  a  few  additional  steps  needed  to  be  taken.  The  most  important  step  was  the 
reconceptualisation  of  the  prevailing  law  on  ownership  and  the  replacement  of  the  socialist 
concept  of  "forms  of  ownership"  based  on  the  identity  principle.  A  new  doctrinal  regime 
needed  to  be  developed  on  the  basis  of  the  generic  owner  and  distinguishing  ownership  rights 
on  the  basis  of  the  property  in  question  and  not  on  the  basis  of  the  identity  of  the  owner.  A 
new  generic  juridical  person  could  have  been  built  upon  this  new  framework  conceived  of  as  a 
subject  of  civil  law  with  the  right  to  own  property  issuing  ownership  interests  that  were  the 
objects  of  the  right  of  ownership.  Juridical  persons  would  then  be  classified  by  reference  to 
their  individual  peculiarities,  including  the  nature  of  the  ownership  interest  issued  by  them, 
rather  than  by  reference  to  the  changing  identity  of  their  owners.  Other  steps  would  have 
followed  from  this  foundation,  including  a  developed  notion  of  equity  capital,  the  right  to 
-..  '  1  -.  1  .  1111  .  .................  I'ý.  11ý'..  ",  "",  "ý  11  11  ý-.............  .  I- 
975  1990  Law  on  Enterprises,  articles  27(6)  and  37(2). 
-315- "incorporate"  based  on  a  registration  regime  and  a  law  of  groups  based  on  ownership  interests 
rather  than  administrative  mechanisms.  Under  this  novostroika,  the  uniquely  Soviet  ownership 
regime  of  the  socialist  state  enterprise  and  the  creation  of  a  different  type  of  juridical  person 
for  each  different  identity  of  owner  (including  one  for  foreign  persons)  would  have 
disappeared.  Any  person  would  be  given  the  right  to  own  in  whole  or  part  any  domestic 
juridical  person  and  would  have  had  the  right  to  control  its  activities  through  the  legal 
mechanisms  peculiar  to  its  governance  regime.  Stand  alone  legislation  could  have  been  used  to 
provide  additional  rules,  advantages  and  procedures  governing  foreign  investment. 
The  1990  reforms  did  indeed  have  a  radical  element  to  them  as  they  evidenced  the 
development  of  a  regulated  market  based  on  profit  and  the  erosion  of  the  unitary  state.  As  has 
been  showed,  the  1990  Ownership  Law  not  only  confirmed  the  retreat  of  the  state  from  its 
monopoly  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  but  also  introduced  certain  new  principles 
into  the  regime  of  civil  law  and  juridical  persons,  namely  the  principle  of  equivalence,  the 
permissive  regime,  and  the  rule  of  law.  Each  of  these  principles  was  further  enunciated  in  the 
976  1990  Law  on  Enterprises.  In  particular,  despite  the  fact  that  the  state  retained  under  that  law 
a  wide  possibility  for  intervention,  the  law  generally  went  on  to  provide  for  the  right  of  suit 
against  the  state  should  any  agency  excee  its  competence.  977 
However,  as  has  been  argued,  although  the  economic  realities  had  moved  radically  towards 
embracing  the  market,  the  new  legal  constitution  as  set  out  in  the  1990  reforms  held  back  and 
instead  retained  an  underlying  structure  that  was  indebted  to  socialist  understandings.  The 
generic  owner  was  deconstructed  and  undermined  by  the  regime  of  "forms  of  ownership" 
based  on  the  identity  principle.  While  during  this  time  the  economic  reforms  openly  leapt 
towards  the  market  model,  the  new  legal  framework  for  the  industrial  organisation  actually 
retreated  back  to  the  confirmation  regime.  The  generic  industrial  enterprise  of  1990  looked 
more  like  an  enterprise  of  the  confirmation  model  than  any  juridical  person  that  had  been 
introduced  since  1987. 
The  development  of  the  market  economy  required  a  generic  owner  concept,  required  a 
developed  understanding  of  the  ownership  interest  of  the  juridical  person,  required  the 
976  On  the  principle  of  equivalence,  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises  was  predicated  upon  regulating  the  generic 
enterprise  "irrespective  of  the  form  of  ownership",  a  principle  noted  in  various  places  (see  preamble, 
articles  l(l),  4(l)  and  31(l)).  On  the  principle  of  the  permissive  regime,  the  1990  Law  on  Enterprises 
explicitly  provided  that  "an  enterprise  may  engage  in  individual  types  of  economic  activity  if  they  are  not 
prohibited  by  legislative  acts"  (article  1(3)  and  was  noted  in  the  context  of  many  other  provisions  (see 
articles  2(4),  9(2),  10(3),  18(l),  (2),  (4)  and  24(l)). 
977  On  the  right  to  take  action  against  state  agencies  exceeding  their  competences,  see  articles  5(4),  6(3),  13, 
30(l),  (2)  and  32(2). 
-316- introduction  of  equity  capital  and  a  juridical  person  perceived  as  a  vehicle  in  the  first  instance 
for  the  elaboration  of  the  interests  of  its  owners,  without  a  wider  social  role.  There  was  no 
doubt  that  the  economic  base  would  prevail,  but  the  expression  of  the  aspirations  of  that 
economy  would  be  forced  to  operate  within  a  constitution  uniquely  unsuited  to  its  demands 
and  as  such  would  lead  to  a  law  on  enterprises  that  was  confused,  lacking  in  clarity  and 
devoid  of  a  coherent  and  sound  footing  which  fundamentally  distorted  and  misunderstood  the 
nature  of  the  juridical  person  and  its  place  within  the  civil  law  system. 
The  choice  of  Perestroika  rather  than  novostroika  was  fundamental  in  the  development  of  the 
law  of  juridical  persons  and  the  ownership  regime,  not  just  for  the  Soviet  Union,  but  for  the 
subsequent  regimes  of  its  republics  after  becoming  independent  states  at  the  end  of  1991.  For 
despite  the  fact  that  numerous  legislation,  waves  of  reforms  and  entire  new  codes  have  been 
enacted  over  the  10  year  period  since  1991,  the  basic  law  on  ownership  (including  in  the 
Russian  Federation)  continues  to  be  structured  upon  the  logic  of  the  socialist  forms  of 
ownership  regime  based  on  the  identity  principle.  And  so  the  legacy  of  the  new  economic 
constitution  of  Spring  1990  seems  to  have  endured,  and  with  it  the  latent  questions  and 
problems  for  the  regulation  of  a  market  economy  and  in  particular  the  law  of  the  industrial 
organisation. 
-317- 8.  CONCLUSIONS 
"Even  so,  we  should  speak  not  of  darkness 
but  of  a  somewhat  blurred  light  1F 
Michel  Foucault 
The  specific  "conclusions"  of  this  thesis  have  already  been  set  out  in  the  "Short  Thesis,, 
introduction.  In  summary,  this  study  presents  a  "history"  of  the  foundation  of  the  law  on 
industrial  organisations  covering  the  period  from  1985  to  spring  1990  and  thereby  offers  a 
teleological  doctrinal  explanation  and  understanding  of  the  1990  economic  constitution  that 
formalised  the  demise  of  the  Stalin  command  economy.  While  there  are  a  number  of 
theoretical  strands  that  comprise  "the  thesis",  looking  back  on  the  study  as  a  whole,  it  seems 
that  the  central  arguments  are  predicated  upon  three  core  "conclusions".  I  do  not  believe  that 
any  of  these  conclusions  have  been  advanced  before  in  the  literature  of  this  area,  either  in 
Russia  or  outside,  and  as  such,  I  acknowledge  they  remain  controversial.  I  hope  however  that 
although  each  is  implicit  throughout  this  work,  they  "emerge  from  within"  both  as  logically 
argued  and  broadly  coherent: 
The  first  is  the  significance  of  "other  branches"  of  law  in  the  theoretical  history  of  the 
development  of  the  industrial  organisation  from  1985.  These  include  the  law  of  collective 
farms,  the  law  of  contract  (in  particular  the  contract  for  joint  activity  and  lease  contract)  and 
foreign  relations  law  (in  particular  the  law  on  joint  enterprises). 
The  second  is  the  importance  of  Spring  1990  as  the  point  at  which  the  "foundation"  of  the  new 
law  on  industrial  organisations  was  finally  constituted,  framed  by  a  new  constitution  for  the 
economy  and  its  actors,  and  promulgated  pursuant  to  the  1990  Ownership  Law  and  1990  Law 
on  Enterprises. 
The  third  is  that  both  traditional  Soviet  law,  as  well  as  the  new  economic  constitution  of  1990, 
did  not  contain  a  developed  understanding  of  the  concept  of  the  ownership  of  a  juridical 
person  or  "the  nature  of  the  ownership  interest".  Through  the  retention  of  the  construct  of  the 
"forms  of  ownership",  a  socialist  underlying  doctrinal  orientation  to  the  law  on  industrial 
organisations  was  ensured;  and  the  law  remained  insufficient  to  regulate  precisely  and 
comprehensively  the  new  industrial  organisations  with  fragmented  ownership  and  equity 
investment.  For  this  reason,  their  characterisation  in  Soviet  law  as  "enterprises",  rather  than 
"companies  ",  accurately  reflected  their  juridical  status. 
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foundation  of  juridical  persons  for  the  period  from  the  early  days  of  perestroika  to  circa  1995 
(the  time  when  the  former  USSR  republics  began  to  enact  new  civil  codes  that  consolidated 
the  piecemeal  legislation  adopted  to  date).  I  wanted  to  encompass  not  just  all-union  legislation 
but  also  the  legislation  of  each  of  the  former  republics  for  that  period.  I  was  already  familiar 
with  much  of  the  relevant  provisions  of  Soviet  law,  as  well  as  the  Russian  and  Kazakh  law  of 
this  period.  My  research  first  took  me  to  each  of  the  Central  Asian  republics,  and  starting  in 
June  1994,1  spent  several  weeks  at  each  of  the  Ministries  of  Justice  in  Kazakhstan,  TaJikistan, 
Kirgizstan,  Uzbekistan  and  Turkmenistan.  I  then  visited  the  Ministry  of  Justice  in  Belorussia 
and was  intending  next  to  go  to  the  Ukraine.  From  each  trip  I  returned  with  many  books  and 
binders  of  legislation  and  photocopies  of  all  laws  and  subordinate  legislation  directly  and 
indirectly  related  to  the  law  of  juridical  persons  for  the  period  from  1985  to  the  date  of  my 
particular  visit.  Much  of  this  material  had  been  classified  as  "for  internal  use  only",  "not  for 
copying"  or  "secret". 
As  I  developed  my  understanding  of  the  law  of  juridical  persons,  I  began  to  realise  how  much 
of  its  origins  lay  in  the  politics  and  law  of  the  1920s  and  1930s.  At  that  time  my  knowledge  of 
the  early  part  of  Soviet  history  generally  was  rather  sketchy.  And  so  my  research  then  took 
me  briefly  back  to  the  law  and  history  of  the  NEP  era  and  the  first  five-year  plan.  As  I 
immersed  myself  in  the  political  history  of  the  early  years  of  Soviet  power,  I  began  to 
appreciate  the  fundamental  distinction  that  was  drawn  by  the  Tsarist  regime,  and  by  Lenin  and 
his  successors,  between  the  "proletariat"  and  the  "peasant",  and  more  generally  between 
"industry"  and  "agriculture".  I  began  to  see  how  this  distinction  came  to  be  expressed  even 
through  to  the  Soviet  law  of  the  early  1980s  that  classified  civil  law  and  the  legal  status  of 
state  enterprises  as  entirely  separate  from  collective  farm  law  and  collective  farms.  I  still  have 
yet  to  come  across  an  example  of  a  legal  textbook  that  considered,  or  considers,  industrial 
organisations  and  agricultural  organisations  under  the  same  section  or  the  same  cover. 
Further  research  on  civil  law  and  collective  farm  law  of  the  later  Soviet  period  followed.  As 
the  scope  of  my  research  became  broader,  my  understanding  of  this  area  of  law  became 
deeper  and  more  precise.  First,  I  concluded  that  this  study  should  be  restricted  to  the  law  on 
industrial  organisations;  but  secondly  I  realised  that  in  order  to  understand  their  development  I 
would  need  to  draw  upon  influences  from  outside  the  narrow  "law  on  industrial  domestic 
organisations"  as  constituted  by  traditional  Soviet  law  which  drew  sharp  formal  distinctions 
between  juridical  persons  and  contract,  between  civil  law  and  foreign  relations  law,  and 
between  industry  and  agriculture.  I  began  by  considering  the  simple  partnership  of  the  1922 
RSFSR  Civil  Code  which  was  the  Soviet  successor  to  the  pre-revolutionary  artel  and  was  the 
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understand  the  place  of  the  1987  joint  enterprises  as  creatures  of  domestic  civil  law.  And  most 
surprisingly  (to  me)  I  began  to  see  parallels  between  the  collective  farm  law  of  the  1930s  and 
the  1987  State  Enterprise  Law,  as  well  as  (perhaps  less  surprisingly)  the  1988  Cooperatives 
Law. 
Having  defined  the  boundaries  and  scope  of  this  study  in  terms  of  "branches  of  law",  I  then 
turned  my  attention  to  the  periodisation.  I  had  already  amassed  vast  rooms  of  legislation  and 
secondary  materials  on  all-union  and  union  republic  law  before  it  became  self-evident  that  a 
study  encompassing  the  law  of  all  of  the  republics  would  go  well  beyond  the  confines  of  a 
single  thesis.  I  then  knew  that  much  of  this  research  would  never  appear  directly  in  this  study, 
however  it  would  not  have  been  possible  to  have  defined  the  limits  of  this  study,  and  indeed 
write  a  meaningful  history  to  a  particular  point,  without  a  broad  understanding  of  what  came 
afterwards.  I  decided  to  begin  to  write  the  outlines  of  the  first  few  Chapters  hoping  to  be  led 
to  wherever  the  logic  of  the  models  took  me.  I  was  familiar  with  "theories"  of  periodisation 
and  had  over  the  course  of  my  research  encountered  a  number  of  attempts  at  periodisation  in 
the  secondary  literature  both  of  the  Soviet  period  generally  and  also  of  the  Gorbachev  years 
specifically.  These  have  been  noted  in  the  footnotes  and  the  body  of  the  preceding  Chapters, 
as  appropriate.  I  knew  how  easy  it  was  to  be  seduced  into  writing  history  by  reference  to 
"landmark"  political  events  and  the  allure  of  ending  this  study  with  the  demise  of  the  Soviet 
Union  in  December  1991  was  great.  I  wanted  however  to  devise  a  periodisation  from  within 
the  logic  of  the  subject  matter  of  the  thesis,  by  reference  primarily  to  endogenous  criteria.  In 
this  regard,  I  found  Eric  Hobsbawm's  refusal  to  be  led  by  the  "obvious"  periodisation  in  his 
histories  of  the  "long  nineteenth  century"  (1789-1914)  and  the  "short  twentieth  century" 
(1914-1991)  particularly  liberating.  Eventually  I  was  driven  by  three  considerations: 
economic,  political  and  legal. 
Gorbachev  in  his  "Memoirs"  noted  1990  as  the  date  for  the  commencement  of  the  final  stage 
of  perestroika,  and  it  is  broadly  accepted  that  1990  marked  the  start  of  the  most  radical  phase 
of  economic  reforms  aimed  at  introducing  market  mechanisms  into  the  Soviet  economy.  This 
was  evidenced  by  the  debates  over  the  1990  budget  and  the  publication  of  various  competing 
economic  plans  and  programmes  prescribing  the  necessary  steps  and  stages  along  the  path 
ahead. 
At  a  political  level,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  revolutions  in  Eastern  Europe  of  the  previous  year, 
1990  saw  the  independence  movements  within  the  Soviet  Union  itself  become  more  acute. 
Soviet  tanks  were  mobilised  after  the  Lithuanian  parliament  on  11  March  voted  almost 
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nationalist  tensions  throughout  the  USSR,  and  between  August  and  October,  10  of  the  16 
autonomous  republics  of  the  RSFSR  declared  their  sovereignty.  1990  was  the  year  when  a 
new  political  settlement  of  the  USSR  moved  from  being  a  question  of  "if"  to  a  question  of 
"when",  and  the  first  draft  of  a  new  treaty  was  presented  for  public  discussion  by  Gorbachev 
on  23  November. 
Both  the  economic  and  the  political  were  reflected  in  the  legal  framework  of  1990.  Up  until 
1990  perestroika  had  developed  almost  exclusively  through  all-union  legislation.  In  the  area  of 
industrial  organisations,  various  pieces  of  legislation  had  been  adopted  that  introduced  in  an 
apparently  ad  hoc  way  a  series  of  "new"  juridical  persons.  In  1990  two  generic  pieces  of 
legislation  were  enacted  at  the  all-union  level:  the  1990  Ownership  Law  and  1990  Law  on 
Enterprises.  As  has  been  argued,  I  gradually  came  to  see  these  two  laws  as  "new 
constitutions"  for  the  Soviet  economy  and  moreover  as  the  culminating  legislation  of  the 
"founding  stage"  of  the  new  law  on  industrial  organisations.  After  spring  1990  the  economic, 
political  and  legal  forces  fragmented  the  "centre"  of  the  Soviet  state,  relocating  it  among  the 
republics.  Different  economic  plans  for  different  republics  were  devised,  different  political 
aspirations  were  aired  and  different  legislation  was  adopted.  In  late  1990  "the  war  of  laws" 
commenced  and  the  republics  began  to  ignore  the  restraints  of  all-union  law  and  adopted 
legislation  on  the  basis  of  their  "own"  politics.  The  law  of  juridical  persons  of  the  different 
republics  dates  not  to  their  formal  independence  in  December  1991  but  to  their  actual 
independence  seized  during  the  months  of  late  1990.  Thus,  for  example,  when  the  RSFSR 
became  a  new  independent  state  (the  Russian  Federation)  at  the  end  of  1991,  that  state  had 
already  adopted  its  own  constitution  (which  had been  amended  several  times  since  1990),  and 
its  own  land  code,  and  laws  on  ownership,  privatisation,  enterprises  and  entrepreneurial 
activity,  competition,  investment  activity,  foreign  investments,  and  a  statute  on  joint  stock 
societies  -  all  were  enactments  passed  during  the  period  between  1990  and  1991.  This  republic 
legislation  of  1990-1991  was  not  based  on  the  restrictions  in  the  prevailing  all-union 
legislation  of  that  time,  but  instead  proceeded  from  and was  constructed  upon  the  foundations 
forged  by  the  all-union  legislation  of  the  previous  perestroika  reforms  of  the  period  from  1985 
to  1990.  The  all-union  1990  March  Constitutional  Amendments,  1990  Ownership  Law  and 
1990  Law  on  Enterprises  were  the  final  consolidating  framework  marking  the  de  facto  end  of 
the  supremacy  of  all-union  legislation.  It  therefore  seemed  appropriate  to  end  at  that  point  a 
study  based  on  all-union  law  and  focused  on  the  foundations  of  the  new  law  on  industrial 
organisations. 
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would  inevitably  present  an  entirely  new  history  of  the  subject.  However,  what  I  regard  as  the 
most  novel  and  critical  element  of  that  history  developed  later  and  rather  unexpectedly.  I  had 
always  sought  to  conceptualise  and  practise  Soviet  law  "from  within  the  assumptions  of  that 
system".  This  I  saw  as  a  strength,  for  it  is  always  the  challenge  of  the  comparativist  to  enter 
into  the  mindset  of  his  subject.  However  in  the  development  of  the  models  presented  in  this 
study  and  in  the  construction  of  the  general  framework,  I  was  determined  also  to  think  outside 
the  systemic  constraints  of  Soviet  law  by  reference  to  abstract  theory  as  opposed  to  within  the 
logic  of  the  text.  As  the  models  evolved,  so  my  thinking  took  me  to  unexpected  places.  I 
assumed  however  that  I  had  reached  the  limits  of  my  analysis  through  the  incorporation  of  the 
law  of  contract,  foreign  relations  law  and  collective  farm  law.  However  in  the  elaboration  of 
each  model  I  was  continually  taken  back  to  the  law  on  ownership.  I  had  always  been  uneasy 
about  the  doctrine  of  "forms  of  ownership"  in  a  market  economy  context  but  was  never  sure 
why.  I  was  familiar  with  the  various  debates  in  academe  about  the  nature  of  the  ownership 
interest  of  the  post-Soviet  juridical  persons  but  had  never  generalised  or  abstracted  beyond  the 
specifics  of  those  debates. 
The  writing  of  my  thesis  was  very  far  developed  before  I  finally  understood  with  clarity  the 
principal  shortcoming  of  the  Soviet  law  on  ownership.  I  believe  my  myopia  was  due  in  part  to 
the  skill  of  Venediktov  and  others  in  constructing  a  "coherent"  law  on  ownership  for  a 
command  economy  without  the  necessity  of  tackling  what  was  in  all  other  economic  systems  a 
keystone  concept  in  this  area  of  law,  namely  the  question  of  the  ownership  "of"  a  juridical 
person  and  the  nature  of  "the  ownership  interest". 
Once  identified,  I  began  to  re-read  much  of  the  source  material  that  I  had  already  read  so 
many  times  previously  in  an  attempt  to  identify  any  clues  as  to  the  legal  nature  of  the  state's 
ownership  interest  of  a  state  enterprise,  and as  to  who,  if  anyone,  "owned"  a  collective  farm. 
Neither  of  these  questions  were  posed  anywhere  in  that  material,  nor  in  any  other  works  that  I 
had  encountered.  There  seemed  to  be  an  almost  hypnotic  silence  -  an  absence  so  obvious  that 
it  was  constantly  overlooked.  As  I  played  with  this  idea,  I  came  to  realise  that  it  was  the  mask 
of  the  regime  of  "forms  of  ownership"  that  obscured  the  identification  of  the  absence  of  this 
concept.  Looking  back  upon  the  Chapters  I  had  already  written,  I  saw  that  the  law  during  the 
late  1980s  eroded  one-by-one  the  tenets  of  the  confirmation  model,  but  that  the  forms  of 
ownership  regime  based  on  the  identity  principle  always  remained,  and  with  it  an  incomplete 
understanding  of  the  significance  and  nature  of  the  ownership  interest  of  the  juridical  person. 
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came  to  see  the  tension  latent  in  the  drafting  of  the  new  constitution  of  1990  -a  tension 
between  the  generic  owner  and  the  "forms  of  ownership  regime".  I  then  understood  that  the 
year  1990  had  presented  the  possibility  for  novostroika,  and  that  legislators  had  recoiled, 
opting  instead  for  a  framework  that  "acknowledged"  a  new  economy  but  that  was  rooted  in 
traditional  socialist  understandings.  With  an  eye  on  the  period  after  1990,  it  was  apparent  that 
the  retention  of  this  socialist  framework  was  in  part  responsible  for  the  "strange"  classification 
of  juridical  persons;  was  in  part  "responsible"  for  the  bifurcation  in  the  law  of  juridical 
persons  between  "foreign  investment  juridical  persons"  and  "domestic  juridical  persons" 
(embodied  in  the  subsequent  legislation  on  foreign  investment);  and  most  importantly  was  in 
part  responsible  for  retarding  a  comprehensive  and  coherent  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the 
ownership  interests  of  different  juridical  persons,  and  ultimately  of  the  juridical  person  itself. 
The  drafting  of  future  legislation  in  this  area  was  strained  and  contorted  due  to  the  mismatch 
between  the  practical  demands  of  a  market  economy  and  the  socialist  doctrinal  principles 
underlying  the  positive  law  framework  of  the  "new"  law  on  ownership. 
All  studies  and  all  histories  must  of  course  be  limited  by  scope,  periodisation  and  content. 
And  in  the  context  of  this  study,  they  have  been  carefully  chosen,  constructed  and  argued  in 
an  attempt  to  put  forward  certain  alternative  understandings.  It  is  only  hoped,  when  the 
history  of  the  law  on  industrial  organisations  of  the  former  republics  after  1990  is  eventually 
written,  or  when  lawyers  struggle  to  make  sense  of  current  legislation  in  the  former  republics, 
that  in  some  small  way,  the  insights,  ideas  and  theories  offered  by  this  study  can  be  of  help  in 
shining  a  light  and  casting  shadows  where  previously  there  may  have  been  darkness. 
Stephen  Lucas  -  April  2002 
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Abbreviations 
The  following  abbreviations  are  used  in  this  study: 
1.  Constitutions,  Fundamental  Principles  and  Codes 
1918  RSFSR  Constitution: 
1922  RSFSR  CrimC: 
1922  RSFSR  Civil  Code: 
1922  RSFSR  Land  Code: 
1924  USSR  Constitution: 
1924  FPCrimL: 
iKonstitutsiya  (Osnovnoi  Zakon)  RSFSR  (1918). 
Ugolovnyii  Kodeks  RSFSR  (1922). 
Grazhdanskii  Kodeks  RSFSR  (1922). 
Zemel'nyi  Kodeks  RSFSR  (1922). 
Osnovnoi  Zakon  (Konstitutsya)  SSSR  (1924). 
Osnovnykh  Nachal  Ugolovnogo  Zakonodatel'stvo  Soyuza  SSR 
i  Soyuzniky  Respublik  (1924). 
Stalin  Constitution:  Konstitutsiya  (Osnovnoi  Zakon)  SSSR  (1936). 
1960  RSFSR  CrimC:  Ugolovnyii  Kodeks  RSFSR  (1960). 
1961  FPCivL:  Osnovi  Grazhdanskogo  Zakonodatel'stvo  Soyuza  SSR  i 
Soyuznikh  Respublik  (1961). 
Kaz  CC:  Grazhdanskii  Kodeks  Kazakhskoi  SSR  (1964). 
RSFSR  CC:  Grazhdanskii  Kodeks  RSFSR  (1964). 
Kaz  CCP:  Grazhdanskii  Protsessial'nyi  Kodeks  Kazakhskoi  SSR  (1964). 
RSFSR  CCP:  Grazhdanskii  Protsessial'nyi  Kodeks  RSFSR  (1964). 
1968  FPLand:  Osnovy  Zemel'nogo  Zakonodatel'stvo  Soyuza  SSR  i  Soyuznikh 
Respublik  (1968). 
Brezhnev  Constitution:  Konstitutsiya  (Osnovnoi  Zakon)  SSSR  (1977). 
FPLease:  Osnovy  Zakonodatel'stvo  Soyuza  SSR  i  Soyuznikh  Respublik 
ob  Arende  (1989). 
1990  FPLand:  Osnovy  Zakonodatel'stvo  Soyuza  SSR  i  Soyuznikh  Respublik  o 
Zernle  (1990). 
1990  FPInvA:  Osnovy  Investitsionii  Deyatel'nosti  v  SSSR  (1990). 
1991  FPCivL:  Osnovy  Grazhdanskogo  Zakonodatel'stva  SSSR  i  Respublik 
(1991). 
1991  FPForInv:  Osnovy  Innostranii  Investitsii  v  SSSR  (1991). 
1994  RSFSR  CC:  Grazhdanskii  Kodeks  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  (Chast'  Pervaya, 
1994;  Chast'  Vtoraya,  1996). 
2.  Laws 
State  Enterprise  Law:  0  Gosudarstvennom  Predpriyatii  (Obedinenii)  (1987). 
Cooperatives  Law:  0  Kooperatsii  v  SSSR  (1988). 
1990  Law  on  Enterprises:  0  Predpriyatiyakh  v  SSSR  (1990). 
1990  Ownership  Law:  0  Sobstvennosti  v  SSSR  (1990). 
-324- 3.  Dekrets,  Decrees,  Statutes  and  Edicts 
1923  Trusts  Dekret:  Dekret  o  Gosudarstvennykh  Promyshlennykh  Predpriyatiyakh, 
Deistvuyushchikh  no  Nachalakh  Kommercheskogo  Rascheta 
(Trestakh)  (1923). 
1927  Trusts  Dekret:  Polozhenie  Gosudarstvennykh  Promyshlennykh  Trestakh 
(1927). 
1927  Joint-Stock  Societies 
Statute:  Polozhenie  ob  Aktsionemykh  Obshchestvakh  (1927). 
1935  Artel  Charter:  Primemye  Ustav  Sel'skokhozyaistvennoi  Arteli  (1935). 
Enterprise  Statute:  Polozhenie  0  Sotsialisticheskorn  Gosudarstvennom 
Proizvodstvennom  Predpriyatii  (1965). 
1969  Collective  Farm  Charter:  Prirnemyi  Ustav  Kolkhoza  (1969) 
Industrial  Association  Statute:  Obshchego  Polozheniya  o  Vsesoyuznom  i  Respublikanskom 
Promyshlennykh  Ob''edineniyakh  (1973). 
Production  Association  Statute:  Polozheniya  o  Proizvodstvennom  Ob"edinenii  (Kombinate) 
(1974). 
Decree  48:  0  Poryadke  Sozdaniya  na  Territorii  SSSR  i  Deyatel'nosti 
Sovmestnykh  Predpriyatii,  Mezhdunarodnykh  Ob''edinenii  i 
Organizatsii  SSSR  i  Drugikh  Stran  -  Chlenov  SEV  (1987). 
Decree  49:  0  Poryadke  Sozdaniya  na  Territorii  SSSR  i  Deyatel'nosti 
Sovmestnykh  Predpriyatii  s  Uchastiem  Sovetskikh  Organizatsii 
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